(ii) Legal aspects and treaty obligations;

(iii) Health and safety matters; and

(iv) Economic aspects, including comparisons with non-nuclear alternatives. taking fully into account the work already done in these fields by technical committees under the auspices of the Agency;

(b) To advise the Board on the factors involved in the establishment and operation of an international service for PNE as envisaged in paragraph 1(c) of its resolution on PNE of September 1974; and

(c) To advise the Board, within the Agency's sphere of competence, on the structure and content of agreements necessary under article V of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

Nuclear-weapon-free Zones

The U.S. Government, on July 12, 1976, transmitted to the Secretary-General of the United Nations a statement of its views concerning nuclear-weapon-free zones, in response to Resolution 3472A (XXX) of the U.N. General Assembly, requesting comments on the comprehensive study of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (CCD) on that subject. Excerpts from the U.S. statement of views follow:

The United States shares the view, reflected in the study, that the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in regions where suitable conditions exist might provide a useful mechanism, complementary to the nonproliferation treaty, for preventing the spread of nuclear weapons and enhancing regional and international security. Nuclear-weapon-free zone arrangements could also create a framework for further regional measures in the field of arms control and disarmament as well as for regional cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

In chapter III of the study, the experts suggest several basic principles that, in their view, should be taken into account in the context of specific nuclear-weapon-free zone projects. These include some principles that the United States regards as relevant to any zone, including the idea that the initiative should come from states in the region concerned, that all states whose participation is deemed important should participate in the zone, that the zone arrangement should provide for adequate verification of compliance, and that the establishment of the zone should not disturb existing security relationships to the detriment of regional and international security. In addition, the United States strongly shares the view expressed by most experts that "an essential principle in any nuclear-weapon-free zone treaty is the effective prohibition of the development, acquisition, or possession by parties to it of any nuclear explosive device."

The United States also is of the view, as expressed by many of the experts, that nuclear-weapon-free zone arrangements should not seek to impose restrictions on the exercise by other states of rights recognized under international law-particularly freedom of navigation on the high seas, in international air space, and in straits used for international navigation and the right of innocent passage through territorial seas-and should not affect the ex

isting rights of its parties under international law to grant or deny transit privileges, including port calls and overflight, to other States.

One question on which particularly divergent views were held concerns appropriate undertakings toward zone parties by states outside the zone, including nuclear-weapon states. The United States considers that the principal and most important undertakings of a nuclear-weapon-free zone arrangement are those flowing from the parties themselves toward other parties; that is, their mutual commitment not to develop, acquire, or possess nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. While undertakings of various kinds by other states, including nuclear-weapon states, could contribute further to the effectiveness of the arrangement, the nature of such undertakings and their importance to the functioning of the zone would have to be considered on a case-bycase basis.

U.N. Doc. A/31/189, Sept. 16, 1976, pp. 41-42. For the CCD study, see Official Records of the General Assembly, 30th Sess., Supp. No. 27A (A/10027/Add. 1, annex I).

Nuclear Transfers

Section 305 of the International Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act of 1976 (P.L. 94-329; 90 Stat. 755), approved June 30, 1976, adds a new section on nuclear transfers (22 U.S.C. 2429) to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961. It prohibits economic and security assistance to countries delivering or receiving nuclear reprocessing or enrichment equipment, materials, or technology unless the delivering and receiving countries agree to place such items under multilateral auspices when available and unless the recipient has placed all such equipment and technology, as well as all its nuclear fuel and facilities, under international atomic energy safeguards.

The new section, added to chapter 3 of part III of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, follows:

SEC. 669. NUCLEAR TRANSFERS (a) Except as provided in subsection (b), no funds authorized to be appropriated by this Act or the Arms Export Control Act may be used for the purpose of— (1) providing economic assistance;

(2) providing military or security supporting assistance or grant military education and training; or

(3) extending military credits or making guarantees;

to any country which

(A) delivers nuclear reprocessing or enrichment equipment, materials, or technology to any other country; or

(B) receives such equipment, materials or technology from any other country;

unless before such delivery

(i) the supplying country and receiving country have reached agreement to place all such equipment, materials, and technology, upon delivery, under multilateral auspices and management when available; and

(ii) the recipient country has entered into an agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency to place all such equipment, materials, technology, and all nuclear fuel and facilities in such country under the safeguards system of such agency.

(b)(1) Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (a) of this section, the President may, by Executive order effective not less than 30 days following its date of promulgation, furnish assistance which would otherwise be prohibited under paragraph (1), (2), or (3) of such subsection if he determines and certifies in writing to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate that

(A) the termination of such assistance would have a serious adverse effect on vital United States interests; and

(B) he has received reliable assurances that the country in question will not acquire or develop nuclear weapons or assist other nations in doing so.

Such certification shall set forth the reasons supporting such determination in each particular case.

