(1903) 89 App. Div. 211, 85 N. Y. Supp. 837.

In Sisson v. Havens (1914) 185 Ill. App. 263, the act of a tenant in locking a door in a hall through which another tenant had access to her apartment was held to be an act authorized by the landlord, where the only suggestion that he made when his tenant complained to him that she was deprived of such access was that she might go through his store on the first floor.

The landlord is answerable for interference with the means of ingress and egress established and in use at the time of the letting of an upper floor by the act of a tenant of the lower floor in transforming a stationary stairway into one that lifts up and out of the way of the lower tenant, and opens to use only at the will of the lower tenant. Lawrence v. Rapaport (1921) 213 Mich. 358, 181 N. W. 1011.

A landlord is liable to a tenant of upper floors for wrongful obstruction of light and air from a well or open space in the building by a chimney constructed by another tenant under the landlord's express authority, for the use of boilers in the basement. Case v. Minot (1893) 158 Mass. 577, 22 L.R.A. 536, 33 N. E. 700.

v. Commercial Union Assur. Co. (1907) 131 Ill. App. 248 (obiter); Lederer v. Fox (1909) 151 Ill. App. 300.

Kentucky.-Nunan v. Bennett (1919) 184 Ky. 591, 212 S. W. 570.

Maine.-McCarthy v. York County Sav. Bank (1883) 74 Me. 315, 43 Am. Rep. 591; Allen v. Smith (1884) 76 Me. 335; Leavitt v. Williams (1917) 116 Me. 347, L.R.A.1918A, 610, 102 Atl. 39.

Michigan. Kenny v. Barns (1887) 67 Mich. 336, 34 N. W. 587.

Minnesota. - Rosenfield v. Newman (1894) 59 Minn. 156, 60 N. W. 1085. Missouri. Sheridan V. Forsee (1904) 106 Mo. App. 495, 81 S. W. 494.

New York.-Eakin v. Brown (1850) 1 E. D. Smith, 36; Robbins v. Mount (1867) 4 Robt. 553, 33 How. Pr. 24; Dunn v. Robbins (1892) 65 Hun, 625, 48 N. Y. S. R. 45, 20 N. Y. Supp. 341; Citron v. Bayley (1899) 36 App. Div. 130, 55 N. Y. Supp. 382; Leonard v. Gunther (1900) 47 App. Div. 194, 62 N. Y. Supp. 99; Becker v. Bullowa (1901) 36 Misc. 524, 73 N. Y. Supp. 944; Brick v. Favilla (1906) 51 Misc. 550, 101 N. Y. Supp. 970, affirmed in (1907) 118 App. Div. 919, 103 N. Y. Supp. 1117.

North Carolina.-Rucker & S. Co. v. Willey (1917) 174 N. C. 42, 93 S. E. 379, 17 N. C. C. A. 115.

Utah. Pembroke Stationery Co. v. Rogers (1912) 41 Utah, 411, 125 Pac. 866.

Canada. Boily v. Vezina (1864) 14 Lower Can. Rep. (Dec. des Tribunaux) 325; Beaulieu v. Beaudry (1899). Rap. Jud. Quebec 16 C. S. 475.

It is immaterial that the faucet in the washbowl supplied by the landlord is not a self-closing one, or that the apertures in the bowl are insufficient to discharge the water delivered by the open faucet. McCarthy v. York County Sav. Bank (Me.) supra.

The act of a tenant on an upper floor in leaving faucets open on finding the water turned off, and not the act of the landlord in turning it on the next day, is the proximate cause of damage

to the tenant of the lower apartment by water. Nunan v. Bennett (Ky.)

supra.

A lessor who is in control of the water system of his building, and who has covenanted to repair, is liable for damages to the tenant of the lower floor, occasioned by the stoppage in the drainpipe and consequent overflow of a fountain cuspidor in a dentist's office. Rucker & S. Co. v. Willey (N. C.) supra.

One who maintains a water-closet for the accommodation of other tenants, and who had notice of its bad condition, is liable to a tenant of a lower floor for damage caused by its overflow, though such overflow was due to the act of persons who had thrown articles into it which obstructed it. Marshall v. Cohen (1871) 44 Ga. 489, 9 Am. Rep. 170.

Where a portion of the premises where bathtubs were situated was in the joint possession of the lessor and lessee, the lessor is liable to the lessee of a lower floor for injuries to his goods, caused by the tubs overflowing, although due to the negligence of the lessee in that portion of the premises where the tubs were located. Freidenburg v. Jones (1879) 63 Ga. 612, s. c. on subsequent appeal in (1881) 66 Ga. 505, 42 Am. Rep. 86.

In Center v. Davis (1869) 39 Ga. 210, the landlord was held liable for damage by water, due to the act of a tenant of the upper floor in throwing trash into a gutter by which water was carried off the roof, causing it to back up and leak through, where the accumulation of trash was due to a pass way built over the gutter by the landlord, upon the ground that it was the duty of the landlord to keep the premises rented to the plaintiff fit for use, and if, by obstructions placed there by himself and used by his tenant, such obstructions and the use thereof by his tenant rendered the plaintiff's premises unfit for the purpose for which they were rented, and damage to the plaintiff resulted therefrom, the landlord is liable therefor.

