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(Cal., 234 Pac. 381.)

cable to the precise question presented here. State ex rel. Carter v. Harper, 182 Wis. 148, 33 A.L.R. 269, 196 N. W. 451.

And

The court of appeals of New York, in Lincoln Trust Co. v. Williams Bldg. Corp. supra, held the adoption of a zoning resolution. creating three districts-residential, business, and unrestricted-to be a valid exercise of the police power. The Iowa supreme court, in Des Moines v. Manhattan Oil Co. 193 Iowa, 1096, 23 A.L.R. 1322, 184 N. W. 823, 188 N. W. 921, held that a zoning ordinance establishing a restricted residential district was not in contravention of a state statute nor the Federal Constitution. the supreme court of Kansas, in Ware v. Wichita, 113 Kan. 153, 214 Pac. 99, held that cities could plan and create reasonable zoning districts for the future systematic development of the city, and provide therein for residential, commercial, and industrial districts. The supreme court of Louisiana pointed out, as do almost all of the cases dealing with the subject, the considerations of public health, safety, morals, and general welfare upon which a zoning ordinance, providing for the creation of residential, commercial, and industrial districts, may be based. State ex rel. Civello v. New Oreans, supra. The supreme court of Wisconsin, in a carefully considered opinion, has likewise upheld, and for much the same reasons, the validity of residential zoning districts. State ex rel. Carter v. Harper, supra.

The case of State ex rel. Morris v. Osborn, 22 Ohio N. P. N. S. 549, presents the precise point in controversy here, and hence is particularly pertinent. While the decision is not one of a court of last resort, nevertheless we are in accord with the reasoning of the court in refusing a writ of mandamus sought by the petitioner to compel the building inspector to issue him a permit to erect certain apartment houses in a neighborhood zoned as an exclusive single

and double family residence property district.

There are some decisions which do not uphold the validity of a zoning ordinance establishing strictly residential districts. residential districts. We are of the opinion, however, that the better reasoned cases are in favor of the validity of comprehensive zoning which establishes strictly private home districts, and that the most which can be said of the cases to the contrary is that they merely show that this is a question upon which reasonable minds may differ.

In addition to all that has been said in support of the constitutionality of residential zoning as part of a comprehensive plan, we think it may be safely and sensibly said that justification for residential zoning may, in the last analysis, be rested upon the protection of the civic and social val- Buildings-jusues of the American tification of zoning ordinance. home. The establishment of such districts is for the general welfare because it tends to promote and perpetuate the American home. It is axiomatic that the welfare, and indeed the very existence, of a nation, depend upon the character and caliber of its citizenry. The character and quality of manhood and womanhood are in a large measure the result of home environment. The home and its intrinsic influences are the very foundation of good citizenship, and any factor contributing to the establishment of homes and the fostering of home life doubtless tends to the enhancement not only of community life, but of the life of the nation as a whole.

The establishment of a singlefamily residence district offers inducements not only to the wealthy, but to those of moderate means, to own their own homes. With ownership comes stability, the welding together of family ties, and better attention to the rearing of children. With ownership comes increased interest in the promotion of public agencies, such as church and school, which have for their purpose a de

sired development of the moral and mental make-up of the citizenry of the country. With ownership of one's home comes recognition of the individual's responsibility for his share in the safeguarding of the welfare of the community and increased pride in personal achievement which must come from personal participation in projects looking toward community betterment.

It is needless to further analyze and enumerate all of the factors which make a single-family home more desirable for the promotion and perpetuation of family life than an apartment, hotel, or flat. It will suffice to say that there is a sentiment practically universal that this is so.

But few persons, if given their choice, would, we think, deliberately prefer to establish their homes and rear their children in an apartment-house neighborhood rather than in a single-home neighborhood. The general welfare of a community is but the aggregate welfare of its constituent members, and that which tends to promote the welfare of the individual members of society cannot fail to benefit society as a whole.

The entrance of one apartment house or flat into a district usually means the entrance of others, and, while it may mean an enhancement of value of the adjacent property for the building of similar structures, it detracts from the value of neighboring property for home building. The man who is seeking to establish a permanent home would not deliberately choose to build next to an apartment house; and it is common experience that the man who has already built is dissatisfied with his home location and desires a change. In other words, the apartment house, tenement, flat, and like structures tend to the exclusion of homes. The home owner may move to another district, but this may not be a sufficient solution of his problem, for if no protection can be given to strictly home districts such as is contemplated by a comprehensive and properly con

structed zoning plan-he may be forced by the ever-increasing encroachment of apartments and flats to relinquish, if not altogether abandon, the benefits emanating from a permanent home site.

Of course, the establishment of exclusive residence districts does not mean that all members of a community will perforce be compelled to live in individual homes. It simply means that, by a comprehensive zoning plan, such uses will be segregated to districts best suited to their development with benefit to their own locality and without detriment to the strictly home districts.

