substantial tariff cuts, eliminating unjustified sanitary and phytosanitary measures, and binding its subsidy levels.

Question. I believe that China must commit, before it is allowed into the WTO, to open its markets, reduce the authority of its state trading enterprises, and phase out its internal subsidies, according to a definitive timetable. Do you believe such a commitment should be made before China is allowed into the WTŎ?

Answer. We share your concerns in these areas. We want to see up-front commitments from China to expand market access significantly for our exporters and investors as part of Beijing's WTO accession protocol. For a commercially viable protocol package to be achieved, China will have to address a number of serious issues. We will seek commitments that:

China will liberalize its trading rights regime; and

For a limited number of "state-traded" commodities, that state trading enterprises will engage with foreign individuals and enterprises in import and export in accordance with commercial considerations.

With respect to subsidies, we also expect China to comply with the terms of the WTO Agreement on Subsidies. We have also requested that China submit a complete schedule of export subsidy commitments, including a commitment not to reintroduce export subsidies where China has already eliminated such subsidies, and to submit a schedule binding the levels of all domestic agricultural subsidies.

Question. In your opinion, should China enter the WTO as a “developed" country or "developing" country?

Answer. For a long time, Beijing has maintained that it should enter the WTO as a "developing" country. This mischaracterized the reality of a China which, although a "developing" country in certain respects, also has become a world-class exporter fully able to implement most WTO commitments at the time of its accession. WTO membership requires adherence to fundamental obligations by countries regardless of their level of development. All countries-developed or developing-must implement some of these commitments, including national treatment in goods, at the time of accession. In March 1995, then USTR Kant or and Chinese Trade Minister Wu Yi agreed to pursue China's WTO accession talks on a flexible and pragmatic basis and to address realistically the issue of China's developing country status on the basis of the Uruguay Round Agreement. In this context, the United States is prepared to consider, where appropriate, transition periods and phase-ins of obligations.

In sum, both sides have moved beyond a debate of "developed" versus "developing." Following the successful meeting between Presidents Clinton and Jiang at the November APEC Leaders Meeting in the Philippines, there are signs that the Chinese may now be ready to get down to the real but difficult business of negotiating with us a commercially viable WTO package that benefits both countries.

Question. Other members of the Clinton Administration have stated that China should enter the WTO only under "commercially acceptable terms." What does this term mean to you? Would China's de facto ban on pork imports be considered "commercially acceptable?"

Answer. If China is to join the WTO, we will need to have a commercially acceptable protocol package of commitments by China to open its markets in-hand before we will agree to China's WTO accession. That means real market access for U.S. goods and services, including agriculture. We are coordinating closely with USTR and USDA, which are working hard to open the China market for U.S. pork.

RESPONSES Of Madeleine ALBRIGHT TO QUESTIONS ASKED BY REPRESENTATIVE

SOLOMON

Question. During the hearing you stated that the State Department "obviously will want to cooperate with you in any way that is possible to do so," regarding allegations of improper or illegal contributions made from foreign sources, and whether American foreign policy was influenced in any way by campaign or other contributions. I would appreciate your cooperation and assistance in answering the following questions regarding the role of the U.S. Government in issuing a visa to Wang Jun early in 1996.

A. Which American Consulate or Embassy issued the visa?

Answer. Embassy Beijing.

B. When was it issued?

Answer. January 22, 1996.

C. What type of visa was issued, what was its number, and for what duration was it issued?

Answer. Wang Jun was issued a B-1 visa valid for three months (1/22/96-4/21/ 96). The Embassy's records do not show the actual visa number or if it was for one or two entries. However, since Mr. Wang's application did not indicate he was planning to enter the U.S. twice, it was almost certainly a single entry visa.

D. In 1996, on what date or dates did Mr. Wang travel to the U.S. and on what date or dates did he depart? Does the State Department know what city or cities he visited besides Washington, D.C.?

Answer. While Mr. Wang's application form does not state where he was going in the U.S., he submitted letters from CITIC, Managing Director Ernest G. Green of Lehman Brothers and Yah Lin "Charlie" Trie of Daihatsu International Trading, Inc., stating that he would be traveling to Washington, D.C. for business meetings. Mr. Wang indicated on his visa application that he would be arriving in the U.S. on February 1 for a stay of seven days; his supporting letter from CITIC stated that he would arrive on January 31, also for a stay of seven days. U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service records indicate that Mr. Wang entered the U.S. on February 1, 1996 in San Francisco and departed from San Francisco on February 10, 1996. E. Does Mr. Wang currently hold a valid visa for travel to the U.S.?

