number of different locations throughout the Federal Government to have one agency in charge. The closest thing we have right now is the Coordinator for terrorism, National Security Council.

Mr. TERRY. Very good.

Mrs. FOWLER. Thank you, Mr. Terry. Mr. Isakson.

Mr. ISAKSON. Mr. Gebicke, I was reading in your prepared testimony a statement that said on the surface it appears to us that there's potential for duplication and overlap among these programs. You were referring to training.

In the materials we were supplied with, there's a report from May which listed the number of training programs in the country other than those in DOD. I happened to count them up, and there were six agencies that had 85 different training programs. And interestingly enough, in three different cases there are programs with exactly the same title produced by two different agencies.

And so in light of your observation that it appears there may be duplication, it appears to me there probably is duplication. You made the statement we have a coordinator at the National Security Council. Is that right? Is there any coordination whatsoever, or are these departments operating independently on the development of these training programs?

Mr. GEBICKE. Well, in the case of DOD, when they developed their training program, they basically developed the program on their own. Programs were also being developed or in existence at the Department of Justice and FEMA at the time. Program material was offered to the DOD, but DOD opted to develop its own program, to give one example.

But what we want to do on our current assignment is, as I mentioned earlier, is-I agree with you on the surface they look like duplications take a closer look at the courses. We need to maybe sit through some of those courses, have some of my staff sit through those courses, make sure they're being targeted to the same audiences, that is, police, fire, hazmat; and then we'll be in a much better position to come back to you and really point out the exact duplication or overlap of the training programs.

My only hope and my only concern would be it wouldn't be too late at that point in time because they proliferated to such great extent.

Mr. ISAKSON. Well, first of all, I think your observation is correct. I think your recommendation is correct. You don't want to pass judgment and say it's obvious. But it's apparent-there's a chart here somewhere with regard to DOD and FEMA's training courses, which I have a copy of. I'll show you this chart, the staff evaluated the DOD courses and the FEMA courses by category, and it looks kind of like a fire drill of some type.

Mr. GEBICKE. I don't think you're going to be able to explain that in 5 minutes.

Mr. ISAKSON. I used to call it a Chinese fire drill, but I'm reluctant to do that now. If you look at the categories on the left and right under FEMA courses and then you see the lines, in each and every case the courses address the same subjects but may be under different title.

You just said that you did not believe that DOD had utilized the resources of any other department's studies or course of training

programs. So it would seem to me to be extremely important that GAŎ do follow through and test these training programs and if there is duplication, find out some way to coordinate it so we're not recreating the wheel.

I would make one other comment if I could. Mr. Terry, Representative Terry, made an outstanding comment. I agree with you that the likelihood of a nuclear, biological, or chemical incident in this country is far less likely than a conventional incident.

We need to be aware that we have already had in this country incidences with conventional weapons in the World Trade Center, and in the case of the use of common fertilizer in Oklahoma City. We must remember they used sarin gas in Tokyo in a subway. And I think, although the rating would not get a 10, I think your answer is honest.

I think it would be less than responsible Congress of we didn't recognize that it is more than likely that in the first decade of the 21st century, the potential for the next type of terrorist act to involve an attempt to use chemical weapons which are very difficult to deploy, or chemical acts. Nuclear, I disagree is probably more unlikely, but it is likely there will be an attempt-hopefully there wouldn't be an incident-and Mr. Terry's comments are so good. Our local law enforcement, fire, police, EPA, transportation people, I think are very, very good at chemical spills on highways.

I think they have. In Atlanta we had an unfortunate terrorist incident during the Olympics. The response was totally local, even though we had a significant amount of Federal assistance in the area. When it comes to the nuclear weapons, biological agents, and chemical agents, I think we must look to the Federal Government to be the first line of information, strategy, and attack. Because the resources to deal with those types of incidents which go far beyond a localized explosion are incredible.

If we have six agencies writing 85 reports to the Federal Government and we have 50 States and the District of Columbia writing training programs on chemical spills, we'll have a disaster on our hands because the right hand doesn't know what the left hand is doing.

