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Without ongoing U.S. financial support, KEDO will be unable to operate or carry out its objectives, which will weaken the credibility of U.S. leadership, jeopardize Agreed Framework implementation, and contribute to rising tensions on the Korean Peninsula. We do not think that past U.S. contributions to KEDO have been too high and, in fact, overall U.S. contributions represent a fraction of the KEDO expenditures to be borne by our primary KEDO partners, South Korea and Japan.

South Korea will play a central role in LWR construction and financing and Japan has committed to contribute significant funding for the LWR project, as well as for other KEDO activities and operating costs. To date, Japan has contributed approximately $9.5 million to KEDO. Additionally, to help alleviate KEDO's current HFO funding shortfalls, Japan has made available a $19 million special contribution fund against which KEDO can borrow money for HFO purchases.

We expect to continue to seek Congressional authorization to expend funds that are justifiable and necessary for U.S. participation in KEDO. We anticipate that budget requests to support our critical participation in this enterprise in FY 1998 and subsequent years will be on the order of $30 million per annum. Such U.S. funding for activities in support of KEDO and the Agreed Framework represent a wise investment, advancing U.S. interests in regional security and global non-proliferation.

Question. I understand that the Energy Department forecast that the encasing of the nuclear fuel rods would be completed by March 1997. Is that still the scheduled completion date? What other security precautions will be taken to ensure against misuse of the plutonium? Where will the rods be stored?

Answer. Section III of the Agreed Framework states that the U.S. and the DPRK will cooperate in finding a method to safely store and dispose of the spent fuel in a way that does not involve reprocessing in_the_DPRK. Current U.S. activities in North Korea are limited to assuring that the DPRK spent fuel is appropriately stored and placed under International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards until such time as it is shipped out of the country.

To date, approximately 53% of the spent fuel rods (roughly 4,202 of the total 8,000) have been canned and stored under IAEA monitoring. Actual canning of the spent fuel began on April 27, 1996, and is planned to be completed in 1997. While we had hoped to complete canning by March 1997, a number of problems have delayed the completion date. The Department of Energy is currently preparing cost and schedule estimates for canning the remaining spent fuel rods.

Upon completion of canning activities, the spent fuel will be kept in storage at the spent fuel storage basin at Nyongbyon until it is shipped out of the country. It will be subject to the freeze on North Korea's nuclear facilities as specified in the Agreed Framework and will be verified by the IAEA through the use of seals, videocamera monitoring, and on-site inspections.

Question. A company in my state has been approached to sell hard red spring wheat to Azerbaijan to replace the 1.1 million tons of wheat per year which was previously supplied by Russia.

As you know, the FREEDOM Support Act extended the Export Enhancement Program to countries of the Former Soviet Union in 1992. Azerbaijan was one of the exceptions due to is embargo against Armenia.

Now that peace in the region has been negotiated, I believe it is time to lift the exception, which Azerbaijan sees as an irritant in its relationship with the U.S. I have also been told the EEP funds are currently not available for FSU countries at this time, which further raises the question of why Azerbaijan is still exempted. The President of Azerbaijan will come to the U.S. in February. I hope you will meet with him and discuss this matter with him and consider his case for removal of Azerbaijan from the 907 exception.

Please comment.

Answer. We agree fully with you that Section 907 of the FREEDOM Support Act should be lifted. The Clinton Administration opposes this restriction on our assistance to Azerbaijan (as did the Bush Administration) and we have supported efforts in Congress to amend or repeal this legislation.

Section 907 hinders U.S. policy objectives in Azerbaijan, including provision of humanitarian aid, support for democratic and open market development, support for the ongoing Nagorno-Karabakh peace process, and promotion of U.S. investment opportunities in Azerbaijan. We would welcome further dialogue with members of Congress toward the removal of Section 907.

The Administration is reviewing the applicability of Section 907 to the Export Enhancement Program (EEP) and plans to be in touch with your office on this matter. For a number of reasons, export enhancement program funds are not currently available anywhere worldwide.

RESPONSES OF Madeleine AlBRIGHT TO QUESTIONS ASKED BY SENATOR HAGEL Question. Nebraska farmers and ranchers still recall the effects of past U.S. foreign policy actions, such as the grain embargo imposed during the Carter Administration, which only served to disrupt critical U.S. markets. As American farmers and ranchers continue to expect fewer regulatory burdens in exchange for the prospects of greater access to foreign markets and greater profits, can you assure this Committee that the Clinton Administration will not use America's agricultural products as a foreign policy weapon?

Answer. The Clinton Administration is committed to promoting the export of America's agricultural commodities. In fact, exports of agricultural commodities have risen dramatically under President Clinton.

