officer a large measure of discretion, -right of legislature to delegate power. provided the exercise thereof is guided and controlled by rules prescribed therefor. Tarpey v. McClure, 190 Cal. 593, 213 Pac. 983, and cases cited. Under its second point, supra, respondent contends that it is not governed or affected by the Act of 1919, which we have been considering herein, but that it is acting pursuant to and by virtue of authority expressly granted to it by the Act of 1917, supra (Stat. 1917, p. 1673). Section 5 of this act provides that the state market director is authorized to regulate and control the business of buying, selling, and otherwise disposing of fresh food fish, and that such fish may not be bought, sold, or disposed of except in accordance with the provisions of the act. Section 7 thereof makes it unlawful to destroy food fish in excess of 50 pounds per day, or to divert any food fish to any use other than human consumption without the written consent of the market director. This is followed by a proviso that "nothing in this section shall be construed to apply to any individual market fisherman who is unable to sell for human consumption fish he has caught and who within forty-eight hours after the destruction or diversion of said fish shall report to the state market director the number of pounds and varieties of fish and how disposed of. . . Respondent argues that this proviso is in effect an express grant to market fishermen, under the circumstances there mentioned, of the right and authority to destroy or divert the fish caught by them, and that, incidentally and by necessary implication, it is a grant to respondent of the right to use such fish in its reduction plant; that the later Act of 1919 does not expressly repeal this act; and that under wellestablished rules of statutory construction it should not be construed as affecting such repeal by implication. This view of the law was evi There is no conflict between the two acts as to the matter here under consideration. The 1919 Act covers a field of legislation not at all covered by the 1917 Act. The earlier act contains certain prohibitions against the destruction or diversion of food fish which are by its terms expressly made inapplicable to the individual market fisherman who is unable to sell for human consumption fish he has caught. The later act contains other and broader prohibitions, which apply to all persons, firms, or corporations engaged in the business of catching fish. This of necessity includes the individual market fisherman who was excepted from the operation of the earlier act. There is no merit in the claim that the earlier act grants to or confers upon such market fisherman a substantive right to destroy or divert fish caught by him. It does no more than this: It omits to prohibit him from so doing. The earlier act expressly negatives the contention that it is applicable to the situation here in question by the proviso that "nothing in this section shall be construed to apply thereto. (Cal. - 234 Pac. $98.) sideration of the points upon which appellant relies for a reversal of the judgment. In findings 1 and 2 the court found that "it is not true that the defendant is or ever was engaged in the business of operating a reduction plant for the manufacture of fish meal, fish oil, and fertilizer, or is now accepting or receiving sardines at any reduction plant, or is, or ever was, using said fish for reduction purposes." As we have noted, the defendant expressly admitted at the commencement of the trial that it was engaged in the business of operating a plant for the reduction of fish into fish oil and fish meal. It contended, however, that this does not constitute a reduction plant as that expression is used in the statute because of the fact that the resulting products-fish oil and fish mealwere not sold by the defendant to be used, and were not used, as fertilizer, but were sold to be used, and were in fact used, as poultry food. In short, it is defendant's contention that a plant which is engaged in the reduction of fish to fish oil and fish meal is a reduction plant only when those products are used as fertilizer, and is not a reduction plant when the products are used as poultry food. The trial court evidently concurred with and adopted this contention, as it is the only theory upon which these findings are explicable. Respondent asserts that "to "the man in the street' the term 'reduction plant' signifies a place where dead animals, garbage, offal, and waste material are converted into fertilizer of the soil. . We are not aware of this fact, if it be a fact. We find no authority, either among the lexicographers or the law-writers or the decided cases, for so narrow and restricted a definition. The verb "reduce" is defined by Webster as follows: "To bring to a certain state or condition by grinding, pounding, kneading, rubbing, etc.; as, to reduce a substance to powder, or to a pasty mass; to reduce fruit, wood, or paper rags to pulp." The Standard Dictionary gives a substantially similar definition. It is true, as suggested by respondent, that this word has also other and widely variant meanings, but no other approved definition thereof has been suggested as being in any wise appropriate to the context of the statute here in question. This court has defined the word "reduce," when applied to the mining industry, as meaning "to bring to a specified form or condition, as, to reduce a rock to powder, or, to deprive an ore of nonmetallic constituents," and has held that the word "reduction," used in this connection, means the separation of metals from their ores. Re Martin, 157 Cal. 60, 106 Pac. 239. In that case, it was also held that the phrase "smelters and other institutions for the reduction or refining of ores or metals," when