(a) Disputes concerning sea boundary delimitations between adjacent or opposite States, or those involving historic bays or titles, provided that the State making such a declaration shall indicate therein a regional or other third party procedure, entailing a binding decision, which it accepts for the settlement of such disputes; (b) Disputes concerning military activities, including those by government vessels and aircraft engaged in non-commercial service, provided that law enforcement activities pursuant to the present Convention shall not be considered military activities; (c) Disputes in respect of which the Security Council of the United Nations, while exercising the functions assigned to it by the Charter of the United Nations, determines that specified proceedings under the present Convention interfere with the exercise of such functions in a particular case. 2. Any disagreement between the parties to a dispute as to the applicability of this article shall be decided in accordance with paragraph 3 of article 10. 3. A Contracting Party which has made a declaration under paragraph 1 may at any time withdraw it, or agree to submit a dispute excluded by such declaration to a procedure specified in Section II. 4. Any Contracting Party which has made a declaration under paragraph 1 shall not be entitled to submit any dispute falling within the excepted category to any procedure in Section II as against any other Contracting Party, without the consent of that party. 5. If one of the Contracting Parties has made a declaration under subparagraph 1 (a) of this article, any other Contracting Party may submit any excepted category of dispute against the declarant party to the procedure specified in such declaration. In the Revised Single Negotiating Text, four annexes follow: ANNEX I. Conciliation ANNEX II. Statute of the Law of the Sea Tribunal ANNEX III. Arbitration ANNEX IV. Special Arbitration Procedure For the text of those annexes, see U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 62/WP. 9/Rev. 2, pp. 16-36. Eastern Mediterranean In a letter to Secretary of State Kissinger dated April 7, 1976, Greek Foreign Minister Dimitri S. Bitsios inquired about the U.S. attitude toward the resolution of disputes in the Eastern Mediterranean, particularly in the Aegean area, and questioned the contribution of the U.S.-Turkish defense agreement of March 26, 1976 (see post, p. 775), to a solution of the Cyprus question. Secretary Kissinger, in a letter of April 10, 1976, replied, in relevant part, as follows: I should like to reiterate our conviction that these disputes must be settled through peaceful procedures and that each side should avoid provocative actions. We have previously stated our belief that neither side should seek a military solution to these disputes. This remains United States policy. Therefore the United States would actively and unequivocally oppose either side's seeking a military solution and will make a major effort to prevent such a course of action. I should like to re-emphasize, with regard to Cyprus, that the United States remains fully committed to the objective of an early and just settlement of this issue. . . . [T]he present dividing lines in Cyprus cannot be permanent. There must be just territorial arrangements. We intend to contribute actively in the search for a solution to the Cyprus problem that will preserve the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Cyprus. For the exchange of letters of Apr. 7 and 10, 1976, see Dept. of State Bulletin, Vol. LXXIV, No. 1925, May 17, 1976, p. 630. Coffee Agreement, 1976 The International Coffee Agreement, which entered into force provisionally on October 1, 1976, for 41 exporting and 20 importing members, including the United States, contains a chapter devoted to methods of consultation for any matter relating to the agreement and for the handling of any disputes concerning its interpretation or application, as well as complaints concerning nonfulfillment of obligations. The text of that chapter is set out below: CHAPTER IX - CONSULTATIONS, Article 57 Each Member shall accord sympathetic consideration to, and shall afford adequate opportunity for, consultation regarding such representations as may be made by another Member with respect to any matter relating to this Agreement. In the course of such consultation, on request by either party and with the consent of the other, the Executive Director shall establish an independent panel which shall use its good offices with a view to conciliating the parties. The costs of the panel shall not be chargeable to the Organization. If a party does not agree to the establishment of a panel by the Executive Director, or if the consultation does not lead to a solution, the matter may be referred to the Council in accordance with the provisions of Article 58. If the consultation does lead to a solution, it shall be reported to the Executive Director who shall distribute the report to all Members. Article 58 Disputes and Complaints (1) Any dispute concerning the interpretation or application of this Agreement which is not