§ 5291. (Act Oct. 3, 1913, c. 16, § 1, as amended, Act April 27, 1916, c. 93, and Act Sept. 8, 1916, c. 463, §§ 500-502, 600.) Articles dutiable, and rates of duty; schedules and free list. On and after the day following the passage of this Act, except as otherwise specially provided for in this Act, there shall be levied, collected, and paid upon all articles when imported from any foreign country into the United States or into any of its possessions (except the Philippine Islands and the islands of Guam and Tutuila) the rates of duty which are by the schedules and paragraphs of the dutiable list of this section prescribed, namely: Notes of Decisions I. Constitutionality of act.-The tariff act of 1890 was held constitutional. In re Sternbach (C. C. 1891) 45 Fed. 175. judgment affirmed Field v. Clark (1892) 12 Sup. Ct. 495, 143 U. S. 649, 36 L. Ed. 294. 2. Postal convention.-The postal convention with Canada and section 15 of the act of March 3, 1879 (section 7307, post), were not intended to affect existing tariff laws. (1881) 17 Op. Atty. Gen. 159. 3. Foreign country.-A long-continued uniform departmental practice of both state and treasury departments, now reviewed, shows the word "country" to have been interpreted to mean the locality and not the political domain itself. U. S. v. Marquardt & Co. (1915) 6 Ct. Cust. App. 168. The right to exact duty upon merchandise imported from Porto Rico prior to April 11, 1899, the date of the ratification of the treaty between the United States and Spain, was within the meaning of the tariff law. A. S. Lascelles & Co. v. U. S. (1914) 49 Ct. Cl. 382. A port in a foreign country with which the United States is at war, although in the exclusive possession and government of the military authorities of the United States, acting under the orders of the president, is a foreign port, within the meaning of the revenue laws. Fleming v. Page (1850) 50 U. S. (9 How.) 603, 13 L. Ed. 276. The Mexican port of Tampico was a foreign port when held by the army of the United States, in 1847, and goods imported thence were liable to duty, under chapter 74 of Act 1846. Id. By the conquest and military occupation of a portion of the United States by a public enemy, such portion is to be deemed a foreign country so far as respects the revenue laws. U. S. v. Rice (1819) 4 Wheat. 246, 253, 4 L. Ed. 562. 4. Canada. The revenue acts of 1799 and 1863 applied to commercial intercourse between Canada and the United States as well as to other foreign countries. U. S. v. Seventy-Eight Cases of Books (D. C. 1869) Fed. Cas. No. 16,258. Porto Rico, after its cession to the United States by the treaty with Spain, April 11, 1899, though it had not been formally embraced by Congress within the customs union of the states, was no longer "foreign country," within the Dingley tariff act of 1897. De Lima v. Bidwell (1901) 21 Sup. Ct. 743, 746, 182 U. S. 1, 45 L. Ed. 1041. The treaty with Spain by which Porto Rico was ceded to the United States became effective for tariff purposes at the beginning of April 11, 1899, on which day the ratifications were exchanged and the president's proclamation was issued, and merchandise arriving from Porto Rico at a port of entry of the United States at any time during that day was not subject to duty. Howell v. Bidwell (C. C. 1903) 124 Fed. 688. The treaty with Spain by which Porto Rico was ceded to the United States, although signed December 10, 1898, and ratified by Spain which was the last to ratify) on March 19, 1899, did not become effective for the purposes of the tariff laws until the exchange of ratifications, April 11, 1899, and all importations of merchandise arriving from Porto Rico at a port of entry of the United States prior to that date were subject to duty. The doctrine of relation has no application to the taking effect of a treaty so far as relates to its effect on individual rights. Armstrong v. Bidwell (C. C. 1903) 124 Fed. 690. 