(2)(A) The Congress may by joint resolution terminate or restrict assistance described in paragraphs (1) through (3) of subsection (a) with respect to a country to which the prohibition in such subsection applies or take any other action with respect to such assistance for such country as it deems appropriate.

(B) Any such joint resolution with respect to a country shall, if introduced within 30 days after the transmittal of a certification under paragraph (1) with respect to such country, be considered in the Senate in accordance with the provisions of section 601(b) of the International Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act of 1976.

Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons

U. S. Policy

President Ford, on October 28, 1976, issued a nuclear policy statement in which he called for an international cooperative effort to develop the benefits of nuclear energy while maintaining needed protection against nuclear proliferation. In his statement, the President announced a series of major U.S. policy decisions and eight principal planned U.S. actions, together with proposals to other nations, to implement those policies.

For a summary of the announced policy decisions, implementing actions and proposals, see ante, Ch. 10, § 8, pp. 558-560.

International Safeguards

Secretary of State Kissinger, in an address to the U.N. General Assembly on September 30, 1976, proposed that nations move on three broad fronts to combat the growing danger of the proliferation of nuclear weapons:

-First, international safeguards must be strengthened and strictly enforced. The supply and use of nuclear materials associated with civilian nuclear energy programs must be carefully safeguarded so that they will not be diverted. Nuclear suppliers must impose the utmost restraint upon themselves and not permit the temptations of commercial advantage to override the risks of proliferation. The physical security of nuclear materials-whether in use, storage, or transfer-must be increased. The International Atomic Energy Agency must receive the full support of all nations in making its safeguards effective, reliable, and universally applicable. Any violator of the IAEA safeguards must face immediate and drastic penalties.

-Second, adherence to safeguards, while of prime importance, is no guarantee against future proliferation. We must continue our efforts to forge international restraints against the acquisition or transfer of reprocessing facilities which produce separated plutonium and of enrichment facilities which produce highly enriched uranium-both of which are usable for the construction of nuclear weapons.

-Third, we must recognize that one of the principal incentives for seeking sensitive reprocessing and enrichment technology is the fear that essential nonsensitive materials, notably reactorgrade uranium fuel, will not be made available on a reliable basis. Nations that show their sense of international responsibility by accepting effective restraints have a right to expect reliable and economical supply of peaceful nuclear reactors and associated nonsensitive fuel. The United States, as a principal supplier of these items, is prepared to be responsive in this regard.

Dept. of State Bulletin, Vol. LXXV, No. 1948, Oct. 25, 1976, pp. 506–507.

Compliance

Strategic Arms Limitation

Frederick Z. Brown, Director of Press Relations for the Department of State, in a news briefing on May 25, 1976, stated that the Soviet Government had informed the United States that the Soviets were behind in the schedule for the dismantling of older ICBM's (intercontinental ballistic missiles), which had been agreed to in accordance with the 1972 strategic arms limitation agreement (TIAS 7503; 23 UST 3435). Mr. Brown stated:

. [T]he Soviets have in fact begun dismantling the required number of older ICBM's. However, they did not complete this

process within the four months as required by procedures agreed to in the SCC [Standing Consultative Committee].

[W]hen this became apparent last winter, the President ordered a review of the matter prior to the convening of the regular SCC Meeting in Geneva.

... [H]e instructed our delegation to raise the matter and make it clear that we considered the Soviets to have failed to meet the agreed schedule. We consider it a serious issue.

However, the Soviets officially informed us prior to our raising the issue that they had not met the schedule and gave us detailed information concerning our intelligence.

At the President's direction, our delegation stated that because of the delays we expected no new submarines-that means Soviet submarines-to begin sea trials until the dismantling had been fully completed and until they were in full compliance. The Soviets accepted this.

.. [O]ur recent intelligence indicates that the Soviets are moving rapidly to complete the dismantling process. . . and that the requisite number of launchers-which happens to be 51-will be completely dismantled soon. No new submarines have begun sea trials.

Finally, at the President's direction, we are continuing to watch this matter very closely, and we will insist upon full and complete compliance with all aspects of the interim SALT Accord.

*

Dept. of State News Briefing, DPC 98, May 25, 1976.

ABM Protocol

The 1974 protocol to the U.S.-U.S.S.R. Treaty of May 26, 1972, on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems entered into force on May 24, 1976 (TIAS 8276; 27 UST 1645). Under its terms, ABM deployments on each side are limited to one site at any one time, with each side retaining the right to remove its ABM system and the components thereof from the present deployment area to an alternative deployment area permitted by the ABM treaty.

Chemical and Biological Weapons

Biological Weapons Convention

Article II of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development. Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction (TIAS 8062; 26 UST 583; entered into force for the United States March 26, 1975) requires each state party to destroy, or to divert to peaceful purposes, as soon as possible