There may be circumstances, however, when an external threat is so central to our national interests that it is necessary to impose sanctions, including sanctions involving agricultural commodities. We would not seek to impose sanctions affecting the exports of agricultural products except under the most compelling circumstances.

The 1996 FAIR Act (often called the 1996 "Farm Bill") addresses these concerns by providing that unless other agricultural exporting countries join the U.S. in an embargo, the loss of farm income to U.S. producers must be made up by the government through direct payments to producers, or enhanced support for export market development.

Question. I, like many of my constituents, am opposed to the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child. I am concerned that it may infringe upon the sovereignty of the United States and equally important on the rights of parents to raise their children how they see fit. This is a parental responsibility, not a UN responsibility. What steps can be taken to ensure that the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child will not infringe upon the sovereignty of the U.S. or on parental rights?

Answer. The Convention's standards are, in many ways, based upon those of the United States and other Western countries and, with some exceptions, are fundamentally consistent with U.S. law.

Nonetheless, we are mindful of the need to treat with care the Convention's potential impact on U.S. law and practice, especially since many of the rights covered by the convention are matters of state and local law. We will be considering possible reservations, declarations and/or understandings to clarify our interpretation of the Convention's provisions, including those pertaining to parental rights, and I expect we would avail ourselves of that right.

Question. What role do you see the Clinton Administration playing in the continuing Middle cast Peace Process? Should the primary U.S. role be to support the parties as they negotiate directly, or should the U.S. take a more proactive stance in these negotiations?

Answer. As I laid out in my written statement, under the President's leadership, we intend to press vigorously on all tracks to realize a secure, comprehensive and lasting peace between Israel and her Arab neighbors. Neither the United States nor any other outside force can or should attempt to impose a solution. As in the case of the Hebron negotiations, our engagement will continue to be shaped by the needs of the parties.

Question. In July of 1996, the Parties of the UN Convention on Climate Change agreed at their Conference in Geneva to consider legally binding policies and measures for reducing emissions of greenhouse gases and timetables for their implementation beyond the year 2000. The Parties expect to complete negotiations on a new legal instrument in December 1997 at the Third Conference of the Parties in Japan. The public debate on whether the policy being negotiated will be supported by the American people has only just begun. There have been hearings in both the Senate and House Energy Committees, and this Committee expects to hold hearings later this Spring. The hearings in both bodies have already made it clear that the questions and criticisms of the Administration's position are many and are bipartisan. Can you assure this Committee that the U.S. will not agree to any commitment that will impact negatively the U.S. economy in terms of both growth and jobs?

Answer. The Administration, like Congress, is extremely concerned about the possible impact on U.S. jobs and competitiveness of any Policy taken to address climate change. In our comprehensive analysis of the options before us, we are examining not only the costs to mitigate climate change, but also the impacts on all sectors and in all aspects of the economy if we do not take mitigating actions. Such costs include those that could stem from not aggressively promoting the development and deployment of new technologies, that is, the consequences to the U.S. if our competitors reach the market first with these new climate-friendly alternatives.

We are seeking to balance the near term consequences to jobs and competitiveness of too hasty action with the longer term obligation to ensure that the United States remains competitive in the world of the future. We believe that the signals we are sending today (particularly in our rejection of a target that would take effect before the year 2005 but also calling for a binding, medium-term target) enable the private sector to promote progress toward a sustainable future without compromising present economic growth.

Question. A Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI) is being negotiated by member countries of the Organization for Economic Development (OECD). The U.S. State Department has projected that negotiations will be complete in May of 1997. Under this Agreement, development countries who are party to the OECD would accept basic foreign investment standards in order to protect foreign investors. Many of the standards, such as the right to transfer money out of a country, hire key people, receive compensation for expropriation, receive national treatment and create investor-state and state-state dispute mechanisms, are contained in bilateral investment treaties the U.S. has with many countries.

Currently, parties are negotiating exceptions to national treatment for particular sectors of the economy. Is the United States prepared to withhold its signature in the event that other countries prevail in taking exceptions that have the effect of voiding the general protections set out in the Agreement?

Clearly this agreement should take the form of an international treaty which would come to the Foreign Relations Committee for consideration. Will you give this Committee your commitment that the Agreement will be submitted in treaty form, thus requiring the advice and consent of the Senate as required by Article II, section 2 of the Constitution?

Answer. The United States view is that the Multilateral Agreement on Investment should be a "state-of-the-art" agreement, meeting or exceeding the standards of our Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs). Thus, the U.S. will sign the agreement only if there is an acceptable balance of commitments on the part of signatories.

We have consulted regularly with the staffs of this Committee, and other Congressional Committees with an interest in the MAI. We will continue to consult as the negotiations progress. Depending on a number of factors, including the substantive content of the final agreement, the Administration could submit it as a treaty to the Senate for its advice and consent, or to both houses for approval, as has been the practice for many trade agreements. I can assure you that we will consult before determining how best to submit the agreement, once signed, to Congress.