10. Articles.-What constitutes merchandise, see § 5462, post. Ships or vessels are not dutiable, eo nomine, under the tariff laws, and are not dutiable "articles," in the meaning thereof. Therefore a large pleasure yacht purchased abroad and brought to this country by an American citizen cannot be subjected to duty. The Conqueror (1897) 17 Sup. Ct. 510, 511, 166 U. S. 110, 41 L. Ed. 937, reversing decree (D. C. 1892) 49 Fed. 99. A crank shaft and steamer's shafts brought to this country from a foreign country to repair a vessel of that country lying disabled in our ports are articles imported into the country within the meaning of section 2503 of the Revised Statutes and section 2502 of the Revised Statutes as amended by the tariff act of 1883 (22 Stat. 491, 499). (1891) 20 Op. Atty. Gen. 194, affirmed (1891) 20 Op. Atty. Gen. 257. A steel shaft cannot be landed and kept on the dock of the Cunard Steamship Company in the United States, for possible use on the steamships Etruria and Umbria in case of emergency, with out payment of duty thereon. (1902) 24 Op. Atty. Gen. 533. The Secretary of the Treasury has the power to permit the transfer and delivery to the steamship Kaiser Wilhelm II of a piece of machinery known as a "screw boss," brought into the harbor of New York by a sister ship for the purpose of replacing a defective piece in the former, without exacting the payment of duty. (1899) 22 Op. Atty. Gen. 360. Articles purchased for the ship's equipment to replace articles lost or deteriorated by use are not subject to duty. U. S. v. One Hempen Cable and One Hempen Hawser (D. C. 1831) Fed Cas. No. 15,931a. An anchor and chain cable purchased abroad to be bona fide a part of the equipment of a vessel must not have been purchased under a necessity occasioned by any fault of her masters or owners in not properly equipping her originally for the voyage. Weld v. Maxwell (C. C. 1858) Fed. Cas. No. 17,374. 11. Imported. The word "importation," as used in the customs laws, is the bringing of goods into the ports of the United States for the purpose of introducing them into the commerce of the country. (1910) 28 Op. Atty. Gen. 173. It must be an article brought or carried into this country from abroad. The Conqueror (D. C. 1892) 49 Fed. 99. The word is never used with reference to shipments from domestic territory. (1912) 29 Op. Atty. Gen. 422. An article is not imported until it actually arrives at a port of entry of the United States. American Sugar Refining Co. v. Bidwell (C. C. 1903) 124 Fed. 677, 683; Arnold v. U. S. (1815) 9 Cranch, 104, 119, 3 L. Ed. 671. And it has been held that there is no importation unless the goods are landed. Kohne v. Insurance Co. of North America (C. C. 1804) Fed. Cas. No. 7,922. But a voluntary arrival at port of destination, though without breaking bulk, held to constitute an importation. The Boston (C. C. 1812) Fed. Cas. No. 1,670. The importation of merchandise is not complete while the goods remain in the custody of the officers of the customs. American Cigar Co. v. U. S. (1906) 146 Fed. 484, 77 C. C. A. 40, reversing judgment Falk v. Same (C. C. 1904) 145 Fed. 574, judgment reversed U. S. v. G. Falk & Bro. (1907) 27 Sup. Ct. 191, 204 U. S. 143, 51 L. Ed. 411. As soon as imported merchandise subject to duty has been entered into the country, duties become due on same, whether the entry is surreptitious or honest. U. S. v. Ehrgott (C. C. 1910) 182 Fed. 267. Goods brought by superior force into the country are not deemed to be so imported, in the sense of the law, as necessarily to attach the right to du ties. If, however, such goods are afterwards sold in the country, or incorporated into the general mass of its property, they become liable to the payment of duties. The Concord (1815) 9 Cranch, 387, 388, 3 L. Ed. 768. An involuntary coming into port by stress of weather held not an "importation" of cargo contrary to the embargo laws. The Mary (C. C. 1812) Fed. Cas. No. 9,183. 