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GAO

Accountability * Integrity * Reliability

United States General Accounting Office

Washington, DC 20548

June 8, 2001

The Honorable Jerry Lewis
Chairman, Subcommittee on Defense
Committee on Appropriations

House of Representatives

Dear Mr. Chairman:

The Department of Defense (DOD) issued antiarmor munitions master plans beginning in 1985 and updated the plans annually until 1990. These antiarmor plans focused on the Cold War armored threat and on the weapons that would be needed to prevail in a Central European scenario. In its report on the Fiscal Year 1999 Defense Appropriations Bill,' the House Committee on Appropriations expressed concern that the military services were continuing to develop and procure an increasing number of tank-killing weapons at a time when potential adversaries have smaller numbers of armored forces. We previously reported that the number of potential enemy armored targets under current warfighting scenarios is less than 20 percent of the number considered in 1990.2 Since 1990, the military services have maintained and improved their inventories of about 40 different types of antiarmor weapons. The military services currently have 13 new antiarmor weapons acquisitions programs with a total cost of about $14 billion.

The Committee directed the Secretary of Defense to develop an Antiarmor Munitions Master Plan to identify the projected armor threat and the projected quantity of all antiarmor weapons, with the purpose of identifying and eliminating excess antiarmor capability. In response, DOD prepared a new master plan and issued it in August 1999. In 2000, we reviewed the plan and reported3 that it did not identify any excess antiarmor weapons or provide the data and analysis needed to identify such excesses. It also did not provide the data and analysis necessary to support the services' plans to acquire new antiarmor weapons.

1 House of Representatives, Report 105-591, June 22, 1998.

2

Defense Acquisitions: Reduced Threat Not Reflected in Antiarmor Weapons Acquisitions, (GAO/NSIAD-99-105, July 22, 1999).

3 Defense Acquisitions: Antiarmor Munitions Master Plan Does Not Identify Potential Excesses or Support Planned Procurements (GAO/NSIAD-00-67, May 5, 2000).

Results in Brief

Subsequently, the October 1999 Conference Report accompanying the Fiscal Year 2000 Defense Appropriations Bill' noted shortfalls in the plan and directed the Secretary of Defense to provide another antiarmor master plan. The conference report specified that the plan (1) evaluate the joint effectiveness of the existing antiarmor weapons in addressing the threat depicted in the defense planning guidance, (2) describe how planned antiarmor weapons could meet shortfalls in current capability in the defense planning guidance scenarios, and (3) prioritize DOD's antiarmor weapons acquisition programs based on this analysis. In July 2000, DOD submitted its revised antiarmor munitions master plan. At your request, we have reviewed the revised plan to determine if (1) it provides the data and analysis specified in the Fiscal Year 2000 Defense Appropriations conference report, and (2) provides data and analysis needed to support the services' current antiarmor acquisition plans.

DOD's July 2000 Antiarmor Munitions Master Plan did not provide the data and analysis specified in the Fiscal Year 2000 Defense Appropriations conference report. Specifically, the plan did not include a joint effectiveness analysis, describe how planned antiarmor weapons could meet shortfalls in current capabilities, or provide a prioritization of antiarmor weapon needs and requirements. According to the Office of the Secretary of Defense official in charge of preparing the antiarmor master plan, his Office did not require the services to jointly analyze their antiarmor munitions capabilities because of past difficulties obtaining service-wide agreement on results from joint analyses. Without a joint effectiveness analysis, DOD could not evaluate shortfalls in current capabilities or prioritize antiarmor weapons acquisition programs on a DOD-wide basis.

The plan provided limited data and analysis to support the services'
current antiarmor acquisition plans. Instead of a joint effectiveness
analysis, the plan relied on two individual service analyses that did not
consider the weapons capabilities of the other services. The master plan
included the results of separate Army and Air Force weapons effectiveness
analyses based on each service's modeling of the current two regional war
scenario. The analyses showed that each service achieved favorable
warfighting outcomes with or without their planned new antiarmor
weapons. With the new weapons, the analysis showed that the favorable
outcomes were achieved slightly sooner in some cases and/or with a few

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