attainment of national objectives." The Commission report refers approvingly to these recommendations of the task force, and relates them to its general recommendation No. 1 for limiting severely the extent of Federal participation in river basin developments.

Note again the reference by the task force to the attainment of national objectives as a criterion for Federal participation in flood-control measures. What does this mean? Are flood-control measures on the Delaware and its tributaries "essential to the attainment of national objectives"? The administration in Washington had no hesitation in announcing that it would rush flood-relief funds to the Delaware Basin area (although I understand that little, if any, such funds have been made available to date). The Army engineers are now spending Federal flood control funds in the area for rehabilitation work. No question has been raised as to the national interest involved in this work, nor can a question legitimately be raised, in my opinion. Yet under the criteria set forth by the task force, permanent flood control measures, designed to prevent or decrease the severity of flood losses in the future, might not be "essential to the attainment of national objectives" and thus might not be eligible for Federal financing. This would be particularly true of such works on intrastate rivers, including the streams in Pennsylvania which caused so much damage in and near Stroudsburg. For the task force recommends that such intrastate works be planned, built, operated, and maintained by local government units or by the affected State. Built with what, I suggest, since these local governments have no money to finance such projects nor do they have the tax sources on which to levy them?

The hollowness of these criteria becomes self-evident when viewed in the light of a major flood catastrophe. Such disasters, whether interstate or intrastate in scope, quickly outrun the capacity of State and local governments and local private agencies to cope with them. The resources of national agencies, public and private, are promptly brought forward to supplement those of local agencies. Similarly, Federal funds for alleviation or control of future floods of a major character will continue to be needed to supplement State and local funds for this purpose, whether the streams be interstate or intrastate in character.

Clearly, both the general tenor and the specific recommendations of the task force and Commission reports call for less rather than more Federal participation in river basin planning and developments.

Our general approach to the problem of Delaware River Basin development thus leads us to views directly contrary to those expressed in the reports of the Hoover Commission and its task force. We want more, not less, Federal participation and assistance in planning the water resources of the Delaware River Basin. At this planning stage we feel that there should be no artificial limitations on what is to be considered as part of a development plan. If hydroelectric power can feasibly be developed in conjunction with other uses, plans for such development should be presented for consideration and discussion. Also, there should be little concern at this stage as to what is a Federal responsibility and what is State or local. The plan should be prepared with all feasible elements considered, and only then should equitable arrangements be made for sharing the costs.

We view the Hoover Commission and task force recommendations as contributing little, if anything, to the sound and expeditious development of the water resources of the Delaware River Basin. We see the need for more Federal participation than in the past in the planning, undertaking, and financing of a water resources program in the basin. The Hoover Commission and its task force recommend less. We intend to exercise the maximum of local initiative in planning for and carrying out measures for the solution of our water resource problems. But we see no inconsistency in welcoming the help of the Federal Government in a joint mutually supporting program of planning and action to solve our water problems, which, after all, partake of the national, as well as the local and State interest.

Mr. JONES. Now, our next witness will be Commissioner McLean, the representative of the Governor of New Jersey.

Mr. McLEAN. Pleased to meet you.

Gentlemen, I don't have a long prepared statement, except on one aspect, describing the flood situation in the State of New Jersey.

Mr. JONES. Mr. McLean, would you first identify yourself to the reporter?

STATEMENT OF HON. JOSEPH E. McLEAN, COMMISSIONER OF CONSERVATION AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, STATE OF NEW JERSEY, REPRESENTING HON. ROBERT MEYNER, GOVERNOR, STATE OF NEW JERSEY

Mr. MCLEAN. My name is Joseph E. McLean, sir, and I'm Commissioner of Conservation and Economic Development in the State of New Jersey, and, hence, a member of Governor Meyner's cabinet; and, of course, the water problem is one of the responsibilities within our department.

(Additional biographical material on Mr. McLean follows:)

ADDITIONAL BIOGRAPHICAL MATERIAL ON JOSEPH E. MCLEAN

Dr. Joseph E. McLean, who was born in Scranton, July 10, 1915, attended public schools there and then majored in government and politics at Lafayette College from which he was graduated in 1937. He obtained his Ph.D in government and economics from New York University in 1942.

Before he joined the Princeton faculty in 1946, McLean served as a research assistant with the Tax Foundation, Inc., of New York, and as executive secretary of the committee on public administration of the Social Science Research Council. In the latter post he served as a management adviser to Federal war agencies in the early 1940's.

Dr. McLean first went to Princeton in 1943 to take a naval indoctrination course. During the period from 1943 to 1946 he served with the Bureau of Naval Personnel; as an assistant to Vice Admiral Adolphus Andrews, director of the Navy Manpower Survey Board; and later in the executive office of the Secretary of the Navy. In the latter capacity he carried out special assignments on Congressional-Navy liaison, industrial relations, and war mobilization.

