tremendous crowd had gathered; and that by the jostling and pushing of the crowd the plaintiff was knocked through an open trapdoor. The defendant argued that the jostling and shoving of the crowd were the proximate cause of the injury, and that it was therefore not liable. The court held, however, that there was no question of proximate cause involved, that the jostling of the crowd was an ordinary incident of its assembling, and that the true cause of the injury was the negligence of the defendant in leaving the trapdoor open when it was its duty to keep its premises in a safe condition, and that it was liable to the plaintiff for its failure to do so.

It seems that one who causes the collection of a crowd is liable for injuries suffered by a member of the crowd, when he has failed to keep his premises in a safe condition, although the acts of the crowd may have contributed to the injuries. Bole V. Pittsburgh Athletic Co. (Fed.) supra; Schofield v. Wood (1898) 170 Mass. 415, 49 N. E. 636.

Schofield v. Wood (Mass.) supra, was an action for damages for injuries suffered by the plaintiff while present at a polo game conducted by the defendant. It was held that the fact that the plaintiff was pushed from his seat by the acts of the crowd, to the floor below, where he fell through a defective guard rail, did not relieve the defendant from liability for negligence in maintaining a defective guard rail. Although the acts of the crowd which the defendant had admitted to the hall contributed to the plaintiff's injury, the defendant, it was held, was primarily liable, having caused the collection of the crowd, and having maintained his premises in bad condition.

But where one causes a crowd to collect on his premises, which are kept in a safe condition, and a member of the crowd suffers injury resulting from the shoving and pushing of the crowd, the owner of the premises is not liable. F. W. Woolworth & Co. v. Conboy (1909) 23 L.R.A. (N.S.) 743, 95 C. C. A. 404, 170 Fed. 934; Hunnewell v. Haskell (1899) 174 Mass.

557, 55 N. E. 320, 7 Am. Neg. Rep. 53; Lord v. Sherer Dry Goods Co. (1910) 205 Mass. 1, 27 L.R.A. (N.S.) 232, 137 Am. St. Rep. 420, 90 N. E. 1153, 18 Ann. Cas. 41.

In the case last cited it appeared that the defendant, by its advertisements, had drawn a large crowd of people to its store. While the store was so crowded, an announcement was made directing attention to a certain counter, and, by reason of the rush toward such counter, the plaintiff was pushed and shoved down a stairway, from which fall she suffered injuries. In overruling the exceptions of the plaintiff to the direction by the lower court of a verdict for the defendant, it was held that the defendant was not negligent because it had its store crowded with people, or because it directed their attention to another part of the store without giving any warning concerning the proximity of the stairs.

And in Hunnewell v. Haskell (1899) 174 Mass. 557, 55 N. E. 320, 7 Am. Neg. Rep. 53, it was held that there was no negligence on the defendant's part in not giving warning of the presence of an ordinary flight of stairs, or guarding the necessary access to it, when there was a crowd in the store.

In F. W. Woolworth & Co. v. Conboy (Fed.) supra, it appeared that the defendant was conducting a bargain sale of certain articles, and that, by the violent shoving and pushing of the crowd, the plaintiff was knocked down a flight of steps and was injured, for which she sought a recovery. The court said: "The crowd on the present occasion seems to have been somewhat more violent than usual. Still such crowds are often found in large stores at the time of special sales, and during holiday

seasons.

They are an unavoidable feature of mercantile life in large cities. The defendant, on the occasion in question, had no reason to believe that such a sale as it was conducting would lead to any uncontrolled or violent conduct on the part of customers visiting the store, and was not

therefore required to maintain its store in an unusual condition of safety to meet such an emergency. It had no reasonable cause to anticipate such violence, but, on the contrary, had a right to believe that patrons would demean themselves with a proper regard to others using the store. It was not, therefore, guilty of any negligence by reason of anything done by the crowd. In the excitement, plaintiff seems to have lost her head and became wholly oblivious of her own safety or environment. She has met with an accident which is quite frequent, and there is nothing in this record justifying the shifting of her misfortune upon the defendant."