Un

We do not wish to unduly emphasize the single-family residence as a means of perpetuating the home life of a people. There are many persons who, by reason of circumstances, find apartment, flat, or hotel life necessary or preferable. doubtedly many families do maintain ideal home life in apartments, flats, and hotels; and it is also undoubtedly true that in many singlefamily dwellings there is much of dissension and discord. It cannot be gainsaid, however, that the presence of families is usually not encouraged in apartments, flats, and hotels, and that people having children are discriminated against and in some instances actually barred. It is also a well-recognized fact that apartments, flats, etc., are noted for their transient occupancy. All these influences tend to militate against the permanence and stability of home life.

What has been said about the desirability of encouraging home life in single-family dwellings as an element in the promotion of the general welfare of a community may not apply with equal force to a regulation which relates to two-family dwellings. Nevertheless the reasoning in that behalf is not wholly inapplicable to zoning regulations having as their basis the general welfare of the community, which permit the two-family dwellings in strictly residential districts. A twofamily dwelling requires no radical

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change of architectural design, and does not entail any added burdens over the single-family residences in the way of fire or health protection or the exercise of those civic safeguards on the part of the body politic which become necessary in localities where many large apartment houses are permitted to prevail. Moreover, the permitting of twofamily dwellings does not radically change the character of the neighborhood which by proper zoning regulations may be devoted to residential purposes. It should require no argument to show the clear distinction between permitting a twofamily dwelling, and permitting a twenty or even ten family apartment house, or a number of either, in a residential neighborhood. Somewhere the line of demarcation must be drawn, and it is primarily the province of the municipal body to which the zoning function is committed to draw that

-drawing of line in zoning ordinance.

line of demarcation, and it is neither the province nor the duty of courts. to interfere with the discretion with which such bodies are invested, in the absence of a clear showing of an abuse of that discretion. In short, as previously indicated, we are not permitted to substitute our judgment for the legislative judgment. Brown v. Los Angeles, 183 Cal. 783, 192 Pac. 716.

It is insisted upon behalf of the appellants that the ordinance in controversy is not what is usually designated as a general zoning ordinance, but is one creating a single exclusive residence zone. On the other hand, it is insisted upon behalf of the respondents that the ordinance is part and parcel of a comprehensive zoning plan, because the ordinance itself declares that it was enacted "in contemplation of and in conformity with a general zoning ordinance covering the entire city of Los Angeles, and which will create residence, business, industrial, and other zones covering the territory within said city in a comprehensive manner; that the district 38 A.L.R.-94.

234 Pac. 381.)

described in this ordinance is provided for in advance of the general zoning ordinance, for the reason that it is a portion of the district which is to be of the highest residential class under such general ordinance; that there are at present no buildings in said district which violate the provisions of this ordinance; and that the best interest and general welfare of the community will be served and the general city plan preserved by the maintenance of this district in this condition."

Obviously, the purpose of comprehensive zoning is the attainment of unity in the construction and development of a city, along lines of reasonable regulations which tend to promote the health, safety, morals, and general welfare of the community; and it is equally obvious that to accomplish this purpose there must be definitely in the minds of the makers of comprehensive zoning a plan, in outline at least, sufficiently extensive so that when embodied in an enacted ordinance a reviewer thereof may say with confidence that it will redound to the welfare of the city as a whole, and that any part of that plan is reasonably related thereto. Of course, a comprehensive zoning plan should -what zoning orcontemplate and dinance should provide for the planning from time to time of the execution of further details, extensions, and such modifications of existing features as unforeseen changes, occurring in the civic conditions, make necessary to the perfection and perpetuation of the plan.

embrace.

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ing ordinance, at the time the emergency ordinance in the instant case was enacted, does not detract from the validity of the latter ordinance upon the theory that there could be no assurance that the contemplated zoning ordinance would be ultimately enacted and enforced. The good faith of the council in enacting the ordinance in question is not challenged; nor is it asserted that the council will not proceed in good faith to the enactment of a general zoning ordinance, and, in the absence of any issue concerning the good faith of the council, the presumption of fair dealing on the part of the council, and the further presumption that they will not fail in the performance of an official duty,

must prevail. That being so, it may be fairly said, we think, that the ordinance in question, being, as it declares, an initial unit in the general zoning of the city, is part and parcel of a comprehensive plan which has relation to the welfare of the city as a whole, and therefore it must be held that the ordinance in question is a valid exercise of the police power.

The judgment is affirmed.

We concur: Myers, Ch. J.; Lawlor, J.; Waste, J.; Seawell, J.; Richards, J.; Shenk, J.

Petition for rehearing denied March 26, 1925.

NOTE.

The constitutionality of zoning statutes or ordinances creating restricted residence districts from which business buildings or multiple residences are excluded is the subject of the annotation following STATE v. THOMAS, post, 1496, which supplements earlier annotation on the same subject in 19 A.L.R. 1395, and 33 A.L.R. 287.

STATE OF WEST VIRGINIA EX REL. H. L. AUSTIN

V.

W. H. THOMAS, Mayor, et al.

West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals - June 16, 1924.

(96 W. Va. 628, 123 S. E. 590.)

Buildings, §§ 3, 8 — ordinance requiring consent to building

validity.

