intended to be amended by the bill, is not fatal, where the in-
tention to amend the section then in force is apparent. Id.
4. A bill, disclosing in its title a purpose to amend the general
drain law, was read twice by title and referred to committee,
who reported back a substitute with a title disclosing a pur-
pose to provide for the election of a drain commissioner in
Berrien county. Held, that it must be presumed that the
purpose of the original bill was the same as that disclosed by
the title to the substitute, and that therefore the substitute
was germane to the purpose of the original and a valid enact-
ment, though not presented by the committee until after ex-
piration of the 50-day limit for the introduction of bills. Id.
5. A title of an act, in substance and effect declaring its purpose
to be to amend the charter of a named city, stating the sec-
tions of the old charter amended and the sections added, and
setting out the general purpose of the amendatory law, is
sufficient under section 20 of article 4 of the Constitution.
Attorney General, ex rel. Hooper, v. Loomis, 547.
6. A local act (Act No. 392, Local Acts 1905), amendatory of a
city charter, and establishing a municipal court and peace
officers for the city, is not invalid under section 25 of article 4
of the Constitution because failing to set out sections of the
general laws of the State which are thereby amended by im-
plication. Id.
7. The title of Act No. 364, Local Acts 1905, viz., " An act to pro-
vide for the locating and establishing of drains within the
county of Ionia," sufficiently gives notice that the act is an
original one so far as the county is concerned, and that any
constitutional provision in regard to the construction of drains
is admissible under it in the body of the bill, and hence is suffi-
cient, under article 4, §20, of the Constitution. Rice v. Ionia
Probate Judge, 692.
8. Act No. 364, Local Acts 1905, providing for the locating and
establishing of drains in Ionia county, section 2 of which pre-
scribes certain preliminary steps as a condition of action
"under the general law," does not attempt to revise, alter, or
amend the general drain law, within the meaning of article 4,
§ 25, of the Constitution, requiring an act revised, or a section
altered or amended, to be re-enacted and published at length,
but merely supplements the general law with some additional
requirements in respect to Ionia county. Id.
9. The policy of a law is for the legislature, and not for the
courts, to consider, and, so long as the law is capable of enforce-
ment, it must be sustained, no matter how strict the require-
ments are or what difficulty may be encountered in enforcing
them. Id. 693.
10. Courts are bound to endeavor, by every rule of construction,
to ascertain the meaning of, and to give full force and effect
to, every enactment of the legislature not obnoxious to consti-
tutional prohibitions. Albert v. Gibson, 698.
See APPEAL AND ERROR (3); CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (4, 6);
DRAINS (4); JUSTICES OF THE PEACE (2).
STREET RAILROADS-See CARRIERS (2, 8); TAXATION (1).
1. The principal business office of a street-railroad company, for
the purpose of fixing the place of paying its personal-property
tax under the statute (§ 3831, subd. 16, 1 Comp. Laws), is in
the city in which its banking is done and all its officers and
directors reside and have their business offices, and not in the
village where stockholders' meetings are held and its general
books kept, notwithstanding it has designated the village in
its articles of incorporation as its principal business office.
Detroit, etc., Ry. v. City of Detroit, 5.
2. The right of action for trespass on lands that have been bid in
for the State for delinquent taxes belongs to the State and
not to the owner of the original title. Blake v. Grondin, 104.
3. Where a decree for the sale of lands delinquent for taxes was
made on the date fixed for hearing the petition, but the court
was in session 19 days thereafter before the decree was present-
ed to the register in chancery, and no objection was filed to the
tax, the decree, not being a decree until received, counter-
signed, and entered by the register, was made after the ex-
piration of the five days' notice provided by Act No. 206, § 66,
Pub. Acts 1893, and was therefore valid. Wolverine Land
Co. v. Davis, 187.
4. Double taxation, in order to violate the constitutional rule of
uniformity, must exist within this State, our courts not being
concerned with taxes levied outside the State.
Thrall v.
Guiney, 392.
5. Under section 3831, 1 Comp. Laws, shares of stock in a foreign
corporation owning property within and without the State,
belonging to a resident of this State, are properly assessed to
him here; the investment represented by such stock not be-
ing property actually and permanently invested in busi-
ness in another State" within clause 5 of the statute cited.
