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does not become obstinate, so long as the husband makes no effort to induce her return to a home freed from the contentious element."

The facts and the conclusion, together with the reasons therefor, were stated by the court in Benscoter v. Benscoter (1909) 20 Pa. Dist. R. 349, 37 Pa. Co. Ct. 276, as follows: "The evidence shows that the libellant took his wife and lived with her in the home of his parents; that this mode of life was disagreeable to her, and that she was and is willing to live with him whenever he shall furnish a suitable home for her apart from his parents. . There is no obliga

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tion on the part of the wife to live with her husband's parents, and to be in subjection to a mother-in-law who thinks she ought to have the house, and who expects to manage it as long as she lives. The husband is in duty bound to provide for his wife. a separate home, and to furnish it in a manner suitable to his station in life. He is morally bound to 'leave his father and mother and cleave unto his wife,' and we think that the testimony shows him to have sadly failed in the fulfilment of the obligation which he assumed at the time of his marriage. We hold that the wife was justified in withdrawing from his father's home, and remaining apart from her husband until he shall provide her a suitable, independent home, and that in so doing she is not guilty of wilful and malicious desertion, as required by the divorce laws of this commonwealth."

The holding in McCampbell v. McCampbell (1916) 64 Pa. Super. Ct. 143, was to the effect that a wife was not guilty of desertion where she left her father-in-law's home, in which they were living, on the refusal of her husband to provide a home separate from his relatives, who made it unpleasant there. The court said: "The appellant failed to present a case of wilful and malicious desertion. The respondent declared her desire to live with her husband in a home of their own, and only objected to a residence in a room in the home of his father. No effort was made to

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procure any other place, nor did the complainant take any steps to modify the conditions existing there, or to relieve the mind of his wife in regard to the discomfort she experienced.

. The evidence shows his income to be sufficient to maintain a home. His disposition to assist in maintaining his father's home is creditable to him, but his first obligation is to his wife and child, and it is at least due to her that he make an effort to create a situation which will have a tendency to make their married life happy."

In Coulter v. Coulter (1913) 175 Mo. App. 1, 161 S. W. 281, which was an action for support and maintenance by the wife, the husband defending on the ground of desertion, it appeared that the wife had left the home provided for her because it was with her husband's mother, who would not allow the family of the wife to come to the house. While the decision in favor of the wife was based on the consent of the husband to his wife's living elsewhere, the court said: "It is still the law in this state that the wife is bound to follow the fortunes of her husband, and to live where he chooses to live, and in the style and manner he may adopt.' . But this rule

is not intended to make the wife the slave of her husband, nor to give him the right to subject her to avoidable indignities. The duty of a wife to forsake her family and cleave to her husband is no greater nor more sacred than the corresponding duty of the husband. Neither spouse has the right to demand in wantonness or mere caprice the estrangement of the other from his or her parents. For a husband to take his wife where she is unreasonably denied the privilege of seeing members of her own family, who are of good repute, would be an indignity no faithful husband would visit upon his wife."

In Albee v. Albee (1891) 43 Ill. App. 370, affirmed in (1892) 141 Ill. 550, 31 N. E. 153, it was held not to be desertion for a wife to refuse to live in the house of her mother-in-law, with whom she did not get along pleasantly. As to the effect of an antenuptial agreement to live there, the court said:

"Much stress is laid on the fact that before the marriage she agreed to live at his mother's house. Such an antenuptial contract is of no force; all such promises are merged and obliterated by the marriage contract, which bound the husband to leave father and mother and cleave to his wife.'"

In Dailey's Appeal (1881) 10 W. N. C. (Pa.) 420, it was held to be constructive desertion for a husband to allow his mother to drive his wife from the house, and not to provide any other home for her.

It has been held that a wife who, after leaving her husband, informed him by letter that she was compelled to take the step because of serious quarrels with his mother, and invited him to come to see her, was not guilty of wilful desertion. Edwards v. Edwards (1905) 69 N. J. Eq. 522, 61 Atl. 531.

It is held in the reported case (HOFFHINES v. HOFFHINES, ante, 332) that the refusal of a wife to live with her husband's parents does not constitute desertion, where the husband, though financially able, refuses to provide a home separate from his relatives, with whom she cannot live happily.

