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tended husband independent individual interests in the estate depended . upon her death prior to his; and if he died before her . . the whole object of the trust was at an end. . . . As very properly observed by the counsel for the appellant, there is no trust estate for anybody after the life estate, in case of the death of the contemplated husband prior to that of the plaintiff. It is a direction to transfer and deliver, and to transfer and deliver according to the law of descent, which is nothing more than a declaration of what would necessarily happen if the plaintiff continued to be the owner of the property, and, dying intestate, left persons capable of taking it by descent." Thebaud v. Schemerhorn (1883) 30 Hun (N. Y.) 332, reversing (1881) 61 How. Pr. 200.

In Massachusetts the rule is said to be that a court of equity may decree the determination of a trust where all its purposes have been accomplished, the interests under it have all vested, and all parties beneficially interested desire that it be ended. Re Thurston (1891) 154 Mass. 596, 26 Am. St. Rep. 278, 29 N. E. 853; Sands v. Old Colony Trust Co. (1907) 195 Mass. 575, 81 N. E. 300, 12 Ann. Cas. 837.

g. Miscellaneous.

It has been said that mere improvidence in a deed of trust is not sufficient of itself to warrant a court in annulling it, but that it may be a circumstance of much weight in determining the settlor's knowledge of its contents. Whitridge v. Whitridge (1892) 76 Md. 54, 24 Atl. 645.

It has been held in England that a voluntary settlement by a young lady shortly after she became of age may be set aside on the ground of improvidence and having regard to the age of the settlor, though there is no evidence of any fraud, undue influence, or unfairness. Everitt v. Everitt (1870) L. R. 10 Eq. (Eng.) 405. See also Prideaux v. Lonsdale (1863) 1 De G. J. & S. 433, 46 Eng. Reprint, 172.

Where a woman, in contemplation of marriage, makes a deed of trust for her benefit during her life, the

fact that she subsequently desires to regain possession of the property and asserts an ability to manage it is not, of itself, a ground for setting aside the trust. Falk v. Turner (1869) 101 Mass. 494. In that case the bill alleged false representations, undue influence, and mistake of law and fact. By the deed she conveyed all her then estate, real and personal, to the defendant (who was a merchant), to hold and manage for her exclusive benefit, during her life, and notwithstanding any marriage which she might contract; said trust to be terminable at any time when in the opinion of the trustee it should be for the best interest of the plaintiff to bring it to an end, but, if it should continue until the plaintiff's death, then the trust fund to be subject to her appointment by will, or, in default of such appointment, to be paid to her children then living and the issue of any deceased child in equal shares, she being at the time of executing the deed a widow with minor children, issue of a prior marriage. The court said, as to her claim of ability to manage the property as a ground for granting the relief asked: "One of the leading purposes of a deed of trust made in contemplation of marriage usually is to disable the wife from disposing of the property while under the influence of her husband, and thus relieve her from exposure to such influence. The bill avers that she now desires to regain the possession and management of the property and has the ability to manage it. Nothing appears in the case to raise a doubt as to her ability, either at present or when she made the deed. But the ability of the cestui que trust to manage the property, or his desire to do so, has never been recognized as a ground for setting aside a trust."

However in Nightingale v. Nightingale (1880) 13 R. I. 113, a trust was set aside on a bill brought by a married woman to terminate it. The trust had been created by her in contemplation of her subsequent marriage with the respondent, and did not in any way break the course of descent of the property. It was to go to her ap

pointees by will, and, if no will, to those who would be her heirs by law. The trustee was, on her request, to permit her to receive rents and make repairs, and he was to sell and reinvest on her request, and, if she survived her husband, to convey the property to her. The trust was created in consequence of a promise made by her to her father, before his decease. The court granted the relief asked for, referring to the changes relating to the property of married women as justifying the decree. It was said: "Since said promise was made, to carry out which the deed was executed, the law regarding the law of property of married women has been so far changed that a married woman can at any time have a trustee appointed to manage and hold her property; she can receive the rents of it herself, and can thus have as full control of it as she could under this trust, except that she cannot sell certain sorts of property without her husband joining in the conveyance. We see no good reason why a decree should not be made for a reconveyance, discharged of the trust."

