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its illegal administration maintained in Namibia and to transfer power to the people of Namibia with the assistance of the United Nations;

11. Demands again that South Africa, pending the transfer of powers provided for in the preceding paragraph:

(a) Comply fully in spirit and in practice with the provisions of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights;

(b) Release all Namibian political prisoners, including all those imprisoned or detained in connection with offenses under so-called internal security laws, whether such Namibians have been charged or tried or are held without charge and whether held in Namibia or South Africa;

(c) A bolish the application in Namibia of all racially discriminatory and politically repressive laws and practices, particularly bantustans and homelands;

(d) Accord unconditionally to all Namibians currently in exile for political reasons full facilities for return to their country without risk of arrest, detention, intimidation or imprisonment;

12. Decides to remain seized of the matter and to meet on or before August 31, 1976, for the purpose of reviewing South Africa's compliance with the terms of this resolution and, in the event of noncompliance by South Africa, for the purpose of considering the appropriate measures to be taken under the Charter.

For the texts of Ambassador Moynihan's statements of Jan. 29 and Jan. 30, 1976, and the full text of Res. 385 (1976), see Dept. of State Bulletin, Vol. LXXIV, No. 1913, Feb. 23, 1976, pp. 243-246.

On August 18, 1976, a biracial constitutional committee, meeting in Windhoek, Namibia (South West Africa), issued a statement that December 31, 1978, "with reasonable certainty" could be set as the date for independence of South West Africa. There was no mention of elections. Asked for comment on that proposal on August 24, 1976, Robert L. Funseth, spokesman of the Department of State, said:

We welcome any move which would bring Namibia closer to independence. And while this most recent step.... is a step in the right direction, it doesn't go far enough. We have reaffirmed on several occasions that a definite timetable, acceptable to the world community, be set for the achievement of Namibian independence. So we will just have to await further developments along this line ...

Our position remains unchanged in that we have called for all of the people and groups of Namibia to express their views freely . : . under U.N. supervision on the political future and constitutional structure of the country. See Dept. of State news briefing, DPC 159, Aug. 24, 1976; The New York Times, Aug. 25, 1976, pp. 1-6. For Secretary of State Kissinger's efforts to bring about a settlement in southern Africa, including Namibia, see post, Ch. 13, § 1, pp. 644-645.

East Timor

The U.N. Security Council, on April 22, 1976, adopted Resolution 389 (1976), reaffirming the right of the people of East Timor to selfdetermination and independence and calling upon Indonesia to "withdraw without further delay all its forces” from Portuguese Timor. It requested the U.N. Secretary-General to arrange consultations among the parties concerned and to ensure that the right to self-determination by the peoples of East Timor would be respected. Twelve countries voted for the resolution, none against; Japan and the United States abstained. Prior to the final vote the Council failed by one vote to adopt an amendment proposed by Japan and supported by the United States that would have called upon Indonesia to withdraw its "remaining" forces, in recognition of a statement by Indonesia that some forces had been and were being withdrawn. Ambassador Albert W. Sherer, Jr., Deputy U.S. Representative on the Security Council, made a statement in explanation of the U.S. abstention, in which he said:

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In the United States view there were only two useful purposes that a resolution on this subject could accomplish at this time. One would be to encourage and enhance the cooperation of all concerned and the other would be to extend the mandate of the SecretaryGeneral. In light of the decision of the Council not to accept the constructive Japanese proposal, a refusal explicitly to note steps to comply with existing resolutions, we do not believe that a spirit of cooperation has been encouraged. So far as the mandate of the Secretary-General is concerned, we do not believe a new resolution was needed in order to keep that mandate in being. His laudatory efforts and those of his special representative could and should be continued in any event. Their work demonstrates once again the indispensable role of the United Nations in the peaceful settlement of disputes.

In declining to vote for this resolution . . . we are not wavering in our support of the right of the people of East Timor or of any people anywhere in the world for equal rights and selfdetermination.

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Press Release USUN-46(76), Apr. 22, 1976. In the operative paragraphs of the resolution, the Security Council

1. Calls ирот all states to respect the territorial integrity of East Timor, as well as the inalienable right of its people to self-determination in accordance with General Assembly Resolution 1514 (XV

2. Calls upon the Government of Indonesia to withdraw without further delay all its forces from the Territory;

3. Requests the Secretary-General to have his special representative continue the assignment entrusted to him under paragraph 5 of Security Council Resolution 384 (1975) and pursue consultations with the parties concerned;

4. Further requests the Secretary-General to follow the implementation of the present resolution and submit a report to the Security Council as soon as possible;

5. Calls upon all states and other parties concerned to cooperate fully with the United Nations to achieve a peaceful solution to the existing situation and to facilitate the decolonization of the Territory;

6. Decides to remain seized of the situation.

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For information on succession of states in respect of treaties, see post, Ch. 5, § 2, pp. 220–221.

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§ 3 Diplomatic Relations and Recognition Diplomatic Relations; Recognition and Non

; recognition of Governments Equatorial Guinea

On March 15, 1976, the United States announced that it had suspended diplomatic relations with the Government of the Republic of Equatorial Guinea on March 14, four days after receiving word that the United States Ambassador and the United States Consul had been declared personae non gratae following a brief, uneventful visit to Equatorial Guinea. The two diplomats had been accredited to Equatorial Guinea, but were resident in the nearby country of Cameroon. Robert L. Funseth, Department of State Special Assistant for Press Relations, stated:

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This action on the part of the Equatorial Guinean Government came without any official warning whatsoever and without any explanation offered. We consider it an unwarranted affront not only to the two individuals concerned, who in their brief visits to Equatorial Guinea have worked in good faith to promote friendly relations, but also to the United States Government, and to accepted norms of international diplomacy. There had never been any previous indication, direct or indirect, from the Government of Equatorial Guinea that it was dissatisfied with the activities of the U.S. representatives. On the contrary, these visits have been carried out with the concurrence and cooperation of the Government of Equatorial Guinea.