Answer. Embassy Beijing has no record of having issued Wang Jun a visa since January 1996. Since the maximum B-1 validity period for PRC citizens is six months, we can say with reasonable certainty that he does not now hold a valid visa.

F. & G. What was the name of the visa issuing officer and the officer's supervisor? Answer. In light of the information provided in the other responses, the Department believes that it would be unnecessary and inappropriate to disclose the names of the individual Department officials. If, however, the Chairman determines that such information is relevant, we would be happy to provide an oral briefing.

H. Did any State Department person meet with, discuss with or otherwise have any personal contact with Mr. Wang at any time during the visa issuing process? Answer. Not to the Embassy's knowledge.

I. Did the visa issuing officer personally interview Mr. Wang prior to granting the visa?

Answer. No. Mr. Wang's application and diplomatic passport were submitted through a routine non-personal appearance drop-off system for government officials. J. Did the issuing officer or the issuing officer's supervisor know that Mr. Wang Jun was chairman of Polytechnologies? If not, why not? Did the issuing officer or issuing officer's supervisor know that Polytechnologies is China's leading arms dealer? If not, why not?

Answer. No. On his application he listed that he was chairman of CITIC (China International Trust and Investment Corporation), a major Chinese corporation. There was no information available to the adjudicating officer or his supervisor that Mr. Wang was also chairman of Polytechnologies.

K. Does the State Department have in place a list of officials of Chinese. arms companies and are visa issuing officers appraised of this list? If not, why not?

Answer. Neither the Department of State nor Embassy Beijing keeps such a list. There is no statutory obligation to do so. In Mr. Wang's case a routine post-issuance namecheck cable was submitted to Washington in January 1996 and circulated within the intelligence community. Based on information that surfaced as part of that process, Mr. Wang's name was entered into the visa lookout system in December 1996.

L. On the date the visa was issued, was any State Department person informed of the Polytechnologies machine gun smuggling operation then under way? If so, what person or persons?

Answer. Since the Polytechnologies case did not break until later in the year, no one at the Embassy was aware of the arms smuggling operation at the time the visa was issued. To the extent that the case involved an ongoing Department of Justice investigation, we have not been able to identify any official in the Department of State who handles law enforcement matters in an official capacity having had knowledge of the case at or prior to the time the visa was issued.

M. Did either the issuing officer or the issuing officer's supervisor question whether it would be appropriate to issue a visa to Mr. Wang? If so, to whom was this question raised and what was the outcome?

Answer. No. On the basis of the information submitted with his application, and in the absence of a namecheck hit, Mr. Wang qualified for a nonimmigrant visa.

N. Was Ambassador Sasser informed that a visa was to be issued to Mr. Wang? If not, why is it not appropriate to inform the U.S. Ambassador when a major arms dealer asks for a visa?

Answer. Ambassador Sasser had not yet arrived at post. Given the information available at the time of the visa issuance, however, there was no reason for this visa issuance to be considered by anyone other than the approving officer.

O. If Ambassador Sasser was informed of the visa for Mr. Wang, did he converse or have any contact with any person involved in the visa issuing process? If so, who was contacted and what was the nature of the contact or the conversation?

Answer. N/A.

P. Did Mr. Charles Trie, Mr. John Huang or any other donor to the Democratic National Committee or President Clinton's legal defense fund have any contact whatever with any person involved in issuing the visa for Mr. Wang? If so, who was the contacting party, who was contacted and what was the nature of the contact? Answer. As noted in Answer "D" above, Mr. Wang submitted, among other documents, a letter from Mr. "Charlie" Trie in support of his visa application. This letter had no bearing on the issuance of Mr. Wang's visa.

Q. Has Mr. Wang been issued any other visa for travel to the U.S. in the past four years? If so, what were the circumstances of his visa and his travel?

Answer. Embassy Beijing can retrieve issuance information back to January 28, 1995. Between that date and today, records show that Wang Jun received three B1 visas, each for three months. The issuance dates were April 17, 1995, September 1, 1995, and January 22, 1996. INS records available to the Department of State also indicate that Mr. Wang entered the U.S. on July 27, 1993 in New York.

Question. Please provide a complete list of any and all Federal officials Mr. Wang met with in the U.S. during 1996. Please provide a complete list of any and all Federal officials Mr. Wang met with in China during 1996.

Answer. I have no personal knowledge of this matter. The Department understands that Mr. Wang met with the President and separately with Secretary Brown early in 1996.

We are inquiring of the Embassy in Beijing whether there were any meetings with Mr. Wang in China during 1996 and will provide you with that information

when it is received.

