not to operate them, it is not to set up the rules under which they will be operated.

Senator MONRONEY. This Board gets into gear then with your Civil Aeronautics Administration, as it must by then. In other words, supposing they decide to develop this new type of homing device or landing, instrument landing system, how do they coordinate with CAA, the Administrator, who must come to the Congress and ask for the money in his budget to buy all this stuff.

Mr. ROTHSCHILD. May I give you a specific example?

Senator MONRONEY. Sure.

Mr. ROTHSCHILD. Let's suppose there is a need for a helicopter navigation device. Let's suppose that there are

The CHAIRMAN. You don't need it from the White House to the airport?

Mr. ROTHSCHILD. And some other places. [Laughter.] And let's suppose that there are several possibilities right now, as always there are, people have been thinking about these things for some time, and some scientists have been developing some ideas, some of which are good, some of which are extra good, and some of which may not be very good.

Each one in the past has sold his idea to one element or another of the Government, and then there has been a wrangle of some kind as to whether or not a device or a concept would do the job.

Now, with this Board, the Board would look at all of this stuff in the field, knowing what the requirement was, say this 1 or these 2 appear to have the greatest possibilities, we will develop these, and once having developed 1 or 2 of them, then they will be available for use by the military and civil elements that use facilities of this type. But we don't want dozens of them scattered around any more. The CHAIRMAN. But we have adopted TACAN, now, haven't we? Mr. ROTHSCHILD. Yes; but that is only one short range navigational element, Mr. Chairman, and we need plenty of other things in this picture.

The CHAIRMAN. I merely want to place in the record to show how important it is that we do something to straighten this thing out. We held one of the first hearings on the VOR/DME-TACAN controversy and Lee was CAA and he later was removed.

The committee reported a resolution and we have the resolution, but there was spent in VOR/DME ground and air installations from private sources $30 million and Government $85 million, a total of $116 million, in the meantime the military was going ahead with commitments by the military for acquisition and development of TACAN to the tune of $320 million.

Mr. ROTHSCHILD. And I believe, Mr. Chairman, that all of that is usable except for the $10 million expenditure that was on DME.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, I don't think-I think the waste-I have been very conservative. I think we lost, to be exact, my best figures, $87 billion on this whole controversy and this whole deal.

I think my figures are correct.

Mr. ROTHSCHILD. I think the only part

The CHAIRMAN. With the private investments and the land acquisition which was not included in some of this, and all those things, I think we are close to between $80 and $87 million, and that was conservative, that was thrown right out the window.

Now, we have the $320 million in TACAN, that is true.

But you testified yourself in 1955, we are going back beyond the period of consistency here now.

[Laughter.]

The cost of developing, the Navy, in charge of TACAN and development for Defense, informed the committee the total of $9,940,000 was spent for research and development.

That would be what this group would now do?

Mr. ROTHSCHILD. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN (reading):

A total of $165,506,000 has been spent for production of equipment for this system exclusive of installation costs

that is in 1955.

In addition the military spent $14 million—

Now, this is the military in the act—

645,000 for VOR ground stations, exclusive of installation costs, and $38 million for VOR airborne equipment, and associated indicators exclusive of installations cost. The Honorable Louis S. Rothschild, Undersecretary of Commerce for Transportation, testified that for the fiscal years 1940 through 1955 or a total of 15, $44 million has been appropriated to the CAA to implement the very high frequency omnirange and distance measuring equipment portion of the so-called common system--

which is the one we were fighting about. So that adds up pretty close to these figures in 1955.

Now, some of it is being used, I know that.

Mr. ROTHSCHILD. Yes, sir. The only part that is definitely out of the picture is the DME part which represents about $10 million.

The CHAIRMAN. I will bet if I am here long enough you will be back and be telling us on the chart that VOR is now obsolete because you can all use TACAN.

Mr. ROTHSCHILD. Well, I would think, Mr. Chairman, that eventually everything we have today will be obsolete not only in this field. The CHAIRMAN. But this went on for a long time, and we are developing two systems. We have now the commercial and private airplanes who use two systems. All the testimony is that-there is no use going into that here.

It just points out the problem. All the testimony that we had and the House committee on the whole thing was that there wasn't-what is it? One-half of 1°, what is it? The difference?

Mr. PYLE. Plus or minus 1°.

The CHAIRMAN. Between the two.

Because it wouldn't work on a ship, therefore, we ought to spend all this money for TACAN. And as a matter of fact, Mr. Pyle, you represented the United States Navy on one of those boards, didn't

you?

Mr. PYLE. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes. You made those decisions. That is in here. Here is the whole thing.

James T. Pyle, United States Navy.

. Senator SCHOEPPEL. For the benefit of this record now, aren't we pursuing this thing to the point at this stage where just such a situation will be eliminated?

