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The memorandum of understanding is providing an important vehicle for reuniting refugee families. I am concerned, however, that the agreement does not cover the release of political prisoners and special humanitarian cases. I hope our Government is making every effort in this direction.

Since Castro's coming to power in January of 1959, some 275,000 Cubans have been given asylum in the United States. The influx was small in the early days of the Castro regime, but rapidly increased as the Cuban revolution gained momentum and its Communist, totalitarian character emerged. For nearly 2 years, beginning in late 1960, the arrivals in Miami numbered some 1,500 to 2,000 persons weekly. The flow was hampered only by the rupture in Cuban-American relations and the restrictions imposed by the Cuban Government.

This Cuban exodus ended abruptly during the missile crisis in October 1962. Those who did enter the United States during the next 3 years included several hundred refugees who departed their homeland on ships returning to the United States, following the delivery of medical supplies in connection with the agreement on prisoners. Others have come via third countries, chiefly Mexico and Spain. Still others have fled, and continue to flee, under adverse and hazardous conditions, using small boats and the waters between Cuba and the United States as their means to freedom.

The American people, especially the citizens of Miami and Dade County, Fla., have responded generously to the needs of the Cubans. To assist this effort, in January of 1961, President Kennedy established the Cuban refugee program. The goal of this program has been the resettlement of refugees throughout our 50 States-for resettlement provides most Cubans with the opportunity to live reasonably normal and productive lives, until conditions permit an assisted return to their homeland, or for those who wish it, to elect American citizenship. I should add, that the private voluntary agencies are providing the essential links between the program of Government and the humans in need.

The Cuban refugee problem has been a major concern of this subcommittee for the last 5 years. The subcommittee has conducted intensive inquiries into the operation of the refugee program, and has made a number of specific recommendations which have, in large part, been carried out by officials in the executive branch. Today's hearing and those which follow are prompted by the new influx of refugees.

We are interested in the background, operation, and significance of the memorandum of understanding, and its effect on Cuban-American relations. We are interested in conditions in Cuba which lead to the exodus of so many of its citizens. There is every reason to believe that the conditions for the Cuban people are worsening. The economy is chaotic, and the Government's totalitarian techniques against the people are being intensified daily.

We are interested in the stability of the Castro government, and its ability to export subversion and revolution to the countries of this hemisphere, which in turn may confront the American States with new refugee problems.

We are interested in the effectiveness of the Cuban refugee program and the resettlement experience of refugees throughout the country

and for this purpose the subcommittee will travel to New York and a number of other cities to investigate the resettlement program.

Of special concern to the subcommittee are a number of issues reflected in the mail to Members of Congress. These issues include the number of Cubans on public welfare rolls, the impact of refugees in the labor market, alleged security problems, and incidents of crime and drug peddling involving Cuban nationals.

Perhaps a less dramatic, but a most important issue, concerns the inability of most Cubans to practice their profession or skill, and to maximize their contributions to our society, because of their immigration status as parolees rather than permanent residents. The talents of many doctors, nurses, teachers, lawyers, skilled workers, barbers, and others, are going to waste because of their present immigration status. I strongly believe that a formula is urgently needed to adjust their status, and have cosponsored a bill in the Senate for that purpose. The subcommittee anticipates filing a report of its findings and recommendations following the conclusion of this inquiry.

The first witness this morning is Mr. Robert M. Sayre, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs. Mr. Sayre, I know that you are accompanied by Mr. Robert A. Stevenson, Coordinator of Cuban Affairs.

STATEMENT OF ROBERT M. SAYRE, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INTER-AMERICAN AFFAIRS; ACCOMPANIED BY ROBERT A. STEVENSON, COORDINATOR OF CUBAN AFFAIRS Mr. SAYRE. Yes, Mr. Robert A Stevenson is on my left. He is the Coordinator of Cuban Affairs. Mr. Chairman, I would like to submit this statement for the record. I would like to run over a few of the high points briefly to bring them especially to the attention of the subcommittee.

I am grateful for this opportunity to review with you the latest developments with regard to the movement of Cuban refugees to the United States and to comment on other aspects of the Cuban scene which I believe will be of interest.

