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Congress statement in the Act regarding withdrawal if not renegotiated within a reasonable time.
On January 1, 1977, the Acting Secretary of State announced that the President had decided, as a consequence of the extended U.S. jurisdiction and in keeping with the intent of the Act, that the U.S. withdrawal should become effective. The Acting Secretary added:
The United States has been an active member of ICNAF since its inception 26 years ago. That Convention has made significant contributions to fishery conservation in the Northwest Atlantic area. We have benefited from decisions taken by Convention members. The scientific research and management of fisheries of the area which have been carried out under ICNAF are outstanding examples of the benefits which can be achieved through international cooperation. The President, has, therefore, concluded that as we move toward implementation of our legislation the United States should take into account, in developing our 1977 management plans, the management proposals developed at the last meeting of ICNAF.
The expertise developed within ICNAF will provide a sound basis for the establishment of a successor organization which will provide for international cooperation in joint research, even though fisheries management within our 200-mile zone will now be a domestic responsibility of the United States. The United States will actively support efforts to continue international consultation and cooperation in dealing with fisheries problems in the Northwest Atlantic and will participate in the conference of plenipotentiaries in early 1977 to consider the drafting of a new convention.
Dept. of State Bulletin, Vol. LXXVI, No. 1962, Jan. 31, 1977. p. 95. On June 29, 1976, Canada gave notice of its withdrawal from the Convention, effective Dec. 31, 1976; but on Dec. 28. it revoked its withdrawal notice, “taking into account the positive results of the meetings of ICNAF held in June and December.” Dept. of State depositary file, L/T. Atlantic Tuna
Pursuant to the Atlantic Tunas Convention of 1975, 16 U.S.C. 971 et seq., and in implementation of the conservation measures adopted by the International Convention for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas (TIAS 6767; 20 UST 2887; entered into force for the United States March 21, 1969), the National Marine Fisheries Service issued, on February 23, 1976, U.S. regulations concerning the taking of yellowfin tuna in Atlantic waters. The regulations, effective February 25, 1976, amended Title 50 of the Code of Federal Regulations, Part 285, Subpart A, with respect to procedural matters and added Subpart C, provisions governing the yellowfin tuna fishery, as well as Subpart D, provisions governing the importation of tuna and tuna products.
For the text of 50 CFR 285, Subparts A, C, and D, as promulgated Feb. 23, 1976, see Fed. Reg., Vol. 41, No. 39, Feb. 26, 1976, pp. 8350-8354.
On May 18, 1976, the National Marine Fisheries Service issued revised regulations on the taking of Atlantic bluefin tuna in Atlantic waters, to continue implementation of the conservation measures adopted by the International Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas. The new regulations, pursuant to the Atlantic Tunas Convention Act of 1975, amended annual catch quotas for bluefin tuna between 14 and 115 pounds and larger than 300 pounds, revised the daily bag limit, clarified the boundary line south from Massachusetts, simplified the reporting requirements, and implemented a certificate system and a release and tag permit system. For the revised text of 50 CFR, Subpart B, see Fed. Reg., Vol. 41, No. 97, May 18,
20412-20413. On April 20, 1976, the Department of State announced the establishment of the Advisory Committee to the U.S. Section of the National Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas. The action was taken pursuant to the Atlantic Tunas Convention Act of 1975, 16 U.S.C. 971 et seq. The purpose of the Committee is stated to be solely advisory with respect to U.S. participation in the work of the Commission, with particular reference to development of U.S. policies, positions, and negotiating tactics. The Committee is to have a chairman and an executive secretary and not more than 20 public members, plus ex-officio members composed of a representative from each of the fisheries agencies of the States which maintain a substantive tuna fishery in the regulatory area under the International Convention for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas.
Dept. of State Press Release No. 183, Apr. 20, 1976. Pacific Tuna
On March 16, 1976, the National Marine Fisheries Service issued amended regulations governing Pacific tuna fisheries, in implementation of the Convention for the Establishment of an Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission (TIAS 2044; 1 UST 230; entered into force for the United States March 3, 1950) and under the authority of the Tuna Conventions Act of 1950, as amended, 16 U.S.C.955(c). The revised regulations, effective March 19, 1976, amended 50 Code of Federal Regulations Part 280 with respect to the regulatory area under the convention, open and closed season restrictions applicable to fishing vessels, and restrictions applicable to cargo vessels.
For the text of 50 CFR 280.1-14, as revised, see Fed. Reg., Vol. 41, No. 55, March 19, 1976, pp. 11524-11529.
Continental Shelf Fishery Resources
On June 21, 1976, the National Marine Fisheries Service announced the adoption, effective July 24, 1976, of Final Standards for Compliance with the Continental Shelf Fisheries Resources section of the Bartlett Act, 78 Stat. 194 (16 U.S.C. 1081-1086). The Standards, which constitute 50 Code of Federal Regulations Part 295, include in the regulations a list of Continental Shelf Fisheries Resources of the United States and set forth prohibited acts and a procedure for enforcing those portions of the Bartlett Act which make it unlawful for any vessel except a vessel of the United States, or any person in charge of such vessel, to engage in the taking of any Continental Shelf fishery resource except as provided by the Act or an international agreement to which the United States is a party. The enforcement procedures subject any vessel engaging in fishing to boarding by an enforcement officer when that officer has reason to believe such vessel is engaged in the taking of any Continental Shelf fishery resource appertaining to the United States.
