Testimony of Ann Simank Council Member, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma On behalf of the National League of Cities Before the House Subcommittee on Oversight, and Emergency Management Opening Good morning. Before sharing with you the positions of the National League of Cities (NLC) on domestic terrorism and related issues, I would like to thank the Subcommittee for providing this forum for discussion of the importance of domestic preparedness in the event of a terrorist attack. I am Ann Simank, Council Member from Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, and I am testifying for the National League of Cities, I have been a member of NLC's Public Safety and Crime Prevention Policy Committee for three years. This NLC policy committee has given considerable attention recently to the many issues related to domestic terrorism. 2 I'd like to summarize our experience in Oklahoma City. On April 19, 1995, at 9:02 a.m., Oklahoma City, my hometown, was devastated by a horrendous terrorist attack, the bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building. That fateful morning, 168 lives were lost, thousands were seriously injured, 30 children became orphans, and approximately 300 businesses were destroyed leaving hundreds unemployed. Many lives were literally in chaos. This senseless act shattered my city, all in a matter of seconds. Were we prepared? I don't know if cities can ever be fully prepared, but today I want to share Oklahoma City's experience with you. Our city had been selected for FEMA's Integrated Emergency Management Course in Emmitsburg, Maryland, in July 1994, less than a year before the bombing. All department heads attended as well as two or three key people from their departments. Numerous representatives from private utilities, private businesses and non-profit organizations also attended. Oklahoma City was well represented at this specialized training event, and we believe it was extremely helpful. However, Oklahoma City faced difficult challenges on the morning of April 19th. This was the largest terrorist attack ever seen in America, and to our knowledge, no one had ever had to perform rescue and recovery while at the same time effectively deal with a crime scene. 3 Immediately after the bombing, our mayor, police chief, fire chief, and the local special agent in charge of the FBI got together and made decisions as to how Oklahoma City should proceed. The FBI would be in charge of the crime scene, the Oklahoma City police would seal the perimeter and assist the FBI, and fire would handle rescue and recovery. Our incident command center was in place, local agreements were made, and everyone was clear as to their role. Within those first few hours, lives were saved, evidence was found, and the system was working well. Approximately 15 hours later, the first FEMA team flew in to offer assistance. FEMA's normal recovery efforts are to assist in natural disasters -tornadoes, floods, hurricanes and earthquakes, rather than working a crime scene. Relationships quickly became strained between agencies that represented disaster recovery versus agencies that represented law enforcement and criminal investigations. Even some of the FEMA trained USAR Teams concerned themselves with turf battles. Fortunately, Oklahoma City's incident command system had been up and working since that morning making it difficult for "outsiders" to penetrate or change it. Ultimately, these questions of "who is in charge" were worked out, and our city's system prevailed. What did we learn in Oklahoma City? Damage starts at the point of impact and local responders are the first and only responders. This is true for many hours after an incident. Any resource made available to cities can be of benefit if complications are ironed out first and their response is timely. 5 Training is essential since cities and towns will be alone the first few hours after an attack. Turf issues should not happen; a clear line of command and protocol should be established at the federal level (National Strategic Plan). • Money should be made available for training and equipment at the local level. • Transportation for specialized teams needs to be included in a National Strategic Plan. Many USAR Teams had to wait long hours before a military transport could get them Oklahoma City. Frankly, our city has no confidence that military transport will be able to bring specialized teams within four hours as indicated by some federal agencies. Don't forget, it is the local response that will be first on the scene, first to assess, and the first to take action. Please, see that the resources get to where they need to be. |