With some regret, we have decided that we have no reasonable alternative but to suspend diplomatic relations with Equatorial Guinea, and we are so informing the Equatorial Guinean Government.

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Spain was thereafter designated as the protecting power for U.S. interests in Equatorial Guinea.

Dept. of State News Briefing, DPC 49, Mar. 15, 1976; Dept. Notice, Apr. 8, 1976. Iraq

Horace F. Shamwell, Jr., Deputy Assistant Legal Adviser for Management, Department of State, gave a legal opinion on November 11, 1976, to the Visa Office of the Department in which he distinguished the severance of diplomatic relations with Iraq from "nonrecognition" of the Iraqi Government. His opinion upheld the eligibility of diplomatic representatives assigned to the Iraqi Interest Section in Washington for A-1 visas under section 101(a)(15)(A)(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1101 (a) (15) (A)(i)). Mr. Shamwell's opinion stated, in relevant part:

since formal recognition was extended to the Iraqi Government in 1963, and since no “derecognition” of that same government has occurred, notwithstanding the break of diplomatic relations in 1967, an individual who is assigned to the Iraqi Interest Section and who is in fact a career diplomatic or consular officer is entitled to be issued an A-1 visa since the United States has recognized his government as the de jure government of Iraq.

Dept. of State File No. 277 0016-314. The above-cited section of the Immigration and Nationality Act establishes a class of aliens to whom A-1 visas may be issued. The class is defined as follows: “An ambassador, public minister, or career diplomatic or consular officer who has been accredited by a foreign government recognized de jure by the United States and who is accepted by the President or by the Secretary of State, and the members of the alien's immediate family ...." The Dept. of State accordingly authorized issuance of diplomatic A-1 visas to Iraqi diplomats assigned to the United States. Vietnam

Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger, in a press conference at Harvard University on October 15, 1976, stated:

We have made it clear to the Government of Vietnam that progress towards better relations with the United States absolutely depends on an accounting for the missing in action. We are prepared to discuss this with the Vietnamese. We've had diplomatic exchanges in Paris, and we expect to start some discussions with them in the near future on that subject.

so far, the Vietnamese Government has not been particularly cooperative. They have been feeding out just a few names to influence particular decisions, but we think that as a question of principle we cannot let the Vietnamese Government blackmail American families with an anguish that has been going on for years, in order to do something that they should have done under the Armistice Agreement (Agreement on Ending the War and Restoring Peace in Viet-Nam (TIAS 7568; 24 USŤ 485) ]

Dept. of State Press Release, No. 518. Oct. 15, 1976; Dept. of State Bulletin, Vol. LXXV, No. 1950, Nov. 8, 1976, p. 573. On July 2, 1976, the reunification of North VietNam and South Viet-Nam was formalized by a declaration set forth by the National Assembly of Vietnam. The official name of the newly reunified state is the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, and Hanoi is the capital.

On November 12, 1976, Robert L. Funseth, spokesman of the Department of State, announced to the press that the Deputy Chief of Mission of the U.S. Embassy in Paris, Samuel Gammon, met that day with Tran Hoan, Counselor of the Embassy of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam in Paris. He said that the United States had proposed the

meeting in March 1976 in an effort to gain an accounting for the missing in action (MIA's), which in turn could lead to progress toward normalization of relationships. At the meeting, he said, the U.S. representative emphasized the need to resolve the question of American personnel unaccounted for in the Indochina war before there could be any improvement of relations between the two countries. He added that“both sides agreed that they would study the positions taken at the meeting and be back in touch with one another.”

Dept. of State News Briefing, DPC 212, Nov. 12, 1976, pp. A6-7. Thailand

After a military junta seized power in Thailand on October 6, 1976, Frederick Z. Brown, Director of the Office of Press Relations in the Department of State, in a news briefing on October 8, stated:

We have had no break, of course, in our relations with the Thai Government and have no reason to believe that our present relations cannot continue. Dept. of State News Briefing, DPC 191, Oct. 8, 1976. Acts Short of Recognition

On March 26, 1976, the U.N. Security Council decided, without objection, to invite the representative of Angola to participate in the Security Council debate on a complaint brought on behalf of the African group of states at the United Nations, “concerning the act of aggression committed by South Africa against the People's Republic of Angola." Ambassador William W. Scranton, U.S. Representative to the United Nations, stated for the record:

my Government has agreed to the participation in this debate of representatives of the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Ango!a on the customary understanding that such agreement in no way constitutes an act of recognition. U.N. Doc. S/PV.1900, Mar. 26, 1976, p. 3.

Recognition of States General

The Department of State supplied to the press on November 1, 1976, a statement of the criteria applied by the United States in deciding whether to recognize a new state. The statement follows:

In the view of the United States, international law does not require a state to recognize another entity as a state; it is a matter for the judgment of each state whether an entity merits recognition as a state. In reaching this judgment, the United States has traditionally looked to the establishment of certain facts. These

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