In explanation of the U.S. veto, the Department of State issued a statement on January 26, 1976, which reiterated the view that a solution to the Middle East problem lay in preserving the framework for negotiations established in Resolutions 242 and 338, and concluded: We believe that we have an obligation to keep open and intact the negotiating framework and to assist in developing a common understanding of the problems that remain before us. We are confident that progress leading to an eventual solution of all the issues is possible, utilizing—and, in fact, only by utilizing-the present framework; and we are committed to assist in every way we can to facilitate such progress . . . . For the text of the draft resolution, and statements made by Ambassador Daniel P. Moynihan in opposition to it on Jan. 19 and Jan. 26, 1976, as well as the Dept. of State statement of Jan. 26, 1976, see Dept. of State Bulletin, Vol. LXXIV, No. 1912, Feb. 16, 1976, pp. 191-197. See also U.N. Doc. S/PV.1876, Jan. 19, 1976, pp. 6-12, and S/PV.1879, Jan. 26, 1976, pp. 41-46. On December 9, 1976, the U.N. General Assembly adopted, by a vote of 122-2-8 (the United States and Israel alone opposing), Resolution 31/62 calling for a reconvening of the Geneva Conference on the Middle East not later than the end of March 1977. The resolution, sponsored by Egypt, directed the Secretary-General to resume his contacts with the parties to the dispute and to report to the Security Council by March 1, 1977, following which the Council is requested to meet. At the same plenary meeting the Assembly adopted a Syrian resolution (31-61) by a vote of 91-11 (U.S.)-29, calling for early resumption of the Middle East Peace Conference with participation by the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), and condemning Israel. In explaining the U.S. votes to the General Assembly, Ambassador William W. Scranton, U.S. Representative at the United Nations, emphasized that the United States did not disagree with the underlying purpose of the Egyptian resolution, which was to emphasize the urgency of resuming the negotiating process. However, he said, the United States disagreed with specific elements of the resolution, most importantly its arbitrary deadline for reconvening the Geneva Conference. This, he stated, was not a matter for the General Assembly, but rather it was a matter for the parties to that Conference themselves to decide in consultation with the United States and the Soviet Union as cochairmen. Ambassador Scranton also objected to the artificial time frame set for a meeting of the Security Council and questioned the utility of any such effort by the General Assembly to determine the pace and form of Middle East negotiations. For the statement by Ambassador Scranton in the U.N. General Assembly on Dec. 9, 1976, and the texts of the two resolutions, see Dept. of State Bulletin, Vol. LXXVI, No. 1960, Jan. 17, 1977, pp. 37-40. Israeli-occupied Territories A veto by the United States on March 25, 1976, blocked a draft Security Council resolution on the situation in the territories occupied by Israel, which, inter alia, would have had the Security Council "deplore Israel's failure to put a halt to actions tending to change the status of the city of Jerusalem and to rescind measures already taken to that effect." It would also have called on Israel to refrain from all measures against the Arab inhabitants of the occupied territories. The Council meeting had been requested by Libya and Pakistan after an Israeli lower court ruled that Jews had the right to pray on the Temple Mount, or Haram al-Sharif, a site sacred to both Jews and Moslems. The Government of Israel, which since 1967 had prevented this because of the danger of disrupting public order, appealed the decision to the Israeli Supreme Court which, in a similar case, had sustained the Government ban. Riots and demonstrations were also occurring throughout the West Bank and Jerusalem, fanned by Palestinian fears of increasing Israeli settlements in the territories and Palestinian criticism of Israeli handling of demonstrators. On March 23, 1976, Ambassador William W. Scranton, U.S. Representative to the United Nations, stated the longstanding U.S. policy that Israeli occupation should be dealt with in the context of a peace settlement negotiated on the basis of Security Council Resolution 242(1967). He stated that Israel's "punctilious administration" of the holy places in Jerusalem had greatly minimized the tensions inherent in the situation. He reaffirmed that the part of Jerusalem captured by Israel was "occupied territory and hence subject to the provisions of international law governing the rights and obligations of an occupying power" and that unilateral attempts to predetermine its future have no standing. Ambassador Scranton declared that substantial resettlement of Israeli civilian population into the occupied territories, including East Jerusalem, was illegal under the Fourth Geneva Convention (1949 Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War; TIAS 3365; 6 UST 3516). He said, in part: . [M]y Government believes that international law sets the appropriate standards. An occupier must maintain the occupied areas as intact and unaltered as possible, without interfering with the customary life of the area, and any changes must be necessitated by the immediate needs of the occupation and be consistent with international law. The Fourth Geneva Convention speaks directly to the issue of population transfer in article 49: The occupying Power shall not deport or transfer parts of its own civilian population into the territory it occupies. Clearly, then, substantial resettlement of the Israeli civilian population in occupied territories, including East Jerusalem, is illegal under the Convention and cannot be considered to have prejudged the outcome of future negotiations between the parties on the location of the borders of States of the Middle East. Indeed, the presence of these settlements is seen by my Government as an obstacle to the success of the negotiations for a just and final peace between Israel and its neighbors. The real issues of peace and stability in the Middle East are very difficult indeed; and unilateral acts, such as civilian population transfers, have been taken which serve to inflame emotions on both sides. Ambassador Scranton concluded by saying that the United States would apply three tests to any proposed Council action: - Do the facts and judgment on which it is based correspond to the actual situation? - Will the action advance the proper administration of the areas involved? - Will the action help or hinder the peaceful settlement process? In explanation of the U.S. veto, Ambassador Scranton said that the draft resolution failed to meet the above criteria, especially because it reflected or implied judgments which did not correspond to the actual situation in the area. He stated that references to Israeli