no money has been provided by the township for payment of the order, because the clerk of the township, respondent below, declined to certify the amounts due upon the order as sums to be included in the budget of the township. Relator filed its petition in the circuit court for the county of Grand Traverse for a mandamus to compel the clerk to make the necessary and proper certification, so that a tax could be spread to pay the amount due on the order. To this petition an answer was filed, and a replication, which called for the framing of issues, and 25 issues were framed and ordered to be submitted to be determined as issues of fact. The matter was brought to hearing before the court and a jury. The answer of the respondent to the order to show cause alleges various reasons why the contract made for the road roller ought not to be performed on the part of the township, and sets out conduct of the supervisor, at the time the contract was procured and the order given, in support of the claim that proper official. action was wanting. In the progress of the hearing in the circuit court, the supervisor, whose name appears in the action to purchase the machine, was called as a witness for relator and gave testimony. The jury were excused from the court-room, and the court said to counsel, among other things: "The action of the township board as such is necessary to constitute a legal contract or agreement for the purchase of this machine. Whatever it may be, under the statute some action must be taken. In this case, the supervisor's testimony is that he was to receive and did receive compensation from the owners of the machine. This compensation consisted in pay for the time which he spent in working for them. In this case it was only $22.50 -probably an amount that was not more than sufficient to pay him, but in the view that I take of the matter it does not matter. It is not material whether he received from the seller of the machine $1 or $100. An officer acting for and in behalf of the township cannot be in the employ of a party contracting with the township in relation to the very matter which is to come before the board, and the fact that in this case the compensation was none too much, probably, I consider is entirely immaterial, and the fact that the parties were honest and that he was acting in an honest manner-simply got his day's pay-is immaterial also. The policy of the law is not such that these wholesalers can go around and employ township officers to go around with them in order to get the article sold, and then sit on the township board and act in behalf of the township. Now, for this reason, it seems to me that, unless this testimony is to be contradicted, the facts that I have indicated would be conclusive of the question in this case." After hearing from counsel, the jury were recalled, and the supervisor was again called to the stand and gave further testimony, which, while it may be said to soften, in no way changes, the facts as stated by the trial judge. The court thereupon iustructed the jury that there was no question for their consideration, discharged them, and denied the writ. It seems to be conceded upon the record that the township never accepted or used the road roller. Counsel for respondent states in his brief that the "sole question decided by the circuit court was that the so-called order was voidable by having been obtained by means contrary to public policy." The granting of the writ of mandamus by a court involves to some extent the exercise of discretion. The relator occupies no different position, and has no greater legal or equitable right to consideration, than its assignor would have. The determination of the court below was warranted, and the judgment is affirmed. MOORE, C. J., and CARPENTER, MCALVAY, and HOOKER, JJ., concurred. 141 408 f151 127 141 408 157 41 PLEADING. JONES v. WAYNE CIRCUIT JUDGE. PROPRIETY OF REMEDY LEAVE TO FILE AMENDED This court will not interfere by mandamus to compel a circuit judge to vacate an order denying a motion for leave to file amended pleadings, the order being reviewable on error after judgment. Mandamus by Clarence R. Jones, administrator de bonis non of the estate of James A. Jones, deceased, to compel Henry A. Mandell, circuit judge of Wayne county, to vacate an order denying a motion to file an amended declaration. Submitted November 15, 1904. (Calendar No. 20,633.) Writ denied September 28, 1905. Lehmann & Riggs, for relator. John D. Conely, for respondent. PER CURIAM. The question in this case is whether this court should interfere by mandamus to compel the circuit judge to vacate an order denying a motion for leave to file an amended declaration; said motion having been made before trial of the cause, which has not yet taken place. An The question is properly reviewable on error after judgment, if the proper exception was taken, by including the proceedings in the bill of exceptions. See People v. derson, 53 Mich. 60; Pangborn v. Insurance Co., 67 Mich. 683; Skutt v. Kent Circuit Judge, 136 Mich. 477; Snyder v. Quarton, 47 Mich. 211. This being so, mandamus will not lie. The writ will be denied. WILKINSON v. DUNKLEY-WILLIAMS CO. APPEAL AND ERROR-DECREE GRANTING INJUNCTION-EFFECT OF Though the effect of an appeal from a decree granting a per- Contempt proceedings by Thomas L. Wilkinson against the Dunkley-Williams Company for violating an injunction. Submitted July 26, 1905. (Calendar No. 20,623.) Application granted September 28, 1905. Samuel H. Kelley, for petitioner. MOORE, C. J. The complainant filed an injunction bill. A preliminary injunction was granted in the court below, and, after a hearing, a permanent injunction was decreed as prayed. The case was appealed to this court, and an appeal bond in the sum of $5,000 was given. The case has been heard and affirmed in this court. See 139 Mich. 621. It is the claim of complainant that pending the appeal the defendant violated the provisions of the injunction, and he seeks in this proceeding to have it punished for contempt. It is the claim of defendant, first, that, if the injunction is in force pending the appeal, it has not violated its terms; and, second, that the effect of appealing the case here, and giving the bond, is to stay all proceedings pending the appeal, and to do away with the effect of the injunction. There can be no doubt that the effect of the appeal is to 141 409 $150 253 bring the case into this court and to stay all proceedings in the circuit court. See section 551, 1 Comp. Laws; Daily v. Litchfield, 11 Mich. 497; Beal v. Chase, 31 Mich. 490; Day v. De Jonge, 66 Mich. 550; Petrie v. Muskegon Circuit Judge, 98 Mich. 130; Wright v. King, 107 Mich. 660. It does not follow, however, that where an appeal is taken from a decree granting an injunction that the terms of the injunction may be ignored. In Brevoort v. City of Detroit, 24 Mich. 322, upon the filing of the bill a preliminary injunction was granted. Upon the hearing the bill was dismissed. An appeal was taken to this court, and pending the appeal an application was made here to have defendants punished for contempt. This court held that the appeal from a decree dismissing the bill did not revive the injunction and that the defendants were not liable as for contempt. In 2 Enc. Pl. & Prac. p. 326, it is said: "Appeals from Orders Affecting Injunctions. Thus an appeal from a decree granting, refusing, or dissolving an injunction does not disturb its operative effect, unless the trial judge in allowing an appeal therefrom is vested with discretion to make and does make an order suspending or modifying the injunction during the pendency of the appeal." In the note it is said: 66 'An appeal from an injunction order, even with a supersedeas bond, does not vacate or suspend it. The defendant must abstain from doing the prohibited thing until reversal or be guilty of contempt. In 16 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law (2d Ed.), p. 436, it is said: "The violation of an injunction pending an appeal is a contempt, and is punishable as such. It is well settled that an appeal from an order granting an injunction or from a decree for a perpetual injunction does not operate as a supersedeas, and does not permit the defendant to disregard the injunction." See Kentucky, etc., Bridge Co. v. Krieger, 91 Ky. 625. In Sixth Avenue R. Co. v. Gilbert Elevated R. Co., 71 N. Y. 430, it was said: |