contained in a penal statute, is sufficiently comprehensive to include a quartz mill in which the operation consisted solely of crushing ore and then washing the same. The process used by defendant herein, briefly described, consists in cooking the fish, separating and removing therefrom the major portion of the oil and water content thereof, and grinding the residue to a meal or powder known as fish meal. cisely the same process is used in those plants which are operated for the reduction of fish for use as fertilizer, except that in the latter case the meal may be ground to a finer powder than is desirable for poultry food, and except, further, that when the product is to be used as fertilizer fish may be used in such an advanced stage of decomposition as would render the product unfit for poultry food. Having in mind the manifest policy of the act, which is the conservation of fish for the purpose of human consumption, we have no doubt that the expression "reduction plant," as used therein, is product of reat least sufficiently duction plant for poultry food. inclusive to apply to any plant engaged in the reduction of fish into other products which are not intended to be used, and are not Pre -effect of use of in fact used, for human consumption. In this view of the law there is no basis in the evidence for the quoted findings numbered 1 and 2, and the same conclusion applies to the first portion of finding No. 4, to the effect that "it is not true that the defendant threatens to accept or receive sardines at any reduction plant, or threatens to use such fish for reduction purposes. -meaning of provision against waste. Finding 3 and a portion of finding 4 are to the effect that it is not true that the defendant has, or is now permitting or causing, or threatening to permit or cause, preventable or other deterioration or waste of fish caught within the waters of this state. It is clear from the terms and provisions of the statute that the term "waste" as there used was designed to to include and to apply to the use of fresh food fish for any purpose other than human consumption. There was uncontradicted testimony at the trial from one of defendant's witnesses that two fishermen, named by him, were engaged in fishing with the direct purpose of delivering their catch to the defendant for use in its reduction plant. There was other There was other testimony, uncontradicted, as to the number of tons of fresh fish which had been delivered by these two fishermen to the defendant upon specified dates shortly prior to the trial. This was not only a violation of the prohibitory provisions of the statute, but we think that it constituted preventable waste within the meaning thereof. The court further found that it is not true that any use made of such fish by the defendant will cause any loss or damage to the people of the state of California, or will be such an obstruction to the free use of property as to interfere with the comfortable enjoyment of property by the people of the state of California, or that the defendant threatens to continue to commit any wrongful act. These findings are apparently predicated upon the con clusion of the learned trial judge that the defendant in using fresh food fish in its reduction plant was exercising a right granted to it by the Statute of 1917, supra, and therefore committed no wrong. Of course, if the defendant were in fact acting within its legal rights and committing no wrong, the plaintiff could not in contemplation of law be damaged thereby. But, as we have seen, the Statute of 1917 confers no such right. The title to, and property in, the fish within the waters of the state, are -title to. vested in the state of California and held by it in trust for the people of the state. Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U. S. 519, 529, 40 L. ed. 793, 796, 16 Sup. Ct. Rep. 600; People v. Truckee Lumber Co. 116 Cal. 397, 39 L.R.A. 581, 58 Am. St. Rep. 183, 48 Pac. 374; Re Phoedovius, 177 Cal. 238, 170 Pac. 412; People v. Stafford Packing Co. 193 Cal. 719, 227 Pac. 485. The legis lature may dispose thereof as to it may seem best, subject only to constitutional limita -right of tions against dis- legislature crimination. With to control. in those limitations the legislature, for the purpose of conserving and protecting fish, may pass such laws as to it seem wise, and the question what measures are best adapted to that end is for its determination. Ex parte Kenneke, 136 Cal. 527, 89 Am. St. Rep. 177, 69 Pac. 261; Re Phoedovius, 177 Cal. 238, 170 Pac. 412. Such fish can become the subject of private ownership only in -how become private property. such qualified way, to such limited extent, and subject to such conditions and limitations, as the state through its legislature may see fit to provide and impose. Re Phoedovius, supra; Paladini v. Superior Ct. 178 Cal. 369, 173 Pac. 588. "It is, therefore, evident that what the people of the state own they can alienate on such terms as they choose to impose, and that this power of regulation continues so long as such fish or game are the In section 4 of the Act of 1917, supra (Stat. 1917, p. 1674), the legislature imposed the following limitations: "No such fish shall be caught, taken or killed in any manner or at any time except that the person so catching, taking or killing or having the same in his possession, irrespective of the manner in which they were obtained, shall by such act or possession thereby consent that the title to such fish shall be and remain in the state of California for the purpose of regulating and controlling the use and disposition of same after such catching, taking or killing, except that the title to such fish legally taken shall vest in the person so taking or possessing them, subject to the restrictions and