In addition to teaching politics at Princeton, Dr. McLean has served as a research associate of Princeton surveys and in various administrative capacities. He also served as a consultant to the State tax policy commission and in 1949-50 was staff director of the New Jersey Commission on the Need for a Medical College.

His experience in government management and fiscal affairs covers a wide range. Federal agencies he has served include the Executive Office of the President, Office of Defense Mobilization, the Air Force, and the Census Bureau of the Department of Commerce.

In 1951 he was director of the Central Jersey District of the Office of Price Stabilization. During the latter part of that year and in 1952 he served as consultant on the East River Project, which set up a national atomic defense plan.

He has written and lectured extensively on numerous public problems. Among his works are a biography of Supreme Court Justice William R. Day, a textbook titled, "State and Local Government," and a volume entitled "Politics Is What You Make It." He served as secretary of the Faulkner Commission on Municipal Government. He directed a management survey of the field offices of the Department of the Interior in 1950.

State activities includes membership on the Law Enforcement Council and the Governor's Committee on Local Health Administration.

Mr. McLEAN. I feel it a privilege, of course, to be here today and to at least offer a few thoughts and ideas, I hope, and perhaps benefit from your thinking on this problem which besets all of us.

It was my feeling that the recent tragic flood dramatized and reemphasized the unity of our region and of our Nation-our region because of the common suffering, and the Nation because of the generosity that seems to characterize the responses to the appeal for those who were damaged by the flood.

At the same time, too, I think the flood emphasized the unity of the water problem. We've had in our own State of New Jersey, particu

larly over the last couple of years, a controversy, strife over solving the water supply problem for the people of the State; but when you tie in such matters as the deepening of the Delaware Channel, the flood problem, the need for potable water supply, the pollution problem, the salt-intrusion problem, and so on, and when, further, you look at the Delaware as a river whose watershed extends among several States, I think we are faced with a problem of real magnitude and we're faced, also, with a very difficult problem of assigning to various governments and government levels one phase of responsibility.

So that, in coming to you today, I come as one, I hope, not dogmatic in my approach, except maybe dogmatic in the belief that there should be cooperation between Federal, State, and local government in tackling a problem of this sort.

I would like to give you, in brief, and, if you wish, leave with you this very up-to-date report on the flood picture in New Jersey on the August 1955 flood. That flood, as you know, in terms of magnitude and as far as damage was concerned, was by far the greatest in New Jersey's history. While floodwaters were high throughout the central and northern portions of the State, the Delaware River and its northern tributaries, Flat Brook and Paulins Kill, reached heights considerably in excess of the great flood of October 1903. And my report goes on to itemize the damage suffered in the various parts of the State, including the types of bridges that are out on the Delaware and including the problem of Sussex County. There, alone, up in the northern part of our State, 47 county bridges were overtopped, of which 16 were severely damaged or destroyed.

Flooding of the Raritan River and its North and South Branches approached records established in 1896 and 1938 which exceeded the 1903 flood in this particular basin. Damages, however, were relatively light. While floodwaters were high on the Passaic River drainage basin, particularly on the Pompton River and its tributaries, losses did not approach those experienced in 1936, 1945 and 1951. On most of the smaller streams in the metropolitan northeastern portion of the State, flood stages were less than those experienced during Hurricane Connie on August 13, 1955.

According to estimates of damage supplied to the office of the Flood Disaster Coordinating Committee by various State departments, State civil defense and the Delaware River Joint Toll Bridge Commission, direct physical damage suffered in the State of New Jersey exceeded $21,646,000. Of this amount, private, industrial and privately owned utility losses were approximately just short of $13 million. Damages to municipalities, counties, and the State amounted to some $8 million. The Red Cross has reported that a total of 7,864 persons were displaced by the flood in New Jersey and that 2,100 families suffered losses. A total of 93 residences, 506 suffered major damage, 1,009 sustained minor damage, and 120 family businesses, not located in homes, suffered major damage. Three days after the flood crest had passed Trenton, 642 families were still without light, 288 were without gas, and telephone services had not been restored to more than 10,000 homes.

Now, in a sense one could belittle the seriousness of this thing. It cost six lives. Some people will say that's not very many. It caused widespread suffering-but I would not belittle any of those thingsand monetary losses, of course, difficult to measure-amounting to

tens of millions of dollars. Our State was spared the appalling loss of life and the hundreds of millions of dollars in damage which was experienced in neighboring States to the north and west.

In reviewing the great floods of the past

Mr. JONES Excuse me a moment.

Mr. LIPSCOMB. I'm sure you don't believe anybody on this committee is belittling these things.