So I appreciate your report very much. I think your observation is correct that there's too much duplication. I really think we need to do what Mr. Terry said. That is, focus on where we in the Federal Government can deliver the first and the most rapid response in the more unlikely but all-too-probable nuclear, chemical, or biological incident so our local people know they can count on us. So we're prepared to deploy.

Mr. GEBICKE. Can I make one comment? And I think it's an obvious comment to all of us here in the room and that is we're not going to protect ourselves against everything. So we have really got to separate what's conceivable, because I think almost anything is conceivable, particularly if we're talking about maybe the first decade of the next century, from what is likely. And I think we need to protect ourselves against what is likely, because I don't think we can protect ourselves against everything that could happen.

Mr. ISAKSON. No, but we must remember the budget that we're considering right now is the budget of the first decade of the next century.

Mr. GEBICKE. Exactly.

Mrs. FOWLER. Thank you, Mr. Isakson.

Mrs. Berkley, did you have a statement or questions?

Ms. BERKLEY. Well, I did have a statement. About a hundred years ago, when I first graduated law school and went back to Las Vegas to practice law, I was appointed deputy director of the State commerce department. And in that capacity I was charged with researching what local entities and State entities would be available in case of a disaster, either natural or man made. And it was quite an eye-opening experience, one, because there were so many different local and State agencies involved, not to mention Federal agencies.

But the second thing is that nobody was prepared to do anything in spite of the tremendous number of agencies involved if, in fact, we had a serious life-threatening tragedy throughout the State of Nevada. So this is an issue that I dealt with about 25 years ago, and that's why I was very interested in coming here today and reading your testimony, which I will review, and then, if you don't mind, submit questions for more thorough answers to the questions that I have.

I do believe that this is a very dangerous world and there will be a time, I fear some time in the beginning of the 21st century, that we might have a catastrophic tragedy somewhere in our country. We need to be prepared for that eventuality. I am concerned about it, interested in it, and anxious to work together to come up with a meaningful way of dealing with this. Thank you.

Mr. GEBICKE. We'll be glad to respond to your questions.
Mrs. FOWLER. Thank you.

Do any members of the subcommittee have any follow-up questions that they would like to address to GAO at this time?

I want to thank you, Mr. Gebicke, and your associates for your work. We look forward to these studies that you are in the process of beginning because this is information we need, as you say, sooner rather than later. As money is being spent and Agency's expenses climb, we have got to work out a better coordinated effort on this so that the money is being spent wisely and efficiently. We look forward to continuing to work with you. This is an issue that we are going to continue to follow in this subcommittee in the coming months. So we'll look forward to working with you on it again. Thank you.

Mr. GEBICKE. We look forward to working with you. Thank you very much.

Mrs. FOWLER. Thank you. I'd like now to call our next panel, if they could come forward.

We have Chief John Eversole and Councilwoman Ann Simank. If you don't mind, we will take a brief recess, so our members could go vote and come right back. We only have one vote. Then we will come back and reconvene the hearing. We are recessed for the time of this vote. Thank you so much. We will be right back. [Recess.]

Mrs. FOWLER. Would the subcommittee come to order, please. I would like to welcome before us our second panel, Ms. Ann Simank, who is a member of the city council in Oklahoma City. She's here today on behalf of the National League of Cities. I also

welcome Chief John Eversole, who is a hazardous materials coordinator for the Chicago Fire Department. He's the chair of the hazardous materials committee of the International Association of Fire Chiefs.

I want to welcome you both; and before we begin, I would like to ask if you heard me earlier, because our practice is to swear in our witnesses, if you could both stand and raise your right hand to take the oath.

[Witnesses sworn.]

Mrs. FOWLER. Thank you. Please be seated.

I think that we'll just go ahead. If you don't mind, we'll start with Councilwoman Simank and then go to Chief Eversole.

