United States Mint. that, in my opinion, the restriction as to the number of such districts imposed by the former provision is still in force. I have the honor to be, very respectfully, Hon. Wм. A. RICHARDSON, GEO. H. WILLIAMS. Secretary of the Treasury. UNITED STATES MINT. Coins cannot be struck at the United States Mint for foreign governments, of such standards and devices as those governments may adopt; there being no authority given by statute to employ the mint for that pur pose. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, April 10, 1873. SIR: I have considered the question submitted in your letter of the 25th ultimo, as to whether coins may be struck at the United States Mint for other governments and nationalities, of such standards and devices as those governments and nationalities may adopt. It is very obvious that, unless authority to thus employ the mint has been conferred by statute, it cannot be used for the purpose mentioned; and, after careful examination of the laws relating to the mint, I have failed to discover any provision from which such a power may be derived. The provision in section 52 of the recent act of February 12, 1873, authorizing "national and other medals to be struck by the coiner of the mint at Philadelphia, under such regulations as the superintendent, with the approval of the director of the mint, may prescribe," was clearly not meant to include the making of anything intended for circulation as money, and is therefore inapplicable. On the other hand, by section 17 of the same act, it is declared that "no coins, either of gold, silver, or minor coinage, shall hereafter be issued from the mint, other than those of the denominations, standards, and weights herein set forth." The denominations, standards, and weights there referred to are such as are fixed for the gold, silver, and minor coins of the United States by the 13th, 14th, 15th, and 16th sections of the act. So that the 17th section would seem to operate Pensions. as a direct prohibition of the use of the mint for the purpose stated in the question propounded by you. I am, accordingly, of opinion that coins cannot be struck at the mint of the United States for other governments, of such standards and devices as those governments may adopt. I have the honor to be, very respectfully, Hon. Wм. A. RICHARDSON, GEO. H. WILLIAMS. Secretary of the Treasury. PENSIONS. The widow of a deceased naval officer was allowed a pension from June 23, 1843, the date of his death, up to April 8, 1847, the date of her second marriage, after which it was discontinued. In 1854 she obtained a divorce from her second husband for intemperance and cruelty. She now alleges that the latter, at the time of her marriage with him, had a wife living, and that she was cognizant of this when she instituted her suit for divorce, but remained silent as to the fact. And she claims a restoration of the pension formerly allowed her as the widow of said officer, on the ground that her second marriage was illegal and her right to the pension was not determined thereby. Held, however, that by promoting said suit, and procuring a decree which in effect affirmed the validity of her marriage while declaring its dissolution, the claimant has rendered the objection of illegality of the marriage unavailable in support of her claim, so long as that decree stands unvacated or judicially unimpeached. In that suit both the fact and the validity of the second marriage were DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, SIR: The case presented by your communication of the 28th ultimo, in connection with a pension-claim pending in your Department, is substantially as follows: In 1848 the claimant was allowed a pension, as the widow Pensions. of a naval officer, from June 23, 1843, the date of his death, to April 8, 1847, the date of her second marriage, after which it was continued to her minor children by her first husband until the youngest reached the age of sixteen years, in June, 1852. In 1854 she obtained a divorce from her second husband on the ground of intemperance and cruelty. She now alleges that her second husband, at the time of her marriage with him, had a wife living, from whom he had been divorced a mensa et thoro in Louisiana; that she was cognizant of this when she instituted her suit for divorce, but that she was silent as to the fact, apprehending that if a nullity of the marriage was decreed on the ground of incapacity on the part of the husband to enter into the contract, it would have the effect of rendering the fruit of the marriage illegitimate; and she claims a restoration of the pension formerly allowed to her as the widow of the said officer, dating from June, 1852. Upon this you inquire whether the second marriage of the claimant was void ab initio, or simply voidable, and also whether, by successfully prosecuting a suit for divorce on the ground stated, she has waived any right she might otherwise have been entitled to in the premises. Where a marriage is entered into during the existence of a previous marriage of one of the parties, the contract is not merely voidable, but void ab initio; and