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collective basis; accordingly, the Congress "encourages the governments of Europe to accelerate their present efforts to achieve European armaments collaboration among all European members of the Alliance."

See also S. Rept. 94-878, May 14, 1976, pp. 168-169, and S. Rept. 94-1004 (Comm. of Conference), June 28, 1976, pp. 53-54.

A memorandum of understanding between the United States and the Federal Republic of Germany, represented by the Department of the Navy and the Federal Ministry of Defense, respectively, was signed on July 16 and 22, 1976, agreeing upon the joint development of an Advanced Surface to Air Missile System for use in the anti-ship missile defense role. It commits the two role. agencies to conduct the validation phase, with an estimated total cost of $17 million, of which $10.5 million would be borne by the United States and $6.5 million by the Federal Republic of Germany. The agreement envisions full scale development and follow-on production to be undertaken upon successful completion of the validation phase, in implementation of standardization and rationalization of weapons and equipment developments.

On August 4, 1976, the Department of Defense made an announcement jointly with the German Defense Ministry that the U.S. and West German armies had agreed on common components for the gun and engine for their new battle tanks, in a major step toward the goal of standardizing weapons among the North Atlantic allies.

The New York Times, Aug. 5, 1976, p. 1.

President Ford and Helmut Schmidt, Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany, issued a joint statement on mutual defense issues on July 17, 1976, on the occasion of a visit by Chancellor Schmidt to the United States. In it they recognized that the traditional arrangement between their two countries on the offsetting of costs associated with the stationing of U.S. troops in Germany had ceased to be relevant. The text of the joint statement follows:

The Chancellor and the President have agreed on a measure exemplifying the close German-American security relationship in Europe, one which strengthens considerably the force posture of NATO defenses. The Federal Republic of Germany has agreed to share as a single payment in the costs of relocating a U.S. combat brigade into the northern area of the Federal Republic, near Bremen. The contribution to this effort amounts to DM 171.2 million ($68.48 million).

The Chancellor and the President have also been discussing, over a period of time, the general question of offset arrangements which serve our own and the Alliance's security needs. As is well known,

the Federal Republic of Germany through the years has purchased substantial amounts of military equipment in the United States, and is expected to continue to do so. This procurement has, of course, benefitted the United States in the economic sense.

It should also be reiterated that since the Federal Republic of Germany became a partner in the NATO effort, it maintained its defense forces in a state of combat readiness equal to the tasks before it. At a time of extreme budgetary and political difficulties in the Alliance, it is reassuring to the U.S. that the Chancellor intends to continue this highly positive and welcome attitude toward the Federal Republic of Germany's NATO commitment. Given the recently introduced changes in the international monetary area, specifically flexible exchange rates, as well as the notably improved strength of the dollar and a more acceptable U.S. balance of payments position, the President and the Chancellor consider that the traditional offset arrangements approach has lost its relevance.

Dept. of State Bulletin, Vol. LXXV, No. 1938, Aug. 16, 1976, p. 247.

Nonuse of Force

The United States abstained on U.N. General Assembly Resolution. 31/9, adopted on November 8, 1976, by a vote of 88 to 2, with 31 abstentions, which invited states to examine further a Soviet draft treaty on the nonuse of force and to submit their views and suggestions on the subject for inclusion on the agenda of the General Assembly in 1977. The item, which had been recommended by the First (Political) Committee, was referred to the Sixth (Legal) Committee for further consideration.

In the First Committee, U.S. Representative Albert W. Sherer, Jr., stated, on October 28, 1976:

[T]he proposal would add nothing to the obligations which we already have under the Charter and therefore is unnecessary and unwise. Article 2, paragraphs 3 and 4, set forth the Charter's basic obligations with respect to the peaceful settlement of disputes and the nonuse of force, and the primacy of those obligations is firmly established by Article 103. Under closer scrutiny, however, the United States concludes that the Soviet proposal would have us embark on an exercise which purports to expand but which may in fact diminish the Charter's obligations by casting doubt on the solemnity of the legal commitments undertaken therein. The very proposal of a separate treaty on the nonuse of force tends to undermine existing Charter obligations by implying that the member states of the United Nations are still free to adopt or reject the principle of nonuse of force embodied in Article 2, paragraph 4, of the Charter. We reject any such suggestion.

In a statement prior to the First Committee vote on October 29, Ambassador Sherer said that the United States could have voted in favor of a study of the question of the need for or desirability of a new treaty, but it could not accept the apparent attempt to prejudge that issue.

Press Release USUN-133(76), Oct. 28, 1976, and Press Release USUN-134(76), Oct. 29, 1976. For the draft World Treaty on the Nonuse of Force in International Relations submitted by the Soviet Union, see U.N. Doc. A/31/243, annex.

Robert Rosenstock, U.S. Representative in the Sixth Committee (Legal) at the United Nations, made a statement on November 22, 1976, further commenting on the Soviet proposal on nonuse of force and urging that any further study of the item be conducted in the Legal Committee. The following are excerpts from his statement:

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[S]tates expressly committed themselves to a binding treaty obligation in article 2, paragraph 4 [of the U.N. Charter], to "refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations." Today that clear and direct rule is universally recognized as a peremptory norm of international law binding on all and not subject to derogation by unilateral declarations or bilateral agreements.

