It is unnecessary for us to consider the power of Congress to impose civil liability upon citizens of the United States for torts committed within the territory of another nation. The present case presents nothing beyond a question of construction.

The statute under consideration lacks the essential characteristics of those, now very common, which provide for compensation to employees injured in the line of duty, irrespective of the master's fault. It only undertakes to impose liability for negligence which must be shown by proof (Southern R. Co. v. Gray, 241 U. S. 333, 339, 60 L. ed. 1030, 1034, 36 Sup. Ct. Rep. 558; New York C. R. Co. v. Winfield, 244 U. S. 147, 150, 61 L. ed. 1045, 1048, L.R.A. 1918C, 439, 37 Sup. Ct. Rep. 546, Ann. Cas. 1917D, 1139, 14 N. C. C. A. 680), and demands under it are based wholly upon tort.

It contains no words which definitely disclose an intention to give it extraterritorial effect, nor do the circumstances require an inference of such purpose. United States v. Bowman, 260 U. S. 94, 98, 67 L. ed. 149, 151, 43 Sup. Ct. Rep. 39. "Legislation is presumptively territorial and confined to limits over which the lawmaking power has jurisdiction." Sandberg v. McDonald, 248 U. S. 185, 195, 63 L. ed. 200, 204, 39 Sup. Ct. Rep. 84.

"The general and almost universal rule is that the character of an act as lawful or unlawful must be determined wholly by the law of the country where the act is done. . For another jurisdiction, if it should happen to lay hold of the actor, to treat him according to its own notions rather than those of the place where he did the acts, not only would be unjust, but would be an interference with the authority of another sovereign, contrary to the comity of nations, which the other state concerned justly might resent.

The foregoing considerations would lead, in case of doubt, to a construction of any statute as in

tended to be confined in its operation and effect to the territorial limits over which the lawmaker has general and legitimate power. 'All legislation is prima facie territorial.'" American Banana Co. v. Unitted Fruit Co. 213 U. S. 347, 356, 53 L. ed. 826, 832, 29 Sup. Ct. Rep. 511, 16 Ann. Cas. 1047.

In an action brought in a court of the United States to enforce the liability of a Colorado corporation for injuries wrongfully inflicted upon a citizen of Texas while within the territory of Mexico, this court said: "But when such a liability is enforced in a jurisdiction foreign to the place of the wrongful act, obviously that does not mean that the act in any degree is subject to the lex fori, with regard to either its quality or its consequences. On the other hand, it equally little means that the law of the place of the act is operative outside its own territory. The theory of the foreign suit is that although the act complained of was subject to no law having force in the forum, it gave rise to an obligation, an obligatio, which, like other obligations, follows the person, and may be enforced wherever the person may be found. But, as the only source of this obligation is the law of the place of the act, it follows that that law determines not merely the existence of the obligation (Smith v. Condry, 1 How. 28, 11 L. ed. 35), but equally determines its extent" (Slater v. Mexican Nat. R. Co. 194 U. S. 120, 126, 48 L. ed. 900, 902, 24 Sup. Ct. Rep. 581).

27 R. C. L. 605; Evans v. Johnson, 39 W. Va. 299, 23 L.R.A. 743, 45 Am. St. Rep. 912, 19 S. E. 623; Stidham v. Matthews, 29 Ark. 650; Stephens v. Anthony, 37 Ark. 571; Stephens v. Shannon, 43 Ark. 464; Gaines v. Summers, 50 Ark. 322, 7 S. W. 301; Cordova v. Hood, 17 Wall. 1, 21 L. ed. 587; Stroud v. Pace, 35 Ark. 103; Abbott v. Parker, 103 Ark. 429, 147 S. W. 70; Cooper v. Flesner, 24 Okla. 47, 23 L.R.A. (N.S.) 1180, 103 Pac. 1016, 20 Ann. Cas. 29; Graysonia - Nashville Lumber Co. v. Saline Development Co. 118 Ark. 199, 176 S. W. 129; Krow v. Bernard, 152 Ark. 99, 238 S. W. 19.

Mr. J. O. Rhyne, for appellees: The defendants loan companies were innocent purchasers of the land and should be protected.

Manchester v. Goeswich, 95 Ark. 582, 130 S. W. 526; Moore v. Morris, 118 Ark. 516, 177 S. W. 6; Henry Wrape Co. v. Čox, 122 Ark. 445, 183 S. W. 955; Cramer v. Remmel, 132 Ark. 158, 200 S. W. 811; Fargason v. Edrington, 49 Ark. 207, 4 S. W. 763; 1 Jones, Mortg. §§ 458, 459, 710; Sorrells v. Sorrells, 4 Ark. 296; Jefferson Land Co. v. Grace, 57 Ark. 427, 21 S. W. 877; 1 Perry, Trusts, § 239.