QUESTIONS FOR THE RECORD BY SENATORS JESSE HELMS AND CHUCK HAGEL

The Committee requests additional information about your role in developing the United Nations mandate that governed the UNOSOM II peacekeeping operation in Somalia. All documents described herein are in the custody or control of the Department of State (including in particular the U.S. Mission to the United Nations) that were generated or received after January 20, 1993, and in any way reflect, refer, or relate to deliberations within the United Nations (or among members of the United Nations) regarding the mandate for the United Nations Peacekeeping Operations in Somalia that came to be known as UNOSOM II. This request extends to all U.S. proposals or other communications to the United Nations (or members of the United Nations) regarding the mandate of that peacekeeping operation, as well as all documents that in any way reflect, refer, or relate to deliberations within the United States Government regarding such proposals or communications.

For purposes of this request, the term "document" means any written or electronic recording of information, including memoranda, telegrams, correspondences, handwritten notes, electronic mail, "non-papers", position papers, meeting agendas or summaries, and legal or factual analyses, and includes all drafting, clearance, and routing information associated with any of the foregoing.

Should any document responsive to this request be withheld from the Committee, a description of each such document should be provided to the Committee setting forth a description of the document, the date it was created or received, the originator of the document, all recipients of the document, and a statement of the basis upon which the document has been withheld.

[The documents on the UNOSOM II Peacekeeping operation in Somalia may be found in Committee files.]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF SENATOR SMITH

Good Morning Madame Ambassador, I am very pleased to welcome you to the Foreign Relations Committee today as we both begin a new chapter of government service you looking forward to the challenges of the office of Secretary of State and I as a U.Š. Senator representing the people of Oregon.

The work of this committee and of the Secretary of State is of great interest and concern to the people of Oregon. An ever-growing percentage of Oregon's economy is dependent upon international trade-especially in the Pacific Rim, where Oregon

has longstanding ties. And international relations whether or not it is on the front page of the newspaper-is important to citizens of our nation.

In your remarks on the day of your nomination, you expressed your "desire for the American people to have a future of steadily increasing prosperity and steadily decreasing danger." Our progress toward these worthy goals is clearly dependent upon the success of a bipartisan foreign policy. The State Department and this Committee must work closely to determine that policy and pursue it, primarily on a bilateral basis, working with-but never relying upon-international organizations like the United Nations and the World Bank.

Madame Ambassador, in a June 1992 article, written before President Clinton was elected and before you had the responsibility of executing American foreign policy, you wrote that the United States must “* * * keep in mind that the challenges facing this country today and in the next century are less and less the type that can be dealt with unilaterally." I agree with part of your assumption-that the United States cannot be solely responsible for solving every conflict in every corner of the world. Our vital national security interests do not call for it, nor does our budget allow for it.

However, later in that same article you concluded that "what it means is that the United States would no longer be in a position to say we're number one." After four years as part of the Clinton Administration's foreign policy team, I am interested to hear how your views have evolved. After all, multilateralism has not lived up to the promise it held in the first years of the Clinton Administration.

With the absence of U.S. leadership, the mission in Somalia drifted to a disastrous end—an inexcusable breach when U.S. soldiers are placed in harms way. Likewise, the multilateral approach to the war in Bosnia made it everyone's responsibility, and thus it inevitably became nobody's problem as tens of thousands of innocent men, women and children were killed and driven from their homes. I expect you have reached the sobering conclusion that we must be "number one", whether in Somalia, Bosnia, or facing the ongoing challenges of Iran, China or Cuba.

Finally, let me address the question of resources for the conduct of diplomacy. I understand that President Clinton's budget for Fiscal Year 1998 seeks an increase in international affairs spending above the current year's level. During the last Congress, an agreement was reached that would reduce all federal spending in order to balance the federal budget by 2002. I believe that we must adhere to that agreement there is no greater pressing issue facing America than the federal deficit. Clearly, adequate resources must be made available for the international affairs budget, but additional funding must be identified from within the existing budget. Streamlining and consolidating our Cold War-era foreign policy apparatus and using the resulting cost savings to further U.S. diplomatic goals would be an excellent place to start.

Thank you again, Madame Ambassador, for being here today. I look forward to your testimony and to your responses to the Committee's questions.

PREPARED STATEMENT OF SENATOR FRIST

Mr. Chairman, Ambassador Albright, and fellow Committee members, I am grateful for the opportunity to be here, and for the opportunity to serve as a member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. The Senate as a whole, and this Committee especially, are responsible for many of the most important affairs of state, among them being treaty ratification and confirmation of Presidential appointees, a task for which we are now convened.