12. Prize goods.-See notes under § 5760, post. 13. Merchandise defined.-See § 5462, post, and notes. 14. Accrual of duties on prohibited goods. No duties can accrue on an importation of prohibited goods. They are forfeited by the act of importation. McLane v. U. S. (1832) 31 U. S. (6 Pet.) 404, 8 L. Ed. 443. The Treasury Department is not required by the statutes to levy and collect duty or its equivalent on goods the importation of which is specifically and absolutely prohibited. (1903) 24 Op. Atty. Gen. 556. 15. Rules for construction of tariff laws-In general.-In the presence of clear and explicit enactment, canons of construction have no application. Godellot & Co. v. U. S. (1912) 2 Ct. Cust. App. 408. All statutes are to be construed so as to sustain rather than to ignore or defeat their purpose; to give them a field of operation, if the language will permit, rather than to treat them as meaningless. M. H. Pulaski Co. v. U. S. (1915) 6 Ct. Cust. App. 291. It will be presumed that the Congress will not do a vain thing; that it intends its acts and every part of them to be held valid and as capable of being given effect. Id. An importer is entitled to the benefit of the rule that revenue laws imposing taxes and like burdens should receive a reasonably strict construction. U. S. v. Matagrin (1911) 1 Ct. Cust. App. 309. Any provision of a law must be read in the light of all the other provisions of that law, and in a tariff law the language used must be interpreted in view of the conditions of commerce existing when the statute was enacted. U. S. v. Marsching (1911) 1 Ct. Cust. App. 216. The exception of a particular thing from the operation of the general words of a statute shows that in the opinion of the lawmaker the thing excepted would be within the general words had not the exception been made. But a proviso is not to be so construed as to make it plainly repugnant to the body of the section it limits. M. H. Pulaski Co. v. U. S. (1915) 6 Ct. Cust. App. 291. The principle is recognized that, when it clearly appears from the language and context of a proviso it is intended to apply to other subjects than those stated in the paragraph of which it is a part or that it is intended to apply generally to other parts of an act, the proviso must, so far as possible, be given full effect; but this principle will not be applied ex industria to bring an article within the operation of the proviso. U. S. v. Harper (1911) 2 Ct. Cust. App. 101. The general doctrine regarding the assessment of duties is that they can be levied upon such articles only as are made dutiable by Congress and are actually imported into the United States. Stone v. Shallus (1906) 143 Fed. 486, 74 C. C. A. 506, affirming judgment (C. C. 1905) 137 Fed. 674. The provisions in a tariff act are designed for the future as well as for the present, and cover all importations which the definitions fit. Klots v. U. S. (1905) 139 Fed. 606, 71 C. C. A. 590, affirming judgment (C. C. 1904) U. S. v. Klotz (C. C. 1904) 133 Fed. 808. In custom laws, as in all others, the intent of the lawmakers is the law. (1887) 18 Op. Atty. Gen. 533. The court in construing tariff laws will seek to conform to the intent of Congress, though such construction may involve a change or modification of the exact language of the statute. In re Chase (C. C. 1892) 48 Fed. 630, 631, reversed U. S. v. Hopewell (1892) 51 Fed. 798, 2 C. C. A. 510. Statutes levying duties are not to be extended by implication beyond the clear import of the language used. Adams v. Bancroft (C. C. 1838) Fed. Cas. No. 44; U. S. v. Wigglesworth (C. C. 