hence, assuming the fact to be as represented by the claimant, that her second husband, when she married him, had a wife living, the marriage between them, in contemplation of law, was void from the beginning. But whether such an assumption is warranted by the circumstances of this case is not free from doubt, if the existence of the previous marriage of the husband, at the time of his marriage with the claimant, rests upon nothing more than an inference drawn from the fact that he had been divorced a mensa et thoro from his former wife, and that she was then still living. I should not regard this as satisfactory; for, conceding the truth of those facts, they are not inconsistent with the fact that a subsequent divorce a vinculo matrimonii may have been obtained between the parties to the former proceeding prior to the marriage with the claimant. In Louisi Pensions. ana, at the period referred to, a divorce a vinculo could not be granted in certain cases unless a decree of divorce a mensa et thoro had been previously rendered, and unless two years had expired from the date of such decree. Accordingly, if the decree a mensa et thoro in this case was rendered more than two years before the marriage with claimant, it is not improbable that that decree was followed by a divorce a vinculo previous to such marriage; and without other evidence than the decree a mensa et thoro, the existence of the former marriage of claimant's second husband when she married him could not well be considered as established. Besides, in the suit for divorce promoted by the claimant herself, both the fact and the validity of her second marriage were directly in issue as the very foundation of the proceedings, and the effect of the sentence or decree granting the. divorce was to affirm the marriage as well as declare its dissolution. (2 Bishop, Mar. and Div., 4th ed., sec. 362, 765.) Irrespective of the point which here suggests itself, as to whether the judgment in that suit, rendered as it undoubtedly was upon the claimant's own allegation of a valid marriage and the evidence appearing in the case in support there of, should be deemed conclusive upon her in any matter or claim now prosecuted by her wherein the question of the validity of her second marriage is involved, it is certainly entitled to great weight simply as evidence of the facts put in issue and decided thereby, and so long as it stands judicially unimpeached it affords just as strong a presumption in favor of the validity of the marriage which it dissolved as is afforded by the above-mentioned decree a mensa et thoro in favor of the validity of the marriage on which that decree passed. But it seems to me that the affirmative of that point is sustainable upon settled principles of law, and that the judg ment referred to should be held conclusive upon the claimant as to the validity of her second marriage. A sentence of divorce, so far as it affects the status of the parties, is regarded as a judgment in rem, and, if free from fraud, furnishes, in general, conclusive proof of the facts which were in issue and were adjudicated by it, as well against strangers as against the parties. The claimant ought not to be permitted to pre Additional Bounty. vail against proof of this high character furnished by the decree in the suit promoted by her, which in effect affirmed the validity of the marriage, by showing, after a lapse of nearly twenty years, that in obtaining the decree she has misrepresented the facts to the court. In regard to the other branch of your inquiry, whether the claimant has waived any right by prosecuting and obtaining a divorce on the grounds stated, I do not perceive how any question of waiver can properly arise in this case. By promoting a suit for the dissolution of the marriage instead of a suit for its nullity, and procuring a decree which in effect affirmed the validity thereof, the claimant cannot strictly be said to have waived any objection to the legality of the marriage; but she has, I think, rendered that objection unavailable in support of her claim, so long at least as the decree stands. unvacated or judicially unimpeached. I have the honor to be, very respectfully, Hon. C. DELANO, Secretary of the Interior. GEO. H. WILLIAMS. ADDITIONAL BOUNTY. Where a soldier was enlisted in the Army as a volunteer in December, 1861, for three years, but afterward, and before the expiration of his term of enlistment, was voluntarily transferred to the naval service, in which he served out the remainder of his term: Held that he is not entitled to the additional bounty provided by the act of July 28, 1866, chap. 296. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, SIR: It appears from the inclosures in your letter of April 9, 1873, regarding the application for bounty of Andrew I. Knowland, of Massachusetts, that on the 21st day of December, 1861, Knowland enlisted in the Fourteenth Regiment of Massachusetts Infantry; on the 4th day of May, 1864, he was transferred to the Navy, serving out the remainder of his enlistment in that service. He now asks for the additional bounty under the act of the 28th of July, 1866. |