A city ordinance providing that no permit shall be granted for the erection of a business house, or a building intended or designed as a place for the sale of goods, wares, and merchandise, if there are more residence than business houses within a radius of 300 feet of the proposed location of such structure, without the consent of three fourths of the resident property owners owning property within the prescribed area, is unconstitutional and void as an unreasonable and discriminatory exercise of the police power.

[See note on this question beginning on page 1496.]

Headnote by LITZ, J.

(96 W. Va. 628, 123 S. E. 590.)

APPLICATION for a writ of mandamus to compel respondents to grant petitioner a permit to erect a business structure upon a lot owned by him in the city of Bluefield. Writ awarded.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the court.

Mr. James S. Kahle, for petitioner: The board of directors of the city of Bluefield cannot require, by ordinance, a property owner to obtain the consent, in writing, of a majority of the property owners within a radius of 300 feet of his proposed structure, as a condition to granting the applicant a permit for the erection of his building.

State ex rel. Omaha Gas Co. v. Withnell, 78 Neb. 33, 8 L.R.A. (N.S.) 978, 126 Am. St. Rep. 586, 110 N. W. 680; Hays v. Poplar Bluff, 263 Mo. 516, L.R.A.1915D, 595, 173 S. W. 676; Ex parte Sing Lee, 96 Cal. 354, 24 L.R.A. 195, 31 Am. St. Rep. 218, 31 Pac. 245; Re Quong Woo, 13 Fed. 229; Eubank v. Richmond, 226 U. S. 137, 57 L. ed. 156, 42 L.R.A. (N.S.) 1123, 33 Sup. Ct. Rep. 76, Ann. Cas. 1914B, 192; 19 R. C. L. § 119, p. 815; Tilford v. Belknap, 126 Ky. 244, 11 L.R.A. (N.S.) 708, 103 S. W. 289; St. Louis v. Russell, 116 Mo. 248, 20 L.R.A. 721, 22 S. W. 470; Lynch v. North View, 73 W. Va. 609, 52 L.R.A. (N.S.) 1038, 81 S. E. 833; Wigal v. Parkersburg, 74 W. Va. 25, 52 L.R.A. (N.S.) 465, 81 S. E. 554; Bostock v. Sams, 95 Md. 400, 59 L.R.A. 282, 93 Am. St. Rep. 394, 52 Atl. 665.

The refusal by the board of directors to grant the permit amounts to a taking of property within the meaning of §§ 9, 10, art. 3, of the Constitution of West Virginia, and of the 14th Amendment to the Constitution of the United States.

Fruth v. Board of Affairs, 75 W. Va. 456, L.R.A.1915C, 981, 84 S. E. 105; Old Colony & F. River R. Co. v. Plymouth County, 14 Gray, 155; Pumpelly v. Green Bay & M. Canal Co. 13 Wall. 166, 20 L. ed. 557; United States v. Lynah, 188 U. S. 445, 47 L. ed. 539, 23 Sup. Ct. Rep. 349; Sweet v. Rechel, 159 U. S. 380, 40 L. ed. 188, 16 Sup. Ct. Rep. 43; Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U. S. 668, 31 L. ed. 212, 8 Sup. Ct. Rep. 273; Cooley, Const. Lim. 6th ed. 475; State ex rel. Sale v. Stahlman, 81 W. Va. 335, L.R.A.1918C, 77, 94 S. E. 497; Eubank v. Richmond, 226 U. S. 137, 57 L. ed. 156, 42 L.R.A. (N.S.) 1123, 33 Sup. Ct. Rep. 76, Ann. Cas. 1914B, 192.

Mr. Russell S. Ritz for respondents.

Litz, J., delivered the opinion of the court:

H. L. Austin, by petition, seeks a writ of mandamus commanding the respondents, W. H. Thomas, mayor, and Henry A. Lilly, C. L. Cheney, J. B. Kirk, and George W. Troutman, directors of the city of Bluefield, to grant the petitioner a permit to erect a business structure upon a certain lot owned by him in said city.

The petition and special replication of petitioner to the answer of respondents show that under the title, "An Ordinance Providing Regulations for the Location, Erection, and Construction of Business Buildings in the Residence Portion of the City of Bluefield, West Virginia, and Providing a Penalty," the said city on January 24, 1922, adopted the following ordinance:

"Section 1. That it shall hereafter be unlawful for any person, firm, or corporation or association of persons to locate, erect or construct any business house or building intended or designed to be used for the barter and sale of goods, wares, and merchandise of any description or character, or for the conduct therein of any business within any residence portion of the city, except as hereinafter provided.

"Sec. 2. By 'a residence portion of the city of Bluefield, West Virginia,' as used in this ordinance, is intended and meant any part of said city where there are more dwelling houses than business houses within a radius of 300 feet of the place where any business houses or buildings intended or designed as a place for the barter and sale of goods, wares, and merchandise of any description, or for the conduct of any business, is sought to be erected, located, or constructed.

"Sec. 3. Any person, firm, corporation, or association of persons desiring to locate, erect, or construct

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