The present movement of refugees by U.S. Government chartered aircraft from Varadero, Cuba, to the Miami International Airport which began on December 1, 1965, is in response to President Johnson's declaration included in his remarks at the Statue of Liberty on October 3, 1965, on the occasion of the signing of the new immigration bill in which he said in part:

But those who come will come because of what they are not because of the land from which they spring-it is in that spirit that I declare to the people of Cuba that those who seek refuge here will find it.

The dedication of America to our traditions as an asylum for the oppressed will be upheld. I have directed the Departments of State, Justice, and Health, Education, and Welfare to make all necessary arrangements to permit those in Cuba who seek freedom to make an orderly entry into the United States.

Our first concern will be with those Cubans who have been separated from children, parents, and husbands and wives now in this country. Our next concern is with those who are imprisoned for political reasons.

A few days earlier, on September 28, and again on September 30, the Prime Minister of Cuba, Fidel Castro, had declared that Cuban

citizens who might desire to join their families in the United States, or others who simply wished to live in the United States, would be permitted to leave Cuba.

On October 4, 1965, the Swiss Embassy in Havana, which represents U.S. interests in Cuba, was requested to inform the GOC (Government of Cuba) official of the U.S. position as stated by the President, and on October 5, 1965, the GOC in a diplomatic note addressed to the Swiss Embassy indicated its willingness to discuss arrangements which would permit an orderly movement to the United States.

On October 8, a detailed proposal was made to the GOC in which the principal suggestions were a system of priority categories, a movement of between 3,000 and 4,000 per month, transportation to be provided by the U.S. Government, and the inclusion of persons imprisoned in Cuba for offenses of a political nature. The GOC replied on October 12, 1965, indicating a willingness to move toward an official understanding along the lines proposed by the United States with the exception of political prisoners and with the added exception that free departure would not be granted to young Cubans between the ages of 15 and 26 "who, under Cuban law, are subject to the first call for compulsory military service."

Negotiations continued in the course of which the Swiss Ambassador in Havana, Mr. Emil Stadelhofer, traveled to Washington on October 23 for a brief meeting with representatives of the State Department, HEW, and Justice. The successful culmination of this effort was the memorandum of understanding made effective on November 6, 1965, by an exchange of notes in Havana between the Embassy of Switzerland in its capacity as representative of the interests of the United States in Cuba and the GOC. (The full text of the memorandum is printed in the appendix.)

While arrangements for chartering aircraft were being made by the Transportation Office of the Department of State working through the Military Air Transport Service, arrangements were also made to charter vessels to bring to the United States from the small Cuban port of Camarioca those persons who were gathered there on the date the memorandum became effective.

This Camarioca movement resulted from Prime Minister Castro's offer to let Cubans in the United States come by small boat to this port and pick up their relatives and families-despite United States objections because of the danger which this presented for the Cubans and those who came to get them. As a result in the period roughly from September 30 to November 30 some 159 small craft of every description succeeded in making this dangerous crossing and returning to the United States with some 2,866 persons.

Had it not been for an extraordinary and all-out effort of the United States Coast Guard in patrolling the Florida Straits and in shepherding these vessels many lives would have been lost.

On several occasions the Coast Guard cutters rescued people already in the water and from craft on the verge of foundering. As a humanitarian gesture, and considering that the GOC had closed the port of Camarioca to new departures, the United States Coast Guard picked up and transported to Key West the remaining 1,970 persons.

Both the sea movement from Camarioca and the airlift which began on December 1 were financed in accordance with a Presidential deter

mination issued on November 10, 1965 authorizing $750,000 to be utilized for this purpose in fiscal year 1966.

This authorization was pursuant to section 2(c) of the Migration and Refugee Assistance Act of 1962 and the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended. Various United States airlines were interested in participating in the airlift, and seven companies have done so. The flight schedule calls for two flights per day Monday through Friday. The airline companies have performed admirably and efficiently. On only one day, due to engine trouble, were the flights canceled. Extra flights were added on each of the two following days to keep the movement on schedule. At the beginning of the movement there were a few delays and difficulties of an administrative nature, but we think it fair to say that for many weeks now it has been a smoothly functioning operation.

The Embassy of Switzerland on the Cuban end has made a fine contribution to this success and merits great credit for its very hard work and dedication.

