The decision in Mount v. State (1883) 90 Ind. 29, 46 Am. Rep. 192, that a statute reimbursing a public officer for loss of public funds occurring while he is engaged in discharging official duties cannot be deemed an appropriation for private purposes, is materially weakened, if not entirely overruled by the preceding decision. In one place in the opinion in the McClelland Case (1894) 138 Ind. 321, 37 N. E. 1089, supra, the court made an unqualified statement to the effect that the legislature has no power to reimburse a public officer for money lost by him in his official capacity. – appropriating taxes to other purposes; uniformity of taxation. A statute relieving a county treasurer from liability to a county and school districts thereof for losses of county and school property stolen from him without his fault, being concerned only with the liability of the keeper of public moneys to indemnify municipalities for losses thereof, and not with the appropriation of the money lost, does not contravene the provision of the state Con stitution declaring that no school tax shall be appropriated to any other purpose than that for which it was levied. Pearson v. State (1892) 56 Ark. 148, 35 Am. St. Rep. 91, 19 S. W. 499. And a statute relieving the liability. of a county treasurer for public money lost through the failure of a bank in which it was deposited does not violate a constitutional requirement of uniformity of taxation, or that every law imposing a tax shall state distinctly the object to which it shall be applied. Miller v. Henry (1912) 62 Or. 4, 41 L.R.A. (N.S.) 97, 124 Pac. 197. So, a legislative act releasing sureties upon the bonds of tax collectors from all responsibility on account of such bonds is not unconstitutional. State v. Hendrickson (1860) 15 Md. 205, the court stating that such an act was a mere release on the claim of a bond, and not an appropriation or use of taxes within the constitutional prohibition against the use or appropriation of the proceeds from state taxes to other purposes than those expressed in the Constitution. G. S. G. 1. If a removal rider on an insurance policy which definitely covers the property in its new location is accepted as part of the policy before the goods are in fact removed, no recovery can be had for their loss while in the old location. [See note on this question beginning on page 1520.] Novation, § 2-insurance removal rider. effect of 2. The attachment of a removal rider to an insurance policy does not work a novation unless it records the intention of the parties, and the amended policy is accepted upon the mutual understanding that it is to be substituted for the original policy. efTrial, § 191 — question for jury fect of rider on insurance policy. 3. The jury must determine whether or not a rider attached to an insurance policy represented the request of insured and expressed the intention of the parties, and whether or not the retention of the policy with the rider attached and a check for return premium for three days, without examination, constituted an acceptance by the insured, so as to bind him by the terms of the rider. TRANSFER by the Superior Court for Merrimack County (Branch, J.) for the opinion of the Supreme Court upon exceptions by defendant after denial of its motions for nonsuit and for directed verdict, and an order. directing a verdict for plaintiff in an action of assumpsit upon a policy of fire insurance. Verdict set aside. The facts are stated in the opinion. Messrs. Benjamin W. Couch and Robert W. Upton, for plaintiff : The indorsement did not cancel the provisions of the original policy for coverage of the stock and fixtures while contained in the Optima Building. Williston, Contr. § 618; Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Olsen, 81 N. H. 143; Pillsbury v. Elliott, 56 N. H. 425; Rodgers v. United States, 185 U. S. 87, 46 L. ed. 818, 22 Sup. Ct. Rep. 582; Morrison Mfg. Co. v. Bryson, 129 Iowa, 645, 103 N. W. 1016, 106 N. W. 153; Hendrickson v. Reed, 126 Ind. 519, 26 N. E. 205; O'Shea v. Vaughn, 201 Mass. 412, 87 N. E. 616; Wolff Dryer Co. v. Bigler, 192 Pa. 466, 43 Atl. 1092; Runnion v. Morrison, 71 W. Va. 254, 76 N. E. 457; Pulpwood Co. v. Perry, 158 Mich. 272, 122 N. W. 552. Plaintiff never assented to an indorsement which would have the effect of uncovering its stock and fixtures while contained in the Optima Building. 