Question. What role did you play in changing the mission of UNOSOM II from a humanitarian one to "nation building"?

Answer. Our goal, early in 1993, was to enable most of the 25,000 troops deployed by President Bush to withdraw, with responsibility transferred to the United Nations. The intervention saved hundreds of thousands of lives, and we intended to withdraw in a manner that would not cause a return to the chaotic conditions that preceded the deployment. Our plan, developed on an inter-agency basis and in coordination with our allies, was to replace most of the U.S. troops with a U.N. peacekeeping force. Civilian organizations assisted Somalis who were working to establish functioning political and economic institutions. The role of the military was to create an environment in which civilian efforts could go forward.

Within the U.S. Government, I participated in deliberations with representatives of the State Department, the Defense Department, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and others as appropriate. At the United Nations, I carried out instructions, which had been thoroughly vetted within the U.S. Government, to implement this policy, which I supported. The policy was approved by the U.N. Security Council, and the transfer of principal responsibility to the United Nations took place in early May 1993.

Question. Do you recall whose idea it was to single out warlord Mohamed Farah Aideed and send U.S. troops on a massive manhunt for him?

Answer. The decision to seek the arrest of those responsible for murdering more than two dozen Pakistani peace keepers was collective in nature. It was broadly supported by members of the UN Security Council, the UN Secretariat, and by UNOSOM troop contributors, including the United States. The decision was reflected in a June 6, 1993 Security Council resolution that authorized peacekeepers to take "all necessary measures" including the arrest and detention of persons responsible for the murders. Mr. Aideed was identified as a likely perpetrator by authorities in the field, and UN peacekeepers were principally responsible for attempting to apprehend him.

Shortly after the UN Security Council vote, the Defense Department received a request from the UN for Delta Force commandos to aid in the effort to apprehend Aideed. This request was turned down. In August, after four Americans had been killed and six wounded by sabotage or sniperfire, 400 Rangers were sent. These de

cisions were based on deliberations among the agencies concerned, including the State Department, Defense Department, Joint Chiefs of Staff, and others.

Question. Were you aware of, and did you support, then-Secretary of Defense Aspin's decision not to send armor to protect Army Rangers during a firefight in Mogadishu on October 3, 1993? Do you believe it was wise for U.S. combat troops to be forced to rely on Pakistani peace keepers for an armored extraction of Army Rangers from this firefight?

Answer. I was not aware of Secretary Aspin's decision at the time. I believe nowas I did then-that U.S. forces should have all the equipment necessary to accomplish their mission and to protect themselves. I also believe that decisions about what equipment is necessary should be made in the Department of Defense, as they were in this case.

Question. Do you believe those U.S. soldiers killed in Somalia would be alive today if the Administration had elected to provide them the capabilities they needed to perform the mission assigned to them?

Answer. I believe now-as I did then-that U.S. forces should have all equipment necessary to accomplish their mission and protect themselves and that decisions about what equipment is necessary should be made in the Department of Defense, as they were in 1993.

There have been extensive evaluations of the military aspects of the death of U.S. soldiers in Somalia. I cannot add to those evaluations except to say that I regret very deeply the tragic deaths that occurred. We can take great pride that our armed forces saved hundreds of thousands of lives.

I should also add that the Administration and the UN have both sought to apply lessons learned in Somalia to subsequent missions.

Question. Senior U.S. military officials were understandably critical of UNOSOM because of its "mission creep." Knowing that you support a policy of "assertive multilateralism," I am concerned that future U.N. peacekeeping missions could also experience "mission creep," with tragic results. When it comes to putting U.S. armed forces in harm's way, what specific guidelines will you apply to ensure that this doesn't happen?

Answer. All the agencies of the U.S. Government involved in decisions about Somalia policy—and all the relevant ones participated at the time-have applied the lessons we learned there, in accordance with the President's decision to reform U.S. participation in peacekeeping. Some guidelines we apply include:

• Know our objectives and exit strategy.

• Have enough force available under rules of engagement that allow its use to fully protect U.S. troops. In Haiti and Bosnia, U.S. forces deterred any opposition with overwhelming forces and robust rules of engagement.

• Keep the objectives simple and agreed. In Somalia and originally in the former Yugoslavia, the United Nations was asked to balance competing objectives when there was no consensus from the member states about the actions it should take.

• Make it clear from the outset that the willingness of the international peacekeepers to help depends on the commitment by the parties to achieve reconciliation.

