more formalized training programs, either in-country or in the United States under CCINC funding. DEA representatives will help evaluate the host government personnel responsible for drug law enforcement and identify those persons who would benefit from executive briefing programs or training in-country or in the United States. DEA in-country representatives will make special efforts to keep in touch with trainees, to continue their development and attempt to assist them in their continued and increased contribution to the common effort. For long range effectiveness the provision of proper training to drug control officials is a high priority function. While the immediate goal of training is to transfer certain knowledge and skills, the ultimate goal should be to develop host government institutions for narcotics training. Accordingly, all training decisions should be made with this in mind.

2. Technical Equipment and Assistance. DEA representatives will help the Embassy Narcotics Coordinating Committee to identify needs of foreign drug control agencies for technical equipment and assistance necessary for the development of the needed foreign drug control capability. To the extent requested and permitted by the host government and in conformity with the country action program planning, DEA representatives will assist in training foreign officers in the use of technical equipment.

3. Illicit Crop Eradication. In certain countries, DEA representatives may be asked to help monitor crop eradication and should advise and assist in income replacement programs being carried out. In this regard, DEA representatives will avoid any direct involvement in foreign police actions where violence can be reasonably anticipated. They are responsible to help assess the specific needs of the program and report to the regional director and Ambassador on problems, progress and results. They should submit recommendations in the same way for improving the effectiveness of the programs.

D. Cooperative Enforcement Activities. Consistent with section I, F, and where such activities are within local guidelines established by the regional director, the Ambassador and host country officials, DEA representatives may assist host country authorities in investigating international trafficking affecting the United States. To that end, DEA representatives should:

1. Develop sources of information. Assist in developing sources of information and the interviewing of witnesses not only among drug traffickers, but among other persons who are knowledgable about illicit cultivation, production and transportation.

2. Utilize undercover operations. Provide direct assistance by operating in an undercover capacity to acquire intelligence and to further investigations regarding the international traffic in illicit drugs affecting the United States.

3. Conduct surveillance. Assist in conducting surveillance of the activities of drug traffickers to develop evidence against major traffickers of illicit drugs affecting the United States. Basic to this objective is that DEA representatives avoid involvement in relatively minor local cases with which host government law enforcement officials are expected to be concerned. The

procedures established by the Attorney General governing the conduct of DEA representatives in foreign countries relating to electronic surveillance will be followed.

4. Provide information to host countries. Provide to the extent possible appropriate information obtained by DEA which will enable host government officials to carry out investigations of or operations against international illicit drug traffickers.

5. Pursue investigative leads. Participate with host country officials in pursuing investigative leads, for example, checking hotel records, public and private organization records, airport and shipping records, and passport records.

6. Obtain drug samples. Receive and transmit to the United States samples of illicit drugs seized by host country officials for use in conducting laboratory studies in regard to the origin of drugs found in the United States traffic.

7. Coordinate extraditions, expulsions and rogatories. Coordinate as appropriate matters regarding extraditions, expulsions, joint prosecutorial efforts, and requests for judicial assistance.

E. Collection of Intelligence. All DEA representatives in foreign countries are assigned a high priority to collect, report and exchange drug intelligence. Intelligence collection is not only seizure and arrest oriented-it should include strategic information such as host country capabilities relative to suppression of illicit cultivation and trafficking. Intelligence should also be collected relative to routes and methods of trafficking, the vulnerabilities of traffickers, and any other information that will clarify the overall drug situation and the ability of host government officials to deal with it. DEA representatives will also give a high priority to analyzing drug intelligence as fully as possible in order to integrate it with enforcement activities in foreign countries and the United States.

1. Couriers, routes of traffic and methods. Special emphasis should be placed on identifying couriers who smuggle illicit drugs into the United States, discovering new methods of smuggling, developing profiles of such offenders and furnishing all other information that may be beneficial to the United States Customs Service in its primary interdiction responsibilities.

2. Proper intelligence indoctrination. Regional directors, country attaches and special agents-in-charge are specifically charged with the responsibility for assuring that the narcotic intelligence responsibility is understood by all DEA special agents and that their efforts in this connection are properly coordinated.

III. DEFINITIONS

A. As used in these guidelines:

1. The term "Ambassador" means the chief of the U.S. mission in a foreign country having jurisdiction over the activities of DEA representatives.

2. The term "authorized by host country officials" means the officials on the list established and maintained by the DEA regional director, who are empowered by their governments to authorize DEA representatives to function within the host country

under agreements with DEA and under these guidelines.

3. The term "auxiliary force" means helping or aiding, or giving support or supplementary power in a police arrest action, or on an illicit crop destruction.

4. "Cruel and inhuman treatment" means conduct endangering life, limb, or health or creating reasonable apprehension of such danger.

5. "DEA representative" means an employee of the Drug Enforcement Administration, who is appointed in the civil service of the executive branch of the United States Government.

6. "Foreign country" means foreign territories, continental or insular, outside the jurisdiction of the United States..

7. "Illicit drugs" means all controlled substances listed in the schedules of the Controlled Substances Act.

8. "Narcotics" means all controlled substances listed in the schedules of the Controlled Substances Act.

9. "Passive presence" means inaction in an observer capacity at a location sufficiently removed from the arrest site so as to avoid direct involvement in the arrest.

10. "Vicinity" means near or close at hand as distinguished from being squarely on the spot where the arrest is being made. It does not depend on distance or topography, but denotes that the DEA representatives must be sufficiently removed from the arrest site so as not to be a part of the arrest activities.

