PostalCards. section 170. No appropriation was therefore made for "postal cards,” and it is hardly necessary to say that the PostmasterGeneral has no power to divert the appropriations specifically made for adhesive postage-stamps, stamped envelopes, and newspaper-wrappers, to the procurement of postal cards. Clearly they are not embraced in the letter of the law; and as they were not provided for at the time, it cannot be supposed that they entered into the intent of such appropriations. Prior to 1870, acts of Congress were passed expressly or constructively imposing upon the Executive Departments of the Government duties involving the expenditure of money for which no appropriations were made, and from the exist ence of those duties it was inferred that the power to incur the necessary debts for their performance also existed. To cut off all such inferences and assumptions by the Departments was the evident purpose of said section 7 of the act of 1870. Arrangements by the Post-Office Department for the manufacture and furnishing of "postal cards" would necessitate the creation of a large indebtedness, and therefore would "involve the Government in a contract for the future payment of money in excess of the appropriations." Manifestly the Postmaster General has no power to do this unless said section 7 is pro tanto repealed by said section 170. To create a repeal by implication, there must be a positive repugnancy between the provisions of the new law and those of the old, (Wood vs. The United States, 16 Peters, 342; Dariess vs. Fairbairn, 3 How., 636.) One statute is not to be construed as a repeal of another if it be possible to reconcile the two together, (Harford vs. The United States, 8 Cranch, 109; Cool vs. Smith, 1 Black, 459.) Explanations of section 170 may be made without holding that it is in conflict with any older law, the most probable of which is, that as the PostOffice appropriation bill was passed before provision was made for postal cards, the necessary appropriation therefor was inadvertently omitted. Possibly Congress may have intended that the Postmaster-General should obtain such information and make such arrangements as he could without the expenditure of money in reference to such cards before the next session of Congress, in view of which it would make the necessary appropriation. Internal Revenue Tax on Tobacco. Be that as it may, Congress has fixed upon the very good policy of keeping the expenditure of the public money under its control, and it is not to be presumed that the intent to depart from that policy by conferring upon the PostmasterGeneral power to make contracts for thousands or millions of dollars at his discretion, would be left to a doubtful construction of the statutes. Persons entering into contracts at this time to furnish "postal cards" must look for compensation to the chances of future legislation. No provision can now be made by the Postmaster-General as to the time or mode of payment, and this would probably tend to increase the expense and place difficulties in the way of the new system. Independently, however, of all questions of expediency, I am of the opinion that you have no power under existing laws to enter into a contract for the future payment of money to persons for furnishing the "postal cards" described in section 170 of the act of June 8, 1872. Very respectfully, Hon. JNO. A. J. CRESWELL, Postmaster-General. GEO. H. WILLIAMS. INTERNAL-REVENUE TAX ON TOBACCO. Effect of the amendment of the 74th section of the act of July 20, 1868, chap. 186, made by the 31st section of the act of June 6, 1872, chap. 315, in regard to the internal-revenue tax on tobacco, considered. All tobacco stored in bonded warehouses, and withdrawn for sale or consumption before the 1st of July, 1872, is, notwithstanding that amendment, subject to taxes imposed by the act of July 20, 1868. But all tobacco in bonded warehouses on the 1st of July, 1872, and withdrawn after that date for the same purposes, is by virtue of that amendment subject to the tax imposed by the act of June 6, 1872. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 19th instant, in which you submit for my official opinion the following question: "At what rates, in view of the amendment of June 6, 1872, should internal revenue taxes Internal Revenue Tax on Tobacco. be required upon tobacco which was stored in an export bonded warehouse on or since June 6th, 1872, when withdrawn for consumption or sale in this country?" Section 31 of the act of June 6, 1872, provides that "on and after the 1st day of July next, the act entitled 'An act imposing taxes on distilled spirits and tobacco, and for other purposes,' approved July 20, 1868, be, and the same is hereby, amended as follows": Among other amendments to said act is this: "That section 74 be amended by striking out all after the enacting clause and inserting in lieu thereof the following, to wit: All tobacco and snuff now stored in any export bonded warehouse shall, on and after July 1, 1872, be subject to the same tax as is provided by this act, and shall, within six months after the passage of this act, be withdrawn from such warehouse upon payment of the tax, or for export, under the regulations of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue now in force concerning withdrawals of tobacco and suuff from bonded warehouses. And any tobacco or snuff remaining in any export bonded warehouse for a period of more than six months after the passage of this act shall be forfeited to the United States, and shall be sold or disposed of for the benefit of the same in such manner as shall be prescribed