settled by negotiation shall, at the request of any Member party to the dispute, be referred to the Council for decision. (2) In any case where a dispute has been referred to the Council under the provisions of paragraph (1) of this Article, a majority of Members, or Members holding not less than one-third of the total votes, may require the Council, after discussion, to seek the opinion of the advisory panel referred to in paragraph (3) of this Article on the issues in dispute before giving its decision. (3) (a) Unless the Council unanimously agrees otherwise, the panel shall consist of: (i) two persons, one having wide experience in matters of the kind in dispute and the other having legal standing and experience, nominated by the exporting Members; (ii) two such persons nominated by the importing Members; and (iii) a chairman selected unanimously by the four persons nominated under (i) and (ii) or, if they fail to agree, by the Chairman of the Council. (b) Persons from countries whose Governments are Contracting Parties to this Agreement shall be eligible to serve on the advisory panel. (c) Persons appointed to the advisory panel shall act in their personal capacities and without instructions from any Government. (d) The expenses of the advisory panel shall be paid by the Organization. (4) The opinion of the advisory panel and the reasons therefor shall be submitted to the Council which, after considering all the relevant information, shall decide the dispute. (5) The Council shall rule on any dispute brought before it within six months of submission of such dispute for its consideration. (6) Any complaint that any Member has failed to fulfil its obligations under this Agreement shall, at the request of the Member making the complaint, be referred to the Council which shall make a decision on the matter. (7) No Member shall be found to have been in breach of its obligations under this Agreement except by a distributed simple majority vote. Any finding that a Member is in breach of its obligations under this Agreement shall specify the nature of the breach. (8) If the Council finds that a Member is in breach of its obligations under this Agreement, it may, without prejudice to other enforcement measures provided for in other Articles of this Agreement, by a distributed two-thirds majority vote, suspend such Member's voting rights in the Council and its right to have its votes cast in the Board until it fulfils its obligations, or the Council may decide to exclude such Member from the Organization under the provisions of Article 66. (9) A Member may seek the prior opinion of the Executive Board in a matter of dispute or complaint before the matter is discussed by the Council. S. Ex. H., 94th Cong., 2d Sess. See ante, Ch. 10, § 2, pp. 484-486, for further discussion of the Coffee Agreement, 1976. U.S. - Brazil Consultations Secretary of State Kissinger, on the occasion of a visit to Brazil, signed on February 21, 1976, with Brazilian Foreign Minister Azeredo da Silveira, a memorandum of understanding concerning consultations on matters of mutual interest. It calls for semi-annual consultations at the cabinet level on the full range of foreign policy matters, plus any specific issue raised by either side. The text of the memorandum of understanding is set out below: THE GOVERNMENT OF THE FEDERATIVE REPUBLIC OF BRAZIL AND THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: Inspired by the long tradition of friendship and cooperation between their two peoples; Reaffirming the need to give wider expression to the solidarity of the Western World and the benefits to be derived from a constructive interpretation of the concept of interdependence among all nations; Recognizing the responsibility of their two countries to pursue their shared goal of a just and enduring solution to international problems; Convinced of the importance to the sound development of their respective policies of close and frequent consultations on matters of common interest; And believing that these considerations call for the establishment of a flexible mechanism permitting open and active communication at the cabinet level, have arrived at the following understanding: 1. The two Governments will normally hold consultations semi-annually, on the full range of foreign policy matters including any specific issue that may be raised by either side. Economic, political, security, cultural, legal, educational and technological subjects, whether bilateral or multilateral, may be discussed within the political framework afforded by the consultations. 2. These consultations will normally be held alternately in Brazil and in the United States on dates to be mutually determined. Special meetings may be called by mutual agreement. 3. The consultations will be conducted by the Minister of Foreign Relations on the part of the Federative Republic of Brazil and by the Secretary of State on the part of the United States of America. The Chairman of the meeting will be the chief of the delegation of the host country. 