11. "Violence" means the exertion of any physical force against persons who are in defiance of the constituted authorities of the host country, or by drug law violators who oppose the constituted authorities.

The DEA directive was transmitted by the Dept. of State to appropriate diplomatic and consular posts by Dept. airgram A-4027, Aug. 11, 1976. The directive was under revision in early 1977 to modify substantially the restrictions imposed by these guidelines.

Psychotropic Substances

When the 1971 Convention on Psychotropic Substances (S. Ex. G, 92d Cong., 1st Sess.) entered into force on August 16, 1976, the ninetieth day following the deposit of ratifications or accessions by 40 countries, the United States had not taken definitive action with respect to ratification of the Convention or passage of necessary implementing legislation.

The Senate Foreign Relations Committee held one day of hearings on the convention on February 4, 1972, but deferred further action until there was adequate opportunity to examine the implementing legislation. The Subcommittee on Health and the Environment of the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, House of Representatives, held hearings in 1972 on an Administration bill to amend U.S. drug laws to conform to the convention's requirements. In the 1972 hearings, critics of the convention and the implementing legislation argued that the convention's system of controls was not justified in view of lack of information about the extent of inter

national trafficking and about the drugs themselves; other critics argued that the convention would not have a significant impact in halting the international flow of psychotropic drugs.

In the 94th Congress, the Administration proposed a revised bill, H.R. 5359, intended to provide a more balanced approach regarding the appropriate role of the medical and scientific communities in controlling the decisionmaking process; second, to assure protection of the confidentiality of patient records; and third, to protect legitimate drug research. An identical bill, H.R. 1530, and a somewhat similar bill, H.R. 685, were also introduced.

At hearings before the Subcommittee on Health and the Environment on May 20, 1976, Donald E. Miller, Chief Counsel of the Drug Enforcement Administration, Department of Justice, and David H. Ernst, Acting Senior Adviser to the Secretary of State and Coordinator for International Narcotics Matters, Department of State, supported the Administration bill. The following are excerpts from Mr. Miller's testimony:

The bills embody a number of technical changes in our own Federal drug control laws which are necessary to insure that the United States will be able to fulfill its obligations when the treaty is ratified. Although these changes of law are relatively minor, the treaty, from which they will enable us to benefit, is of great importance.

This treaty, like all other international agreements, does require some minimal surrender of sovereign power. For example, if the international body should decide to bring a drug under control, or to increase existing controls over a drug, the decision might require some additional legal action to be taken within the United States. The bills intentionally give the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare the prerogative of deciding what additional controls, if any, may be required in such a case and under what statute they must be imposed. It is only if the Secretary determines such a necessity that a change would be made in the status of the drug with regard to the Controlled Substances Act which DEA administers. By the same token, it is the Secretary who will determine the negotiating position of the United States with regard to deliberations of the international body on drug control questions.

The effects of these bills and the psychotropic treaty on existing law are an intricate and highly technical matter. In order to allay fears that the treaty would restrict research, alter the power of the Congress to change existing drug penalties, or impose additional controls on physicians, we have provided reassurances by expressly setting forth matters into which neither the treaty nor the act will extend.

For many years, beginning with the Opium Convention of 1912,

various international controls have been applied to the legitimate commerce in narcotic drugs. . . . [I]t is important to note that in all this time, the legitimate commerce in these narcotics has never constituted a significant source within the illicit traffic. This is due to the international controls which have been applied through these treaties and the passage of national laws which they have required. . . . [T]his is not the case with regard to the medically useful but nonetheless non-narcotic substances referred to in international terminology as "psychotropic" substances. These include the hallucinogens such as LSD, amphetamines, barbiturates, and various tranquilizers. Indeed, there are at present no international controls governing commerce in this category of drugs. Lack of international controls is merely another unfortunate example of the kind of double standard with which drug abuse is often regarded. It is the kind of double standard which views heroin addiction with horror, but is willing to overlook barbiturate addiction, or dependence on amphetamines as a different and less harmful sort of thing. This is an outdated notion which should be rejected.

The toll of human damage resulting from the abuse of these drugs is often equal to and sometimes may exceed that associated with heroin. It is our firm adherence to this principle which has led us to seek the imposition of international controls in this area comparable to those applied to narcotic drugs. In our view, there can be no excuse for accepting the one and rejecting the other. This is the important principle involved in the issue before you today. ... Perhaps no country stands to benefit more from the terms of the convention on psychotropic substances than the United States. In all categories of drug abuse, our Nation is perhaps the most seriously affected; and this is no less true in the case of the drugs which would be controlled under this treaty.

In the last several years, there has been a great deal of attention focused on the problem of diversion of dangerous drugs within the United States. The Congress has provided new laws with which to attack such diversion, and the DEA has applied these laws with good results. But the diversion of drugs is not only a problem within the United States, it is equally a problem in many foreign nations and particularly so in the case of international commerce.

The United States is a major exporter of barbiturates. In 1975, we exported over 20,000 pounds of these drugs to many countries throughout the world. These quantities of amobarbital, secobarbital and pentobarbital translate into over 100 million dosage units. We hope they were used for legitimate medical purposes; however, neither we nor any international agency is in a position to determine to what extent our exports are contributing to the international illicit traffic. As a major exporter, the United States has a moral obligation to prevent our supplies from entering the illicit traffic and, to the extent provided by section 1003 of the Controlled Substances Import and Export Act, we limit our exports to countries having legitimate need. However, without an international system, there is no uniform control or method of monitoring the dispositions of our exported psychotropic drugs. What is needed is enactment of international law which would obligate countries to enact controls; police the illicit traffic; license