Case of Thomas G. Williams. son in the service of the United States, or for any Indian, to take and destroy any ardent spirits or wine found in the Indian country, except such as may be introduced therein by the War Department. And in all cases arising under this act Indians shall be competent witnesses." In so far as this section conflicts with preceding acts of Congress they are repealed. According to the said act of 1868, the President was invested with unlimited discretion. over the introduction and use of spirituous liquors in the Territory of Alaska; but Congress, in 1873, adopting the above-cited section 20 of the act of 1834, absolutely prohib its the introduction of spirituous liquors or wine into said Territory unless authorized by the War Department. My opinion, therefore, is that, as to this matter, Alaska is to be regarded as "Indian country," and that no spirituous liquors or wines can be introduced into that Territory without an order by the War Department for that purpose. Very respectfully, Hon. WM. W. BELKNAP, GEO. H. WILLIAMS. Secretary of War. CASE OF THOMAS G. WILLIAMS. Where the payment of a claim against the Government would otherwise come within the prohibition of the joint resolution of March 2, 1867, [No. 46,] the fact that the political disabilities of the claimant, imposed by the third section of the fourteenth amendment of the Constitution, bave since been removed by Congress, does not free the claim from the operation of that resolution; the prohibition of payment still continues. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 30th ultimo, in which you ask for my opinion as to the validity of the claim below mentioned, upon a statement of facts submitted by the Second Comptroller of the Treasury which is in substance as follows: Thomas G. Williams graduated at the United States Military Academy, and was appointed brevet second lieutenant Sec Bankrupt-Law. ond Infantry July 1, 1849. He was promoted second lieutenant First Infantry June 13, 1850, and first lieutenant August 7, 1855. He resigned March 15, 1861, and joined in the rebellion against the United States. He now claims that a balance of pay, as of his grade in the Army, is due him from October 1, 1852, to November 30, 1852, and from March 1 to the date of his discharge, March 15, 1861. Congress by joint resolution, approved March 2, 1867, (14 Stat., 571,) declares "that until otherwise ordered it shall be unlawful for any officer of the United States Government to pay any account, claim, or demand against said Government which accrued or existed prior to the thirteenth day of April, A. D. eighteen hundred and sixty-one, in favor of any person who promoted, encouraged, or in any manner sustained the late rebellion," &c. On the 3d of March, 1873, (17 Stat., 792,) Congress passed an act providing "that all political disabilities imposed by the third section of the fourteenth amendment of the Constitution of the United States be, and the same are hereby, removed from James D. Halyburton, of Virginia, and Thomas G. Williams, of San Antonio, in the State of Texas." Williams, it seems, maintains that this act in some way modifies the joint resolution of 1867, so as to make his said claim valid against the United States. There is no foundation whatever for this assumption. The disabilities referred to in said act relate exclusively to the right to hold office. Said joint resolution remains in full force and effect, and as the claim in question is one of those described therein it cannot be paid. Very respectfully, Hon. WM. W. BELKNAP, Secretary of War. GEO. H. WILLIAMS. BANKRUPT-LAW. Where a payment is made by a debtor to a creditor who has committed an act of bankruptcy, and against whom proceedings in bankruptcy have been instituted and are pending, but who has not yet been adjudged a bankrupt, it will not be a valid satisfaction of the debt in the event of an adjudication of bankruptcy in such proceedings, if the payment transpired subsequent to the filing of the petition therein. Bankrupt-Law. But a payment made by a debtor to a creditor who is known to have committed an act of bankruptcy, but against whom proceedings have not at the time been taken, is valid, so far at least as the present bankruptlaw is concerned. All debts and liabilities subsisting in favor of the bankrupt at the period when the petition was filed, or then constituting a part of his estate, together with the right to receive or sue for and recover the same, become upon the execution of the assignment completely and exclusively vested in the assignee by relation to that period. Hence a payment to the bankrupt of any such debt or liability after that date would be no satisfaction of the demand as against the claim of the assignee, unless the payment is protected by some exception made by Congress which covers the particular case. Neither the bankrupt act of 1867, nor its supplements, contain any exception, express or implied, in favor of a debtor who has paid his debt to the bankrupt after the time of filing the petition against the latter. It follows that the claim of the assignee, duly appointed, must prevail against the debtor, notwithstanding such payment, though it was made bona fide and without knowledge of the bankruptcy proceeding. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, November 18, 1873. SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 1st instant, in which, at the instance of the First Comptroller, you submit for my official opinion the following questions: "Whether a valid payment can be made, first, to a person who has committed an act of bankruptcy, and against whom proceedings have been instituted and are pending in bankruptcy, but who has not yet been adjudged a bankrupt; second, to a person who is known to have committed an act of bankruptcy, but against whom proceedings have not yet been taken." The 14th section of the bankrupt-law of 1867 (14 Stat., 522) provides for an assignment of all the estate, real and personal, of the bankrupt to the assignee appointed under the provisions of that statute, and declares that such assignment shall relate back to the commencement of the proceedings in bankruptcy, and that "thereupon, by operation of law, the title to all such property and estate, both real and personal, shall vest in said assignee," &c. Certain exemptions from the assignment are expressly made, but they are of no consequence in connection with the questions proposed. In the 3d proviso of the same Bankrupt-Law. section it is furthermore declared that, among other things, all choses in action belonging to the bankrupt, and all debts due him, or any person for his use, with the like right, title, power, and authority to dispose of, sue for, and recover the same, as the bankrupt might or could have had if no assignment had been made," shall, in virtue of the adjudication of bankruptcy and the appointment of his assignee, be at once vested in such assignee." This section refers to an assignee appointed under a proceeding in what is called voluntary bankruptcy; but its provisions, so far as pertinent here, are made applicable to assignees appointed in cases of involuntary bankruptcy by the 42d section, and the expression "commencement of proceedings in bankruptcy," whether voluntary or involuntary, is defined in section 38 to mean the filing of the petition in bankruptcy. The 35th section of the act declares void (among other transactions) all payments made by any person being insolvent, or in contemplation of insolvency or bankruptcy, within four or six months previous to the filing of the petition, with a view to give fraudulent preference or to evade the provis. ions of the act, where the party receiving the same has reasonable cause to believe that such person is insolvent or is acting in contemplation of insolvency, &c.; and this and the 39th section authorize the recovery back by the assignee of the money so paid. But there is no provision in the act which invalidates payments made to the bankrupt before the petition is filed against him. In a legal point of view, these payments, therefore, seem to stand precisely as they would if no bankruptcy proceedings were instituted. In an opinion given by the Supreme Court of the United States in a late case before the same, (Buchanan vs. Smith, 16 Wall., 277,) it is remarked with reference to section 14, above cited, that the appointment of an assignee under a decree in bankruptcy relates back to the commencement of the bankrupt proceedings, and that the instrument required to be executed under the hand of the judge or register assigns and conveys to the assignee "all the estate, real or personal, of the bankrupt, including equitable as well as legal rights and interests, and things in action as well as those in possession, Bankrupt-Law. which belonged to the debtor at the time the petition in bankruptcy was filed in the district court." This view of the scope and effect of the assignment mentioned appears to me to rest upon the plain and obvious meaning of the statute; and accepting it as a correct statement of the law as it now stands, the result at which I arrive is, that all debts and liabilities subsisting in favor of the bankrupt at the period when the petition was filed, or then constituting a part of his estate, together with the right to receive or sue for and recover the same, become, upon the execution of the assignment, completely and exclusively vested in the assignee by relation to that period, and that, consequently, a payment to the bankrupt of any such debt or liability after that date would be no satisfaction of the demand as against the claim of the assignee, unless the payment is protected by some exception made by Congress which covers the particular case. By the bankrupt-act of April 4, 1800, (2 Stat., 19,) an assignment by the commissioners of a bankrupt's estate had a retrospective relation to the time when the act of bankruptcy was committed upon which the commission issued. (See sec. 10.) They were empowered to assign all the debts due to the bankrupt, or to any person for his use, and, after the assignment, neither the bankrupt nor any person acting as trustee for him could legally recover or discharge the same. But it was expressly enacted that where any debtor, bona fide, paid his debt to the bankrupt without notice of the bankruptcy, he should not be liable to pay it to the assignee. (See sec. 11.) Here the principle is distinctly recognized by Congress that, except where it is otherwise provided by statute, a payment made to the bankrupt subsequent to the time at which the assignment takes effect does not discharge the indebtedness as against the assignee. Under the bankrupt-act of August 19, 1841, (5 Stat., 440,) the estate of the bankrupt became vested in the assignee only "from the time of" the decree of bankruptcy. (See sec. 3.) This act declared void certain payments, &c., when made by the bankrupt previous to the decree, in contemplation of bankruptcy. (See sec. 2.) Yet payments made to the bankrupt before the decree would seem to be unaffected by the |