The judgment of the chancery court should be affirmed because the deed under which plaintiff claims lien was not recorded and did not retain a vendor's lien.

Arkansas Nat. Bank v. Stuckey, 121 Ark. 309, 181 S. W. 913; East v. Key, 84 Ark. 429, 106 S. W. 201; Sullivan v. Winters, 91 Ark. 149, 120 S. W. 843.

Where the defense of an innocent purchaser is involved, the burden is on the opposite parties to show notice.

Shenoy v. Phipps, 145 Ark. 121, 224 S. W. 393; White v. Moffett, 108 Ark. 490, 158 S. W. 505; Jones v. Ainell, 123 Ark. 532, 186 S. W. 65; Osceola Land Company v. Chicago Mill & Lumber Co. 84 Ark. 1, 103 S. W. 609; 27 R. C. L. 718; Stubbs v. Pyle, 137 Ark. 538, 209 S. W. 723.

Wood, J., delivered the opinion of the court:

On the 28th of April, 1923, Douglas Carter instituted this action against Obe S. Thompson and his wife, Eula Thompson, to which action the Security Mortgage Company and the McIver Abstract Company were also made defendants. Carter alleged that on the 18th day

of May, 1918, he was the owner of an undivided two-sevenths interest in 188 acres of land in Clark county, which he sold to Obe S. Thompson and Eula Thompson, his wife, on that date for the consideration of $750, $50 of which was paid, and $700 evidenced by a promissory note payable December 1, 1918. Carter alleged that the note was secured by a vendor's lien which was reserved in the deed to Thompson and wife; that for reasons unknown to plaintiff the defendants Thompson and wife withheld the deed from record. The plaintiff alleged that the mortgage company and the abstract company and others were claiming liens on the property, and he asked that they be required to answer and set up the note, and the extent of their claims and liens, if any, and he prayed that he have judgment against Thompson for $987.47, with interest, and that the same be declared an equitable lien upon the lands mentioned, superior to the rights of any of the defendants, and unless the debt of Thompson was paid, that the lands be sold to satisfy the same.

The mortgage and abstract companies answered jointly, setting up their respective mortgages, and denied the allegations of the complaint. They set up that they were claiming an interest in the property under valid and subsisting mortgages executed to them by Thompson and wife; that the mortgage to the mortgage company was executed April 5, 1919, to secure a promissory note for the aggregate sum of $4,000, due April 1, 1919, which mortgage was duly recorded on April 19, 1919; that the mortgage to the abstract company was executed to secure notes in the aggregate sum of $1,117.78, due from April 1, 1920, to April 1, 1926; that the mortgage to the abstract company was subject to the mortgage to the mortgage company; that they were purchasers and owners of the lands in controversy; that by reason of the mortgages to them, and the advances made by them to Thompson

and wife, they were the purchasers and owners of the property, having acquired the same without notice, actual or constructive, of the interests of the plaintiff Carter. They set up that they had become owners in fee simple of the lands, and had held continuous, adverse, and hostile possession for seven years, and pleaded the Statute of Limitations in bar of plaintiff's claim.

The plaintiff testified substantially to the effect that he inherited a one-seventh interest in the lands in controversy from his mother, Melissa E. Carter, who at her death, left seven living children. Plaintiff bought the interest of one of his sisters, and therefore he owned a two-sevenths interest in the lands. He sold this two-sevenths interest on March 18, 1918, to Obe S. Thompson, who married witness's sister, Eula Carter. The consideration was $750, $50 being paid in cash, and the balance of $700 evidenced by a promissory note payable December 1. The note contained the recital: "This note is based upon a land deed of even date. This note is given for a two-sevenths undivided interest in land containing 188 acres, all in sections 19 and 20, township 7, range 20." The note The note was signed by Obe S. Thompson. The witness did not execute the deed on the day the note was executed, but the next week he sent Thompson a deed by mail. Witness executed to Thompson a warranty deed which showed on its face that lien was retained for the balance due on

the purchase money. Thompson had never paid the note. On crossexamination, a paper was handed to witness, and he was asked if that was a copy of the deed, and he answered that it was, except that the deed witness signed did not have the words "for which a vendor's lien is retained" scratched out. The paper, thus identified, was introduced, and it recited in part as follows: "That D. Carter and wife, Allie M. Carter, for and in consideration of the sum of $50 to us in hand paid by Obe Thompson, the receipt of

which is hereby acknowledged, and the further sum of $700, to be paid as follows, for which vendor's lien is retained: Seven hundred dollars, December 1, 1918, at 8 per cent interest per annum from date, do hereby grant, bargain, sell and convey unto the said Obe Thompson and unto his heirs and assigns forever the following lands lying in the county of Clark and state of Arkansas, to wit." Then follow the habendum and warranty clauses with the relinquishment of dower. There was a line drawn with red ink through the words "for which a vendor's lien is retained." The deed was dated March 18, 1918, and acknowledged on April 6, 1918. Witness testified that the words through which the line was run were not stricken out when the deed was delivered to Thompson through the mail, and at the same time he also delivered to Thompson the deed that had been executed to witness by witness's sister to her one-seventh interest.