A person who causes the collection of a crowd on his premises owes each member the duty of protection from assault on the part of other members of the crowd, and is liable for any injuries suffered as a result of any such attack. Indianapolis Street R. Co. v. Dawson (1903) 31 Ind. App. 605, 68 N. E. 909; Mastad v. Swedish Brethren (1901) 83 Minn. 40, 85 N. W. 913, 53 L.R.A. 803, 85 Am. St. Rep. 446.

In the case last cited it appeared that the defendant gave a picnic, at which a large crowd assembled, and sold thereat intoxicating liquor, whereby one person became drunk and assaulted the plaintiff, injuring him severely. It was held that the defendant was liable in damages, on the ground that it was its duty to protect a member of the crowd, which it had caused to collect, from injury inflicted by others of the crowd, especially where its own acts had contributed to the disorder.

In Indianapolis Street R. Co. v. Dawson (1903) 31 Ind. App. 605, 68 N. E. 909, it appeared that the defendant railway company maintained a park, in which it advertised a free band concert and invited the public. The plaintiff, a negro, was assaulted and beaten by several members of the crowd, who, it was alleged, had conspired, with the knowledge of the defendant, which took no steps to prevent it, to attack all negroes who entered the park. The defendant was held to be liable for its failure to protect the plaintiff from injury. W. Q. F.

strued, and any fair and reasonable doubt as to the existence of a power must be resolved against the municipality.

[See 17 R. C. L. 526; 3 R. C. L. Supp.

702.] License, § 22 municipal corporainherent power to tax.

tions 4. Power to license or tax an occupation must be expressly granted to cities by the legislature, or be a neces

straining appellant from enforcing the provisions of an ordinance of the city requiring a license to operate and conduct factories and workshops within the city, and regulating their operation, alleging that the ordinance is invalid. Appellant demurred to the bill of complaint. The court overruled the demurrer. Appellant electing to stand by its demurrer, the court entered a decree permanently enjoining it from enforcing the provisions of the ordinance. The circuit court certified that the validity of an ordinance is involved, and that the public interests require that the appeal be direct to this court.

The ordinance in question defines "factory" and "workshop" to mean any "building, room, inclosure, premises, place, or establishment in the city of Chicago, where any merchandise, goods, wares, commodities, or products are manufactured, made, finished, printed, engraved, worked on, altered, repaired, polished, cleaned, renovated, or assorted, in whole or in part, for sale or for wages or compensation." The definition is therein limited to apply only to places that are not specifically defined and required to be licensed under other ordinances of the city. It is also provided "that when more than one such building, room, inclosure, premise, place or establishment is to be managed, conducted, operated, or carried on in the city of Chicago by one person, firm, or corporation, all of the same shall be deemed one factory or workshop and shall be subject to the payment of one license fee."

The license fees are graded according to the number of employees in such factories or workshops, and range from $2 for one employee to $1,000 for over 8,000 employees. The regulatory features of the ordinance require frequent examinations of the premises occupied by the factories or workshops, to determine whether all health, safety, and sanitary laws have been complied with, and to compel them to be kept in a clean, sanitary condition, free from

vermin and matters of an infectious or contagious nature, to prohibit the employment of persons with communicable diseases, provide for the removal and disposition of decomposed, fetid, or putrescent matter and refuse, waste, and sweepings, the maintenance of proper washing and toilet facilities, adequate ventilation, dry floors, and proper drainage, to prevent seepage and leakage to the floors below. The ordinance further provides for the revocation of licenses by the commissioner of health and for a penalty for violation of it. The ordinance also contains a number of sections repealing ordinances regulating factories, etc., theretofore passed.

