If this country is setting out on a new course in foreign affairs, as statements such as this and the Guam Doctrine would imply, it is essential that the American people and their elected representatives understand this new policy against the background of this country's prior experience with its commitments; and it is toward such a better understanding that this subcommittee is trying to make a contribution. In turn the Congress and the public can thereupon participate more knowledgeably and effectively in the formulation of foreign policy. It is with these thoughts in mind that we have invited Dr. Carl Kaysen, the Director of the Institute for Advanced Study at Princeton, to testify before the subcommittee today on the broader aspects of our overseas commitments.

From your role, Dr. Kaysen, as Deputy Special Assistant to President Kennedy for National Security Affairs and as a consultant to the Rand Corp., and in my opinion as one of the most informed people in the country from the standpoint of our military, political, economic, and social problems, as are embraced in their relationship with our various international activities, we believe, I believe, you have the necessary experience in these fields.

From your academic credentials first, as Littauer Professor of Political Economy at Harvard and then as Director of the Institute for Advanced Study, we believe you have the perception and judgment to provide this subcommittee with valuable knowledge, advice, and suggestions.

(Dr. Kaysen's biography follows:)

BIOGRAPHY OF CARL KAYSEN

NOVEMBER, 1970.

Present Address: Institute for Advanced Study, Princeton, New Jersey 08540 (office); 97 Olden Lane, Princeton, New Jersey 08540 (home).

PERSONAL HISTORY

Born: 5 March 1920, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, son of Samuel and Elizabeth Kaysen. Married: Annette Neutra, in Philadelphia, 13 September 1940. Children: Susanna Neutra Kaysen, born 11 November 1948 in Boston; Laura Neutra Kaysen. born 6 September 1955 in Boston.

EDUCATION

Primary and Secondary; Philadelphia public schools and Overbrook High School, Philadelphia; College, University of Pennsylvania: A.B. June, 1940 with highest honors in economics; Graduate, Columbia University (part-time) 194042, no degree; Harvard University, February 1946-June 1947, M.A. 1947, Ph.D. 1954; Harvard University, Society of Fellows, junior fellow July, 1947-June, 1950.

SCHOLASTIC HONORS AND AWARDS

Phi Beta Kappa, 1940, Social Science Research Council Demobilization Award. 1946-7, Junior Fellow, Society of Fellows, Harvard University, 1947-50, American Academy of Arts and Sciences, 1954, Guggenheim Fellow, 1955-6, American Philosophical Society, 1966.

NON-ACADEMIC WORK, WAR SERVICE, ETC.

Financial Research Project, National Bureau of Economic Research, New York. Member of project staff, June, 1940-April, 1942 (simultaneously with part-time graduate study at Columbia).

Office of Strategic Services, Washington, D.C. May, 1942-January, 1943; economist in the Economics Division, Research and Analysis Branch, working on various problems of the German war economy.

U.S. Army (Air Force), February, 1943-November, 1945; entered as a private, separated as captain. Served overseas (ETO), May, 1943-September, 1945. As

signed to HQ 8th AF and later HQ, US Strategic AF in Europe as intelligence officer working on problems of intelligence and planning in relation to air attack. From V-E day to September, 1945 assigned to OSS, ETO to work on problems of German capacity to pay reparations.

State Department, Washington, D.C. November-December, 1945; continued briefly work on reparations begun in service.

Rand Corporation, Santa Monica, California; consultant 1947-68. Occasional consulting on problems of military planning and intelligence.

Project Charles, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge. Consultant June-July, 1950. Consultant on problems of economics of civil defense and vulnerability to air attack.

Federal District Court of Massachusetts. Economic consultant (law clerk) to Judge Charles R. Wyzanski, Jr. September, 1950-52.

Consultant to Weapons System Evaluation Group, Office of the Secretary of Defense, 1953-54.

Member of the Scientific Advisory Committee to the Director of Civil Defense, January-October, 1955.

Consultant to General Electric Company Research Laboratory, Schenectady, New York, July, 1957-61.

Consultant to the Assistant Attorney General, Anti-Trust Division 1958-59. Member of panel of scientists, consultants to Applied Science Division, Operations Evaluation Group, US Navy, September, 1960–61.

White House Staff Member, Office of the Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, The White House 1961.

Deputy Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs 1961-63. Special Consultant to the President 1963-65.