It was shown by several witnesses, and it is undisputed, that the plaintiff was one of seven children of George W. and Melissa E. Carter. Thompson testified that he executed the note above mentioned to the plaintiff Carter for the two-sevenths interest he claimed in the lands. Carter executed a deed to witness for this interest. The deed was misplaced. Carter also delivered to witness a deed from his sister to him for her one-seventh interest. The two-sevenths interest conveyed to witness by Carter is covered by a mortgage which the witness gave the mortgage company and the abstract company, and this is the same land mentioned in the note witness executed to Carter for the land. Witness had paid nothing on this note.

J. O. Rhyne testified that he was the attorney for the mortgage company and the abstract company, and had in his hands a deed sent him by Obe S. Thompson in May or June, 1923. After looking over the deed and making a copy thereof, he mailed it back to Thompson. Wit

ness had not had in his possession the deed from Lola Bridges to the plaintiff dated March 15, 1913. The first time witness learned of the existence of the deed from Carter and wife to Thompson was when he read a copy of the complaint. The deed referred to was received by witness one day, and mailed back to Thompson the next.

The testimony of the president of the mortgage and abstract companies was to the effect that he did not know of any outstanding claims of the plaintiff against this property at the time the loans were made to Thompson. If he had, he would not have closed same. He first learned of it on April 27, 1923. Thompson submitted an abstract of title to the companies in order to obtain the loan. The abstract was turned over to the title examiner of the companies. The examiner testified that the common source of title to the lands in controversy was in Melissa E. Carter, who died about the year 1893; that Obe S. Thompson claimed title under deeds executed by John H. Carter and wife, W. A. Garmaney and wife, George Wilson and wife, dated May 20, 1916, and which recited that the grantors were the only heirs at law of Melissa E. Carter, deceased, except Eula E. Thompson, wife of the grantee; that there was a second deed dated May 29, 1916, from the same grantors to Obe S. Thompson, containing the same recital as to the grantors being the only heirs at law of Melissa E. Carter, deceased. The examiner of the abstract asked that an affidavit be produced showing when Mrs. Carter died, and the names and ages of her children. An affidavit was made by one John L. Bozeman, who stated that he was sixty-seven years of age and had known the Carter family for many years. He knew Melissa E. Carter in her lifetime. She died at the home of her husband on June 24, 1893. Eula Carter Thompson, Emma Carter Garmaney, George Wilson Carter, John H. Carter and Will Carter were the only heirs at law of Melissa E. Carter,

deceased. Upon the affidavit of Bozeman, after rechecking the title and basing his opinion on the abstract brought down to date, including the affidavit of Bozeman, the examiner approved the title. The abstract showed the mortgage from Thompson and wife to the mortgage company, and the companies thereupon advanced to Thompson the money secured by the mortgages.

On cross-examination, the examiner of titles stated that the abstract did not show any conveyances from Carter and Lola Bridges to Obe S. Thompson. The first witness heard of Carter's claim was when Rhyne showed witness a copy of the complaint in this case. Witness did not see the deed from Douglas Carter to Obe Thompson, but saw a copy of what purported to be a copy of that deed in the hands of the companies' lawyer. He did not recall reading any portion of it. Witness saw it about two or three weeks before testifying, when Rhyne came to witness's office to see him about testifying in the case.

McIver, the president of the mortgage and abstract companies, being recalled, testified that he did not know that Thompson had sent the original deed to his attorney, Rhyne, after the suit was instituted. Witness never at any time or place saw a purported copy of the deed. Thompson, being recalled by the companies, stated that he had a conversation with McIver, the president of the companies, in April, and told him that there was no vendor's lien on the land in favor of Carter; that the note he gave said nothing about a lien, and that if there was a lien shown it was a forgery. Witness and his wife executed the mortgages to the companies in 1919, and intended it to be a first and second lien on the property.

Upon the pleadings and the testimony the court found that the mortgages given by Thompson and wife to the mortgage and abstract companies, dated April 5, 1919, and upon the entire interest in the lands in controversy, were superior and par