chemical engineering problems, including preventing corrosion of equipment and ensuring containment, not on information about the identities of toxic agents. There is no evidence that a foreign laboratory that analyzes samples from inspections will learn anything that would significantly assist a CW program. We are quite prepared to exercise our full rights under the CWC should we have a concern in a particular instance in this or any other area.

Question. Officials at the Preparatory Commission noted that Chinese candidates to become inspectors had been "directed to volunteer," that each had a background in either chemistry or chemical weapons munitions, and that most-if not all-are tied to the PLA chemical "defense" program. Paragraph 2 of Part II of the Verification Annex affords the U.S. the treaty right to not accept the participation of inspectors in verification activities on U.S. territory.

Will you assure the committee that the United States will exercise its treaty right and indicate its "non-acceptance" of any Chinese inspector or inspection assistant? Will you assure the Committee that you will also reject any inspector or inspection assistant who is a national of a state sponsor of terrorism?

Answer. We will use our ability under the CWC to refuse entry to specific inspectors or inspection assistants on a case-by-case basis to protect our national security interests. We will certainly bear in mind any concerns we may have about any Chinese inspector or inspection assistant or any one who is a national of a state sponsor of terrorism.

Question. In report language accompanying the Omnibus Appropriations Act, the Congress stated, "It is clear that a decision to adhere to binding targets and timetables would be a substantial and significant change in the FCCC commitments. The Committee believes that any decision to modify the commitments under the FCCC would have to be re-submitted for the Senate's advice and consent."

Will you comply with this language?

Answer. Yes. The Administration has consistently stated that it expects any agreement containing binding targets and timetables to be sent to the Senate for advice and consent to ratification.

Question. The report language also stated, “the Committee expects the State Department negotiating delegation to insist that at least 6 months be provided for study of final negotiating text of any proposed protocol or amendment to the FCCC." Will you comply with this language and provide such a period for analysis before making a recommendation on the Agreement?

Answer. Provisions in the Framework Convention on Climate Change address the concern implicit in your question. The Convention's Article 15 (for amendments) and Article 17 (for protocols) require that the text of a "proposed" amendment or protocol be communicated to the Parties at least six months before the meeting at which it is proposed for adoption. We anticipate that the Secretariat will comply with this requirement, and the State Department will provide any such text to the Congress when it is available. It is important to note, however, that the Convention does not require that the "final" text of a protocol or amendment be made available six months prior to adoption; it is contemplated that negotiation will take place on any proposed text before its adoption.

Question. China, India, and other developing nations will be some of the U.S.'s major economic competitors in the 21st Century, yet will be unevenly impacted by the Agreement. As the agreements currently are structured, in effect, the U.S. will be paying to off set these countries' emissions.

Will you recommend that the President sign an agreement that is structured to exempt such countries from the same commitments the U.S. economy will be facing? Answer. The Administration anticipates that all nations, including developing nations, will participate in a global effort to address the threat of global climate change in the post-2000 period. The Berlin Mandate-the charter for the current round of negotiations envisions that this effort will include, for developed country Parties, setting quantified emissions limitation and reduction objectives within specified timeframes. For developing country Parties, the Berlin Mandate provides that there will be no new commitments in this round but that all Parties, including developing country Parties, will reaffirm their existing_commitments and continue to advance the implementation of those commitments. These include existing commitments to formulate and implement national and regional programs containing measures to mitigatge climate change. This approach is consistent with the common but differentiated responsibilities and capabilities of all Parties under the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change, to which the Senate gave its advice and consent in October 1992.

Accordingly, the Administration believes that the United States should not sign an agreement that excludes specific provisions dealing with the continuing efforts of developments countries to advance the implementation of their existing commit

ments. However, we anticipate that these provisions will be different from those that will apply to developed country Parties.

Question. Please provide a list of all the Developing Country Parties to the Framework Convention on Climate Change that were granted an exemption from any new commitments by the Berlin Mandate Decision of March 1995 and identify those that are significant trading partners of the U.S.

Answer. A list of all current Parties to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change is attached. All Parties not listed in Annex I to the Convention, or that have not since indicated that they intend to be bound by Convention provisions chat apply to Annex I Parties, are considered "developing country Parties." Of those countries, U.S. merchandise trade is most significant with [the top 10 in rank order, based on 1995 statistics of imports and exports]: Mexico, China, Korea, Brazil, Venezuela, Saudi Arabia, Indonesia, Colombia, Argentina aid Egypt.

STATUS OF RATIFICATION OF THE UNITED NATIONS FRAMEWORK
CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE

Question. What provision of the Convention authorized the first Conference of the Parties to grant by decision an exemption to more than a majority of the Convention's Parties from any new commitments in establishing a new subsidiary body and a process for a new protocol or another legal instrument?