Chairman, President's Task Force on Foreign Economic Policy 1964.

Member of the Committee on Arms Control and Disarmament, White House Conference on International Cooperation November, 1965.

Chairman, Bureau of the Budget Task Force on Federal Statistical Data 1966.

ACADEMIC WORK

Harvard University 1947-66; Teaching Fellow in Economics 1947; Assistant Professor of Economics 1950-55; Associate Professor of Economics 1955-57; Professor of Economics 1957-66; Associate Dean, Graduate School of Public Administration 1960-66; Lucius N. Littauer Professor of Political Economy 1964-66; Acting Senior Fellow, Society of Fellows, 1957-8, 1964-5; Syndic, Harvard University Press 1964-66.

Harvard University Summer School International Seminar, Lecturer 1952. Salzburg Seminar in American Studies, Teaching Assistant, Summer 1947; Faculty Member, Seminar 1969.

London School of Economics, Senior Fulbright Research Scholar 1955-56. Ford Foundation Research Grant to study American Aid in Greece, 1959-60. Institute for Advanced Study, Director, 1966-Present.

Senator SYMINGTON. I understand you have a prepared statement. We would be glad to have you read all or any part of it. Then we would have some questions we would like to ask you.

STATEMENT OF DR. CARL KAYSEN, DIRECTOR OF THE INSTITUTE FOR ADVANCED STUDY, PRINCETON, N.J.

Dr. KAYSEN. Thank you very much, Senator Symington.

Let me try to skip briefly over certain parts of this long statement, which I should like to submit for the record.

(Dr. Kaysen's full statement and an article follow :)

STATEMENT OF DR. CARL KAYSEN, DIRECTOR OF THE INSTITUTE FOR ADVANCED

STUDY, PRINCETON, N.J.

In responding to the Subcommittee's charge to review the political and military background of our overseas commitment, I find that I can do no better than to begin by quoting from something I wrote two years ago—namely, an essay

entitled "Military Strategy, Military Forces, and Arms Control" which appeared in a volume, Agenda for the Nation, published by the Brookings Institution, 1968. This essay was aimed primarily at sketching the relation between our international political stance and the nature, size, and costs of our military forces. The primary focus of this Subcommittee's hearings has been on overseas commitments, but these, of course, can be understood only in the larger context of our total strategic posture. It is this larger context I wish to set by quoting from my earlier essay.

"Our military strategy in the past has been shaped by three chief goals, all interrelated, but nonetheless of different importance. The first was to deter and defend against a direct attack on the United States. The second was to deter and defend against both a direct attack on Western Europe and the use of the threat of military force, including the threat of attack on the United States, as a weapon in the indirect conquest by political means of some or all of Western Europe. The third, and both later in time and lesser in importance, was to oppose expansion of communist power in any part of the world, especially when it took the form of a takeover by communists, with overt or covert assistance from the Soviet Union, of the government of a previously noncommunist state. This strategy had its origins in the events in Europe in the first years after the end of the war; by the end of the Korean war in 1952, it had settled into a hard mold from which it is only just now shaking loose. It has been given formal expression in a series of multilateral and bilateral treaties binding the United States in mutual defense pacts with nearly fifty nations, several of which are involved in more than one treaty, beginning with the Rio pact of 1947, covering nineteen Latin-American powers, and including the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), with fifteen members (1949), the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO), with eight members and two protocol states (1954), the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO), with four members and U.S. "association” (1955), and bilateral treaties with Japan, Taiwan, and South Korea.

Each of the three major goals can be associated with a corresponding aspect of the level, structure, and deployment of U.S. forces, though this correspondence is somewhat artificial, since the various elements of our forces are interrelated and serve more than one goal. The first has led to the creation and maintenance of a long-range strategic striking force, equipped with thermonuclear weapons and capable of world-wide action. We have also created defensive forces against enemy strategic attack, but our main reliance has been on an offensive force. The size and composition of our offensive force has been shaped by the concept of U.S. strategic superiority. In its crudest form this has meant a larger and more effective force than that of the Soviet Union, which even now remains the only other nation with significant long-range striking power. . . . The second goal is reflected mainly in the sizable long-run deployment of U.S. forces in Europe under the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, though the strategic forces make a vital contribution to it as well. These forces constitute a major military establishment in all arms: the equivalent of nearly 5 divisions of combat ground forces, several battalions of medium- and short-range missiles with nuclear warheads plus support troops, an air force of some 900 tactical aircraft and $5,000 men, equipped with a very large number of tactical nuclear weapons, and the Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean, a major fleet (built around two carrier task forces) of some 50 ships, 200 aircraft, and 25,000 men. In addition, the backup forces for NATO in the United States amount to nearly 4 army divisions trained and equipped for European service, a sizable portion of the 475 ships, 2,500 planes, and 240,000 men of the Atlantic Fleet, and some part of the tactical air strength in the United States. Indeed, the combined U.S. forces in Europe form a more powerful military establishment than that of any nation save the Soviet Union.