1842) Fed. Cas. No. 16,690. An article is provided for in a revenue law when it is aptly described as well as when it is named. Faxon v. Russell (C. C. 1876) Fed. Cas. No. 4,707. Where two terms of description are differentiated in a statute and in another paragraph one of these terms is employed, its use here must be taken to be confined to the single subject matter expressed, exclusive of the other. Goat & Sheepskin Import Co. v. U. S. (1914) 5 Ct. Cust. App. 178. An article coming within two or more of the descriptions contained in a schedule must be assigned to the earlier one. Bogle v. Magone (1894) 14 Sup. Ct. 718, 152 U. S. 623, 38 L. Ed. 574. The fact that articles in separate parts are invoiced as entire ties is not controlling, and will not prevent a separate classification, when such classification is otherwise proper. In re Crowley (1893) 55 Fed. 283, 5 C. C. A. 109, affirming (C. C. 1892) 50 Fed. 465. Where a clause of the tariff act clearly covers an article in question, statements contained in the report of a senate committee on the act cannot be considered to show an inferential intent to place it under another clause. In re Downing (1893) 56 Fed. 470, 5 C. C. A. 575. The fact that inconsistency in duties may result is not adequate ground for holding that Congress meant the opposite from what it said. Horrax v. U. S. (1909) 167 Fed. 526, 93 C. C. A. 22. Where a general tariff provision prescribes an additional duty capable of application to all of several articles enumerated in another provision, it should be applied to all, even though it may operate unequally. U. S. v. George Nash & Co. (1907) 158 Fed. 401, 85 C. C. A. 511, reversing judgment George Nash & Co. v. U. S. (C. C. 1907) 152 Fed. 573. A declaration that certain duties and rates of duty should be imposed upon certain imports in lieu of the duties heretofore imposed, held tantamount to a repeal of the prior rates of duty. Gossler v. Goodrich (C. C. 1867) Fed. Cas. No. 5,631. A law imposing a duty on articles used for a particular purpose should not be construed to cover articles not so used at the date of the act, unless expressly so provided. Martin v. Curtis (C. C. 1842) Fed. Cas. No. 9,160. Where an enumeration has been continued from one tariff act to another, it must be assumed that the legislative body had in contemplation some article of commerce intended to be covered by that enumeration. Kwong Yuen Shing v. U. S. (C. C. 1909) 175 Fed. 317. One of the surest methods of interpreting a provision in a tariff law is by its past history. Atty. Gen. 541. (1897) 21 Op. The fact that at the date of the passage of the act (R. S. § 2504, Schedule A) goods of the kind in question had not been manufactured will not withdraw them from the class to which they belong as described in the statute, where the language used fairly and clearly includes them. Newman v. Arthur (1883) 3 Sup. Ct. 88, 109 U. S. 132, 27 L. Ed. 883. 16. Commercial or technical sense. The commercial designation of an article when clearly established, and shown to have been definite, uniform, and general, will control, in the construction of a tariff statute. Elliott v. Swartwout (1836) 10 Pet. 137, 151, 9 L. Ed. 373; Curtis v. Martin (1845) 3 How. 106, 108, 11 L. Ed. 516; Arthur v. Morrison (1877) 96 U. S. 108, 110, 24 L. Ed. 764; Same v. Lahey (1877) 96 U. S. 112, 113, 118, 24 L. Ed. 766; Robertson V. Salomon (1889) 9 Sup. Ct. 559, 560, 130 U. S. 412, 32 L. Ed. 995; Hedden v. Richard (1893) 13 Sup. Ct. 891, 149 U. S. 346, 37 L. Ed. 763 (reversing judgment Richard v. Hedden [C. C. 1890] 42 Fed. 672); Maddock v. Magone (1894) 14 Sup. Ct. 588, 589, 152 U. S. 368, 38 L. Ed. 482 (af firming judgment [C. C. 1890] 41 Fed. 882); Lutz v. Same (1894) 14 Sup. Ct. 777, 778, 153 U. S. 105, 38 L. Ed. 651; Sonn v. Same (1895) 159 U. S. 417, 16 Sup. Ct. 67, 