Claim of C. A. Perry & Co. given that the oxen should not be sent beyond the outposts of the Army; that the military authorities did not furnish forage to the oxen, mules, &c., and at night they were kept. by order within the line of guards. "Fourth. That the discipline and control thus exercised over the said trains were in accordance with the regulations of the Army, and for the safety of said trains, as in time of war or in marching through a hostile country. "Fifth. That in consequence of the severity of the weather, xposure to the cold, and scarcity of forage, many of the oxen, mules, and horses of said trains perished. "Sixth. That the stock, both public and private, had become so much reduced, that on or about the 15th of November the Army was broken into small parties to move into Fort Bridger, and the stock left, including claimants', was used indiscriminately in hauling the public and private wagons. "Seventh. That there was no contract or agreement for such use of claimants' oxen, mules, and horses, nor was there any order, oral or in writing, expressly directing the impressment of this particular train and property, but in the order (No. 36) of October 24, 1857, by Adjutant McNab, it was named as a supply-train, and moved under military control." Do these findings (upon which I exclusively base my opinion) show that the property of the claimants was impressed into the military service of the United States? Construing the words of the statute negatively, it may be said that they do not apply to every interference with or trespass upon the use or possession of property by military authority, nor would the control or destruction of property by such authority necessarily give the owners a claim for it under the stat ute. There must be an appropriation of the property, or, in other words, it must be taken by the military for public use, before the right to compensation arises under this act. Owners of property may have a right to sue military officers for trespass, or may have a claim, for the payment of which Congress ought especially to provide; but to establish a claim under the statute in question, it ought to appear, it seems to me, that the property was taken for and used in the service of the United States. Claim of C. A. Perry & Co. Colonel Johnston's order, quoted in the Comptroller's statement, at most only interdicted the advance of merchant trains, of which claimants' was one, into the Mormon country. Whether this order was made from apprehension that the Mormons would destroy the property if it came within their reach, and so despoil the owners, or whether it was intended to cut off supplies to the enemy, does not appear, nor does it appear that such order was contrary to the judgment and wishes of the claimants. According to the seventh finding of the Comptroller, no oral or written directions were given for the impressment of this property, and the only room for ontroversy is, therefore, as to whether or not it was impressed by implication. If Colonel Johnston did not order claimants' property for the use of the Army, then it is quite clear that he did not intend to have it taken for any such purpose. There was ample time and opportunity for an order of that kind, if such an idea was entertained; but it is not pretended that when the merchant-trains and troops came together, Colonel Johnston's army needed more transportation or supplies than they then had. The presumption is as fair as any other that these merchant-trains became from that time forward an incumbrance and not an aid to the expedition. That the merchant-trains were subject to military control, and that they were designated in a lieutenant's order as supply-trains, hardly warrant the supposition that they were forced into the service of the United States. If the owners of these trains, finding for any reason that they could not get to Salt Lake City in advance of the Army, chose to accompany the troops, they would, of course, subject themselves to the regulations of the Army, and they were probably designated as supplytrains to distinguish them from the other Army trains. What difference does it make what they were called, when in point of fact they were not used as supply-trains for the Army? All the property remained under charge of the owners, their agents and servants, and neither the agents nor the property in their charge were engaged in any service or in any man. ner employed or used in connection with the operations of the Army. Suppose the troops and trains had arrived safely in Salt Lake City, can it be pretended that the owners of the trains would have had any claim against the United States for services rendered to the expedition? Claim of C. A. Perry & Co. The sixth finding of the Comptroller states, that in consequence of the extreme severity of the weather, and the consequent reduction and suffering of the stock, public and private, the Army was, about the 15th of November, "broken into small parties, to move into Fort Bridger, and the stock left, including claimants', was used indiscriminately in hauling the public and private wagons." The indiscriminate use of cattle in that time of difficulty and distress does not prove that the Army had need of means for the transportation of its own supplies, or that there was therefore a necessity to press into service the animals belonging to the claimants, or that these, or any of them, were actually so impressed. The expedition being divided into