⚫ no regular government-wide collection and review of funding data existed;

⚫ no apparent government-wide priorities were established;

⚫ no assessment process existed to coordinate and focus government efforts; and ⚫ no government office or entity maintained the authority to enforce

coordination;

As a result, the third report recommended that the National Security Council (NSC), OMB, the departments, and agency heads - such as the State Department and the Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI) – build upon the new statutory requirement embodied in Section 1051. I am also pleased to report that this remains an annual obligation, requiring by March of each year an annual overview of government-wide efforts to combat terrorism around the globe.

Finally, at the request of Chairman Hastert and myself, GAO has recently released its fourth and latest product on the subject, entitled, “Combating Terrorism: Threat and Risk Assessments Can Help Prioritize and Target Investments." Again, enough evidence has been provided to question the federal government's level of funding. This last report - responsible for reviewing the implementation of the Nunn-Lugar-Domenici domestic response program- hopefully will assist with the establishment of consistent national standards and priorities.

The Threat

Mr. Chairman, members of the committee:

In your mind's eye, join me and imagine what it was like in 1995 for the Senior Airman at a remote location in a foreign land, relaxing after a long, hot, stressful day in the Arabian desert;

Imagine, too, what it was like in 1996 for the federal employee beginning the day in Oklahoma, pouring coffee, grabbing a breakfast snack, and preparing for morning briefings;

Imagine what it was like in 1993 for Americans - businesswomen, diplomats, tourists, visitors - milling innocently about in the heart of New York City, one of our nation's busiest locations;

Imagine, if you can, what it was like for these individuals before these three locations became infamous for the catastrophic events that followed. To a person, none expected anything but completion of an average day; yet all experienced a jolt, a shock, a sense of horror, as chaos and bedlam brought an abrupt halt to their respective routines.

The bombing victims at Khobar Towers in Saudia Arabia were trained military professionals in a foreign land. The bombing victims at the Oklahoma City Federal

Building and the World Trade Center, were average American citizens – civilians - at home in their communities, totally unprepared for the violence they were forced to experience.

Despite the different circumstances, all three events share in common one unavoidable, tell-tale truth: Americans died brutally, without warning, unnecessarily, and in a manner that will almost certainly be imitated in the future. In 1995 and 1996, about one-fourth of all international terrorist acts were against U.S. targets; and although the number of terrorist incidents both worldwide and in the United States has declined in recent years, the level of violence and lethality of attacks has increased. Violent events in the past, may encourage further attempts to strike America in places such as our own yards, back home in our districts, and other places where attacks might be least expected. Enemies of the United States, I fear, have adopted effective methods and means to strike against America.

Surely, enemies to America - both foreign and domestic - recognize the military capabilities of the United States. It is hard to ignore our successes throughout history and around the globe; it is difficult NOT to marvel at our technological advancements; and it is nearly impossible to overlook our massive military might at sea, in the air, and on the ground. Our naval, air, ground, and Marine forces remain superior and unmatched in today's world.

Further, enemies to America - both foreign and domestic - almost certainly recognize the capabilities of our domestic law enforcement and emergency response officials. The Federal Bureau of Investigations, or FBI, the U.S. Secret Service, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (ATF), U.S. Customs, and the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) are highly respected worldwide. Their standards currently set those of the international community.

But what of the point at which the responsibilities of these two communities intersect? Do our domestic law enforcement capabilities effectively coordinate with those of the Department of Defense? In the case of another incident on American soil, are Defense Department officials prepared to effectively support local officials? Are existing programs - such as the Emergency Response Assistance program, the Rapid Response Information System, and the Nunn-Lugar-Domenici "First Responder Training" program -- adequately focused and adequately funded to handle a future incident, particularly one involving a weapon of mass destruction (WMD) such as a biological or chemical agent, or nuclear device?

We better be sure.

Is the threat real? I believe wholeheartedly that it is.

Are we in danger of overstating the threat? I am not sure. But, let me share with you something about which there is no doubt. I implore you to consider two lists, one

based on capabilities, the other based on alleged activities. I ask you first to consider the list of nations around the globe known to either possess or nearly possess the capability to produce chemical and biological weapons you are, of course, familiar with the unclassified list: North Korea, China, India, Pakistan, Iran, Iraq, Libya, Syria, and Russia. Second, I ask you to consider the group of nations singled out by the State Department for engaging in state-sponsored terrorism. Again, you are familiar with the list's membership: Cuba, Iran, Iraq, Libya, North Korea, Sudan, and Syria. Finally, I ask you to look at the correlation between these lists and ask you to decide. Are you willing to risk the potential consequences of not being prepared?

The Response

To properly prepare for potential terrorist acts we must set forth with a political commitment to attain both efficiency and adequate resource levels across the entire federal government.

The recent past offers a bit of optimism. A relatively high level of Congressional support has existed:

• The 1994 National Defense Authorization Act expressed a sense of Congress that the President should strengthen federal interagency response planning for early detection and warning of -- and response to - potential use of chemical or biological agents and weapons.

• The Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1996 required the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of Energy to submit to Congress a joint report on military and civil defense response plans.

The 1997 National Defense Authorization Act required the President to take immediate action to enhance the capability of the Federal Government to prevent and respond to terrorist incidents involving WMD and to provide enhanced support to improve both the response and deterrent capabilities of state and local emergency response agencies. More than $50 million in assistance was authorized.