1 Cooley, Briefs on Ins. p. 457; New York L. Ins. Co. v. McIntosh, 86 Miss. 240, 38 So. 775; Black, Rescission, § 525; Myers v. Keystone Mut. L. Ins. Co. 27 Pa. 271, 67 Am. Dec. 462; Snell v. Atlantic F. & M. Ins. Co. 98 U. S. 85, 25 L. ed. 52; Barrette v. Casualty Co. of America, 79 N. H. 60, 104 Atl. 126; Pierce v. Nashua F. Ins. Co. 50 N. H. 297, 9 Am. Rep. 235. Messrs. Warren, Howe, & Wilson, for defendant: Persons having a contract may substitute another for it, when the former contract ceases to be binding on either party. Triangle Waist Co. v. Todd, 168 App. Div. 693, 154 N. Y. Supp. 542. The transaction of December 21st was a novation, which is the substitution of a new obligation for an existing one which is thereby extinguished. Re Ransford, 115 C. C. A. 560, 194 Fed. 658; Re Straub, 158 Fed. 375. Defendant is liable only in accordance with the terms of its policy, i. e., the contract of December 21st, as evi denced by the indorsement upon the policy. Moore v. Phoenix Ins. Co. 62 N. H. 240, 13 Am. St. Rep. 556; Johnson v. Maryland Casualty Co. 73 N. H. 259, 111 Am. St. Rep. 609, 60 Atl. 1009; Anderson v. Etna L. Ins. Co. 75 N. H. 375, 28 L.R.A. (N.S.) 730, 74 Atl. 1051. Plaintiff is bound by the terms of the policy. Durgin v. American Exp. Co. 66 N. H. 277, 9 L.R.A. 453, 20 Atl. 328; Johnson v. Maryland Casualty Co. 73 N. H. 259, 111 Am. St. Rep. 609, 60 Atl. 1009; Lauze v. New York L. Ins. Co. 74 N. H. 334, 68 Atl. 31; Anderson v. Etna L. Ins. Co. 75 N. H. 375, 28 L.R.A.(N.S.) 730, 74 Atl. 1051; Gagne v. Massachusetts Bonding & Ins. Co. 78 N. H. 439, 101 Atl. 212; Metropolitan L. Ins. Co. v. Olsen, 81 N. H. 143. The validity of the ruling "that the policy covers the loss" depends upon whether the policy affords conclusive evidence that defendant insured the property which was destroyed. Richardson v. Empire Cream Separator Co. 80 N. H. 278, 115 Atl. 917. Snow, J., delivered the opinion of the court: The policy, issued by the defendant August 25, 1922, insured the plaintiff's stock and fixtures "while contained" in the Optima Building. On December 21, having completed arrangements for transferring the plaintiff's business to the Statesman Building, its treasurer went to the office of the defendant's agent to arrange for changes in the policy. The evidence of the interview is conflicting. The treasurer testified that he stated that he "intended to move" the goods from the Optima Building, and wanted to be "protected and covered in the new location," but that he made no request that the property be uncovered while in the Optima Building. The agent understood him to say that he "had moved" and "wished to change this (— N. H. — 128 Atl. 686.) policy to the new location." The only other witness, a clerk in the agent's office, testified, on direct examination, that the treasurer requested that the policy be changed "to cover on the new location," but on cross-examination admitted that he stated that "they were moving from one location to another," and "that they wanted the policy extended so that it would cover the goods as they were moved to the new location." The policy was returned the same day to the plaintiff's office at the new location, with a rider providing that "on and after date this policy will cover on goods while contained in Statesman Building." The policy was accompanied by a check for $1.28, covering the return premium due the plaintiff by reason of the lesser rate applicable to the to the new location. Three days later fire destroyed the goods while contained in the Optima Building. The agent testified, in substance, that he assumed that all the goods had been moved; that such assumption was based more than anything else on the fact that he had seen some goods going into the new place of business; that he would have used form No. 65 if he had understood that the goods had not been moved; that he did not intend to uncover the goods, but to cover them only in the new location; that the situation arose from a mistake or misunderstanding between him and the plaintiff's treasurer. There was evidence from which it could be found that neither the amended policy nor the check was examined by the plaintiff's treasurer or other officers until after the fire. The form of rider adopted, known as No. 22, was designed to be used under various circumstances, including cases where goods had been removed to a new location. It could be found that it was the form usually employed when a substitution of location was intended. The agent was accustomed, when requested, however, to use another form, No. 65 (3-22), known as a "removal permit," which protected the goods in