The CHAIRMAN. That is right. That is why I think that this is a step forward, this bill. I don't think like the Senator from Okla

homa, I think I would rather have it stronger where somebody says all right this won't reoccur, this is the decision, and you carry it out. I am like the Senator from Oklahoma, otherwise, you are going to have this same thing.

I just see these squabbles coming up again at terrific cost. This I think was dollarwise one of the worst bungles in the Government. Mr. ROTHSCHILD. To get back to my position of consistency. Mr. Chairman

The CHAIRMAN. Now, we are back to 1957; all right.

Mr. ROTHSCHILD. I advocated that the 2-man board be supplanted by a 3-man board, and I still do, sir.

Senator MONRONEY. Mr. Secretary, why couldn't this be put in as part of your Civil Aeronautics Administration? You have got these scientific groups at work, you have your supergrades, you have the vast experience on operational techniques. Now, if you need something else why can't it be a part of the Civil Aeronautics Administration?

Mr. ROTHSCHILD. How would you care for the Department of Defense's interest in this matter?

Senator MONRONEY. That is what I was wondering, if that is the reason why we are going to have to set up an entirely new agency, for the failure of the Department of Defense to feel that they can be safely taken care of on the divided use of the common airways system by the Civil Aeronautics Administration.

Mr. ROTHSCHILD. They are the single largest user of the airways. Senator MONRONEY. Couldn't you have maybe cheaper and as effective, maybe an appellate board where they could, if they felt they were being abused, that they could lay their case before a board composed of the Air Force and Navy air arm and the civil air arm?

I just wonder how much efficiency and progress you are going to develop taking this thing clear outside the realm of the operational agency that has got to run the airways.

Mr. ROTHSCHILD. Perhaps this would be a good time to say this Board is only planned to be in existence for 3 years, and in the interim there will be other organizational plans which would supersede this Board.

Senator MONRONEY. These marble buildings in Washington are filled with dozens of boards that were established on that thing. I doubt very seriously, once it is established, unless you have in mind the end result of an overall board which we today believe should be established, or I do, to merge this into, that you will not find this here in the next 20 or 30 years, this Board.

Are you going to kill out any of these air coordinating committees and the Air Traffic Control Navigation Panel, the ANDB or RTCB? Mr. ROTHSCHILD. It does kill out ANDB.

Senator MONRONEY. Any others?

Mr. ROTHSCHILD. Not at this point of Mr. Curtis' organization program, but he will have much to say on that in a few days, Senator. Senator MONRONEY. That is all, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Any further questions of Mr. Rothschild?

We will place in the record, the message of the President of the United States on this Senate bill.

MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES TRANSMITTING AN INTERIM REPORT PREPARED BY THE SPECIAL ASSISTANT FOR AVIATION FACILITIES PLANNING, DATED APRIL 1957

TO THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES:

Widespread attention has been drawn to the need for vigorous action to advance the safety and convenience of the public and military agencies engaged in air travel and air operations. On March 1, 1956, I appointed a Special Assistant for Aviation Facilities Planning, and directed him to develop comprehensive proposals for meeting the Nation's needs for air-traffic control and airnavigation facilities.

I transmit herewith an interim report prepared by my Special Assistant for Aviation Facilities Planning. This report sets forth the gravity of our present and anticipated air-traffic problems. It also proposes the establishment of an Airways Modernization Board and explains the manner in which it will function. The Director of the Bureau of the Budget is transmitting to the Congress draft legislation to establish the Airways Modernization Board. This measure will greatly expedite the improvements of air-traffic control and air navigation and I therefore urge its early enactment.

THE WHITE HOUSE, April 11, 1957.

DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER.

INTERIM REPORT OF SPECIAL ASSISTANT FOR AVIATION FACILITIES PLANNING APRIL 1957

Shortly after assuming the duties of Special Assistant for Aviation Facilities Planning last year, the facts on our air traffic in the United States began to pour into my office. The alarm which has been voiced in the past from many sources is, in fact, supported by evidence that our airways and terminals are subject to increasing congestion.

Over 65,000 aircraft hours are flown daily in the United States. We have counted, with the aid of radars, as many as 220 aircraft flying at one time in the vicinity of a major city. Many thousands of military jets mingle in the mixed traffic of our airways and serve to accept the dangers of "see and be seen" rules. The pilot needs assistance if he is to cope with the great increase in aircraft speed and if the danger of collisions is to be minimized.

The present situation is perhaps no more startling than the extraordinary growth in air traffic which the public desires and the economy will support in the future.

In 1946, only 6 billion passenger-miles were flown in the United States by the airlines. In 1956, this had mushroomed to 20 billion passenger-miles. My studies show that this figure will be approximately 70 billion in 1975. In addition, the present 61,000 private United States aircaft will exceed 100,000 in 1975.