[W]hat is desperately needed is not further glosses on the prohibition of the threat or use of force or further instruments reiterating once again obligations none deny but: First, greater will on the part of states to honor what they know full well to be their obligations; second, examination of methods of resolving differences as to facts and an intensive, prolonged and detailed examination of the alternative to the use of force-the peaceful settlement of disputes.

Clearly differences between states exist and will continue to exist for the foreseeable future. It is a moral as well as a pragmatic imperative in today's interdependent, nuclear world that states become habituated to settling their disputes by peaceful means. There is no rational alternative. Unfortunately, while there is much learning and little doubt concerning the meaning of paragraph 4 of article 2 of the Charter, the same cannot be said of paragraph 3 of article 2. The Charter wisely listed the obligation to "settle international disputes by peaceful means" ahead of the prohibition of the threat or use of force because disputes must be settled if we are to avoid violence. The two norms are part of an inseparable whole.

We all have a solemn treaty commitment to avoid the threat or use of force in the Charter. We must not diminish the full force and effect of these Charter obligations by elaborating a partial parallel treaty structure. We would do no service to the primacy of the Charter by adopting another treaty on the same subject matter. If the provisions of both treaties were to be identical, we would debase the treatymaking process and the rule of pacta sunt servanda by suggesting that two treaties are better than one. If the words of the two treaties were not precisely the same, comma for comma, a number of difficulties would be bound to arise. Among the foremost of the difficulties would be that not all states will become parties to the second treaty and we will have two regimes sometimes parallel, sometimes divergent. A second major difficulty that would arise is that some states will seek to find interpretive loopholes stemming from the differences between the two texts-however slight those differences may be. It is even possible that some may argue that the elaboration of a new treaty implies member states are free to adopt or reject the basic prohibition of the threat or use of force...

If we are not to follow the treaty route, but decide the general area merits further examination, we would do well to ask whether the suggestions of the character contained in the U.S.S.R. proposal contain a useful basis for pursuing the elaboration of a recommendation such as a resolution or declaration. . . . [W]e are inclined to think that the approach and format contained in the Soviet text are not-even aside from the inadvisability of a treaty-a good basis for consideration of the complex of issues involved in the prohibition of the threat or use of force and the obligation to settle disputes by peaceful means.

[A]ny serious effort to deal with the problem of the threat or use of force must deal with the peaceful settlement of disputes which is . . . another of the aspects of the international security system as a whole. In order to be meaningful, however, any effort to deal with peaceful settlement must build upon the principle contained in the Friendly Relations Declaration that “recourse to, or acceptance of, a settlement procedure freely agreed to by states with regard to existing or future disputes to which they are parties shall not be regarded as incompatible with sovereign equality." What is needed is an examination of the various means of disputes settlement and a recognition that acceptance of dispute settlement procedures involving impartial third parties for future disputes is essential if we are to eliminate force as a means to settle disputes...

States derive their sovereignty from international law. They must come to recognize that the supreme manifestation of that sovereignty is to agree not merely to the principle of peaceful settlement but to meaningful and expeditious settlement procedures. This is where the concern to avoid the use of force can now be most productively directed.

A meaningful effort to discuss the norms contained in article 2 of the Charter must not suggest that these norms exist in a vacuum. Other parts of the entire system such as Chapters VI, VII and VIII

must also be taken into account if distortion and confusion are to be avoided. Emphasis on only some parts of the interlocking system risks downgrading other parts. Vague references to measures for limiting confrontation and for disarmament are more likely to distract us from serious efforts to reduce armaments and tension than contribute to positive change.

If we are to proceed with future consideration of ways and means of eliminating the use of force, all of these aspects of the problem must be carefully studied and analyzed.

... [A]ny future study of the item should be conducted in the Legal Committee.

Press Release USUN-156(76), Nov. 22, 1976. On Nov. 25, 1976, the Sixth Committee decided, by consensus, to include in its report to the General Assembly a statement noting that the legal issues involved in the nonuse item will need to be examined in current and future deliberations on the subject. U.N. Doc. A/31/360, Nov. 26, 1976.

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The third session of the Diplomatic Conference on the Reaffirmation and Development of International Humanitarian Law Applicable to Armed Conflicts, held in Geneva April 21 - June 11, 1976, made considerable progress in the development of two draft protocols to the 1949 Geneva Conventions on the Protection of War, Victims: Protocol I-International Armed Conflicts, and Protocol II-Non-International Conflicts. Ambassador George H. Aldrich, Deputy Legal Adviser of the Department of State, headed a U.S. delegation which worked successfully to achieve the adoption of a satisfactory article on grave breaches, a new regime for the protection of medical aircraft, and provisions dealing with the missing and the dead. Other major U.S. interests included completion of a technical Annex concerning identification of medical aircraft and other medical transport, and acceptable articles on means and methods of combat in international conflicts.

As in previous sessions, the Conference organized into three main committees. The U.S. Delegation Report submitted by Ambassador Aldrich on October 15, 1976, summarized the achievements of those committees. The following are excerpts from that report:

Committee I

Committee I has responsibility for provisions dealing with the scope of application of the protocols and general matters. . ., the treatment of persons in the power of parties to the conflict..., executory provisions

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and the preambles.

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