Africa. The U.S. Department of Justice is continuing to investigate reports of illegal arms sales to South Africa involving American arms manufacturers.

Press Release USUN-191(76), rev. 1, Dec. 22, 1976, p. 26.

87

Arms Control and Disarmament

Nuclear Weapon Tests and Peaceful
Nuclear Explosions

The Treaty between the United States and the Soviet Union on the Limitation of Underground Nuclear Weapon Tests (the "Threshold Test Ban Treaty"), signed on July 3, 1974, provides in article I that

Each party undertakes to prohibit, to prevent, and not to carry out any underground nuclear weapon test having a yield exceeding 150 kilotons at any place under its jurisdiction or control, beginning March 31, 1976.

On March 31, 1976, Robert L. Funseth, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for Press Relations, made available to newsmen the following U.S. statement:

The Threshold Test Ban Treaty (TTBT) was signed on July 3, 1974, and scheduled to take effect on March 31, 1976. However, article III of that treaty calls for the United States and U.S.S.R. to negotiate a separate agreement governing the conduct of underground nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes (PNE's). At the time of signing the TTBT and on several subsequent occasions, we stated that in view of the close relationship between the verification of a threshold on nuclear weapon tests and the conduct of peaceful nuclear explosions, we would not present the TTBT to the Senate for ratification until a satisfactory PNE agreement had been concluded.

The negotiations for a PNE agreement began in October 1974 with the agreed objective of insuring that peaceful nuclear explosions would not be conducted so as to provide weapons-related benefits that were otherwise precluded by the TTBT. The two sides have made considerable progress in completing an agreement, and the negotiations are continuing in Moscow to resolve the few remaining issues.

The two sides hope that a satisfactory agreement can be concluded within the next several weeks. During this period, we expect that neither side will conduct weapons tests above the threshold of 150 kilotons. For the immediate future, we have no plans for high-yield weapons tests above the threshold of 150 kilotons.

Dept. of State Bulletin, Vol. LXXIV, No. 1921, Apr. 19, 1976, p. 507. For the text of the Threshold Test Ban Treaty, see the 1974 Digest, pp. 728-731; Dept. of State Bulletin, Vol. LXXI, No. 1831, July 29, 1974, p. 218.

On July 29, 1976, President Ford transmitted to the Senate two interrelated treaties with the Soviet Union aimed at controlling the danger of nuclear weapons: The first, the Treaty on the Limitation of Underground Nuclear Weapon Tests, with Protocol, known as the Threshold Test Ban Treaty (TTBT), was signed at Moscow on July 3, 1974, but ratification was not immediately sought because it would have been incomplete without the second, the Treaty on Underground Nuclear Explosions for Peaceful Purposes (PNE Treaty). The latter was signed at Washington and Moscow on May 28, 1976. The treaty limiting weapons testing establishes a nuclear "threshold," prohibiting tests having a yield exceeding 150 kilotons (equivalent to 150,000 tons of TNT). The parallel treaty on peaceful nuclear explosions (PNE's) places exactly the same limit of 150 kilotons on the yield of any individual nuclear explosion for peaceful purposes, such as might be conducted as part of an engineering project. The companion treaties were needed because of lack of any essential distinction between the technology of a nuclear explosive device that could be used as a weapon and a nuclear explosive device used for a peaceful purpose. Article III of the TTBT specifically excluded PNE's from its provisions and called for negotiation of a separate treaty to govern them.

In his letter of transmittal to the Senate President Ford described the treaties, in part, as follows:

The TTB Treaty and the PNE Treaty contain numerous provisions to ensure adequate verification, including some concepts, more far-reaching than those found in previous arms control agreements, which are not only important in themselves but which will have significant precedential value as well. For example, the Limited Test Ban Treaty is verified only by national technical means. The TTB and PNE Treaties add requirements for exchange of specific information in advance to assist verification by national technical means, and the PNE Treaty establishes procedures for on-site observation under certain conditions on the territory of the party conducting the explosion.

The TTB Treaty provides for an exchange of data on the geography and geology of nuclear weapon test sites as well as the yields of some actual weapons tests conducted at each site. The PNE Treaty requires that the party conducting any underground nuclear explosion for peaceful purposes provide the other party in advance with data on the geography and geology of the place where the explosion is to be carried out, its purpose, and specific information on each explosion itself. These requirements are related to the yield of the explosion and become more detailed as the magnitude of the explosions increase.

In addition to the limitation on individual nuclear explosions of 150 kilotons, the PNE Treaty provides for an aggregate yield

limitation of 1.5 megatons on group underground nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes. A group explosion consists of substantially simultaneous individual explosions located within a specific geometrical relationship to one another. The Treaty provides for mandatory on-site observer rights for group explosions with an aggregate yield in excess of 150 kilotons in order to determine that the yield of each individual explosion in the group does not exceed 150 kilotons and that the explosions serve the stated peaceful purposes. The Treaty also provides for on-site observers for explosions with an aggregate yield between 100 and 150 kilotons if both parties agree, on the basis of information provided, that such observers would be appropriate for the confirmation of the yield of the explosion.

The TTB Treaty and the PNE Treaty, taken together as integrated and complementary components of this important limitation on nuclear explosions, provide that very large yield nuclear explosions will no longer be carried out by the parties. This is one more useful step in our continuing efforts to develop comprehensive and balanced limitations on nuclear weapons. We will continue our efforts to reach an adequately verifiable agreement banning all nuclear weapon testing, but in so doing we must ensure that controls on peaceful nuclear explosions are consistent with such a ban...