40 L. Ed. 203; U. S. v. Buffalo Natural Gas Fuel Co. (1899) 19 Sup. Ct. 200, 172 U. S. 339, 43 L. Ed. 469; Same v. Wotton (1892) 53 Fed. 344, 346, 3 C. C. A. 553; Same v. Roessler & Hasslacher Chemical Co. (1897) 79 Fed. 313, 24 C. C. A. 604 (affirming judgment Roessler & Hasslacher Chemical Co. v. U. S. [C. C. 1896] 71 Fed. 957); Same v. Wo On & Co. (1909) 167 Fed. 314, 92 C. C. A. 626; Same v. Buffalo Natural Gas Fuel Co. (1897) 78 Fed. 110, 24 C. C. A. 4 (affirming judgment In re Buffalo Natural Gas Fuel Co. [C. C. 1896] 73 Fed. 191, judgment affirmed U. S. v. Buffalo Natural Gas Fuel Co. [1899] 19 Sup. Ct. 200, 172 U. S. 339, 43 L. Ed. 469). Same v. Breed (C. C. 1832) Fed. Cas. No. 14,638; May v. Simmons (C. C. 1880) 4 Fed. 499; Kennedy v. Hartranft (C. C. 1881) 9 Fed. 18; Dodge v. Hedden (C. C. 1889) 42 Fed. 446; May v. Simmons (C. C. 1880) 4 Fed. 499; Ross v. Fuller (C. C. 1883) 17 Fed. 224; McCoy v. Hedden (C. C. 1889) 38 Fed. 89; Fox v. Cadwalader (C. C. 1889) 42 Fed. 209; "Zante Currants" (C. C. 1896) 73 Fed. 183; In re Wieland (C. C. 1899) 98 Fed. 99; In re John Hope & Sons Engraving & Manufacturing Co. (C. C. 1900) 100 Fed. 286; Nordlinger v. U. S. (C. C. 1902) 115 Fed. 828 (judgment reversed U. S. v. Nordlinger [1903] 121 Fed. 690, 58 C. C. A. 438, writ of certiorari denied Nordlinger v. U. S. [1903] 24 Sup. Ct. 848, 191 U. S. 575, 48 L. Ed. 308); U. S. v. Burlington Venetian Blind Co. (1912) 3 Ct. Cust. App. 378; Goat & Sheepskin Import Co. v. U. S. (1914) 5 Ct. Cust. App. 178; (1887) 18 Op. Atty. Gen. 533. The commercial signification will always be understood to have the same meaning in commerce as it has in the community at large unless the contrary is shown. Schmeider v. Barney (1885) 5 Sup. Ct. 624, 113 U. S. 645, 28 L. Ed. 1130. And terms which had no commercial meaning at the time they were used in a tariff statute must be construed in accordance with their plain, natural meaning. Tiffany v. U. S. (C. C. 1900) 103 Fed. 619. The commercial meaning is to be determined at the time the act was passed. U. S. v. One Hundred and Twelve Casks Sugar (1834) 33 U. S. (8 Pet.) 277, 8 L. Ed. 944; Curtis v. Martin (1845) 44 U. S. (3 How.) 106, 11 L. Ed. 516; Arthur v. Morrison (1877) 96 U. S. 108, 24 L. Ed. 764; Same v. Lahey (1877) 96 U. S. 112, 24 L. Ed. 766; Same v. Davies (1877) 96 U. S. 135, 24 L. Ed. 810; Sonn v. Magone (1895) 16 Sup. Ct. 67, 69, 159 U. S. 417, 40 L. Ed. 203; Lawrence Johnson & Co. v. U. S. (1908) 166 Fed. 728, 92 C. C. A. 418 (affirming judgment [C. C. 1907] 159 Fed. 189, and writ of certiorari denied [1909] 29 Sup. Ct. 694, 214 U. S. 511, 53 L. Ed. 1062); Bacon v. Bancroft (C. C. 1840) Fed. Cas. No. 714; Hadden v. Hoyt (C. C. 1840) Fed. Cas. No. 5,891; Hall v. Same (C. C. 1840) Fed. Cas. No. 5,934; Lee v. Lincoln (C. C. 1841) Fed. Cas. No. 8.195; Roosevelt v. Maxwell (C. C. 1856) Fed. Cas. No. 12,034; Jaffray v. Murphy (C. C. 1874) Fed. Cas. No. 7,172; Hutton v. Schell (C. C. 1879) Fed. Cas. No. 6.962; May v. Simmons (C. C. 1880) 4 Fed. 499; Ross v. Fuller (C. C. 1883) 17 Fed. 224; McCoy v. Hedden (C. C. 1889) 38 Fed. 89; Fox v. Cadwalder (C. C. 1889) 42 Fed. 209; "Zante Currants" (C. C. 1896) 73 Fed. 183; U. S. v. Sarchet (D. C. 1832) Fed. Cas. No. 16,224; Beatty's Ex'r v. U. S. (1856) Dev. Ct. Cl. § 244. But a term having a commercial signification is not controlling in the classification of the article where a different intent is inferable from the context. Roosevelt v. Maxwell (C. C. 1856) Fed. Cas. No. 12,034; In re Salomon (C. C. 1891) 48 Fed. 287; Hahn v. U. S. (C. C. 1903) 131 Fed. 1000, judgment affirmed U. S. v. Hahn (1904) 135 Fed. 349, 68 C. C. A. 130. The commercial designation is of first importance, and, if that fails to give the article its proper classification, resort must be had to the common designation. Robertson V. Salomon (1888) 