In Burton v. Burton (1923) 198 Ky. 429, 248 S. W. 1031, the trust attacked and attempted to be set aside was created by a widow, in contemplation of her second marriage, for the benefit of herself, with remainders at her death to her two children. Among other reasons for setting the trust aside, it was alleged that if it were allowed to stand it would result in injustice to a child by the second marriage. There was no allegation of fraud, mistake, or undue influence. The court said: "In this connection it properly may be remarked that neither the averment of the petition nor argument of appellant's counsel that the trust in question, if allowed to stand, will result in injustice to her after-born child, the offspring of her second marriage, can add any force to the appellant Edmonia T. Burton's right to the relief sought in the action, when it is considered that the deed creating the trust was admittedly made by her in contemplation of her second marriage, and presumably in contemplation of the future birth of

other children to her as a result thereof; and the further fact, also, is considered that the granting to her of the relief she seeks would result in the enforcement of no remedy in behalf of the child of her second marriage, for the prayer of her petition is that the deed of trust executed by her be canceled, the trust revoked, and she be adjudged the owner in fee, and restored to the possession of the property now held by the trustee."

In Re Thurston (1891) 154 Mass. 596, 26 Am. St. Rep. 278, 29 N. E. 853, it appeared that the petitioner created a trust for the purpose of placing her property beyond the control or interference of her husband. The deed, which contained no power of revocation, gave her the right to appoint by will, "and in default of such appointment to the issue of said Sarah O. Billings, by right of representation, equal shares, and if she shall die without having exercised her power of appointment herein reserved to her, and without leaving issue then surviving, then unto the heirs of her the said Sarah O. Billings." After the execution of the trust deed she obtained a divorce and remarried. She had three children by her first marriage, all of whom were minors at the time of the hearing of her petition to terminate the trust. The petition was dismissed on the ground that other children of the petitioner may be born, who, in default of appointment by her last will and testament, would, with any other of her issue, take the trust fund upon her decease, and that her children now living are minors, and have no power to make assent to the prayer of said petition upon which the court can act. On an appeal the decree was affirmed, the court declaring that a voluntary settlement which has been completely executed cannot be revoked or set aside, except on proof of mental incapacity, mistake, fraud, or undue influence. The court further said: "But if she had retained such a power it would have defeated the object of the settlement, which was, as she alleges, to place the propery beyond the interference or control of her husband."

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Kopp v. Gunther (1892) 95 Cal. 63, 30 Pac. 301, was an action to have a certain conveyance of lands by the plaintiff to the defendant decreed to create a mere naked legal trust, and to compel the defendant to convey the lands to the plaintiff. At the time of the conveyance referred to, it appeared that the defendant executed a written instrument, in which, after reciting that the plaintiffs had conveyed the lots to the defendant in trust, he accepted the trust and agreed to carry it out according to the declaration of trust set forth in the plaintiff's will, which was made the same day. The facts alleged were in substance as follows: The plaintiff, at the time of the execution of these instruments, was advanced in years and in feeble health, and was harassed by an unconscionable suit brought against him by a woman who wanted damages for an alleged breach of promise of marriage. Being oppressed by illness and anxiety about the suit, he sought the advice of the defendant, in whom he had confidence, and under these circumstances, and being thereto advised by the defendant, he executed the instruments. In the execution of the instruments, the plaintiff understood and believed that he was making a testamentary disposition of his property; and he did not intend thereby to place his real estate or any portion of his property beyond his control, or understand that he was doing so. The deed expressed a consideration of $5,000, but no consideration was paid, and it was executed "solely for the purpose of securing defendant for small amounts of money to be loaned to plaintiff by defendant, and as a part of his last will, as aforesaid." Since then, the suit for breach of promise of marriage had been tried, and judgment thereon was duly given and made in favor of the plaintiff for his costs. It was further averred that the "plaintiff has revoked said will and every part thereof, and has also revoked the naked trust, if any, created by said conveyance." It was also averred that the defendant had advanced to the plaintiff about $300; that the plaintiff had offered to pay