It is alleged in the bill that the appellees are corporations organized under the laws of Illinois; that Barnard & Miller are engaged in the business of printing, lithographing, and pamphlet binding, and employ about fifty men; that Tallman, Robbins, & Company are engaged in the business of manufacturing and selling loose-leaf filing devices, and employ about seventy-five men; and that Charles F. L'Hommedieu & Sons Company is engaged in the business of manufacturing and selling platers' and polishers' supplies, and employs about forty employees, all located in Chicago. It is further alleged that there are about 5,000 other individuals, firms, and corporations engaged in business in Chicago that would be brought within the terms of the ordinance; that appellees and those similarly situated were in business in Chicago before the passage of the ordinance, and that a city is attempting to enforce the provisions of the ordinance, and has commenced suit against appellees and others similarly situated. The bill sets forth the ordinance in extenso, and alleges that it is null and void upon several alleged grounds, but the only grounds urged in support of the deeree of the court are that the general assembly has not granted the city of Chicago the power to enact the ordinance, that it is not a valid

any to municipality. fair and reasonable doubt as to the existence of the powers must be resolved against the municipality. Aberdeen-Franklin Coal Co. v. Chicago, 315 Ill. 99, 145 N. E. 613; Earlville v. Radley, 237 Ill. 242, 86 N. E. 624; Chicago v. Ross, 257 Ill. 76, 43 L.R.A. (N.S.) 205, 100 N. E. 159. This court has many times held that power to license or tax an occupation must be expressly

License-manicipal corpora

tions-inherent power to tax.

granted to cities by the legislature, or be a necessary incident to a power expressly granted. Chicago v. Murphy, 313 Ill. 98, 144 N. E. 802; Potson v. Chicago, 304 Ill. 222, 136 N. E. 594; Condon v. Forest Park, 278 Ill. 218, L.R.A.1917E, 314, 115 N. E. 825; Chicago v. Mandel Bros. 264 Ill. 206, 106 N. E. 181; People ex rel. Friend v. Chicago, 261 Ill. 16, 49 L.R.A. (N.S.) 438, 103 N. E. 609, Ann. Cas. 1915A,

Constitutional

er-control of business.

292; Chicago v. Ross, supra; Chicago v. M. & M. Hotel Co. 248 Ill. 264, 93 N. E. 753. If the business sought to be regulated does not tend to injure the public health or public morals, or law-police pow- to interfere with the general welfare, it is not a subject for the exercise of the police power. Lowenthal v. Chicago, 313 Ill. 190, 144 N. E. 829. Section 1 of article 5 of the Cities and Villages Act (Smith-Hurd Rev. Stat. 1923, chap. 24, § 65), with its 100 clauses, is the source of the legislative power of the city council. Its powers are therein enumerated to the exclusion of all

as amended in 1919 (Laws 1919, p. 285), was held void in People ex rel. Roos v. Kaul, 302 Ill. 317, 134 N. E. 740, and that decision was reaffirmed by this court in the cases of Moy v. Chicago, 309 Ill. 242, 140 N. E. 845, and Arms v. Chicago, 314 Ill. 316, 145 N. E. 407.

It is further contended that, if those decisions stand, their only effect is to declare invalid clause 82 as amended, and that, as the amendment is void, or renders the act void, the old law will be revived. Conceding this to be true for the purposes of this case only, clause 82, prior to its amendment in 1919, did not confer the right or power on the city to enact this ordinance. That clause, previous to the amendment, simply authorized cities and villages to direct the location and regulate the use and construction of breweries, distilleries, livery, boarding or foundries, machine shops, garages, sales stables, blacksmith shops, laundries, and bathing beaches withally authorizes and empowers cities in their limits. The clause specificand regulate the use and construcand villages to direct the location

tion of the particular establishments and places therein -authority over named, and under specified busithe previous hold- nesses-effect. ings of this court that enumeration is the exclusion of all other estab

lishments, occupations, businesses, or places, not nuisances per se, over which cities and villages are given control. People ex rel. Friend v. Chicago, 261 Ill. 16, 49 L.R.A. (N.S.) 438, 103 N. E. 609, Ann. Cas. 1915A, 292; Chicago v. P. F. Pettibone & Co. 267 Ill. 573, 108 N. E. 698; Potson v. Chicago, 304 Ill. 222, 136 N. E. 594.