by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, under the direction of the Secretary of the Treasury." Taking section 31 as a whole, it is perfectly clear that Congress intended to impose upon all manufactured tobacco remaining in the manufactory or found stored in a bonded warehouse on the 1st of July, 1872, and withdrawn subsequent to that date for consumption or sale, a uniform tax of twenty cents per pound, unless the word "now," in that part of the section above cited, subjects the particular tobacco stored in a warehouse between June 6, the passage of the act, and the said 1st of July, and thereafter withdrawn for the purposes aforesaid, to a tax of thirty-two and sixteen cents per pound, according to the quality, as provided in the act of 1888. Any such discrimination, if made, ought to be founded upon good reasons and clearly appear. Attention in considering this question is due to the peculiar phraseology of the enacting clauses of said section. This amendment is not made to take effect at once, but at some Internal Revenue Tax on Tobacco. future date; and though perfected and approved by Congress on the 6th of June, is not in fact made until the 1st of July. Certain words of the act of 1868 are to be striken out and in lieu thereof the words quoted above are to be inserted; but they are not to be inserted until the 1st of July. Can they have any force or are they any more than proposed amendments prior to that time? Can words that are to be inserted at some future day in a law, and at that time to become a part thereof, have any effect before the insertion is made? To hold that the amendment took effect on the 6th of June, by virtue of the word "now," is to hold that on that day it reduces the taxes on certain tobacco from thirty-two to twenty cents per pound, if withdrawn as directed, although by its own express provision it was not to be any part of the law until the 1st of July. To hold that the word "now" relates to the time when the amendatory words are inserted in the old law, is not only reasonable in point of construction, but gives to the act a reasonable and just effect. I need not say that, like much of the phraseology of our internal-revenue laws, the language in question seems tautological and confused; but while it is more than probable that in the numerous amendments to the original draught of the bill the precise meaning or effect of the word "now" was overlooked, it is beyond doubt that Congress did not intend that there should be any change in the law until the 1st of July. To support this view reference may be made to other parts of the act in question, which is to take effect, as elsewhere declared, on the 1st of August, 1872, but some of its provisions are to go into operation upon the passage of the act; in which cases the word "now" is not used, but the words "prior to " or "after the passage of the act," to indicate that time. Section 42 of the act is as follows: "That all internal taxes now assessed or liable to be assessed against but not collected from ship-builders as manufacturers, under section 4 of the act of March 31, 1868, entitled 'An act to exempt certain manufacturers from internal tax and for other purposes,' for sales of vessels, be, and the same are hereby, remitted, and no further assessments shall be made on account thereof." Can this section, in consequence of the use of the word "now," Internal Revenue Tax on Tobacco. be construed to mean that all taxes mentioned therein "assessed or liable to be assessed" on the 6th of June, when the act was passed, shall be remitted, and that such taxes "assessed or liable to be assessed" between that time and the 1st of August, when the act takes effect, shall be collected? or rather does it not mean that all such taxes "assessed or liable to be assessed" when the act takes effect shall be remitted? Section 44, among other clauses, has the following: "That no right of action barred by any statute now in force shall be revived by anything herein contained." Is it not clear that a defendant in a suit under this act, desiring to avail himself of the statute of limitations, could, if necessary to perfect the bar, include the period between the passage of the act and the time it took effect? One idea suggested to show that the word "now means the 6th of June and not the 1st of July, is that Congress intended to abolish bonded warehouses, and was therefore unwilling to allow tobacco to be stored therein between said dates, to be withdrawn upon the payment of the new and lower tax. I do not see how this would facilitate the destruction of such warehouses, when the act expressly declares that they may continue and be used as therein provided for six months after its passage, at which time any tobacco found in them is to be forfeited to the Government. Section 73 of the act of 1868 provides for the exportation of tobacco through bonded warehouses, but the amendment of 1870, which repeals that section and provides for exportation from the manufactory, clearly does not go into effect until the 1st of July; so that if the right to store tobacco in bonded warehouses ceased on the 6th of June by virtue of the said word "now," there would seem to be no way in which tobacco, without payment of the tax, could be exported from the United States between that date and the 1st of July. Assuming that the word "now" means the 6th of June, it thence follows that there is no way in which tobacco stored in a bonded warehouse between said date and the 1st of July can, after the latter date, be withdrawn for exportation without prepayment of the tax; for on the 1st of July the old law was repealed, and the right to withdraw tobacco after that date |