The species listed in the regulations have been found to constitute a Continental Shelf fishery resource by either (1) the Offshore Shrimp Fisheries Act of 1973 (87 Stat. 1061), or (2) the Secretary of Commerce, in consultation with the Secretary of State.
Fed. Reg., Vol. 41, No. 123, June 24, 1976, pp. 26019-26020.
§ 5 The Deep Seabed and
the High Seas
Ocean Mining Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger presented, on April 8, 1976, a series of proposals regarding deep sea mining, aimed at contributing to a solution of the problem by the United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea. In a statement delivered in New York, he proposed, inter alia, a system of parallel access to seabed resources, under which, whenever a deep seabed mining site is set aside for state or private exploitation, a similar site would be set aside for the international community. He also suggested a temporary limit on production of seabed minerals, which would be tied to the projected growth in the world nickel market, currently estimated to be about 6 percent a year, that would in effect limit production of other minerals contained in deep seabed nodules, such as copper. Portions of his statement devoted to the deep seabeds follow:
First, to ensure an equitable decisionmaking system, the United States continues to believe that the Treaty should authorize the formation of an International Seabed Resource Authority to supervise exploration and development of the deep seabeds. The Authority would be comprised of four principal organs:
-An Assembly of all member states, to give general policy guidance;
-A Council, to serve as the executive, policy-level and main decisionmaking forum, setting operational and environmental rules for mining, and supervising the contracts for deep seabed mining;
-A Tribunal, to resolve disputes through legal processes; and --A Secretariat, to carry out the day-to-day administrative activities of the Authority. The United States proposes
-that the power of the Authority be carefully detailed by the Treaty in order to preserve all those rights regarding the uses of the seas which fall outside the competence of the Authority, and to avoid any jurisdictional overlap with other international organizations;
—that the composition and structure of the Council reflect the producer and consumer interests of those states most concerned with seabed mining. All nations whose vital national concerns are affected by decisions of the Authority must have a voice and influence in the Council commensurate with their interests;
—that the proposed permanent seabed Tribunal adjudicate questions of interpretation of the Treaty and of the powers of the International Authority raised by parties to the Treaty or by private companies engaged in seabed mining. Without a Tribunal, unresolved contention is a certainty. Such a body will be necessary if any seabed proposal is to win wide acceptance. Second, to ensure that all nations, developed and developing, have adequate access to seabed mining sites:
- The United States proposes that the Treaty should guarantee nondiscriminatory access for states and their nationals to deep seabed resources under specified and reasonable conditions. The requirement of guaranteed access will not be met if the Treaty contains arbitrary or restrictive limitations on the number of mine sites which any nation might exploit. And such restrictions are unnecessary because deep seabed mining cannot be monopolized; there are many more productive seabed mining sites than conceivably can be mined for centuries to come.
- The United States accepts that an "Enterprise" should be established as part of the International Seabed Resource Authority and given the right to exploit the deep seabeds under the same conditions as apply to all mining.
- The United States could accept as part of an overall settlement, a system in which prime mining sites are reserved for exclusive exploitation by the Enterprise or by the developing countries directly-if this approach meets with broad support. Under this system, each individual contractor would propose two mine sites for exploitation. The Authority would then select one of these sites which would be mined by the Authority directly or made available to developing countries at its discretion. The other site would be mined by the contractor on his own.
- The United States proposes that the International Authority should supervise a system of revenue sharing from mining activities for the use of the international community, primarily for the needs of the poorest countries. These revenues will not only
advance the growth of developing countries; they will provide tangible evidence that a fair share in global economic activity can be achieved by a policy of cooperation. Revenue sharing could be based either on royalties or on a system of profit sharing from contract mining. Such a system would give reality to the designation of the deep seabeds as the common heritage of all mankind.
-Finally, the United States is prepared to make a major effort to enhance the skills and access of developing countries to advanced deep seabed mining technology in order to assist their capabilities in this field. For example, incentives should be established for private companies to participate in agreements to share technology and train personnel from developing countries. Third, in response to the legitimate concerns of land-based producers of minerals found in the deep seabeds, we offer the following steps as an additional major contribution to the negotiations:
—The United States is prepared to accept a temporary limitation, for a period fixed in the Treaty on production of the seabed minerals tied to the projected growth in the world nickel market, currently estimated to be about 6 percent a year. This would in effect limit production of other minerals contained in deep seabed nodules, including copper. After this period, the seabed production should be governed by overall market conditions.
- The United States proposes that the International Seabed Authority have the right to participate in any international agreements on seabed-produced commodities in accordance with the amount of production for which it is directly responsible. The United States is prepared to examine with flexibility the details of arrangements concerning the relationships between the Authority and any eventual commodity agreements.
- The United States proposes that some of the revenues of the International Seabed Resource Authority be used for adjustment assistance and that the World Bank, regional development banks, and other international institutions assist countries to improve their competitiveness or diversify into other kinds of production if they are seriously injured by production from the deep seabeds. An urgent task of the International Authority, when it is established, will be to devise an adjustment assistance program in collaboration with other international institutions for countries which suffer economic dislocations as a result of deep seabed mining.
The United States believes that the world community has before it a grave responsibility. Our country cannot delay in its efforts to . develop an assured supply of critical resources through our deep seabed mining projects. We strongly prefer an international agreement to provide a stable legal environment before such development begins, one that ensures that all resources are managed for the good of the global community and that all can participate. But if an agreement is not reached this year it will be increasingly difficult to resist pressure to proceed unilaterally
Dept. of State Bulletin, Vol. LXXIV, No. 1922, Apr. 26, 1976, pp. 533-542.