provisions of law." -title to fish caught. It follows that if the fish were taken in violation of law, the fisherman who caught them acquired no title thereto, and even if they were taken lawfully, a sale thereof to defendant for use in its reduction plant would convey no title thereto, and the title would still remain in the state. The use of fish which was admittedly made by the defendant herein was not merely a violation of prohibitory provisions of a statute, but was also a wrong committed against the property right of the plaintiff. It was such an obstruction to the free use of property as to interfere with the comfortable enjoyment thereof by the people of the wrongful use of state of California and as such constituted a nuisance. People v. Truckee Lumber Co. 116 Cal. 397, 39 L.R.A. 581, 58 Am. St. Rep. 183, 48 Pac. 374; People v. Stafford Packing Co. supra. Under these circumstances, it cannot be said that such use of fish by the defendant did not or will not cause any loss or damage to the plaintiff, and this finding is therefore contrary to the evidence. Nuisance food fish. This brings us to the question whether or not the damage and in jury so inflicted upon the plaintiff, and which the defendant admittedly threatens to continue to so inflict, is or will be irreparable in such sense as to entitle the plaintiff to injunctive relief. This question is so intimately bound up with the question of the availability of an adequate remedy at law that the two may well be considered together. The court found: "It is not true that the plaintiff has no plain, speedy, and adequate remedy at law. at law. As we pointed out in the Stafford Case, supra, this is in the first instance a question for the trial court, and if the evidence Appeal-quesis conflicting, or if tion of remedy opposing inferences may reasonably be drawn therefrom, it still remains a question of fact for the trial court. There still remains for review upon appeal, however, the question whether there is any substantial evidence to support the finding thereon. The court also found "that the supply of sardines in the Bay of Monterey, and generally along the Pacific Coast, is practically inexhaustible, and that the quantity heretofore taken from the Bay of Monterey during the seasonal run of sardines has not appreciably depleted said species of fish, but on the contrary said species is upon the increase." Appellant vigorously assails this finding as unsupported by, and contrary to, the evidence. But we are inclined to disagree with this contention. There was evidence that the supply of sardines in the vicinity of the Bay of Monterey had not been appreciably depleted up to the time of trial. There was also evidence to the effect that the size of the catch in this vicinity has increased since 1919. There was no evidence that the supply is practically inexhaustible or that the species is on the increase, except as these facts might be inferred from the testimony above adverted to. There was also testimony, not substantially contradicted, to the effect that if unrestricted fishing of sardines in the coastal waters of this state for the reduction thereof into fertilizer and poultry food is permitted, the supply will not merely be depleted, but will be practically exhausted as a result thereof. But as this was in the nature of opinion evidence and as the facts upon which the opinion was predicated are nowise conclusive, we are not prepared to say that the trial court was bound to accept this testimony at its face. value. We conclude that this finding is not unsupported by the evidence, but we do not regard it as determinative of the present question. The only other remedy suggested by respondent as available to appellant herein is an action at law for damages. It is apparent that It is apparent that the amount of damages which would compensate plaintiff for the destruction of its fish and the diversion thereof to uses other than human unauthorized seizure and taking of property for a use other than a public use. The remedy which was suggested in the Stafford Case, supra, as an adequate remedy at law, to wit, the revocation of defendant's permit, is inapplicable herein because this defendant has no permit which is subject to revocation. It is operating without a permit and in violation of the law. The circumstance that it may be prosecuted criminally for a violation of the penal provisions of the statute affords no adequate remedy -injunctionfor a civil wrong, criminal prosewhich consists of an cution as adeinvasion of plain quate remedy. tiff's property right. People v. Truckee Lumber Co. and People v. Stafford Packing Co. supra. We conclude that there is no adequate remedy at law available to the plaintiff herein, and this conclusion renders it unnecessary to consider plaintiff's contention that under subdivision 1 of § 526, Code of Civil Procedure, it is not required to show great or irreparable injury in order to entitle itself to injunctive relief. The finding of the trial court "that large quantities of the sardines which have been accepted and received by the defendant were unfit for human consumption " is immaterial in the light of the fact that it was proven by uncontradicted testimony and expressly admitted by defendant -injunctionthat it was also en- partial legal gaged in receiving and using in its reduction plant large quantities of fish which were fit for human consumption. use-effect. For the reasons above indicated, the judgment is reversed. We concur: Shenk, J.; Seawell, J.; Richards, J.; Waste, J.; Lennon, J.; Lawlor, J. ANNOTATION. Constitutionality and construction of statutes for prevention of waste of food I. Scope, 1196. II. In general, 1197. III. Fish, 1198. products. 1. Scope. This annotation is limited strictly to statutes intended to prevent de |