Reflections of the third goal in our military deployments are more diffuse. more variable in time, and thus are less easy to specify precisely. The very size of the forces we maintain, other than strategic offensive and defensive forces and those committed to NATO, is perhaps the most important expression of this third goal. So are such specific deployments as two divisions and some air force units in Korea and a marine division scattered throughout the Pacific; the size and far westward patrol range of the Seventh Fleet in the Pacific; the existence and mission of Southern Command in Panama; the restructuring of the U.S. strategic reserve under Strike Command, in order to create a capability for rapid response with conventional ground and tactical air forces on minimum notice any place in the world; and the world-wide network of military assistance agree

ments and military training missions both within and without the framework of mutual defense treaties. The great spread of U.S. air bases, communication facilities, and related installations around the world in part reflect this same purpose, although they also serve as support for forces deployed in Europe and the United States. Finally, of course, the most recent powerful and pointed expression of this third goal has been our commitment of more than half a million American troops to a war in South Vietnam to halt and reverse the partly political, partly military, process by which the joint forces of the guerillas in South Vietnam and the communist government of North Vietnam had begun to take over the South, and to discourage further communist penetration in Southeast Asia.

The greatest changes in the international political scene have been those affecting the relations between the United States and the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union is no longer the unchallenged leader of a unified bloc of thirteen Communist governments-all but Cuba forming a contiguous mass from Eastern Europe to East and Southeast Asia. Nor is it still the political headquarters of a single world-wide communist movement controlling a network of legal and illegal communist parties and exercising significant political influence in many important countries in both the third world and the U.S. alliance system. The political and ideological split between the Soviet Union and China has not simply bifurcated the communist world; it has shattered it into fragments. And even the largest and most powerful fragment in both economic and military terms-the Warsaw Pact grouping (minus Albania)-though still led by the Soviet Union, no longer shows the unity of purpose and unquestioning submission to Soviet leadership it once did. On the other side, of course, our own dominant role within the American alliance system has also diminished, though it never equaled that of the Soviet Union in terms of command. The result is that the edge of the Soviet-American confrontation is much less sharp, as allies on both sides take a political stance between those of the two superpowers.

On the military side of the confrontation, there has been an increasing mutual recognition by both superpowers of the sharp limitations on their use of military forces directed at each other to achieve or advance political goals. The succession of crises involving some greater or lesser degree of Soviet-American confrontation, Berlin in 1961, Cuba in 1962, the Middle East in 1967, has underlined the reality and strength of the political constraints on the direct use of military force. These constraints are essentially the product of the nuclear age; their working will be examined in some detail in the discussion of strategic forces below.

Profound as these changes are, they have by no means removed the sources of conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union. Mutual ideological hostility still exists on both sides, but it is especially important in the Soviet Union, where it has a much more significant role in the internal political process than in the United States. Direct conflict of political interests over the German settlement in all its ramifications remains although it, too, has become less sharp. Neither side publicly accepts the legitimacy of the role and activities of the other in the underdeveloped world, but the tendency, respectively, to interpret every action in terms of communist aggression and conspiracy or capitalist encirclement and neo-imperialism has diminished somewhat in intensity, again perhaps more here than there. Many of these conflicts, moreover, are becoming those traditional among great powers and losing their intense flavor or religious war. These changes are not only the result of mutual appreciation of the political implications of the facts of military technology; they also reflect deeper currents within both the United States and the Soviet Union, currents that are flowing with equal or perhaps greater strength within the other NATO and Warsaw Pact countries as well. In any modern industrialized nation in which the government is responsive to popular will-whether through the mechanisms of democracy or through other less sure and sensitive means the primary pressures of popular opinion will ordinarily be focused on internal problems of economic and social welfare. Extraordinary events and circumstances are required to sustain wide public interest in foreign policy. Even the governments of the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact allies, far as they are from democracy, are gradually becoming subject to and responsive to popular pressures and demands, and thus the same political forces that give primacy to internal problems in the West are operating to some degree on them. Expensive and risky foreign and military policies demand political justification in popular terms, a demand that becomes increasingly difficult to meet, even on the Soviet side.