I understand that representatives from the Departments of Justice and HEW will also testify before this committee and will, I am sure, describe the handling procedures and processing of the refugees. In the month of December, 3,351 persons arrived on these flights; in January, 3,464; in February, 4,031 and in March, to the eleventh, 1,594.

The movement continues to be of persons in the first priority category, that is, "immediate relatives" of persons now living in the United States, and appears likely to remain so for several more months. At the time it becomes possible to consider the movement of persons other than the first priority category, in accordance with paragraphs 8 and 9 of the memorandum of understanding, it is our hope that it will be possible to give first consideration to relatives of American citizens in accordance with the system of preferences which has been more or less traditional in our immigration laws.

With regard to the possibility that some Cuban refugees might be received by other countries in this hemisphere, we have make known to the COAS on two occasions our interest in this subject.

On February 12, 1966, the first response came when 106 refugees destined to join relatives in Costa Rica were brought to Miami by an extra flight of the regular airlift plane.

The arrangements for their onward transportation to San Jose, including the cost, were made in Costa Rica. În arranging this movement the good offices of the Swiss Ambassador were an essential factor.

At the moment similar movements to two other countries are in the planning stage and we are optimistic that they will ultimately be realized.

INTERNAL SITUATION IN CUBA

It is our expectation that the refugee movement will continue for the foreseeable future. The number of Cubans who wish to leave is clearly in the hundreds of thousands. In view of the gray, bleak situation inside Cuba, it is not surprising that Cubans from all walks of life have left the island since the airlift began.

As problems press from all sides, and as life in Cuba becomes more closed and unattractive, frustrations and apathy increase.

citizens who might desire to join their families in the United States, or others who simply wished to live in the United States, would be permitted to leave Cuba.

On October 4, 1965, the Swiss Embassy in Havana, which represents U.S. interests in Cuba, was requested to inform the GOC (Government of Cuba) official of the U.S. position as stated by the President, and on October 5, 1965, the GOC in a diplomatic note addressed to the Swiss Embassy indicated its willingness to discuss arrangements which would permit an orderly movement to the United States.

On October 8, a detailed proposal was made to the GOC in which the principal suggestions were a system of priority categories, a movement of between 3,000 and 4,000 per month, transportation to be provided by the U.S. Government, and the inclusion of persons imprisoned in Cuba for offenses of a political nature. The GOC replied on October 12, 1965, indicating a willingness to move toward an official understanding along the lines proposed by the United States with the exception of political prisoners and with the added exception that free departure would not be granted to young Cubans between the ages of 15 and 26 "who, under Cuban law, are subject to the first call for compulsory military service."

Negotiations continued in the course of which the Swiss Ambassador in Havana, Mr. Emil Stadelhofer, traveled to Washington on October 23 for a brief meeting with representatives of the State Department, HEW, and Justice. The successful culmination of this effort was the memorandum of understanding made effective on November 6, 1965, by an exchange of notes in Havana between the Embassy of Switzerland in its capacity as representative of the interests of the United States in Cuba and the GOC. (The full text of the memorandum is printed in the appendix.)

While arrangements for chartering aircraft were being made by the Transportation Office of the Department of State working through the Military Air Transport Service, arrangements were also made to charter vessels to bring to the United States from the small Cuban port of Camarioca those persons who were gathered there on the date the memorandum became effective.

This Camarioca movement resulted from Prime Minister Castro's offer to let Cubans in the United States come by small boat to this port and pick up their relatives and families-despite United States objections because of the danger which this presented for the Cubans and those who came to get them. As a result in the period roughly from September 30 to November 30 some 159 small craft of every description succeeded in making this dangerous crossing and returning to the United States with some 2,866 persons.

Had it not been for an extraordinary and all-out effort of the United States Coast Guard in patrolling the Florida Straits and in shepherding these vessels many lives would have been lost.

On several occasions the Coast Guard cutters rescued people already in the water and from craft on the verge of foundering. As a humanitarian gesture, and considering that the GOC had closed the port of Camarioca to new departures, the United States Coast Guard picked up and transported to Key West the remaining 1,970 persons.

Both the sea movement from Camarioca and the airlift which began on December 1 were financed in accordance with a Presidential deter

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