4. Each delegation will be composed of such other high-ranking officials, including cabinet members, as may be appropriate to the agenda to be discussed. 5. After review of matters of common interest by the delegations, the chiefs of the delegations may propose to their respective governments measures deemed pertinent and appropriate. 6. By joint decision, study groups or working groups may be established to examine particular questions of current interest or to help carry forward special projects. 7. Each party will establish such internal arrangements as it deems appropriate to follow through on the agreed conclusions and recommendations that may arise from the consultations. 8. In addition to these consultations at the cabinet level, consultations will be carried forward on an on-going basis through normal diplomatic channels. These channels will be used for the preparation of a mutually acceptable agenda for the consultations. 9. The foregoing arrangements will complement and in no way replace or detract from the existing channels for transacting business. 10. This memorandum will come into operation upon signature by the Foreign Minister of the Federative Republic of Brazil and of the Secretary of State of the United States of America. SIGNED in duplicate at Brasilia this twenty-first day of February, 1976, in the Portuguese and English languages. Dept. of State Bulletin, Vol. LXXIV, No. 1916, Mar. 15, 1976, pp. 337-338. Cyprus Negotiation Secretary of State Kissinger, in addressing the U.N. General Assembly on September 30, 1976, stated the willingness of the United States to assist in restoring momentum to the negotiating process on the Cyprus problem but said that a settlement must come from the Cypriot communities themselves. Suggesting that a set of principles might help the parties to resume negotiations, he proposed agreement on the following concepts: -A settlement should preserve the independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity of Cyprus; -The present dividing lines on Cyprus must be adjusted to reduce the area currently controlled by the Turkish side; -The territorial arrangement should take into account the economic requirements and humanitarian concerns of the two Cypriot communities, including the plight of those who remain refugees; -A constitutional arrangement should provide conditions under which the two Cypriot communities can live in freedom and have a large voice in their own affairs; and -Security arrangements should be agreed that permit the withdrawal of foreign military forces other than those present under international agreement. Dept. of State Bulletin, Vol. LXXV, No. 1948, Oct. 25, 1976, p. 503. The U.N. General Assembly on Nov. 12, 1976, adopted by a vote of 94 to 1(Turkey), with 27(U.S.) abstentions, Res. 21/12, concerning the question of Cyprus. It calls for implementation of earlier GA and Security Council resolutions, requests the Secretary-General to provide his good offices for the negotiations between the two communities, and decides to include the Cyprus item in the provisional agenda of the 32d sess. Senator George McGovern, U.S. Representative to the Assembly, made a statement in plenary on Nov. 11, expressing the hope that the two parties would come together under the Secretary-General's auspices to consider the set of ideas put forward by Secretary Kissinger, supra. Dept. of State Bulletin, Vol. LXXV, No. 1955, Dec. 13, 1976, p. 721. Middle East In the U.N. Security Council on January 26, 1976, the United States vetoed a six-power draft resolution (S/11940) which would have affirmed, inter alia: (a) the right of the Palestinian people to self-determination; (b) the right of Palestinian refugees to return to their homes or to receive compensation for their property; (c) that Israel should withdraw from ail Arab territories occupied since June 1967; and (d) that appropriate arrangements should be established to guarantee the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence, within secure and recognized boundaries, of all states in the area. The resolution would also have decided that the foregoing should be taken fully into account in all international efforts and conferences organized within the framework of the United Nations for the establishment of peace in the Middle East. The United States opposed the draft resolution on the grounds that it attempted to revise the negotiating framework established in Security Council Resolutions 242 (1967) and 338 (1973) and accepted by the principal parties to the Middle East problem. The United States argued further that altering the framework without agreement of all parties would have been seriously harmful to the future of the peacemaking process. In addition, the United States abstained on a proposed United Kingdom amendment that would have added a new operative paragraph reaffirming the provisions of Resolutions 242 and 338 and declaring that nothing in the draft resolution superseded them. The United States stated its position to be that it would be inappropriate for a document to alter the rights, entitlements, and expectations of those resolutions and at the same time reaffirm them. |