Id.
6. A resident of this State owning shares of stock in a foreign
corporation which owns property in this and several other
States, on which it pays taxes according to the law of the
States where the property is situated, cannot complain of an
assessment to him in this State of the value of his shares
diminished by the proportion which the value of the corpora-
tion's property in this State bears to its whole property. Id.
7. One who has the benefit of a construction of a tax law which,
as construed, affects him no differently than it does any
other citizen of the State owning property of the same class,
cannot complain that his assessment violates the fourteenth
amendment of the Constitution of the United States. Id.
8. The inheritance tax law of 1899 (Act No. 188) has no applica-
tion to a transfer affected by a will probated in 1865, devis-
ing an estate to testator's four children, each to hold an un-
divided one-fourth for life, and on the death of each life ten-
ant an undivided one-fourth to go to the grandchildren then
living or to the issue then living of any deceased grandchild.
Miller v. McLaughlin, 425.
9. An objection that copies of the notices of tax sale purchases
were served instead of originals is not tenable where the rec-
ord shows that exact duplicates were served. Williams v.
Olson, 580.
10. The tax law (Act No. 229, Pub. Acts 1897) does not require
that, when a single deed is issued by the auditor general for
the taxes of several years, the notice given by the purchaser
shall show the amount of the taxes for each of the years. Id.
11. The notice of sale of land for taxes is not invalid because direct-
ed to a particular person named as owner where he is in fact
the owner. Id.
12. The notice of sale of land for taxes, required by the statute
(Act No. 229, Pub. Acts 1897) to be served upon the owner
by the sheriff, at the instance of the purchaser, in order to
set running the limitation that will entitle him to possession,
is not jurisdictional, since the parties are already in court,
and the sheriff's return is not conclusive, but the proper ser-
vice of the notice is a fact which must exist, and if ques-
tioned must be shown to exist, before the purchaser will be
entitled to enter, to a writ of assistance, or to maintain
ejectment. Id.
13. The sheriff's return of service of a notice of the sale of land
for taxes is not conclusive, but may be attacked either by
the landowner or the tax title holder in affirmance or in avoid-
ance of the tax title and of acts attempted in reliance upon
it. Id. 581.
14. The sheriff may serve a tax purchase notice by deputy. Id.
15. Where property is assessed to its true owner, a corporation or
association, and not to its trustee, the tax cannot be collected
from the trustee; section 3826, 1 Comp. Laws, providing that
for assessment purposes a trustee may be treated as owner,
and section 3922, relating to errors in assessments, not being
applicable. Township of Homer v. Smith, 586.
See ATTORNEY AND CLIENT; HIGHWAYS AND STREETS (2);
MUNICIPAL Corporations (13-17).
1. A demand by a tenant in common of personalty for the exclu-
sive control of the property, and a refusal of such demand by
a tenant in possession, does not amount to a conversion.
Parke v. Nixon, 267.
2. Where the purchaser of real estate, at a sale under order of the
probate court, took immediate and exclusive possession of
the entire property, and neither he nor his grantees ever ad-
mitted a tenancy in common, but entered and occupied un-
der a deed purporting to convey the entire interest in the
property, their occupancy was adverse to the claim of a ten-
ant in common, and, being continued for the statutory per-
iod, barred his rights. Payment v. Murphy, 626.
See ESTOPPEL (2); PRINCIPAL AND AGENT (5).
TORTS See MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS (22).
TOWNSHIP OFFICERS-See MANDAMUS (3).
A township is not entitled to recover damages for injuries to
its highways, bridges, and culverts, caused by the enlarge-
ment of artificial watercourses by the authorities of adjoin-
ing townships and counties. Township of Merritt v. Harp,
233.
1. Where a declaration in trespass for assault and battery charges
defendant with shooting plaintiff "wantonly, willfully, and
maliciously, and without provocation, justification, or legal
cause," and the evidence shows that defendant, a police offi-
cer, without right, attempted to arrest plaintiff, and shot
several times in his direction to stop him, an instruction sub-
mitting the case to the jury on the theory of a negligent
shooting is harmless to defendant. Johnson v. Mack, 99.