efforts to change the religious character of Jerusalem and to Israeli violations of human rights in the occupied territories were not justified by the actual situation in the area, and that the draft resolution would not help in the peaceful settlement process. For statements by Ambassador Scranton on Mar. 23 and 25, 1976, see Dept. of State Bulletin, Vol. LXXIV, No. 1921, Apr. 19, 1976, pp. 527-530. See also U.N. Doc. S/PV.1896, Mar. 23, 1976, pp. 28-40. The text of the draft resolution follows: The Security Council, Having considered recent developments in the occupied Arab territories, Deeply concerned at the serious situation which has arisen in these territories as a result of continued Israeli occupation, Deeply concerned further at the measures taken by the Israeli authorities leading to the present grave situation, including measures aimed at changing the physical, cultural, demographic and religious character of the occupied territories and, in particular, the City of Jerusalem, the establishment of Israeli settlements in the occupied territories and other violations of the human rights of the inhabitants of those territories, Emphasizing the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war, Recalling and reaffirming the resolutions of the General Assembly and the Security Council calling upon Israel to rescind all measures already taken and to desist from taking any further action which would alter the status of the City of Jerusalem and the character of the occupied Arab territories, Noting that, notwithstanding the aforementioned resolutions, Israel persists in its policy aiming at changing the physical, cultural, demographic and religious character of the City of Jerusalem in particular, Reaffirming the urgent need for establishing a just and lasting peace in the Middle East, 1. Deplores Israel's failure to put a stop to actions and policies tending to change the status of the City of Jerusalem and to rescind measures already taken to that effect; 2. Calls on Israel, pending the speedy termination of its occupation, to refrain from all measures against the Arab inhabitants of the occupied territories; 3. Calls on Israel to respect and uphold the inviolability of the Holy Places which are under its occupation and to desist from the expropriation of or encroachment upon Arab lands and property or the establishment of Israeli settlements thereon in the occupied Arab territories and to desist from all other action and policies designed to change the legal status of the City of Jerusalem and to rescind measures already taken to that effect; 4. Decides to keep the situation under constant attention with a view to meeting again should circumstances so require. U.N. Doc. S/12022. The draft resolution was not adopted owing to the negative vote by a permanent member of the Council. The vote was 14 in favor, 1 (U.S.) against. Namibia During the debate in Committee Four at the United Nations on the question of Namibia on December 2, 1976, Ambassador William W. Scranton, U.S. Representative to the United Nations, restated the U.S. position on Namibia: This year has . . . witnessed extensive consultations to bring the Namibian problem to the conference table. The United States has made a concerted and vigorous effort to persuade the interested parties to resolve the problem of Namibia by negotiations and not bloodshed. Although formal talks have not yet begun, progress has been made and diplomatic consultations continue. The United States is dedicated to ending the illegal occupation of Namibia by South Africa and to bringing about majority rule and independence for Namibia as a single unitary state. Secretary Kissinger outlined the main elements of a negotiated solution to the Namibian problem in his speech to the General Assembly on September 30; the United States favors the following elements: Independence for Namibia within a fixed short time limit; - The calling of a constitutional conference at a neutral location under the United Nations aegis; and - The participation in the conference of all authentic national forces including specifically SWAPO. * * * Progress toward all these objectives has been made in negotiations with the Government of South Africa. But we must also be realistic. There are other genuine Namibian interests and voices which must be heard on the future of the territory. The United States believes that the place to resolve the differences between the parties to the Namíbian problem is the conference table. We will exert every effort to bring the parties to undertake a process of negotiations. Press Release USUN-176 (76), Dec. 2, 1976. For Secretary Kissinger's speech to the General Assembly on Sept. 30, 1976, see Dept. of State Bulletin, Vol. LXXV, No. 1948, Oct. 25, 1976, pp. 497-510. The U.N. General Assembly passed, on December 20, 1976, eight resolutions on Namibia recommended by the Decolonization Committee. The United States voted against the resolution concerning the "Situation in Namibia" (Res. 31/146) and abstained on five others. U.S. representative Stephen Hess explained with respect to the negative vote that the United States could not "be party to the endorsement in the resolution of armed struggle as a means to resolve the Namibian problem. . . . [W]e are committed to the search for a peaceful, negotiated solution to the Namibian problem." He explained also that the United States could not support paragraphs of the resolution which describe the situation in Namibia as constituting a threat to international peace and security and call on the Security Council to impose a mandatory arms embargo against South Africa. See ante, Ch. 10, § 12, p. 571. He added that the United States did not recognize any one of the political groups inside or outside of Namibia as the sole authentic representative of the Namibian people. Press Release USUN-176 (76), Dec. 2, 1976. Palestine The United States vetoed a draft resolution (S/12119) on Palestinian rights which came to a vote in the U.N. Security Council on June 29, 1976. The vote was 10 in favor, 1 against, with 4 abstentions. The U.S. voted negatively on the grounds that the resolution was unbalanced and dealt with a matter which was more properly a subject of negotiation. Ambassador Albert W. Sherer, Jr., U.S. Representative, in a statement to the Council, said that the framework for settlement existed in Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338. He added: Our reason is not lack of concern for the Palestinian people. We have consistently made clear our concerns on this score and our conviction that there must be a solution to the Palestinian issue if there is to be a lasting settlement. We are convinced that resolutions and committee reports are not the most effective way of dealing with the question of the political future of the Palestinians. The United States will do its utmost to bring about the early resumption of serious negotiations looking toward a settlement of |