The Department of State's report on the treaties, dated June 22, 1976, contains an analytical summary of the two treaties, article by article. In connection with article I of the TTBT (which contains an undertaking by each party to prohibit, to prevent and not to carry out any underground nuclear weapon tests having a yield exceeding 150 kilotons at any place under its jurisdiction or control), the Department states:

The technical problems associated with a yield threshold were recognized by the sides in the spring of 1974 during the negotiation of the TTB Treaty. In this context the U.S.S.R. mentioned the idea of some kind of a "mistakes" understanding concerning occasional, minor, unintended breaches. Discussions on the subject of such an understanding took place in the autumn of 1974 and in the spring of 1976. The U.S.S.R. was informed by the United States that the understanding reached would be included as part of the public record associated with submitting the TTB Treaty to the Senate for advice and consent to ratification. The entire understanding is as follows:

Both parties will make every effort to comply fully with all the provisions of the TTB Treaty. However, there are technical uncertainties associated with predicting the precise yield of nuclear weapon tests. These uncertainties may result in slight, unintended breaches of the 150 kiloton threshold. Therefore, the two sides have discussed this problem and agreed that: (1) One or two slight, unintended breaches per year would not be considered a violation of the Treaty; (2) such breaches would be a cause for concern, however, and, at the request of either party, would be the subject of consultations.

The U.S.S.R. was also informed that while the United States would not consider such a slight, unintentional breach a violation, the United States would carefully review each such breach to insure that it is not part of a general attempt to exceed the confines of the Treaty.

An "agreed statement," dated May 13, 1976, accompanied the PNE Treaty. It specifies that development testing of nuclear explosives does not constitute a "peaceful application" and any such development tests shall be carried out only within the boundaries of nuclear weapon test sites specified in accordance with the TTBT; also, that associating test facilities, instrumentation or procedures related only to testing of nuclear weapons or their effects with any explosion carried out in accordance with the PNE Treaty does not constitute a "peaceful application."

The treaties are to enter into force simultaneously upon exchange of instruments of ratification. Both treaties will remain in force for five years, and will be extended for successive five-year periods unless either party has given six months prior notification of its intention to terminate them. Article VIII of the PNE Treaty specifies that "under no circumstances shall either party be entitled to terminate this Treaty while the Treaty on the Limitation of Underground Nuclear Weapon Tests remains in force."

The TTBT contains a formal commitment by the parties to continue negotiations with a view toward achieving a solution to the problem of the cessation of all underground weapon tests.

For the President's letter of transmittal, the Dept. of State report, and the texts of the two treaties and their related documents, see S. Ex. N, 94th Cong., 2d Sess.

PNE Advisory Group

On June 11, 1975, the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) established an Ad Hoc Advisory Group on the Nuclear Explosions for Peaceful Purposes.

Pursuant to this decision, the International Atomic Energy Agency convened a meeting of consultants on the legal aspects of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes (PNEs) on February 2, 1976.

John H. McNeill, attorney, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, and U.S. participant in the meeting, stated the following points during the course of this meeting:

The purpose of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) was to ensure that potential benefits of PNEs, if and when realized, would be shared on a nondiscriminatory basis with all non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the treaty; no supplying obligation for nuclear-weapon States exists until potential benefits have been realized. As stated

at the NPT Review Conference, the U.S. Government has not yet reduced any application to practice, nor has it obtained any commercial benefits from this technology. If and when the United States should succeed in doing so, it would, of course, make these benefits available as called for in the treaty.

- All PNEs must be fully consistent with existing treaty obligations. Both the supplier and recipient States have a responsibility to ensure that a proposed application entails no risk of violation of any relevant international agreement. In particular, the provisions of the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water (LTBT) must be strictly observed.

-While the U.S. Government would expect the IAEA to take an interest in the amount of radioactive debris expected to be produced by a proposed application, the decision as to whether proposed applications would violate the LTBT remains with the States party to the Treaty. The U.S. Government would expect the IAEA not to allow itself to become associated with any project which would cause radioactive debris to be present outside the boundaries of the State in which the explosion was conducted.

While the IAEA would appropriately provide advice to parties envisaging a PNE application, the IAEA has no authority to render judgments on compliance with the NPT or other applicable international agreements by States parties. It may, of course, evaluate the consistency of an application with relevant international agreements for the purpose of making judgments as to IAEA participation.

-According to article V, the charge for explosive devices used in PNE application is the only charge related to such application which needs to be as low as possible.

- Benefits made available to non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the NPT through bilateral arrangements, pursuant to NPT article V, must be provided at lowest possible device-cost also.

Because of the obligations of nuclear-weapon States under NPT articles I and II, suppliers have the right to insist that security measures be satisfactory to them before providing services. Special status according privileges and immunities to international inspection and supplier State personnel involved in carrying out or observing PNE projects will have to be provided by the recipient State.

-The explosive device must remain at all times in the exclusive custody and control of the supplier State.

- Pursuant to agreement between the supplier and recipient States, ancillary services associated with the PNE application may be provided by a State other than the State supplying the PNĚ service.

For IAEA document on establishment of Ad Hoc Advisory Group on Nuclear Explosions for Peaceful Purposes, see GOV/DEC (XVIII)/85, No. 44. The Board concurrently established the following terms of reference for the Group:

(a) To examine the aspects of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes (PNE) coming within the Agency's sphere of competence, with particular reference to: (i) Procedural aspects relating to possible requests for PNE-related services;