2. In trespass for removing fences from premises claimed by
plaintiff, and alleged by defendant to be a highway, the
court instructed that "on the part of plaintiff, *** who
has the burden of proof to show that a wrong has been com-
mitted against him, the issue becoming one as to whether
this was a public and lawful way, the plaintiff claims that it
was not, and that he had a right to inclose the strip of land."
In a subsequent part of the charge the jury were told that
they must find for plaintiff, unless they found that the road
was established as claimed by defendant. Held, that, taking
the charge as a whole, plaintiff could not complain that the
burden was cast on him to show that the alleged highway
was not a lawful road. Neal v. Gilmore, 519.
See NEGLIGENCE (3); TAXATION (2).
1. In an action for loss of profits, resulting from the shutting
down of plaintiff's mill in consequence of defendant's negli-
gence, the admission of testimony that the mill had orders
enough to keep it running, without requiring the production
of the orders, is not erroneous as against a mere general ob-
jection of irrelevancy and immateriality, though the orders
were the best evidence. Michigan Paper Co. v. Kalamazoo
Valley Electric Co., 48.
2. A verdict should be directed for defendant where, under the
evidence, the jury cannot find against him without basing
their finding on a pure guess as to which one of several pos-
sible causes produced a certain result. Fuller v. Ann Arbor
R. Co., 66.
3. Where, on the trial of an action for personal injuries, plain-
tiff, on cross-examination of defendant's expert, who had
made an examination of plaintiff, showed that he carried
away some pus discharged from plaintiff's womb, for the pur-
pose of making a microscopical examination, but there was
nothing in the testimony to indicate that such examination
was not necessary, or that the witness was moved by a pur-
pose or desire to discover that plaintiff was afflicted with
gonorrhea or syphilis, a statement by plaintiff's counsel, in
argument to the jury, that such microscopical examination
was unnecessary, and had been made by the witness for the
purpose or with the desire of discovering that plaintiff was
afflicted with gonorrhea or syphilis, was prejudicial to de-
fendant, and was not cured by mere remarks by the court
that none of the physicians had reason to believe that there
was any reason for them to look for such disorders, and that
the remarks of counsel were unwarranted, though plaintiff's
counsel thereupon stated that he would drop the matter,
and requested the court to instruct the jury on the point,
to which the court stated that all that was essential had been
said on the subject. Remey v. Detroit United Ry., 117.
4. Counsel cannot, in his opening statement, cover a case not
made in the declaration. Douglas v. Marsh, 209.
5. Plaintiff cannot complain of an instruction relative to a theory
favorable to defendant on the ground that defendant pre-
sented no such theory, where plaintiff brought it out himself
by cross-examination. Parke v. Nixon, 267.
6. A request, assuming as true facts not proved, is properly re-
fused. Id.
7. Refusal of the court to require production before the jury of
articles of wearing apparel claimed to have been injured by
defendant, held, not an abuse of discretion, defendant's wit-
nesses having been given full opportunity to inspect them
before trial. Withey v. Pere Marquette R. Co., 413.
Instructions, see TRESPASS (1); TRUSTS (2).
TROVER AND CONVERSION-See SALES (8); TENANCY IN COM.
MON (1).
1. A trustee of funds invested in bank at a low rate of interest,
being in need of ready money in his business, and owning
houses let at good rental, proposed to the beneficiaries of the
trust, who were intelligent women of mature years, that they
purchase the houses with the trust funds, which, after con-
sideration, they did, at what appeared at the time to be a fair
valuation, and afterwards received the rents. Held, that the
beneficiaries could not, more than four years afterwards, after
the trustee's death, and after the houses had depreciated in
value owing to a general depreciation in the neighborhood,
repudiate the transaction and have the sale set aside. Skeld
ing v. Dean, 143.
2. An instruction that leaves the jury to infer that there are cir-
cumstances to sustain the testimony of the only witness testi-
fying to the existence of a parol trust, when in fact there are
none, and the circumstances are in direct hostility to such a
claim, is erroneous. Botsford v. Bradfield, 370.
|