Clearly, the safety and convenience of the public now and in the future requires more sophisticated and energetic efforts to reduce the hazard and delay in the Nation's air traffic.

The Federal Government must lead and support this effort. The present vigorous program of the Civil Aeronautics Administration to expand its existing facilities using known techniques is highly commendable and deserves our full support. Its full energies will be needed to accomplish this. The specific proposal of legislation attached to this report in no way affects the operational measures which the Civil Aeronautics Administration intends to carry out.

I have searched thoroughly for the basic causes of our airways problems, and in particular one has emerged sharply: The military and civil agencies in the Federal Government which control and expedite air traffic are not provided systems acceptable to them with which to modernize their operations. Acceptability depends, in large part, on joint test and evaluation by civil and military pilots and ground controllers.

The Government can take steps to solve this problem now, and I respectfully attach a draft bill which proposes legislation to do it. Therefore, I wish to explain this problem, and its solution, which is urgently needed. This is the purpose of the interim report.

A search was first made to determine why aggressive efforts have not been made in the past decade to modernize systems and methods used to assist our air traffic. I found that there was no lack of scientific ideas. In fact, an overabundance of electronic systems have been developed in the laboratories to improve our terminal and en route operations. Most of these have been shelved and never used.

The key to this dilemma may be found in the organizational arrangements in the executive branch which are intended to set the goals, to develop and to select the systems and methods which will meet these goals.

The problem of modernizing the airways was clearly recognized in 1948 as one which required urgent action. The actions taken then have not been effective. The Government attempted to resolve the technical conflicts in air traffic control at that time by creating the Air Navigation Development Board. This Board was established by an interagency agreement between the Departments of Defense and Commerce. Many excellent men have bent their efforts toward making it work. However, the statutory authority of each of the two agencies and the clouding of the air traffic control problem by an understandable concentration on agency missions have made the Board far less effective than anticipated. There being just two voting members on it, all actions have required unanimous agreement. This Board of two members, without legal status and without control of its own funds, has been unable to bring sufficient authority, decisions, or clear objectives to bear on air traffic problems.

In addition, there are several government and industry committees which have deliberated constantly in the past 10 years on the goals and the techniques for air traffic control and air navigation. In spite of the usual difficulties of committee action, they have produced, in the past, some useful advice. However, there has been no one agency with specific authority and capability for them to advise.

The determination of our goals, and the selection of systems and methods for controlling our air traffic, have been dangerously slow. It cannot be expedited by committee and interagency coordination. This was not recognized 10 years ago, and today we find our air traffic system antiquated and under strength.

The rapid, continuing growth of aviation foretells future conditions which demand a new element of decision making now, a more modern organizational structure to evaluate and select our air traffic system of the future.

This shortcoming has been recognized and separated from many other organizational problems in aviation. The nature of its remedy and the urgency of need has prompted me to prepare a draft bill and clear it with the interested executive departments. This bill is intended for the use of Congress in creating an Airways Modernization Board. The Chairman would be appointed by the President and would have no affiliations with existing Government agencies. The Departments of Commerce and Defense would each supply one member to the Board, in view of their basic interest in its activities.

The Airways Modernization Board, as an independent agency, would be responsible for developing and consolidating the requirements for future systems which are needed to provide the necessary communications, navigational aids, and control needed to accommodate the future air traffic in the United States. It would be responsible as well for the systems engineering, the evaluation, and the selection of such aids as will best serve the needs of aviation.

This bill recognizes that military and civil aviation share the same airspace. It recognizes that the selection of future systems and methods of control of air traffic is a public action in the broadest sense. The Board is authorized to assemble military as well as civil personnel to assist in conducting its affairs. The Board is likewise expected to arranged for satisfactory and equitable advice from the users of aircraft and the engineering talents of industry. In other words, the Board will conduct a joint analysis, test, and selection activity which recognizes that the national system must accommodate the civil and military air traffic in peace or war.

The overall system is an essential part of our national defense against air attack. It likewise must respond to the growing demands of public need. These apparently different requirements have not been subject to resolution by the committee conference methods which have been used. Therefore, the Board is expected to engage in extensive test and experimentation in the field, where the intricate problems of procedure and equipment can be tried, and the pilots and traffic controllers can experiment together, bringing the skills of science to bear, and to resolve their problems. This Board, with an impartial Chairman, will then be able to arrive at decisions and specify the most advantageous systems from an economic, operational, and technical point of view.

It is intended that this Board will specify new systems which will best serve the needs of all air navigation and traffic control to the interested military and civil agencies. It is not intended that the Board will have the authority to develop or procure the final ground or airborne equipments to be used in operations.