Answer. Article 7.2(a) of the Convention gives the Conference of the Parties responsibilities in reviewing the effectiveness and implementation of the Convention. The Conference of the Parties is authorized to "[p]eriodically examine the obligations of the Parties and the institutional arrangements under the Convention, in light of the objective of the Convention, the experience gained in its implementation and the evolution of scientific and technical knowledge." Article 7.2(m) authorizes the Conference of the Parties to "exercise such other functions as are required for the achievement of the objective of the Convention. * * *" This would include the authority to carry out negotiations of a new legal instrument, which is contemplated in both Article 15 (Amendments to the Convention) and Article 17 (Protocols). In negotiating that instrument, the Parties to the Convention may determine what obligations should be imposed on the Parties. In this context, it should also be borne in mind that Article 4(2)(d) of the Convention provides that the "Conference of the Parties shall, at its first session, review the adequacy" of commitments made by developed country Parties under Article 4.2(a) and 4.2(b).

Question. Does the Berlin Mandate process, including the exemption, automatically expire at COP3 in Kyoto unless extended by the Parties at COP3?

Answer. The Berlin Mandate anticipates that the Parties will adopt a new legal instrument at their Third Conference (COP3), now scheduled for December 1997 in Kyoto. Assuming that the Parties adopt such a new legal instrument in Kyoto, the Berlin Mandate would expire at COP3.

Question. Will the Administration assure this Committee that it will not agree to any extension of the Berlin Mandate decision or process and/or the exemption at or before COP3?

Answer. As noted, the Berlin Mandate anticipates that the Parties will adopt a new legal instrument at COP3. If the Parties are close to agreement at COP3 but indicate that a period of additional time would be required to reach closure, the Administration would not oppose such an effort.

Question. When the Senate was asked to ratify the Convention, did the President or the State Department advise the Senate that the Convention authorized the Conference of the Parties to grant such exemptions?

Answer. Article 3 of the Convention (Principles) provides in pertinent part, that "the developed country Parties should take the lead in combating climate change. ****" I understand that, when the Bush Administration transmitted the Convention to the Senate for advice and consent in 1992, it made clear that the instrument applied certain important obligations in Article 4 only to developed country Parties. As noted elsewhere in this response, this Administration anticipates that any new agreement containing binding targets will be submitted to the Senate for its advice and consent.

Question. What is the nature of a "decision" by the COP under the Convention? Is such a decision legally binding on the Parties, including the U.S. and the Congress, particularly the Senate?

Answer. The COP's Berlin Mandate decision is not regarded as legally binding. Question. The U.S. Non-paper of December 1996 identifies four concepts, without the important details for each concept, that "are linked" and states that "all four must be included in the legal instrument." Is it your intention if any one concept is missing, the U.S. will not agree to adoption of the instrument in Kyoto?

Answer. The four concepts in question are: (1) that the target [for emissions reductions by developed country Parties] be binding; (2) that the target focus on the medium term; (3) that there be national flexibility in implementation; and (4) that

developing countries be included in next steps [consistent with the Berlin Mandate]. The Administration's position is that all four must be included in the new legal instrument to be adopted in Kyoto in December 1997.

Question. The Non-paper states that the "United States believes it will be critical to include developing countries in next steps." It is our understanding that in December the developing Country Parties and the Chairman of the Berlin Mandate process gave no support to this fourth concept. We understand the "next steps" to mean a post-Kyoto process that could result in a second protocol or another legal instrument and that because of the exemption any instrument adopted in Kyoto will not include developing countries in a "concerted global effort" for the post-2000 period. Is that your understanding?

Answer. No, the Administration's view is that "next steps" refers to the current Berlin Mandate process, under which we anticipate that a protocol or an amendment will be adopted that includes provisions applicable to developing country Parties. Under these provisions, we anticipate that developing country Parties will reaffirm their existing commitments and agree to specific actions that "continue to advance the implementation of those commitments."

However, the agreement reached in Kyoto will represent only a milestone along a much longer path toward the Convention's ultimate objective: stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system. For this reason, the United States has also suggested that the Parties consider, in the context of the Berlin Mandate negotiations, setting the stage for further negotiations after Kyoto that will lead to a subsequent milestone along the path.

Question. Why should the U.S. agree to a protocol or another legal agreement on greenhouse gases that does not include developing countries that are U.S. Trading Partners?

Answer. In our view, the United States should not agree to a protocol or another legal agreement that does not provide for specific actions by developing countries that are U.S. trading partners. As the Administration has indicated repeatedly in the past, finding a solution to the climate change problem will require a concerted global effort. We expect that the current negotiations will lead to a new legal instrument that calls on developing country Parties to reaffirm their existing commitments and that makes specific provision for such Parties to continue to advance the implementation of those commitments.

Question. Do you agree that based on the information available to you and the Congress as of now regarding the limited progress of the U.S. in the Berlin Mandate decision process toward gaining the participation of developing countries in a "concerted global effort," it would be wise policy from the standpoint of jobs, trade, competition, economic growth, and the global environment for the Congress to insist that no binding targets, timetables or additional commitments beyond 1990 levels be agreed to in Kyoto, and link any future U.S. commitments to post-Kyoto commitments from developing countries.