In Young v. Young (1920) 136 Md. 84, 110 Atl. 207, it was held that a wife was not guilty of desertion where it appeared that she left home because she could not live happily with her husband's parents, and he failed to provide a separate home for her, although he was financially able to do

So.

It was held in Marshak v. Marshak (1914) 115 Ark. 51, L.R.A.1915E, 161, 170 S. W. 567, Ann. Cas. 1916E, 206, that the refusal of a wife to live with her husband's parents was not desertion, where she was unable to live there happily, and her husband, though financially able, failed to accede to her requests to live somewhere else. It appeared that the plaintiff and defendant, after their marriage, went to live with the aged parents of the plaintiff. During the two years' residence there the defendant was abused, and not permitted to take charge of the home as its exclusive

mistress, free from domination of outsiders. The defendant finally left and returned to the home of her parents. She expressed her willingness to live with her husband if he would provide a home separate and apart from that of his parents, but refused to return to his parents' home. The plaintiff brought action for divorce on the ground of desertion. The court, in dismissing the complaint, said: "It is apparent from the record that the defendant could not get along with the plaintiff's parents, and that their relations were unfriendly and unpleasant. We do not think the defendant left her husband because she did not desire to live with him, but, on the contrary, she left him because she was not able to live happily in the home of his parents. There was no necessity for her to live there. The plaintiff was a strong, able-bodied young man, and was able to provide her a home at another place. Under the circumstances, we think a just and affectionate husband should have listened to the pleadings of his wife, and should not have arbitrarily confronted her with a decision of either living unhappily with him at his parents' home, or living separate and apart from him at another place."

In Mossa v. Mossa (1908) 123 App. Div. 400, 107 N. Y. Supp. 1044, the insistence of the husband that the wife should live with his parents, with whom she could not agree, was, in connection with other circumstances, held to be constructive desertion by the husband.

In Buckner v. Buckner (1912) 118 Md. 101, 84 Atl. 156, Ann. Cas. 1914B,. 628, it appeared to be assumed that a wife might be justified in deserting her husband, where he required her to live with his daughters by a former marriage, if their discourtesy and antagonism were such as to render her life miserable; but it was held that the evidence did not show that the acts of discourtesy were sufficiently serious to entitle her to demand a separation of the father from his daughters as a condition of the resumption of the marital relation, where she entered into the marriage with knowledge that

the husband would not give up his daughters, as she proposed, and with appreciation of their sensitiveness to her presence in the household in the place of their deceased mother.

In Hall v. Hall (1881) 9 Or. 452, similar treatment of a wife by the husband's daughters by a former marriage was held to entitle the wife to a divorce for cruelty, the court saying, as to the husband's responsibility therefor: "All these facts were within his knowledge, and he either could not, or would not, control his daughters, or comply with his wife's request to send them away, or make other provision for them. In our judgment, the appellant, by this course, adopted the responsibility of their misconduct towards his wife, and made their cruel and humiliating treatment his own. And we think, in connection with his own defaults in the discharge of marital duties, it was sufficient to render the respondent's life burdensome, and that there is sufficient ground to believe that such was its effect."

It has been held that there is no desertion where a husband consents to his wife living apart from him after she refuses to live with her stepchildren. Day v. Day (1892) 84 Iowa, 221, 50 N. W. 979.

In Davis v. Davis (1887) 86 Ky. 32, 4 S. W. 822, it was held not to be desertion for a wife to leave home, where the daughters of her husband by a former marriage were kept by him in the home, and there lived lewd and immoral lives.

In Hacker v. Hacker (1895) 90 Wis. 325, 63 N. W. 278, the leaving of home by a wife was held to be justified by mistreatment of her by sons of the husband, in connection with acts of cruelty by the husband himself.

It was said in Wright v. Wright (1899) N. J. Eq. 43 Atl. 462, that "the general rule that the wife must accept such a home as a husband can afford to give her, and partake of his poverty, does not go so far, in my judgment, as to hold that the defendant here was bound to live with her husband's mother and sister under circumstances which she believed were injurious to her health, and which did

not, so far as regards her husband's pecuniary means, appear to her, and do not appear to me, to render such living necessary."

