but not later than nine months after the entry into force of the Convention, all agents, toxins, weapons, equipment and means of delivery specified in article I, which are in its possession or under its jurisdiction or control. The nine-month period ended on December 26, 1975, for the United States. President Ford requested, in a directive of December 23, 1975, from Lt. General Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, that heads of Federal executive departments and agencies certify to him that, as of the required date, each was in compliance with article II and that any retained biological agents and toxins were for peaceful purposes as defined in his memorandum. W. E. Colby, Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), responded by memorandum dated January 15, 1976, that as of December 26, 1975, the CIA was in compliance with the President's directive and with the Biological Weapons Convention. W. P. Clements, Jr., Deputy Secretary of Defense, in a memorandum dated January 24, 1976, informed the President: I am pleased to be able to certify that as of December 26, (1) All programs of the Department of Defense in which any biological agents or toxins are retained are completely oriented toward medical research, protective and defensive measures, and vulnerability studies and research, and (2) All quantities of such materials retained are reserved or committed solely to those programs noted above which are in full compliance with your determination of "prophylactic, protective, and other peaceful purposes," and (3) The destruction of all stockpiles of biological or toxin agents maintained in support of operational plans and their associated munitions was completed on October 18, 1972, and the destruction or conversion of all delivery systems designed to use biological agents or toxins was accomplished on January 21, 1974. As a separate action, the Department of the Army will destroy the items which were the subject of a recent investigation by the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. Although these few prototypes were capable of disseminating biological agents, they were not considered "a means of delivery" within the meaning of the Biological Weapons Convention. On March 12, 1976, General Scowcroft confirmed by memorandum to the Secretary of State the receipt of other necessary compliance certifications, and he forwarded them to the Department as part of the permanent record of U.S. compliance with the Convention. Dept. of State File L/T. The President's directive stated that biological agents or toxins may be retained only for the following activities, which he had determined to be for "prophylactic, protective, and other peaceful purposes": 1. Prevention, diagnosis, or treatment of diseases of human beings, animals or plants, or research and development activities for the purpose of developing means and methods for the prevention, diagnosis, or treatment of disease; 2. Activities concerned with the protection of human beings, animals, plants, and material from the effects of exposure to microbial or other biological agents or toxins, including vulnerability studies and research, development and testing of equipment and devices such as protective masks and clothing, air and water filtration systems, detection, warning and identification devices, and decontamination systems; 3. Research, development, testing, and use of equipment, devices and techniques for detecting the development, production, stockpiling, acquisition, or retention of microbial or other biological agents or toxins; 4. Biomedical or other research for the purpose of increasing human knowledge and not intended for weapons development; 5. Research, development, production, or use for the enhancement or protection of agriculture and the environment; 6. Use of biological processing techniques for non-weapons purposes, including use in the chemical, pharmaceutical, food, mineral extraction and other industries, or in research and development of such techniques; and 7. Educational and instructional activities related to the above. Ambassador Joseph Martin, Jr., United States Representative at the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (CCD), stated in the 721st meeting of the Conference, August 17, 1976, that the U.S. Government was of the view that the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction prohibited both existing and future means of biological and toxin warfare, and specifically would prohibit the use of recombinant DNA (deoxyribonucleic acid) molecules for weapon purposes. An excerpt from Ambassador Martin's address follows: As to agreements already in existence, a particularly important example is the Biological Weapons Convention. In this connection, I would like to draw the attention of the Committee to some statements made in December 1974, during the ratification process of the Biological Weapons Convention in my country. The Foreign Relations Committee of the United States Senate inquired whether the Biological Weapons Convention would prohibit future types of biological warfare which might employ techniques beyond the current "state of the art." The executive branch responded that: The Biological Weapons Convention would prohibit any future type of warfare which employed biological agents or toxins, regardless of when the agent was first developed or discovered. This also applies to weapons, equipment and means of delivery. In other words, the Convention prohibits not only existing means of biological and toxin warfare but also any that might come into existence in the future. Permit me to recall that on August 5, 1970, the distinguished biologist, Dr. Joshua Lederberg, pointed out to the CCD the advances being made in molecular biology and expressed his concern that newly developed techniques in this field might eventually be used to create infective agents against which no credible defense is possible. The most widely-discussed techniques are often referred to as "genetic engineering," but technically are properly known as "recombinant DNA techniques." These are techniques for joining two different pieces of DNA in the laboratory to produce new DNA sequences, known as recombinant DNA molecules. In principle, such techniques could be used to design radically new viruses for biological warfare purposes. When advances in science and technology are made, it is natural to ask about their possible use for hostile purposes and whether or not such uses are prohibited or restricted by existing international agreements. In the case of potential use of recombinant DNA molecules for weapons purposes it is our view that such use clearly falls within the scope of the Convention's prohibition. This interpretation is based upon the negotiating history as well as the explicit language of the Convention, and we believe that it is shared by the other signatories. I do not believe it is possible to read the Biological Weapons Convention and come to any other conclusion. The preamble states that the States Parties are "determined, for the sake of all mankind, to exclude completely the possibility of bacteriological (biological) agents and toxins being used as weapons." The intent of article I, which begins, "Each State Party to this Convention undertakes never in any circumstances. 