good offices mission. The vote again was 13-0-0, China and Benin not participating. Ambassador Albert W. Sherer, Jr., Deputy U.S. Representative on the Security Council, paid tribute to UNFICYP's performance, urged other nations which had not yet done so to lend their material support to UNFICYP, and voiced U.S. hope that the parties would make renewed efforts to negotiate a lasting settlement that would remove the necessity for continued presence of UNFICYP.

Sec. Council Res. 401 (1976). Press Release USUN-188(76), Dec. 15, 1976. For the report of the Secretary-General for the period June 6-Dec. 6, 1976, see U.N. Doc. S/12253.

U.N. Command in Korea

On August 18, 1976, North Korean military personnel attacked U.N. Command (UNC) personnel in the Joint Security Area of the Korean Demilitarized Zone, killing two American officers and injuring four Americans and five Republic of Korea military personnel. The UNC personnel were trimming branches from a tree which the UNC considered to hinder observation between the two UNC checkpoints. The U.N. Commander promptly requested a meeting of the Military Armistice Commission (MAC), and U.N. forces in Korea were put on an increased state of alert. U.S. air units and a carrier task group were sent to the area. On August 21, the UNC sent 110 American and South Korean personnel into the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) to cut down the disputed tree and remove two North Korean roadblocks. A few hours later North Korean President Kim Il-sung conveyed a message through the MAC to the Commander in Chief of the UNC, expressing regret that the August 18 incident had occurred, and urging that further incidents in the area be avoided.

No report to Congress under the terms of the War Powers Resolution (P.L. 93-148; 87 Stat. 555) was made in connection with the events in Korea and the augmentation of U.S. forces there. George H. Aldrich, Acting Legal Adviser of the Department of State, in a memorandum of August 21, 1976, stated the relevant considerations concerning that decision as follows:

The War Powers Resolution requires that "the President in every possible instance shall consult with Congress before introducing United States Armed Forces into hostilities or into situations where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances. . . ". Given what I know of the situation in Korea, I would not interpret this requirement as applicable to the strengthening of our armed forces there, even when accompanied by a heightened alert status. More difficult is the question whether the sending of reinforced patrols into the DMZ would qualify, but, so long as they are engaging merely in acts which we are entitled to take under the Armistice Agreement and which we have con

sistently taken, then I do not think the prospect of increased North Korean aggressiveness triggers the consultation requirement. In any event, consultation is only required where "possible"; and, to the extent that it is possible, it is clearly desirable in any case.

The resolution requires reporting within 48 hours in three circumstances. The possibly relevant one with respect to the presently planned deployment is Sec. 4(a)(3)-"numbers which substantially enlarge United States Armed Forces equipped for combat already located in a foreign nation." Whether the proposed additions are substantial enlargements depends upon an analysis of what is already there and what is being added.

I believe it would be an undesirable precedent to construe the resolution as requiring a report in a situation where a relative handful of people have been added to an existing force of some 41,000 men. Although in terms of tactical aircraft the increment is significant, I believe we should interpret 4(a)(3) as concerned primarily, if not entirely, with numbers of military personnel, rather than with items of equipment. Certainly the text speaks of "numbers," and the examples given in the legislative debates referred only to numbers of personnel. I am satisfied that this interpretation is reasonable and fully defensible and that a contrary interpretation would create a precedent that would haunt us in many future cases.

Dept. of State File No. P76 0149-2476.

On September 6, 1976, a supplementary agreement to the Military Armistice Commission Headquarters Agreement of October 19, 1953, was signed in the MAC by the Secretary of the UNC Delegation and the Secretary of the Delegation of the Korean People's Army and the Chinese People's Volunteers (KPA/CPV). It restricts security personnel to their respective sides of the military demarcation line within the Area and provides for removing the North Korean guard posts from the UNC side. The provision against movement across the military dividing line does not apply to MAC personnel, joint observer teams, or the personnel of the neutral nations supervisory commission.

The United States, on behalf of the UNC, transmitted a report of the Korean incident to the President of the Security Council (U.N. Doc. S/12181, Aug. 20, 1976). On Sept. 1, 1976, Ambassador Arthur W. Hummel, Jr., Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, testified on the incident and its aftermath before the Subcommittees on International Organizations and International Political and Military Affairs of the House Committee on International Relations. Dept. of State Bulletin, Vol. LXXV, No. 1944, Sept. 27, 1976, pp. 386-392. Ambassador William W. Scranton, U.S. Representative to the U.N., transmitted to the President of the Security Council, on Dec. 23, 1976, a report of the U.N. Command concerning the maintenance of the 1953 Armistice Agreement for the period Sept. 1, 1975-Dec. 20, 1976, including a report of the Aug. 18 incident and the text of the supplementary agreement of Sept. 6, 1976 (U.N. Doc. S/12263, Dec. 23, 1976).

Nineteen countries, including the United States, on August 20, 1976, submitted to the United Nations a draft resolution and

explanatory memorandum on the Korean unification issue. The resolution called for a resumption of talks between the South and North of Korea based upon their Joint Communique of July 4, 1972, and a conference of all the parties directly concerned leading to more fundamental peace arrangements to replace the 1953 Armistice Agreement (TIAS 2782; 4 UST 234). It called on both sides to exercise restraint so as to create an atmosphere conducive to peace and dialogue.

The explanatory statement called attention to a proposal that had been made by the United States on July 22, 1976, to meet with the parties directly concerned to seek an agreed new legal structure for the armistice during the forthcoming session of the U.N. General Assembly in New York and elsewhere. It stated that the only response had been the submission on August 16, 1976, by North Korean supporters of a confrontational draft resolution calling, inter alia, for withdrawal of all foreign forces under the U.N. flag and unconditional dissolution of the U.N. Command.