There is no desertion where the husband consents to his wife leaving, after a quarrel with his sister, mother, and other relatives, with whom they are living. Lindenschmidt v. Lindenschmidt (1888) 29 Mo. App. 295; Coulter v. Coulter (1913) 175 Mo. App. 1, 161 S. W. 281.

In Shinn v. Shinn (1893) 51 N. J. Eq. 78, 24 Atl. 1022, it was held that a wife did not desert her husband by leaving him and refusing to return, because of her unwillingness to live as a boarder in the home of his relatives, all of whom treated her in a cool and formal manner. The court said: "All Mrs. Shinn desired was a home in which she could be mistress. This every wife is entitled to, and it is the duty of the husband to furnish one corresponding to his circumstances and condition in life. If it be admitted that Mrs. Shinn may not have been fully justified in leaving the place where she was boarding on the ground of cruelty, it is very clear that she almost immediately afterwards manifested not only a willingness, but a strong desire, to live with her husband as his wife, if he would provide a home for that purpose. It is equally clear to my mind that Mr. Shinn was convinced of this, and therefore insisted upon the condition that she must either come back to him and live with him as a boarder in the home of another, or in such a house so provided with the comforts of living as above indicated, but which, in my judgment, cannot be regarded as a home corresponding with Mr. Shinn's circumstances and condition in life."

In Hall v. Hall (1911) 69 W. Va. 175, 34 L.R.A. (N.S.) 758, 71 S. E. 104, the fact that the husband insisted on his wife living with an aged relative of his, with whom her relations were unpleasant, was adverted to in connection with other circumstances justifying her in leaving the home.

A husband is not guilty of deserting his wife where she refuses to follow him when he leaves the house of

her parents, after a quarrel between the husband and father-in-law. Mayer v. Mayer (1879) 30 N. J. Eq. 411. In that case it appeared that the plaintiff and defendant were living with the plaintiff's father, when the defendant was upbraided by his father-in-law for some trivial misconduct, and left at once, asking the plaintiff to go with him. She refused, and never thereafter offered to live with him.

Leaving his wife and his home in his father-in-law's house as a result of being told to go and not to return until he is able to support a wife, and not having any of his letters answered, does not constitute desertion. Sarson v. Sarson (1908) 74 N. J. Eq. 564, 70 Atl. 663. In support of its holding, the court said: "He was obliged to leave the house; he wrote to her and she refused to answer his letters, or to communicate with him in any way. How this could be desertion on the part of the husband I do not quite understand. The separation, certainly, was not, in the first instance, wilful on his part, for he was compelled to leave by his father-in-law."

A spouse, guilty of desertion in wrongfully leaving and refusing to live with the parents of the other spouse, ends the desertion by offering to return. Albee v. Albee (1892) 141 III. 550, 31 N. E. 153.

III. Leaving of home not justified. In Rodenbaugh V. Rodenbaugh (1894) 17 Pa. Co. Ct. 477, an action by a wife for divorce on the ground of desertion, it was held that the wife in leaving her husband because of unhappiness in living at her motherin-law's home was guilty of desertion, as the husband was not bound to furnish her a separate dwelling. According to the evidence the plaintiff and defendant went housekeeping with the defendant's mother. When the plaintiff complained that she could not get along with her mother-in-law, the defendant advised her that he had provided a home for her as good as he could afford, and that she could go if it did not suit her. Thereupon she left and brought this action. The court said: "The testimony shows that libel

lant left the house of respondent because of some trouble with her motherin-law and the family. He did not desert her. . . If she had good cause for leaving the house and home he had provided for her, she ought to be willing to live with him in a suitable house, and say so to him. She cannot say he deserted her when she left him."

The court in Jones v. Jones (1893) 55 Mo. App. 523, in holding that it was desertion for a wife to leave because of "snappish complaints" made by her mother-in-law, said: "The law is that it is the duty of the wife to share her husband's fortunes and to remain in his home, however humble, if it is all he can provide. . . . If the husband sees fit to invite members of his family to live with him, his wife cannot on that account leave his home. . The only conclusion to be drawn from all the evidence is that her abandonment of her husband's roof was caused merely by her dissatisfaction with her lot as wife. She had voluntarily assumed that relation. The highest interests of society forbade her to renounce it at will."

