9/ California ES staff member. Sec. 2114 (d) of H.R. 1 takes cognizance of this problem by providing that: "any state or political subdivision receiving Federal assistance. shall provide the Secretary of Labor with complete up-to-date listings of all employment vacancies. . in positions or programs wholly or partially supported through such Federal Assistance." 10/ The DOL is presently conducting an experiment that promises 11/ Cumulative through FY 1970. 12/ Estimate from Hearings on 1971 DOL appropriations, the House Appropriations Subcommittee, May 14, 1969, p. 164. 13/ Cumulative through 6/30/70. 14/ Cumulative through 12/31/70. 15/ Enrollment figures indicate people who were given on-thejob training. There are no figures on those who retained jobs after termination of the federal training subsidy. 16. Starks v. Portion-Redi, an Alabama lawsuit, describes the employer's practice of using CEP enrollees to fill menial jobs, firing them when the training subsidies run out, and then applying for a new complement of CEP trainees to fill the same jobs, at public expense. (N.D. Ala. Civ. Action No. 70-662). 17/ This report does not encompass an evaluation of state and local vocational education programs. However, they share with the ES much of the blame for the failure of the federal manpower programs to accomplish their goals. 18/ See, for example, U. S. Commission on Civil Rights, Hearings, Cleveland, Ohio, April 6, 1966, pp. 426-433. 19/ Although this report does not deal with ES service to the skilled worker, our consultants in the states indicated that the network had failed to meet the special needs of intellectuals and professionals thrown out of work as a result of recent defense and space cut-backs. Special programs for these unemployed individuals were developed by the DOL in Washington. (See, for example, Harpers' Magazine, Dec. 1970, p.91). 20/ The DOL has recently taken a firm line in regard to minority hiring, requiring each state to develop minority hiring plans. This approach appears to be producing results. See Chapter V, Part A, for a more complete discussion. 21/ See, for example, Ruttenberg & Gutchess, The FederalState Employment Service; the Auerbach evaluation of the Work Incentive Program (Auer-1628-TR-100-1, March 15, 1970), The Summary of Findings, Conclusions and Recommendations for the Human Resources Development Program Study. (Final Report, 1590-1). 22/ The only exception is in the case of programs such as WIN where the federal government has defined the grievance procedures. A. The Work Incentive Program (WIN) The WIN program is the first manpower program for which the ES was given primary responsibility. Under it, the ES must perform the full range of job-related services that are now considered essential to manpower programs for the disadvantaged and that are being proposed as part of the welfare reform proposals. A review of ES performance under WIN illustrates the service's chief deficiencies and affords a basis for assessing its capability to handle expanded responsibilities. WIN requires the ES to work with selected welfare recipients in the Aid to Families with Dependent Children category (AFDC). The ES must develop an employability plan for each enrollee including, as needed, basic education, counseling, training, work experience, health screening, and follow-up support all designed to prepare him for a job that will take him off the welfare rolls. -1 In the two full years the WIN program has been in operation, it has handled only a small percentage of the eligible AFDC population, substantially fewer than the slots allocated for the program. From the beginning, the services provided under the program have been fragmented, inhibiting its effectiveness. The enrollment process, which depends on state welfare offices for referrals and the initial determination of suitability, is complicated. Essential components of the program have been delayed or lacking altogether and, most serious of all, the ES simply hasn't been able to find or develop the jobs.1/ The most favorable estimates indicate that only 20% of the participants get jobs and many of these placements are insufficient to insure removal from the welfare rolls for any substantial period of time. The Labor Department estimated, in early 1971, that 20% were dropping out for "no good reason" and 60% were dropping out for programmatic failures --lack of day care, no available training slots, etc. and for personal reasons, such as illness or death. The cost of the program has been extremely high. According to Assistant Secretary Lovell, the cost per successful enrollee in the WIN program over an estimated period of one year, is $4,000, a low expenditure he claims, "to get somebody into the work force in a permanent fashion."2/ But the Department has no follow-up information to show how many WIN placements have resulted in "permanent" removal from the Welfare rolls. In the 1970 hearings on the FAP legislation, Senator Russell Long summed up performance under WIN as follows: "The accomplishments of the Department of - The Senator went on to say that the enabling legislation included ample authority to develop training programs designed to meet individual recipients' needs. "It is not in the legislation, but in its administration that the program has failed." Even the unimpressive enrollment figures of the DOL are inflated; after one year of operation 19,000 enrollees, or 28.2%, were in an inactive "holding" position because of scheduling failures by the administrators of the program. Appendix B gives a breakdown of performance under the WIN program as of December 1970, for each state surveyed. The most comprehensive analysis available of ES performance under the WIN program comes from a March 1970 assessment conducted in 23 cities by the Auerbach Corporation for the Labor Department. That report highlights a number of serious deficiencies in the program: --despite the legislative provisions for medical |