Since the end of the cold war, and the collapse of the Soviet Union, the United States has entered an era in which our role as a world leader is not clearly understood. The relatively simple terms of a bi-polar world have given way to the ambiguities of the present age. Our national interests are now without the clear definitions of the previous era, and we have lost some of the cohesion of spirit and unifying elements which were provided-ironically enough-by the threat of a monolithic and aggressive potential adversary.

The geopolitics of our era, and those of America's interests, are being shaped by other forces as well. As we approach the next century, and the next millennium, the acceleration of global commerce and the rapid exchange of information compels us to reconsider the nature of borders and distance. The rise of new, regional powers-some with nuclear weapons capabilities-dictates that we approach regional security and alliances with flexibility and caution. Our trade across the Pacific Ocean has now surpassed that across the Atlantic. Our explosive economic growth has given rise to even greater dependence on increasingly shaky sources of energy. Extremist religious fervor continues to dog our efforts for peace and stability as

angry nations exalt violence for their angry gods. Finally, democracy and self-determination-truly American inventions as they are now practiced-have become the worldwide norm for governance, even as the greatest historical outside threat to our own democratic institutions has dissolved.

Our responses to these and many other challenges to our security and our leadership will determine, as the adage says, whether we will win the peace after having won the war. To win the peace we, as a nation, must have leadership, vision, and a unity of spirit and goals. I do not believe this current era in American history provides all the critical elements for success. Our era of uncertainty resembles, in many ways, those preceding both great world wars of this century, where the securing of the peace came with great difficulty and at great price.

Our Nation's role as a world leader is confused, just as the definition of our national interests or vital national interests-are confused. Why? Because we lack true leadership, and because we lack a national consensus on the definition of our national interests. We Americans are unsure what world leadership will require of us, just as we are unsure of our destiny within our own borders.

The Administration and the Congress, together, can provide the leadership, even as America determines its vital interests in the coming century and searches for its soul at home. However, that ability to lead will require a particular vision from us, the leaders. We cannot simply be reactionary, nor can we chase utopian ideas, for governing and leading are sober businesses, indeed. Winning the peace, providing leadership, and developing a national consensus concerning our vital interests is a tall order and may yet prove to be the greatest challenge of our lifetime.

Madam Ambassador, I'm sure you understand those challenges as we do. It is my hope that, should you be confirmed, we can work together to forge a national consensus of goals and interests, as well as provide the leadership necessary to reassert the United States as the unequaled leader among nations. This is a tall order of business we face, and its importance cannot be overstated. I look forward to hearing your views on these and other topics, and, hopefully, working together toward shared goals in future.

PREPARED STATEMENT OF CARL OLSON, CHAIRMAN, STAte DepartmeNT WATCH

State Department Watch is a nonpartisan public interest foreign policy watchdog group. We desire to raise significant ongoing issues and questions that Ambassador Albright should provide written answers for, so that the American public and the U.S. Senate can be fully informed as to the nominee's views.

UNITED NATIONS

1. The issues of slave labor and child labor have been decried by organs of the United Nations, such as the International Labor Organization and UNICEF. However, the United Nations does not have a policy to refuse to buy goods made by slave labor or child labor. The UN should make its rhetoric into a practical reality by adopting such a policy for its billions of dollars of purchases annually.

2. Troops under United Nations command are in a unique and sensitive position. Since the United Nations is not a government, it has no direct sovereignty. Any military person from a member country who is assigned for United Nations command duty should (1) be required to be a volunteer for such duty, (2) should not be required to swear a higher allegiance to the United Nations over his own country, (3) should enjoy all POW rights under the Geneva convention (even though the UN is not a signatory), and (4) should not need to surrender his rights or identity card for his own country's military.

BAN ON SLAVE-MADE IMPORTS

The ban on importing goods made in whole or in part by slave labor was well established in the Tariff Act of 1930. In today's world, the largest forced labor system is in China, and some gulags remain in the former Soviet Union. The Chinese array of 1100 "laogai" forced labor factories, farms, and other facilities use upwards of 20 million workers. They produce a wide range of products, from simple toys and tea to sophisticated machinery and electronics, much of which is exported, including to the United States. The American Harry Wu has documented this massive human rights abuse and economic warfare threat to American jobs and companies. For his efforts he was falsely imprisoned in Chinese jail for "spying" during the summer of 1995.

In order for the U.S. Customs Service to enforce this ban, it is necessary to inspect the suspected facilities. Under a Memorandum of Understanding that the De