TESTIMONY OF ANN SIMANK, OKLAHOMA CITY COUNCIL MEMBER, ON BEHALF OF THE NATIONAL LEAGUE OF CITIES; AND CHIEF JOHN M. EVERSOLE, CHICAGO FIRE DEPARTMENT, AND CHAIR, HAZARDOUS MATERIALS COMMITTEE, INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF FIRE CHIEFS

Ms. SIMANK. Thank you, honorable Chairwoman. Good afternoon. I am very pleased to be with you. Before sharing with you the positions of the National League of Cities on domestic terrorism and related issues, I would like to thank the subcommittee for providing this forum of discussion on the importance of domestic preparedness in the event of a terrorist attack.

I am Ann Simank, council member from Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, and I am testifying, as you heard, for the National League of Cities. I have been a member of the National League of Cities public safety and crime prevention policy committee for the past 3 years. This NLC policy committee has given considerable attention recently to the many issues that we've talked about here today.

On April the 19th, 1995, at 9:02 a.m., Oklahoma City, my hometown, was devastated by a horrendous terrorist attack, the bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal building. That fateful morning 168 lives were lost, thousands were seriously injured, and over 30 children became orphans, and approximately 300 businesses were totally devastated and put out of business that minute. Many lives were literally in chaos in our city.

This senseless act of terror shattered my city, all in a matter of just seconds. Were we prepared? I don't know if cities and towns in America can ever be fully prepared, but today, I want to share a little bit about my experience with you in Oklahoma City.

Our city had been selected for FEMA's integrated emergency management course in Emmitsburg, Maryland, shortly before the bombing. Approximately 1 year before and all of our department heads attended this training course, as well as two or three key people from each department, and many of our community leaders attended, chamber of commerce people attended, public utility workers attended, nonprofit organizations attended. The training was excellent, and we were fortunate that we were selected as a city to be able to have that training.

However, Oklahoma City faced difficult challenges on the morning of April 19th. This was the largest terroristic act ever seen in America, and to our knowledge no one had ever had to perform re

covery and response at the same time while dealing with a crime

scene.

Immediately after the bombing occurred, our mayor and our fire chief and our police chief got together with the local special agent of the FBI, and we just had a decision-making process in a room, and the decisions were made about how Oklahoma City would get out there and proceed. The Federal Government wasn't here yet from Washington.

We decided that the FBI would be in charge of the crime scene, of course, and that the Oklahoma City police would seal the perimeter to keep citizens and other people out of the area because it is a crime scene and that the local Oklahoma City would assist the FBI in the crime scene investigation, and we also decided that the fire department and the fire chief would be in charge of rescue and recovery.

Now, our incident command system was up and operating immediately when these local agreements were made, and it worked well. That morning and all that day we, the local people, were there all alone, and we had made these decisions. We saved lives all day long and into the early hours of the evening the last victim was saved. And we also collected evidence that day.

It was about 15 hours later before the first FEMA team arrived, and so you're going to have cities that sit there 15 hours operating before someone gets there to help them. When the first FEMĂ team arrived, things changed. Other teams flew in, other agencies and people flew in, and I think because of FEMA's normal recovery process in dealing with hurricanes and earthquakes and so forth they had never dealt with a crime scene. So no one really knew how to deal with all of this. No one knew what the protocol would be. All of those questions came up, like who is in charge here. Turf battles started happening.

In the meantime, Chief Gary Marrs and the fire department continued to do rescue and recovery, thinking there might be someone alive. Fortunately, Oklahoma City had good training. Oklahoma City has always been a city that balances its budget and we had resources, fortunately. Not all cities do, and our incident command center was so strong and we were operating so well that all of the different Federal agencies, law enforcement agencies versus disaster recovery agencies and all of the bickering that was happening could not penetrate our incident command system. So we were able to go ahead and stay in charge of Oklahoma City's incident.

What did we learn? We learned that damage starts at the point of impact. The minute something happens your local responders are the ones that will be there. They are the ones that need to know how to take care of the damage, and they're going to be there alone for many, many hours. We learned that any resources that you, you here in Washington, can make available to us out there will be of very much of benefit to us. We need those resources. But we also want you to iron out those complications that surround the

resources.

Training is essential since cities and towns are alone, and equipment is essential. Turf issues should not happen. When you're dealing with people's lives and in an incident of this magnitude, a clear line of command and protocol should be established, and the Na