• And just this past year, the budget request for the Defense Department included $49.5 million for support of the domestic emergency preparedness program. The resulting 1998 authorization provided for this request as well as an additional $10 million for equipment for the Marine's Chemical-Biological Incident Response Force and $10 million to support development of a domestic/biological counterterrorism mission for the National Guard.

But I am concerned about our nation's ability over the next few years to attain efficiency or to sustain such a commitment. The Defense Department rightly assumes a

supportive role during a terrorist incident within the United States, leaving the Department of Justice the primary responsibility for response and coordination. Yet even a role supportive in nature has come at a great cost – in both manpower and dollars. Much of the highly specialized expertise resides in DoD; and most of the highly-trained individuals necessary for such tasks are also from the Department of Defense. Unfortunately, -- for them, for their families, and for our nation - these same individuals are often needed elsewhere, in overseas contingencies around the world. In these strict budgetary times, support and training assistance to domestic authorities is placing Defense personnel under a terrible strain.

This year's budgetary constraint is particularly tight and I have not received information to cause me to believe that anything might be different in the near future. This is not to say there aren't several matters to provide encouragement, such as the recent announcement to authorize 10 Rapid Assessment and Initial Detection (RAID) teams within the Guard and Reserve components. Indeed, the collocation of these teams with FEMA regional offices just might provide the necessary "bridge" between federal and state officials and spawn better coordination.

Yet, I am aware of the Defense Department's budgetary struggle to meet existing requirements and must assume that this new effort might also find itself at risk of receiving inadequate resources. We should look closely at this recommendation before committing a large sum of our precious - and increasingly scarce - financial resources. And we should recognize that this resource pool is declining further now that FEMA has recently decided to withdraw itself from any lead-agency role. Without its assistance, the Defense Department must now find additional, previously unanticipated budget authority over the next 4 years to support this requirement.

As the work of GAO has helped us discover, our approach may be fundamentally flawed: perhaps too many different federal agencies and local governments possess existing or emerging capabilities for responding to a WMD attack; uneven and nearly incompatible levels of expertise often exists; duplication and poor communication may complicate our effort; and public complacency may threaten to weaken our overall capability. To be sure, if I must leave only one message today, let it be this: coordination problems may exist; but these problems pale in comparison with the potential problems resulting from public complacency.

Mr. Chairman, there is a Chinese proverb that states, "May you live in interesting times." We should be thankful that we do. We also live during challenging times. At a time of budget cuts, force drawdowns, streamlining, and reductions in military personnel endstrength levels, we are faced with a familiar threat that is growing in importance. To counter the terrorist threat -- to provide as much safety to Americans at home and abroad -- we may need to not only strengthen and reinforce existing capabilities but legislate additional resources. If we fail in this calling, we may face another day when - without warning - an innocent American again falls victim to such evil.

50-803 98-2

Mr. SOUDER. Thank you very much for your testimony.

If I could ask you just one question. As you have mentioned, there are 40 different organizations working with this and recently there has been much discussion about the National Security Council and the National Guard. Would you comment how you think we might best structure the Federal Government's efforts to combat terrorism both for crisis management and consequence?

Mr. SKELTON. There is no easy answer to this. But you must prioritize. You must have an Indian chief running the show. The left hand must know what the right hand is doing. That's what got me involved in this whole effort to begin with. Not knowing whether one agency, whether the State Department, FBI, Department of Defense you choose it-really knew what the other was doing.

So, there must be prioritization of who is running what type of operation. Second, you must make sure that they are coordinated, not just with themselves. The 40-I think there are actually 43 different organizations, Mr. Chairman-and that they know what they are doing. But there is necessity to coordinate in the event of a domestic attack with the various law enforcement agencies in a State or in a city. This is a daunting task and one that is going to take tremendous leadership by the lead agency, which ever it was. And as you know, as I said a few moments ago, FEMA has withdrawn as the potential agency.

So, I think those are the priorities that we must cause to happen. Because to begin with, they help deter. No. 2, should an event occur, we will want to capture the suspects, try them, and if found guilty, punish them properly. No. 3, there must be a proper response to those people that are injured and lose property, or have problems that are connected with such a disaster. Those three elements must be included in any prioritization that we offer.

Mr. SOUDER. Well, thank you very much. I appreciate your leadership on National Security and Intelligence and look forward to working with you this year. The hearing stands in recess until we can get back from our vote. Thank you.

[Recess.]

Mr. SOUDER. The second panel could come forward. The committee is again in order.

Thank you for coming today. We have with us Mr. Richard Davis, Director of the National Security Analysis, National Security and International Affairs Division, U.S. General Accounting Office. Accompanying Mr. Davis is Ms. Davi D'Agostino, Assistant Director, National Security Analysis and we also have Mr. Larry Johnson, former Deputy Director of the U.S. Department of State, Office of Counter Terrorism who will also testify. Mr. Johnson's experience includes teaching a senior crisis management seminar for foreign governments, designing terrorism exercises for the Department of Defense, and supervising security assessments for several U.S. businesses. Mr. Johnson also worked for the Central Intelligence Agency and currently is a partner at Berg Associates. Thank you for joining us, and we look forward to your testimony. I have to swear you in. Would you rise and raise your right hands.

[Witnesses sworn.]

Mr. SOUDER. Mr. Davis, will you please proceed?