said sum, and was ready to pay any other indebtedness which might be found due the defendant; had demanded a reconveyance and tendered to the defendant a deed to be executed by him; but that the defendant had refused to execute such deed. The court held that a demurrer thereto was properly sustained, as the complaint contained no averments of undue influence, fraud, or any other of the ordinary grounds on which the avoidance of solemn conveyances of property were usually based.

In Austin v. Austin (1885) 18 Neb. 306, 22 N. W. 116, the action was brought to set aside a deed of trust given by the plaintiff to his wife in trust for himself and family, his apparent purpose being a desire to prevent his children from getting his remaining property. Several years afterwards they separated, following which the action to set aside the deed was brought. The court, in refusing to grant the relief asked for, said: "The defendant frankly admits in the answer that certain property named therein was transferred to her for the use and support of her husband and family. It would subserve no good purpose to review the evidence at length. Both the plaintiff and defendant, evidently, are worthy persons, and had they resided at a place remote from their children, in all probability no differences would have arisen between them. The property was deliberately conveyed and transferred by the plaintiff to the defendant for the use of himself and wife. A considerable portion of the real estate has been conveyed to innocent third parties, who should be protected in their purchases. The trust is clearly established, and having been deliberately created by the plaintiff, we see no sufficient reason for setting it aside."

In Filley v. Fownes (1913) 81 N. J. Eq. 498, 87 Atl. 439, it appeared that the bill was filed to compel the defendants, the daughter and son-in-law of complainants, to account for a trust estate, and to compel a reconveyance of the properties so conveyed in trust. The trust was created by the com

plainants, an aged couple, and consisted of a conveyance of various properties to their daughter for the purpose of protecting the complainants against their own improvidence, as well as for protecting certain interest of the daughter therein. The court, in holding that the trust would be enforced, said: "The vice chancellor, after hearing the testimony, found that the trust had been fairly administered, and except for the purpose of assuring the complainants in the future administration.of the estate, by substituting a trust company of this state as trustee in the place of Mrs. Fownes, who was a resident of Pennsylvania, the deed of trust was upheld. Our examination of the testimony and the record leads us to concur in the view of the learned vice chancellor that the trust created by these complaints was irrevocable; that the terms of the trust were declared in the written document creating it; that the trust thus created was sufficiently manifested to comply with the requirements of the Statute of Frauds; and that the complainants, in creating it, were fully cognizant of its purpose and effect, and were properly advised as to their legal rights under it. We find in the case no evidence of fraud or of undue influence, and under such circumstances the equitable rule is clear that where a voluntary trust is created for the benefit, wholly or partly, of a person other than the grantor creating it, and the relation of trustee and cestui que trust is thus established, it will be enforced."

In Collins v. Collins (1874) 56 N. Y. 668, the action was brought to compel a reconveyance of certain premises, formerly conveyed by the plaintiff to the defendant. The husband of the plaintiff purchased the property in question, which was a hotel, together with a large assortment of furniture therein, and caused it to be conveyed to the plaintiff, his wife. He was engaged in making repairs when he was taken sick and died. The plaintiff, his widow, and four children by a former wife, survived him. Upon his deathbed, his property being encumbered,

and he owing a large amount of debts, he requested the defendant, his brother, to take charge of his business and the property after his death, manage the same, and do the best possible therewith for the benefit of his wife and children, and he requested the plaintiff to convey the property to his said brother for that purpose. After his death the plaintiff conveyed the property as desired to the defendant, who thereupon took charge of the same, and advanced large sums of his own funds in discharging liens and encumbrances. The court below decided that the plaintiff was not entitled to a reconveyance, but that, by the deed, the defendant became the owner in fee for the benefit of the plaintiff and the children of the deceased, and judgment was directed that the property be sold by a referee, and out of the proceeds the defendant be reimbursed his advances, expenses, and disbursements, and also be allowed for his services; and that the residue be divided into five equal parts, one part to be paid to the plaintiff and one to each of the children. It was held that the plaintiff had no right in the premises capable of assertion, either at law or in equity, and that she, at least, had no reason to complain of the judgment.