Although a landlord is not liable generally to a tenant for damages caused by the carelessness of other tenants in upper rooms of the building, yet if it appears that there was a continual wetting of the lower rooms, due to the carelessness of a cotenant, and such wetting was so great as to make the premises untenantable, an agreement on the part of the tenant to remain affords a sufficient consideration for a promise by the landlord to stop the leak and to pay the tenant of the lower floor for any damages sustained thereby. Dunn v. Robbins (1892) 48 N. Y. S. R. 45, 20 N. Y. Supp. 341.

i. Miscellaneous.

A lessor is not liable to a tenant for another tenant's negligence in the use of gasolene, in consequence of which the premises caught fire, where he did not know or have reason to believe, when he let the premises, that they would be used in such a way as would render such occupancy dangerous, or as would amount to a nuisance. Lewis v. Hughes (1888) 12 Colo. 208, 20 Pac. 621.

The landlord is liable for the destruction of the tenant's property by the collapse of the building, caused by its negligent alteration by another tenant, under permission of the landlord. Blickley v. Luce (1907) 148 Mich. 233, 111 N. W. 752.

Where a lessor, after leasing a flat on the ground floor of a building, put into the basement the necessary plumbing for doing laundry work, so that other tenants who chose to do so could do their laundry work there, and the fumes from the work came into the upper rooms, so as to make a disagreeable odor and dampness to such an extent that windows had to be opened and the health of the lessee's wife and children was threatened, there is a constructive eviction. Phoenix Land & Improv. Co. v. Seidel (1909) 135 Mo. App. 185, 115 S. W. 1070.

E. S. O.

Campbell, J., delivered the opin

ion of the court:

Plaintiffs Paul and Ralph Quackenbush brought this action in the district court of Larimer county against Samuel Shuck and B. W. Stewart to quiet title to lands situate in that county. As required by our practice in such cases, defendants in their answer set forth their title. The parties deraign title from the same grantor, Cora McIninch; the plaintiffs under a warranty deed direct from her; the defendants through a sheriff's deed, in pursuance of an execution sale authorized by decree of the same court in which was begun the present action, which decree in effect determined that the common grantor, Cora McIninch, one of the defendants there, held the property in trust for the use and benefit of her codefendant husband, and ordered a sale of the property to satisfy the creditors' demand.

Some interesting and important questions are involved, the principal ones being:

(1) May a suit in the nature of a creditors' bill be maintained in the courts of this state without a previous judgment in the creditors' favor, and then only when the judgment has become a specific lien on the property affected, followed by the issuance of an execution and a return of nulla bona?

(2) If so (a) may a decree therein be rendered upon service by publication, and (b) may a specific lien in the creditors' suit itself be created, and otherwise than by one or more of the three methods pointed out in Robison v. Gumaer, 43 Colo. 310, 95 Pac. 935?

(3) Is the equity or lien of a judgment creditor in such a creditors' suit superior to that of one who purchased the lands in question before, but whose deed of conveyance was recorded after, the beginning of the creditors' suit?

(4) Are plaintiffs here bound by the judgment in such creditors' suit?

The following and controlling facts are set forth in the answer,

For

and established by the evidence, and are virtually admitted: In October, 1916, a personal judgment in favor of Shuck, a defendant here, was rendered in a district court of Nebraska against David P. McIninch, the husband of Cora McIninch. Personal service was had upon him. He had no property in Nebraska out of which this judgment could be satisfied. After it was rendered, he was charged with a criminal offense, and, with his wife, left the state. He is a fugitive from justice, and their whereabouts are unknown. While he was thus indebted, David bought 40 acres of land in Larimer county, Colorado, and a water right belonging thereto. He paid the entire consideration therefor. the purpose of defrauding his creditors and especially Shuck, David caused title to this property to be taken in the name of Cora, his wife, and her deed was duly recorded. The record title so continued for about one year and until March 26, 1917, on which day a warranty deed to the two Quackenbushes was executed by David and Cora jointly and placed on record. It purported to be, and apparently was, executed and delivered August 26, 1916, about seven months before the date of its record. The first time the defendants here knew or had reason to believe that these plaintiffs, grantees in the deed, had or claimed any interest in the land, was on this day, and was the result of the constructive notice of the record of the deed. The only property rights of any kind David ever had in Colorado, and out of which Shuck could satisfy his claim, was this equitable title or resulting trust attaching to the property thus conveyed by David and his wife to the plaintiffs. On January 26, 1917, about two months before the recording of the McIninch deed to the plaintiffs, Shuck, one of the defendants here, began in the district court of Larimer county, Colorado, a suit in the nature of a creditors' bill, docket No. 3621, against McIninch and his wife and other persons who had or claimed some in