We

Similarly in Garrison v. Garrison (1907) 31 Ky. L. Rep. 1209, 104 S. W. 980, the court, while recognizing the general rule, held that the facts of the case did not bring the wife within the rule. The court said: "However, we are firmly of the opinion that the husband's first duty is to his wife. say this, recognizing to the fullest extent every obligation that the son owes to his parents. The husband, of course, has the right to select a home, but he has not the right to place his wife where she will be subjected to indignities and abuse. Let us see, then, whether or not appellant's charges are sufficiently sustained to justify her in leaving her husband. The only evidence of abuse and indignities offered appellant is the statement of a visitor that, upon the rare occasions she was at Mrs. Daniel Garrison's home, Mrs. Garrison's manner towards appellant was cold and distant; that at one time Mrs. Garrison locked the dining room door when appellant offered to get dinner; that at.

another time Mrs. Garrison rearranged the napkins and dishes which had been previously arranged by appellant; and that Mrs. Garrison told appellant she was a liar when appellant accused her of pilfering. These are the indignities and insults that were offered during a period of twentyeight years. A remarkable record, it seems to us, in view of the attitude which appellant assumed in her mother-in-law's home. It does not appear that appellant ever did her part in that home. Her manner does not show that consideration or respect, to say nothing of love, which are naturally due from the wife towards the aged parents of her husband. Simply because she was not called to breakfast, she lived in her own room for three years, and permitted a feeble woman past seventy years of age to cook her meals, and an old man of the same age to carry those meals upstairs to her. When a wife occupies that position in a household, and shows such utter indifference to the feelings of those around her, we do not see how she can justly complain of the mere fact that their manner is haughty or cold."

In Giese v. Giese (1903) 107 Ill. App. 659, the prevailing opinion, in holding the wife unjustified in deserting the husband, and therefore not entitled to separate maintenance, stated the facts to be that, against her wishes and request, the husband suffered the mother of his first wife to control the household; that the day after she (the wife) left, he wrote asking her to return, and that she replied that she would not live with him and his mother-inlaw, but would live with him and his daughter as soon as he obtained a home, and in the meantime they might live in her house-matters standing thus until the bill was filed. In the dissenting opinion, however, upholding the desertion, the judge recited these additional facts: "This woman [the mother-in-law] handled all the household funds, and would let the wife do nothing. She even went to the store and purchased clothing which she thought was suitable for the wife; and, when offended by something the wife did or said, for the last

three weeks the wife remained she did not speak to appellant." The dissenting opinion also criticized the trial court for not permitting the wife to show that, when she returned to the house in answer to the husband's letter, the mother-in-law took the wife's clothes and threw them in front of her, and told her to get out.

In Klein v. Klein (1906) 29 Ky. L. Rep. 1042, 96 S. W. 848, a wife was held to be guilty of desertion in leaving home after finding herself unable to live amicably with the husband's parents, where the husband was at the time trying to arrange for another home. In so ruling the court said: "The fact that appellant took his bride to the home of his parents is not to his discredit, nor should it militate against him. It was a comfortable home where she would be well provided for, and he had no cause to believe that the relations between his wife and his mother would not be agreeable, and it is in evidence that both he and his father were making reasonable efforts to procure another home when the untimely appearance of her father and his hasty action prevented the accomplishment of this purpose that would probably have resulted in the parties to this litigation continuing to live happily together as man and wife. The conduct and behavior of appellant's parents towards appellee was not of such a character that it could not have been borne by appellee, at least, until her husband could procure for her another home,—and under the circumstances it was her duty to have remained with her husband; and when she abandoned him to go with her father to his home in Wisconsin, and remained there for the statutory period, the appellant was entitled to a divorce on the ground it was sought."

A wife is not justified in leaving home because the husband insists on keeping as members of the family his children by a former marriage, aged four and twelve years, who treat the wife disrespectfully. Nickerson v. Nickerson (1898) 34 Or. 1, 48 Pac. 423, 54 Pac. 277.

It has been held that cruelty could

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