In Parker v. Allen (1890) 36 N. Y. S. R. 671, 14 N. Y. Supp. 265, wherein the court refused to cancel a trust deed executed by a woman, but granted relief by way of reformation, it was said: "It clearly appears from her own evidence, as well as that of Mr. Parker, who drew the deed, that it was desired and intended by it to place her property, through its instrumentality, beyond her own control. She distrusted her ability to resist the influence or importunities of others who might endeavor to overreach her and obtain her property from her, and for that reason was anxious to place it beyond her own immediate control; and the creation of a trust having that effect was voluntarily and understandingly accepted by her, and, so far as the deed has been directed to that object, it appears to have conformed to her

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she says that she did not intend to place her property beyond her own control. But at the same time she did intend to create a trust which would —as it has prevent her from encumbering or disposing of her property; and with that intention in view she could not have anticipated or expected that she would still be at liberty to control her estate. These objects are plainly incompatible, and the latter necessarily yielded to the former, as that was the paramount and controlling intention leading to the creation of the trust. Without the surrender of the future power of encumbrance and disposition the trust would fail of the object, for she would then be left as completely subject to the influence and control of others as if the trust were not created at all. . . . This deed cannot, therefore, be set aside because it contains no power for its revocation. But, to sustain it, the law does require that it shall appear to have been explained to and understood by her before she executed it. . . . And to the extent already considered, that has been proved to be the fact. But as to the direction which the estate shall take after her decease, the evidence does not supply that degree of support to the deed. It was not explained to her that, in the event that her son or daughter died before herself, the entire estate would unqualifiedly go to the survivor of these two children, which would disinherit the children of her deceased child, if any there should be, dying during her own life; and there is not the slightest evidence that she ever intended that possible result. As to this part of the deed it is in conflict with the principle just mentioned. And so it is as to the fact, proved by the evidence, that this direction was regarded by her as her will, which, if it had been true, would have rendered her estate subject to her future disposition by a subsequent will. It was also the understanding that she herself should be empowered, on ten days' notice, to set aside the trustees nominated in the deed, and select another to act in their place, and that

has been wholly omitted from the deed by inadvertence and oversight in the hurry of preparing it. In these respects it cannot be sustained, and might be wholly set aside for failure to secure to her the power to change the final disposition of her estate by a last will. But it is not necessary that it should be, and the exercise of that power should not be made, for the defendant would thereby be exposed to the effect of such influences as she feared, and which it was her design to guard against, and which it is also the duty of the court to prevent her from being exposed to. The law requires her to be subjected to no such risk, for it permits the deed to be so changed in these respects as to harmonize it with the intention inducing its execution."

In Reese v. Ruth (1826) 13 Serg. & R. (Pa.) 434, the action was for money had and received etc. brought by the plaintiff below against the plaintiffs in error. On the trial of the cause the plaintiff gave in evidence a deed of trust from herself to the defendants, conveying to them all her interest in the estate of her deceased husband "to be put out at interest during her life, for her only proper use and benefit, and to be paid over, after her decease, as she, by any instrument of writing, purporting to be her will, should order and direct, and for want of such will to such persons as should by law be entitled to the same, such part thereof as, after paying her debts and funeral expenses, should remain in either of the defendant's hands; allowing the plaintiff, during her life, a sufficient and comfortable competency for her support, as they may judge necessary and proper." The plaintiff gave evidence, also, that the defendants had received a considerable sum on her account from the administrator of her deceased husband, and had given their refunding bond, as required by law, on receipt of the same. She also gave evidence that she had been illtreated by the defendants, and not supported and maintained according to the trust. On the other hand, the defendants gave evidence by which they endeavored

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