either location during the period of removal in proportion as the value in each bore to that in both. It provided in terms that when the goods had been removed the insurance should be transferred to the new location, and that the risk in the former location should then cease. This form, like No. 22, provided for an additional or a return premium according to the difference. in the rates applicable to the different locations. Had form No. 65 been used, the return premium would have been a few cents less than the amount of the check of February 21, depending upon the time to be consumed in the removal. It was the plaintiff's contention at the trial that the amended policy by its terms left the goods covered in both buildings, while the defendant claimed that the rider was a substitution of a new location, and that therefore the amended policy by its terms uncovered the goods in the old location. Subject to the defendant's exceptions, its motion for a verdict was denied, and a verdict was directed for the plaintiff on the ground that "the policy covers the loss." Each party, in argument, now seeks to justify its construction of the language of the amended policy as a conclusive inference of fact from all the competent evidence. The position of neither party is conclusively established by the evidence. The question is, What was the contract on December 24, the day of the fire? Anderson v. Ætna L. Ins. Co. 75 N. H. 375, 377, 28 L.R.A. (N.S.) 730, 74 Atl. 1051. There is no claim that the policy was surrendered for cancelation. Unless it was modified on December 21, its language, unaffected by the rider, determines the rights of the parties. The transaction on that day did not work a novation unless the rider recorded the intention of the parties, and unless the amended of removal policy was accepted Novation-insurance-effect rider. upon the mutual understanding that it was to be substituted for the original policy. Cutting v. Whittemore, 72 N. H. 107, 108, 54 Atl. 1098, and cases cited. Upon the testimony of the plaintiff's treasurer, and of the defendant's agent and of its clerk, reasonable men might differ as to whether or not the rider represented the treasurer's request, and therefore whether or not it expressed the intention of the parties. If it were found that it did not, reasonable men might still differ upon the question whether or not the retention by the plaintiff of the policy and the check without examination for three days, while engaged in changing the location of its business, constituted an acceptance by the plaintiff. Whether or not, therefore, there was ANNOTATION. Insurance: removal rider or permit as affecting risk while goods remain in old location. This annotation, as is indicated by its title, is concerned only with the right to recover for the loss of goods while they remain in the old location after a rider or permit has been issued by the insurer, authorizing the insured to remove them to a new location. In the reported case (A. PERLEY FITCH CO. V. PHENIX INS. Co. ante, 1517) it appeared that a fire policy covered the plaintiff's stocks and fixtures while located in a certain building. The plaintiff subsequently arranged to transfer his business to another building, known as the Statesman Building. Following an interview concerning which the evidence was conflicting, the insurer returned the policy to the plaintiff's office, with a rider providing that "on and after date this policy will cover on goods while contained in Statesman Building." Owing to a lesser rate in the new location, a check for a return premium was sent with the policy, and was retained by the plaintiff. Three days later, and before the removal of the goods, they were destroyed by fire. The court below directed a verdict for the plaintiff on the ground that the policy covered the loss. It is declared on appeal that the transaction did not operate as a novation unless the rider recorded the intention of the parties, and unless the amended policy was accepted on the mutual understanding that it was to be substituted for the original policy. The court, in setting aside the verdict, holds that whether there was a meeting of the minds of the parties as to a modification of the policy by an amendment thereto involved questions of fact which should have been submitted to the jury, it being declared that if the rider was not an accepted part of the policy the goods were insured only while in the old location, but that, if the rider was an accepted part of the policy, then