For the draft resolution and explanatory memorandum presented by the United States and 18 other countries with a request for inclusion in the agenda of the 31st General Assembly, see U.N. Doc. A/31/194, Aug. 20, 1976. For the Aug. 16 resolution submitted by North Korean supporters, see U.N. Doc. A/31/192. The two resolutions were withdrawn by their respective sponsors on Sept. 21, 1976, just prior to the convening of the 31st General Assembly.

Ambassador Arthur W. Hummel, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, summarized the U.S. position on Korea on September 1, 1976, in testimony before the Subcommittees on International Organizations and International Political and Military Affairs of the House International Relations Committee. Excerpts from his statement follow:

The Korean Peninsula has been in an armed truce since 1953, with the political problems that caused the Korean hostilities still unresolved and two heavily armed forces facing each other across a 4-kilometer-wide demilitarized zone. Over the past 23 years of the armistice the consistent goal of the United States has been to prevent the outbreak of new hostilities and contribute to stability in an area where the interests of four great powers ourselves, Japan, the U.S.S.R., and the People's Republic of China-all intersect. The security of Korea remains vital to peace in Northeast Asia and is closely linked to the security of Japan, a major ally.

Our position in Korea is clear:

• We urge the resumption of serious South-North discussions which both sides agreed to in 1972 and which North Korea has broken off.

• If North Korea's allies are prepared to improve their relations with South Korea, we are prepared to take reciprocal steps toward North Korea.

• We continue to support proposals that the United Nations give full membership to both South and North Korea, without prejudice to eventual reunification. And

• We are prepared to negotiate a new basis for the armistice or replace it with more permanent arrangements in any form acceptable to all the parties concerned.

*

Dept. of State News Release, Sept. 1, 1976.

Regional Peacekeeping

U.S. Sinai Support Mission

*

On January 13, 1976, President Ford issued Executive Order 11896, establishing the U.S. Sinai Support Mission to carry out the duties and responsibilities of the U.S. Government to implement the "United States Proposal for the Early Warning System in Sinai" (TIAS 8155, 8156; 26 UST 2271, 2278) in connection with the interim agreement between Egypt and Israel on disengagement, signed on September 4, 1975, and its annex. The work of the Mission is made "subject to broad policy guidance received through the Assistant to the President for national security affairs, and the continuous supervision and general direction of the Secretary of State."

Fed. Reg., Vol. 41, No. 9, Jan. 14, 1976, pp. 2067-2069; Dept. of State Bulletin, Vol. LXXIV, No. 1913, pp. 232-233.

§ 6

South Africa

Military Sanctions

Arms Embargo

On October 19, 1976, the United States, the United Kingdom, and France vetoed a draft resolution in the U.N. Security Council which would have declared the situation in Namibia a threat to the peace and, under chapter VII of the U.N. Charter, would have imposed a mandatory arms embargo against South Africa for its failure to withdraw from Namibia in compliance with U.N. resolutions. In explanation of the U.S. vote, Ambassador William W. Scranton, U.S. Representative to the United Nations, stated in the Security Council:

*

[W]hile the sensitive process of consultation is going on it does not serve a useful purpose for the Security Council to take new initiatives on the Namibian question. After many years of frustra

tion in trying to bring Namibia to independence, we have now for the first time the prospect of results. Substantial progress has been made toward reaching a peaceful settlement to the Namibian problem in consultation with South Africa and the interested African parties. We have in sight the possibility of independence for Namibia, which this Council has sought so persistently for so many years. We do not feel that the measures called for in the resolution before us will improve the chances to gain a free and independent Namibia. In fact, they could just do the opposite. It would be tragic if the delicate fabric of negotiations were to be torn asunder by any precipitate move at this time. . .

The United States has continued to enforce its own arms embargo towards South Africa. We initiated this embargo in 1962, even before the Security Council called for a voluntary embargo against South Africa in the following year.

[T]he United States has made clear to South Africa the urgent need for unqualified independence for Namibia. We are keeping Secretary-General Waldheim informed of the progress of our negotiations and we will continue to do so and are in regular contact with the front line Presidents. The United States will not flag in these efforts.

Press Release USUN-119(76), Oct. 19, 1976. The draft resolution on the situation in Namibia (S/12211) received 10 votes in favor, 3 against, with 2 abstentions. It was not adopted, owing to the negative vote of 3 permanent members of the Security Council. For the text of the vetoed resolution, see Dept. of State Bulletin, Vol. LXXV, No. 1950, Nov. 8, 1976, pp. 594-595.

On November 9, 1976, the U.N. General Assembly approved Resolution 31/6D by a vote of 110-8 (U.S.), with 20 abstentions, requesting the Security Council once more to take action under chapter VII for a mandatory arms embargo against South Africa and calling on France, the United States, and the United Kingdom to "adopt a positive policy" so the Council could act under chapter VII. Rev. Robert P. Hupp, U.S. representative, in explanation of vote, stated:

We have voted against the draft resolution concerning the “Arms Embargo Against South Africa" since we are not convinced that the invocation of chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations against South Africa for its apartheid policies is ap propriate at this time. We object strongly to those paragraphs which allege that the United States is sending weapons to South Africa. As the General Assembly well knows, the United States has continued to impose its own arms embargo against South Africa since 1962, and has urged other nations to impose voluntarily an embargo of military equipment. Recently, it was discovered that a U.S. company had illegally shipped arms to South Africa. The shipment was made as a result of misrepresentation by a company employee. That employee subsequently has been prosecuted. convicted, and sentenced to jail. Let me make this clear so that no one doubts the strength of our commitment. We have jailed an American citizen for facilitating an arms shipment to South