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These trends are both deep and slow-acting; it cannot be asserted with any confidence that they will not be reversed in the shorter or longer term. Between the early and final drafts of this paper, Soviet and other Warsaw Pact forces invaded Czechoslovakia to reverse the Czechs' unacceptably rapid program of liberalization in internal politics and economics. It is difficult to assess the full results of this venture now; yet several preliminary conclusions can be set down. First, the operation was defensive in character and provides no basis for inferring an increase in Soviet readiness to act against NATO or the United States directly. Second, the slowness with which the Russians are pressing their demands on the Czechs and the restraint they are showing in the face of stubborn resistance from Czech leaders and people in contrast to their behavior in Hungary in 1956-appear to indicate some Soviet reservations on the political effectiveness of military force. Third, disunity within the Warsaw alliance and between the Soviet-oriented communist parties and the Soviet Union has increased sharply. Thus, on the basis of present evidence (late 1968), it seems no more correct to view these events as a reversal in the trends sketched above than as a confirmation of them; yet they could presage such a reversal.

On the United States side, a hardening of our own policy toward the Soviet Union and the communist world, shown by, say, an attempt to achieve "military victory" in South Vietnam and to make concrete in terms of military deployments the notion of maintaining U.S. "military superiority," might also reverse these trends. The political future is unpredictable; but the choice of policy by the United States is a major independent variable in the system. If we ourselves choose to deemphasize military means in foreign policy, we can hold back further increases in our military forces and in some cases (which will be detailed below) reduce them unilaterally. We can actively seek arrangements and agreements, both bilaterally with the Soviet Union and multilaterally, that will permit still further reductions in military forces on both sides. Choice of such a course can make a major contribution to a general movement in the preferred direction of more security. Though this is obviously not a riskfree course, it will be argued below that it is in fact less risky than its alternatives.

In pursuing his path, we should not expect that the Soviet will quickly and simply forego all efforts to project its power in diplomatic, economic, and military terms into the noncommunist parts of the world. No more can we expect that it will abandon its determination to maintain the borders of the present communist world or discontinue its search for whatever degree of unity under its own leadership over whatever part of it that appears feasible. Quite the contrary, we should anticipate continuing evidences for some time of Soviet efforts at playing the role of world power: further deployments of Soviet ships outside the waters adjacent to its territory, such as have recently been observed in the Mediterranean; wider patrols of Soviet missile-launching submarines; continued arms shipments on credit terms and dispatches of military training missions to countries of the third world. Many of these actions can be seen as responses to earlier similar ones on our side. In none of these areas would an increase in Soviet activity reach the level of our own for some time, even if that had already begun to decline. What can be anticipated is that, first, those forces which have increasingly limited the political effectiveness of our own activities in these areas will operate in the same way on the Soviet efforts, and second, the Soviet leadership, which-for all its ideological commitments-appears to be a group of rational men capable of attending to the facts of experience, will learn from this experience, however slowly, even as we have ourselves.

The relations of East and West in Europe have displayed the same tendencies toward softening, perhaps to an even greater degree than bilateral SovietAmerican relations. Two points have been central in this change. The first is the increasingly low probability assigned by European governments on both sides of the dividing line through Germany to the prospect of a massive westward military movement by the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact allies. Even the understandably nervous and dissatisfied government of the Federal Republic, with the strongest cause to be discontented with the European status quo, does not act-in terms of military budgets and force levels-as if it gave high priority to the Soviet military threat. The second is the decline in the belief in "negotiating from strength" in Europe. This change, which has come about fairly gradually over the last decade, is of fundamental importance. Some of the NATO partners, especially the United Kingdom, never believed that the pressure of Western military power could bring about a new settlement that would reunify Germany; some of them, including the Scandinavian countries and perhaps