the goods were insured only while in the Statesman Building. In Kunzze v. American Exch. F. Ins. Co. (1869) 41 N. Y. 412, affirming (1864) 2 Robt. 443, it appeared that the plaintiff had effected an insurance with the defendant, on certain personal property in a dwelling house and store, at Tompkinsville, in Richmond county, against loss and damage by fire, under a policy dated the 1st day of May, 1862, for one year from that date. A portion of the property insured, while in those premises, was destroyed by fire, on the 24th day of March, 1863, and an action was brought in the superior court of New York to recover the amount of the loss. The defendant resisted the claim, on the ground that, on the day previous to the occurrence of the fire, the "said policy of insurance was transferred upon the aforesaid subjects of insurance, situate in the two-story brick building, on the west side of Bay street near Gore street, Stapleton, Staten island, and, from and after the said transfer, said defendants were exonerated by plaintiff from all liability from damage under said policy upon said property at said Tompkinsville, and also on the ground of false swearing relative to the amount of the loss and damage sustained by him." On the trial, after proof was offered by the defendant for the purpose of sustaining the first ground of defense, the court, at the close of the testimony, withdrew that defense from the jury, "on the ground that the goods had not been transferred; and, secondly, that there had not been a delivery of the transfer sufficient to bind the plaintiff." The court on appeal affirmed the judgment appealed from saying: "The only inference fairly deducible from the evidence is that all parties contemplated a transfer of the risk on the goods after they were removed, and testimony does not warrant the conclusion that the policy was to be inoperative from the time the application or the making of the memorandum until the goods were removed to the building at Stapleton. The fact stated by the bookkeeper, that Diedrick told him that the plaintiff wanted the policy transferred to cover the goods in the new building, clearly shows that the object was to continue the insurance on them after their removal, and appears to me to repel the idea they should be uninsured, in the meantime, while remaining in the place they were in when first insured. The first ground on which the judge at the trial placed his withdrawal, the fact that the goods had not been trans38 A.L.R.-96. with him in the other ground, that there had not been a delivery of the transfer sufficient to bind the plaintiff." In First Nat. Bank v. Home Ins. Co. (1922) 274 Pa. 129, 118 Atl. 17, the appeal was by the plaintiff from a judgment entered on a verdict for the defendant in an action on a fire ininsurance policy. The insurance covered a quantity of cheese in a certain building. Later, the plaintiff decided to remove the cheese into a stone warehouse, situated a short distance away, on the opposite side of the street. Thereupon the bank's president, on December 26, 1918, telephoned J. H. Thayer, the defendant's agent who had issued the policy, with reference to transferring the insurance to the new location. The evidence was conflicting as to this conversation. The jury, accepting the defendant's version, found that the bank president, when informed that the insurance could be transferred, insisted that it should be done immediately, as the cheese would be moved that day, to which the agent, after vainly urging it would be better to wait until the actual removal, consented, hung up the receiver, and directed his clerk to record the transfer on the policy record in his office, which was done and entry thereof made as follows, viz.: "Property insured under above policy is hereby transferred to a stone building situate on the east side Main street, Mildred, Pa. Insurance to cease in old location and take effect in new from this date. J. H. Thayer, Agent." A copy of the record of transfer was sent the same day to the defendant's district office at Scranton. The oral agreement for the transfer, however, did not expressly provide that the insurance should cease at the old location. The cheese was not removed and twelve days thereafter was destroyed by fire. The court, in affirming the judgment, said: "The court below correctly distinguishes the cases of Kunzze v. American Exch. F. Ins. Co. (1869) 41 N. Y. 412, and Sharpless v. Hartford F. Ins. Co. (1891) 140 Pa. 437, 21 Atl. 451, cited |