Answer. We believe such an approach could lead to global gridlock as each country waited for other countries to act. Such a stalemate would ensure the continuing accumulation of greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere that peer-reviewed scientific analysis tells us will force a change in the Earth's climate system with potentially devastating consequences. Given the long atmospheric lifetime of greenhouse gases, extensive delay will prevent effective remedial action and we could be forced to cope with such consequences for generations.

In our view, the more responsible course is to work with all countries now to develop a global response adequate to avoid the significant threat of global climate change. Over time, we anticipate that thin global response will involve significantly greater efforts on the part of developing countries, particularly as their economic status changes and as new technologies lead to lower emissions of greenhouse gases. Question. I hope I am correct in my understanding that the U.S. is not contemplating economic loss or diversion payments to developing countries in return for their support for a Kyoto agreement. Is this the case? In December, the developing countries contend that a protocol or other legal instrument applicable to Annex I countries will have adverse economic impacts on many of them because a slow down in developing nations. Will the Administration assure us that it will not agree to any provision in such an instrument for developing countries that will mitigate any adverse economic impacts on developing countries?

Answer. Yes. The Administration believes that developing country concerns about economic loss must be weighed against even greater concern about the significant environmental threat all countries face from global climate change. Moreover, we do not anticipate that developing countries will face significant adverse economic consequences as the result of actions taken pursuant to a new legal instrument. In any

event, the Administration does not believe that any such provisions should be included in the new legal instrument adopted in Kyoto.

Question. Negotiations with the Japanese Government have become increasingly difficult as we seek new air cargo service and passenger carriers market expansion in Asia. I joined 55 of my colleagues in writing a March 20 letter to the President, urging the Administration to protect our air cargo rights against the threats of the Japanese to cancel seven routes operated by Federal Express. I attach a copy of this letter for your information.

Will the State Department, working in conjunction with the Department of Transportation, continue to hold Japan accountable to its commitments under the United States-Japan 1952 bilateral aviation agreement and its commitments under Memorandum of Understanding signed in 1985?

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Answer. Yes. The Department will vigorously defend our rights under existing agreements and will seek new opportunities for our carriers in Asian markets. During talks in August and again last week in Tokyo, the State and Transportation Departments made it clear to the Japanese government that the rights of our carriers, both cargo and passenger, must be respected. Japan cannot expect to gain new opportunities for its carriers unless the underlying problems stemming from a denial of our carriers' current rights are resolved.

Question. The State Department chairs bilateral negotiations and coordinates the Department of Transportation's actions with U.S. foreign policy. While your Department and the Department of Transportation have a number of statutory and regulatory tools at your disposal to help our air carriers resolve problems with foreign governments, an October 1996 GAO report noted that your Department and the Department of Transportation still face constraints in resolving these problems.

What additional statutory tools would be helpful to the State Department in helping our air carriers?

Answer. We believe the tools we currently have are adequate to protect the interests of our carriers when they have problems with foreign governments. In consultation with the Department of Transportation, we regularly assess how we can improve our effectiveness. I will report back to you if we decide that additional statutory measures would be helpful. I look forward to continuing a dialogue on the matters raised in the GAO report and on broader issues of aviation policy.

Question. On December 21, the People's Republic of China appointed a puppet "Provisional Legislature." China intends that this body shall take the place of the elected Legislative Council of Hong Kong net July 1. It is a fact that the Joint Declaration, which China signed in 1984, commits Beijing to an elected legislature for Hong Kong. This Provisional Legislature is not elected in any sense of the word; it has been selected by the dictators in Beijing. Furthermore, the Provisional Legislature includes ten members who actually lost election to the Legislative Council in the 1995 elections. The Provisional Legislature had its inaugural meeting in China, not Hong Kong, so as to avoid a legal challenge. The image of 400 people having to go across the border to appoint their friends, associates and each other to a puppet legislature, whose strings are pulled in Beijing, would be comical if it weren't so revolting. How will the United States go about supporting the duly-elected Legislative Council of Hong Kong?

Answer. The United States has long supported open, accountable, and democratic government in Hong Kong. It is an essential part of Hong Kong's successful business and political environment. The current Legislative Council, elected in 1995, was a step toward the objective of a fully-elected legislative body as provided in China's own Basic Law.

I believe China's decision to replace the current elected Legislative Council with a provisional legislature on July 1 was both unjustified and unnecessary. Beijing's decision raises questions about Hong Kong's future autonomy and China's intention to implement the commitments it has made. A provisional legislature also obviously does not reflect the representative will of the Hong Kong people. I will therefore watch closely to see what action it takes and how long it lasts.

Until July 1, Hong Kong's only constitutional legislature is the current Legislative Council. It was elected through an open, fair and representative process. Though specific transition issues must be resolved between Britain and China, we will contínue to work with the current Legislative Council, both through meetings with its members and by encouraging continuing interaction of its members with Members of Congress. I also expect to convey to Chinese leaders the importance the United States attaches to China's actions in upholding its commitments for Hong Kong, as expressed in the Joint Declaration and its own Basic Law.

Question. Does the Administration believe China has broken its commitments to Hong Kong for an elected legislature, judicial independence and autonomy?