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ed Mr. Hutchison as a witness, and he denied that either Mr. Reynolds or himself imparted any knowledge to the bank with reference to what the bond was given for. His attention was also called to the conversation between Mr. Wilson, Mr. Reynolds, and himself. He admitted a conversation, but denied such a conversation occurred. The testimony objected to was admitted only for the purpose of bearing upon his credibility. We think it was admissible for that purpose.

Error is assigned because the court permitted testimony to be given of what William M. Thompson, then president of the bank, said about extending the time of payment of the bond after it became due. It was the claim of defendant that the bank never bought the bond, that it was acting all through the transaction for the Hutchison Manufacturing Company, and that the statement made by the president of the bank at this time tended to support this claim. We think the testimony was competent as bearing upon that question. When the case was here before it was held the bond was not valid in the hands of the Hutchison Manufacturing Company, and that it was incumbent upon the plaintiffs to show the bond was purchased without notice of its infirmities. Without repeating what was said we call attention to the language of Justice HOOKER in 127 Mich., at pages 528 and 529. The trial court, in a careful and impartial charge, left the question to the jury whether there was proof of a bona fide purchase. The jury found in favor of defendant. Judgment should be affirmed.

BLAIR, J., did not sit.

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WOLVERINE LAND CO. v. DAVIS.

TAXATION-SALES-DECREE-ENTRY-VALIDITY.

Where a decree for the sale of lands delinquent for taxes was made on the date fixed for hearing the petition, but the court was in session 19 days thereafter before the decree was presented to the register in chancery, and no objection was filed to the tax, the decree, not being a decree until received, countersigned, and entered by the register, was made after the expiration of the five days' notice provided by Act No. 206, § 66, Pub. Acts 1893, and was therefore valid.

Appeal from Oakland; Smith, J. Submitted January 12, 1905. (Docket No. 52.) Decided September 19, 1905.

Petition by the Wolverine Land Company against Daniel L. Davis and others for a writ of assistance. From a decree dismissing the petition, petitioners appeal. Reversed.

R. S. Woodliff and D. W. Closser, for petitioner.
P. B. Bromley, for defendants.

HOOKER, J. Petitioner appealed from a decree of the circuit court denying a writ of assistance to put it in possession of premises by virtue of a tax deed. The auditor general's petition for the sale of delinquent tax lands was filed July 29, 1896, and an order obtained setting September 21, 1896, as the date upon which the matter would be heard. The decree bore date September 21, 1896, but was not presented to the register in chancery until November 11th following, on which date he countersigned and entered it. Sale was made December 7th, and a certificate of sale issued to Baldwin, and on May 3, 1898, he received a tax deed. On May 29, 1903, the executors of his estate deeded the premises to the petitioner, and the petition for writ of assistance was filed. It was claimed on the hear

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ing, and the circuit court held, that the decree was premature and void. The September, 1896, term of the circuit court convened on September 21st, and was in session 19 full days before November 11th. No objection was filed to the tax by any one at any time.

The testimony shows beyond dispute that this decree was not received by the register in chancery until November 11th, when he countersigned, filed; and entered it. Although it was dated September 21st, the date fixed by the order of publication as the date on which the tax petition would be heard, this cannot be considered to have been a decree before it was received by the register. See Sellers v. Botsford, 9 Mich. 490; Newbould v. Stewart, 15 Mich. 155; Kingsbury v. Kingsbury, 20 Mich. 215. It was therefore made after the expiration of the five days provided by the statute. We have held that where a decree has been rendered, and the court adjourned sine die without sitting five days after the time fixed for hearing the tax proceeding, the decree was void. We have never held, however, that this was so where the court was shown to have been in session the requisite period, and we have intimated that, although a decree may be entered before the expiration of the five days mentioned in section 66, Act No. 206, Pub. Acts 1893, and no one has appeared and filed objections, with a showing that he had been prevented from filing them earlier without fault on his part, the decree is not rendered void. The law contemplates that the court will adjudicate upon such a showing; not that the application necessarily gives a right to file objections and have them heard. In such a case, if the judge should deny the application, his decision would be final, if not appealed from; and, as we have said, the fact that a decree had been entered would not preclude his granting the application. But, where the court has adjourned without sitting the requisite five days, another question is presented, and we have held that, there being in such case an abridgment of the statutory opportunity for presenting this application, the decree was made void. We

think the subject is fully covered by the cases cited, viz.: Youngs v. Clark, 120 Mich. 528; Gates v. Johnson, 121 Mich. 664; Brown v. Mining Co., 123 Mich. 117; Brown v. Napper, 125 Mich. 117; Allen v. Cowley, 128 Mich. 531; Peninsular Sav. Bank v. Ward, 118 Mich. 93; McGinley v. Mining Co., 121 Mich. 89.

The decree is reversed, and a decree will be entered granting the prayer of the petition, and with costs of both. courts.

MOORE, C. J., and CARPENTER, MONTGOMERY, and OSTRANDER, JJ., concurred.

PEOPLE v. COLBATH.

1. CRIMINAL LAW-EVIDENCE-AGE-COMPETENCY.

Though as a general rule a person is competent to testify to his own age, where it appears that he has no recollection of his mother, and no information on the subject from relatives, or other members of his family, his opinion, based on the statements of other persons, is not evidence, and the statements of such persons are hearsay.

2. SAME-CROSS-EXAMINATION-MATERIALITY.

Where a witness has testified to the age of prosecutrix in statutory rape, and stated that there is a record thereof, and it has been given to defendant's counsel, the witness cannot be cross-examined as to the ages of the other children shown by the record, unless it is shown how such cross-examination is material.

3. SAME-INSTRUCTIONS.

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For the court, in his charge in a prosecution for statutory rape, to refer to prosecutrix as 'the little girl," if error, is harmless.

MOORE, C. J, and BLAIR and OSTRANDER, JJ., dissenting.

Error to Bay; Shepard, J. Submitted February 16, 1905. (Docket No. 269.) Decided September 19, 1905.

Iram E. Colbath was convicted of statutory rape and sentenced to imprisonment for not less than six and not more than twelve years in the branch of the State prison at Marquette. Affirmed.

Pierce & Kinnane, for appellant.

John E. Bird, Attorney General, Brakie J. Orr, Prosecuting Attorney, and R. T. Waddle, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for the people.

HOOKER, J. It is the general rule that a person is competent to testify to his own age. When, however, it appears that he has no recollection of his mother, and has no information upon the subject from his relatives or other members of the family, his opinion, based on the statements of other persons, is not evidence, while the statements of such persons are hearsay. In this cause the defendant's counsel sought to introduce evidence of such statements through cross-examination of the witness, who had not been asked upon direct examination to state her age. It was inadmissible, and the court did not err in excluding it. The fact that she was defendant's victim, or even complaining witness, does not affect the question, which is measured by the rule applicable to any witness.

The sister of defendant's alleged victim testified to her age, and stated that she was present at her birth, when she, the witness, was fifteen years old. On cross-examination she was asked if there was a record of Eva's birth, and replied, "Yes; we have it." It was developed that pending these proceedings her brother had written a letter, from which witness' husband had made a record. It is inferable that this letter gave the ages of the children. The letter was not in court, and it does not appear what the record made by the witness' husband showed. This record was produced and given to defendant's counsel, who

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