Question. Regarding the recent use of U.S. troops in Rwanda and Uganda, U.S. military officials there used the term "mission search" to describe the process of finding a mission. How was it decided that U.S. troops would be sent into Uganda and Rwanda before a clear mission was established? Why would U.S. troops be sent before a clear mission was established?

Answer. The United States deployed approximately 450 personnel to the region (but not to Zaire) as an advance for a possible multinational force. Part of the U.S. military role was to help locate groups of refugees to ascertain their movements and condition. Their efforts greatly assisted in determining if a larger U.S. force presence might be needed. It was not needed, because more than 600,000 Rwandan refugees began returning to their home country on November 16.

Our overall mission in Eastern Zaire was quite clear: hundreds of thousands of Rwandan refugees faced dire circumstances and U.S. logistical and overflight capabilities were required immediately to deliver assistance and to encourage their safe return to Rwanda. Had a multinational force actually been deployed, an advance U.S. military presence would have greatly facilitated their movement as well.

Question. Regarding the Administration's suggestions to use U.S. combat troops in Eastern Zaire this past November, what specific role did the Administration envision for U.S. combat troops and what were your recommendations regarding this proposed operation?

Answer. U.S. troops were never envisioned for combat operations. U.S. troops were to be limited to facilitating humanitarian assistance to refugees under the pro

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posed MNF by establishing a civil-military operations center, providing intelligence support, and providing advance information for possible psychological operations support, airlift support, and airfield control support.

I supported the Administration's decision to consider a proposed MNF for Eastern Zaire once an assessment was made of the need and of conditions on the ground. Initially, consideration was given to deploying U.S. military personnel to facilitate humanitarian relief operations at Goma airfield, but it became unnecessary to undertake that mission. In the light of the large-scale return of refugees to Rwanda and the international community's access to many of the refugees who remained in Eastern Zaire, the multinational force was never deployed.

Question. Regarding the general policy for using U.S. troops to address humanitarian situations, what is the justification for spending diminishing DOD resources to pay for humanitarian activities for which the U.S. already provides hundreds of millions of dollars to the Agency for International Development (AID), the UN and scores of non-government and private and voluntary organizations?

Answer. U.Š. military forces are normally used for humanitarian purposes only to respond in the short term to natural or manmade disasters and crises of a magnitude to which international relief agencies cannot sufficiently respond. This was the case in U.S. military deployments to Rwanda in 1994 (Operation Support Hope) and to Bangladesh in 1991 (Operation Sea Angel).

The Department of Defense has certain unmatched capabilities to respond rapidly to crises by providing logistics, transportation, and command, control, and communications support to address complex emergencies. Accordingly, Congress has expressly authorized DOD participation in humanitarian missions. It would be infeasible to replicate U.S. military capabilities in the UN or other agencies on any large scale basis to meet these humanitarian situations.

Question. What does the Administration mean by the term “nation-building" and what specific actions by the U.S. military do you think are appropriate with regard to a "nation-building" mission?

Answer. Nations can be built only by their own people. In some situations, outside military forces can provide security in nations recovering from civil conflict or other disasters so that civilians can rebuild governmental and private sector institutions with help from civilian international agencies. It is not the mission of our military to engage in nation-building.

The phrase "nation-building" did not originate with the U.S. Government, and to my knowledge we have never defined it. Before I became Ambassador to the United Nations, then-Secretary General Boutros Boutros Ghali began using the phrase “nation-building" to refer to international activities that would assist states in developing political and economic structures strong enough to prevent the recurrence of humanitarian tragedies or internecine conflicts.

RESPONSES OF Madeleine ALBRIGHT TO QUESTIONS ASKED BY SENATOR THOMAS

Question. The Berlin Mandate, which was agreed to by the United States and others at the first meeting of the Conference of the Parties to the Framework Convention on Climate Change (FCCC) in April 1995 calls for negotiations outlining new commitments for the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions by developed countries only. Does the U.S. intend to agree to a protocol, amendment or other legal instrument which would be binding upon developed countries only?

Answer. We anticipate that all nations, including developing nations, will participate in a global effort to address the threat of global climate change in the post2000 period. The Berlin Mandate the charter for the current round of negotiations envisions that this effort will include, for developed country Parties, setting quantified emissions limitation and reduction objectives within specified timeframes. For developing country Parties, the Berlin Mandate provides that there will be no new commitments in this round but that all Parties, including developing country Parties, will reaffirm their existing commitments and continue to advance the implementation of those commitments. These include existing commitments to formulate and implement national and regional programs containing measures to mitigate climate change. This approach is consistent with the common but differentiated responsibilities and capabilities of all Parties under the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change, to which the Senate gave its advice and consent in October 1992.

Accordingly, we anticipate that the agreement will include specific provisions dealing with the continuing efforts of developing countries to advance the implementation of their existing commitments and that these provisions will be binding on

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