Mr. MCLEAN. Lord, no, no, I didn't mean that, but I try to get this thing in a little sense of perspective as to our State versus Connecticut, which I think suffered a greater damage on a proportionate basis, but I won't give you too much here. We've had the benefit of previous studies by the United States Army engineers. For example, the Delaware River has been considered a rather passive stream and not one that would be generally subject to being a major flood problem, at least. But the recent flood

Mr. JONES. Let me ask you a question.

Mr. McLEAN. Yes.

Mr. JONES. You say it's passive. Isn't it possible that such articles that appeared in the Saturday Evening Post and the New York papers would lead the people throughout the country to believe that we're getting along all right in the Delaware River-there is no cause for alarm?

Mr. McLEAN. Oh, yes.

Mr. JONES. Here is one saying that the Great White Father rears its ugly head like a Colossus and looks down at you, and if it comes up here and gives you a little flood relief, why, then you'd be the captive of the Federal Government.

Mr. McLEAN. I might say there are some times when I wouldn't mind being a captive of the Federal Government, and those particular articles did not necessarily reflect

Mr. JONES. It's a political problem as well as an engineering problem.

Mr. McLEAN. It certainly is, absolutely. We have the entwined problems of engineering and politics in this whole matter.

Mr. JONES. We have been led to believe, with all these publications, that there wasn't anything up here like the Red, White, and Blue. Mr. MCLEAN. I might say the passivity angle I mentioned, when you couple it also with the articles you're mentioning, is reflected in the United States Corps of Engineers 308 report of 1933 on the Delaware River. It put the accent on the development of the river for water supply and power purposes, with flood control considered merely a byproduct benefit.

Mr. JONES. Well, 308 reports were made all over the country.
Mr. McLEAN. That's right.

Mr. JONES. And they were not detailed surveys but they were surveys on a large scope and were not to reflect the final outcome of the engineering study.

Mr. MCLEAN. I might say, too, that there has been no major floodcontrol project in the State of New Jersey. Now, you may say this is a dereliction on the part of the State or our politicians or whatnot in not pressing for greater Federal aid.

Mr. JONES. I don't meant that.

Mr. LIPSCOMB. Well, have they?

70818-56-pt. 1

Mr. McLEAN. I would say they have not articulated a great pressure for it and, indeed, I was going to say this a little bit later on the INCODEL plan-and I speak knowing that someone like Jim Allen is in the room, who has given a good deal of his career to INCODELbut it seems to me it had its origins basically in a rather negative root. It started out with a great fear of TVA or anything like it coming to this part of the world, and in that sense it was negative in wanting to block out the Federal Government, and at least I have that directly from people mixed up in INCODEL for a long time. I wasn't there when it started, but you have a record of more than 20 years of INCODEL, and in spite of the hard and conscientious work of certain people, I would say—in certain areas, at least, with the possible exception of maybe pollution control-that INCODEL has had a record of failure in terms of really tackling the problems of water supply, flood control, and so on. And this is not said in any sense of trying to criticize INCODEL, but this is the example of an effort at interstate cooperation.

I heard only the tail end of Mayor Clark's remarks, but I think I would concur with him in his statement-and I'm not trying to put words in his mouth-that the interstate compact is not necessarily the answer to all of our problems, and it would be our own firm belief that here is where you have to have cooperative federalism at work, with the Federal Government playing a major or prominent role in the solution of the water problems of this particular area.

I won't bore you with the statistics.

Mr. JONES. Do you recall some of the annual reports of INCODEL, finding fault and criticism with the development of the Tennessee River by the Tennessee Valley Authority?

Mr. MCLEAN. I thought the language and phrasing used in some of the INCODEL reports over the years highly unfortunate, because there was reflected in those reports something of an ideology, or whatever you want to call it, of an anti-Federal-Government bias. don't believe in giving up everything to the Federal Government, but I think when you are faced with a navigable stream, a river that flows through several States, whose tributaries reach into several States. that we are faced with a problem that is truly one to be considered by the Federal Government and not by the so-called grassroots approach alone.

We've got to get cooperation, I think, and genuine participation by the Federal Government if we're going to get anything beyond a piecemeal approach to the use of the Delaware River, and I'd be a firm believer in asking for that kind of cooperative approach. I would hope that the Federal Government will someday come through with money for the deepening of the Delaware Channel. I believe that will be an asset to our own Delaware Valley and an asset to the entire Nation. I don't know whether it is proper to use the analogy of point 4, the underdeveloped areas, where we're going into the world-I don't think on a large enough scale-but there are underdeveloped areas in the United States, and sometimes they include the most highly developed. area. I think a national role has to be played in this area, whether we're concerned with the South and TVA or the West and reclamation or whether with regeneration of New England, let's say. All these areas are part of a great Nation and I think merit the support of the Federal Government.