'is equally forceful and clear. To take a more restricted view of the Convention's scope would rob the Convention of much of its value and could even lead States to call into question the continued viability of the Biological Weapons Convention. These were the views of the United States when the Convention was negotiated and ratified. They are still its views today. This is a matter of great importance to my Government and one on which doubt cannot be permitted to exist. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency File ACDA/GC. The United States entered a formal objection on August 18, 1976, to a reservation by the Government of Switzerland to the latter's ratification of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction, but acknowledged treaty relations between the United States and Switzerland under the Convention. The Swiss ratification, deposited with the U.S. Government on May 4, 1976, contained two reservations which, in translation, read as follows: 1. Owing to the fact that the Convention also applies to weapons, equipment or means of delivery designed to use such biological agents or toxins, the delimitation of its scope of application can cause difficulties since there are scarcely any weapons, equipment or means of delivery peculiar to such use; therefore, Switzerland reserves the right to decide for itself what auxiliary means fall within that definition. 2. By reason of the obligations resulting from its status as a perpetually neutral state, Switzerland is bound to make the general reservation that its collaboration within the framework of this Convention cannot go beyond the terms prescribed by that status. This reservation refers especially to Article VII of the Convention as well as to any similar clause that could replace or supplement that provision of the Convention (or any other arrangement). In transmitting to other governments the depositary notice of the Swiss ratification and reservations, the Department of State enclosed a copy of the Secretary of State's note of August 18, 1976, to the Ambassador of Switzerland stating the views of the U.S. Government with regard to reservation no. 2, quoted above. Those views follow: As is stated in the first Swiss reservation, the Convention prohibits the development, production, or stockpiling of weapons, equipment, or means of delivery designed to use the prohibited agents or toxins for hostile purposes or in armed conflict. In the view of the United States Government, this prohibition would apply only to (a) weapons, equipment and means of delivery the design of which indicated that they could have no other use than that specified, and (b) weapons, equipment and means of delivery the design of which indicated that they were specifically intended to be capable of the use specified. The Government of the United States shares the view of the Government of Switzerland that there are few weapons, equipment, or means of delivery peculiar to the uses referred to. It does not, however, believe that it would be. appropriate, on this ground alone, for states to reserve unilaterally the right to decide which weapons, equipment or means of delivery fell within the definition. Therefore, while acknowledging the entry into force of the Convention between itself and the Government of Switzerland, the United States Government enters its objection to this reservation. Dept. of State File L/T. Radiological Weapons The United States proposed at the United Nations, on November 18, 1976, that an international agreement be negotiated to prohibit the use of radioactive waste materials for the development of radiological weapons of mass destruction. In a statement before the First Committee (Disarmament), Dr. Fred C. Ikle, Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, pointed out that "rapidly accumulating radioactive materials have the potential for use in radiological weapons-a hazard distinct from nuclear explosives" and that such weapons, if ever developed, could produce pernicious effects, both short term and long term, over substantial areas. He continued: My government suggests that next year an appropriate forum, such as the CCD [Conference of the Committee on Disarmament], consider an agreement that would prohibit the use of radioactive materials as radiological weapons. Such an agreement would not affect the production of radioactive materials, either as a necessary by-product of power reactors or for other peaceful applications, or affect our call for storage of spent fuel under international auspices. Such an agreement could complement the Geneva Protocol of 1925, which prohibits the use of poison gas and bacteriological methods of warfare. In addition, a radiological warfare agreement could contain a provision for appropriate measures by the parties to preclude diversion of radioactive materials for use as radiological weapons. Such a commitment would, of course, be a particularly worthwhile undertaking for the major nuclear industrial states. Countries with substantial nuclear energy programs have accumulated large amounts of waste materials with extensive remaining radioactivity. Negotiation of a radiological weapons agreement should not, of course, impede work on other multilateral arms control issues. It is our intent that it will not. But feasible arms control steps, such as this, should not go unrealized simply because larger problems have yet to be solved. Such a proposal, if adopted, would address a potentially significant future danger; each arms control agreement that is sound on its own merits can be another positive step toward a safer world. * ACDA Press Release 76-22, Nov. 18, 1976. Environmental Modification On December 10, 1976, the U.N. General Assembly adopted Resolution 31/72, requesting the Secretary-General, as depositary of the Convention on the Prohibition of Military or any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques, to open it for signature and ratification at the earliest possible date. The vote was 96 (U.S.)-8, with 30 abstentions. The text of the convention, with annex, as annexed to Res. 31/72, is set out below. It is followed by a series of understandings adopted in the CCD Working Group. DRAFT CONVENTION ON THE PROHIBITION OF MILITARY The States Parties to this Convention, Guided by the interest of consolidating peace, and wishing to contribute to the cause of halting the arms race, and of bringing about general and complete |