130 U. S. 412, 9 Sup. Ct. 559, 32 L. Ed. 995. In tariff laws, words of classification are, in general, to be construed either in their common or their commercial meaning, as opposed to their scientific or technical sense. U. S. v. Buffalo Natural Gas Fuel Co. (1897) 78 Fed. 110, 24 C. C. A. 4, affirming judgment In re Buffalo Natural Gas Fuel Co. (C. C. 1896) 73 Fed. 191, judgment affirmed U. S. v. Buffalo Natural Gas Fuel Co. (1899) 19 Sup. Ct. 200, 172 U. S. 339, 43 L. Ed. 469. The commercial signification of a name is that which those engaged in foreign and domestic sale, purchase, and exchange generally adopt to describe the article. (1887) 18 Op. Atty. Gen. 533. To fix and limit a phrase to a simple commercial meaning, it is necessary to show not alone that this phrase is improperly employed in describing a given commodity, but at the same time to show it is employed definitely and uniformly in the United States to describe another and different commodity. Acker v. U. S. (1911) 1 Ct. Cust. App. 328. In the construction of tariff acts there is no rule whereby words used therein are to be interpreted according to the technical understanding of manufactur nating a special group of articles, although each article in the group is always bought and sold by its specific name, and no articles are bought and sold by the group designation. In re Herrman (C. C. 1892) 52 Fed. 941, judgment affirmed (C. C. 1893) 56 Fed. 477, 5 C. C. A. 582. Where Congress provides that the rate of duty on any commodity shall be regulated by an ascertainment of the percentage of a particular grade of that commodity, present in some aggregation of its different grades, which aggregation is not defined, such aggregation is the one recognized in the commercial world as the standard. In re Blumlein (1893) 55 Fed. 383, 386, 5 C. C. A. 142. Usage sufficient to establish a commercial designation which will control the meaning of words in a tariff act cannot be made out by the evidence of one dealer, whose testimony is practically limited to his own usage, especially when he admits that the articles are sometimes bought and sold under other names. Berbecker v. Robertson (1894) 152 U. S. 373, 14 Sup. Ct. 590, 38 L. Ed. 484. In order to determine the commercial meaning of a term in tariff acts, it is not the meaning used in transactions between the retail dealer on the one side and the individual purchaser at retail on the other that is to be considered; but the meaning used between parties who are, on both sides of the transaction, engaged in that particular occupation as the business of their lives. Morrison v. Miller (C. C. 1888) 37 Fed. 82. Where terms employed in the tariff laws have a special restricted meaning, according to the general usage of the trade to which the articles appertain, it is to be presumed that congress used them in such restricted sense; but the fact that they have such restricted meaning must be clearly established, otherwise they are to be interpreted according to their common popular signification. Hedden v. Richard (1893) 13 Sup. Ct. 891, 149 U. S. 346, 37 L. Ed. 763 (reversing judgment Richard v. Hedden [C. C. 1890] 42 Fed. 672); Kennedy v. Hartranft (C. C. 1881) 9 Fed. 18. The commercial designation of an article among traders and importers when clearly established fixes its character for the purpose of tariff laws, but the commercial meaning cannot be ascertained by a resort solely to the understanding of importers, but resort must be had to the manufacturer, jobber, retail merchant, and trader of every description as well as the importer. Erhardt v. Ballin (1893) 55 Fed. 968, 969, 5 C. C. A. 363. Where an article has been so advanced by separate processes as to be adapted for a special purpose different from the original purpose, and to be sold to a different class of persons, and |