small parties, and the new order of marching formed, in the haste natural to the occasion it was of no importance whether the Government animals or those belonging to the claimants were used to move a wagon. There was a common struggle among all to save, if possible, public and private property from destruction, and the service of the United States under these circumstances may have been as valuable to claimants as were their services to the United States. Reference is made in support of the claim to Harmony vs. Mitchell, (13 How., 115;) but that was an action of trespass, and not a claim under the said statute of 1849, which only provides for payment where the property is lost or destroyed "while it was actually employed in the service of the United States." In that case, too, the court say that the plaintiff's "wagons and mules were used in the public service." Attorney-General Bates, in the case of the Porters, who were owners of one of the said merchant-trains, gave an opinion in favor of their claim. (10 Opin., 21.) I am not informed as to the statement of facts upon which that opinion was founded, but I do not disagree with him as to the law. He says: "An impressment is a taking into public service by compulsion. I understand service to mean the voluntary or involuntary subjection of one's conduct to the control of another for the benefit of that other." There is no finding before me that claimants' train was taken into public service by compulsion, or that it was employed for the benefit * Sea-Service in.the Navy. of the United States, or indeed that it was in any way taken into the public service. I cannot avoid the conclusion that the claimants in this case, finding themselves obstructed in their way to Salt Lake City by the hostility of the Mormons or the order of Colonel Johnston, or both, concluded that their best course, under the circumstances, was to join and accompany the Army, and that they now seek to make the Government responsible for the early and unexpected storms of winter, which were alike disastrous to public and private property. I do not think that the facts, as they are presented to me, show that the claimants' property was destroyed while it was actually in the military service of the United States, by im. pressment or otherwise. Very respectfully, your obedient servant, Hon. GEO. S. BOUTWELL, GEO. H. WILLIAMS. Secretary of the Treasury. SEA-SERVICE IN THE NAVY. The construction given by the Navy Department to the 3d section of the act of March 2, 1867, chap. 174, "to amend certain acts in relation to the Navy," which requires officers transferred from the volunteer to the regular Navy to be credited with their previous sea-service, concurred in; namely, that to eutitle an officer to credit for sea-service thereunder he must have been in the volunteer Navy at the time of his appointment to the regular Navy, and that where he had ceased to be an officer in the volunteer Navy prior to such appointment, however brief the interval, he does not come within the provision referred to. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, November 20, 1872. SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of a communication of the 30th ultimo from the Acting Secretary of the Navy, stating that Sailmaker Thomas S. Gray, of the Navy, claims credit for volunteer service in the Navy, and asking for my opinion as to the proper construction of the 3d section of the act to amend certain acts in relation to the Navy, which is as follows: "That the officers of the volun Detention of Mail-Matter. teer naval service, who are, or may be, transferred to the regular Navy or Marine Corps, shall be credited with the seaservice performed by them as volunteer officers," &c. (14 Stat., 516.) It is stated in the letter of the Acting Secretary that, 66 according to the construction now given by the Department to this law, an officer must have been in the volunteer Navy at the time of his appointment in the regular Navy to entitle him to credit for his volunteer service, and that if he had been mustered out, and was not an officer in the volunteer Navy, however brief the interval, before his appointment in the regular Navy, the credit is not allowed." I concur in this construction. When an officer is transferred from the volunteer naval service to the regular Navy, he is taken out or removed from one to the other; and in no sense can he be said to be an officer transferred, when he is a private citizen at the time of his appointment. I do not think it makes any difference whether a long or short time elapsed after the appointee asking for credit was mustered out of the volunteer service; for if he was mustered out at all he could not be transferred. Very respectfully, your obedient servant, Hon. GEO. M. ROBESON, Secretary of the Navy. GEO. H. WILLIAMS. DETENTION OF MAIL-MATTER. No authority is conferred upon the Postmaster-General by the provisions of the 301st and 302d sections of the act of June 8, 1872, chap. 335, or by the provisions of any other section of that act, to order the detention of mail-matter after it has reached its destination and been distributed by the postmaster ready for delivery, though there may be a well-grounded suspicion that it is or has been attempted to be circulated in violation of law. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, SIR: I have received your communication of the 26th instant, inclosing a copy of a letter addressed to you by Calvin |