of forts, magazines, arsenals, dockyards, and other needful buildings, without such consent having been obtained.1 1207. Whenever any lands have been or shall be conveyed to individuals or officers, for the use or benefit of the United States, the President is authorized to obtain from such person a release of his interest to the United States.2 Power to obtain releases. Apr. 28, 1828, c. 41. s. 3, v. 4, p. 264. Sec. 3752, R.S. uses by condem. 1208. That in every case in which the Secretary of the Acquisitions of lands for public Treasury or any other officer of the Government has been, or hereafter shall be, authorized to procure real estate for the erection of a public building or for other public uses he shall be, and hereby is, authorized to acquire the same for the United States by condemnation, under judicial process, whenever in his opinion it is necessary or advantageous to the Government to do so, and the United States circuit or district courts of the district wherein such real estate is exercise of the authority, be strictly construed Thus, where a statute authorized the Secretary of War to purchase, for a certain stated sum, a certain described tract containing a specified number of acres, held that the act did not invest him with discretion to purchase a portion only of such tract. (Ibid.. par. 7.) Authority to acquire land in a State, by the exercise of the right of eminent domain, whether by proceedings for condemnation in the United States circuit court or in the courts of the State, (a) can be vested in an executive official of the United States only by express legislation of Congress. The Constitution vests in Congress the exclusive power to dispose of the property of the United States, real or personal. (b) The Secretary of War in the absence of authority from Congress, can not alienate land of the United States Thus, where a company proposed to cut out and remove a part of a dam (some 140 feet) on Fox River Wisconsin, belonging to the United States, and to substitute another, as a private improvement, below, held that this was a proposition for the alienation by an executive official of public property, and could not legally be entertained. Ibid., 630, par. 14.) In view of the prohibition of section 3736, Revised Statutes that no land shall be purchased on account of the United States, except under a law authorizing the same, the Secretary of War can not accept a grant by gift of land or of an easement in land, without authority of special statute [By act of April 24, 1888, he is expressly empowered to purchase, or accept donations of land for river and harbor improvements. And held that, in the absence of authority from Congress, a purchase of lots in a city cemetery for the burial purposes of a neighboring military post, would not be legal or operative. (Ibid par. 15) The State of South Carolina ceded to the United States, by an act of its legisla ture of 1794, the land of the present military reservation at Southport S C the site of old Fort Johnson. A condition of the deed of cession was to the effect that a fortification should be erected on the land within three years and be maintained forever thereafter for the public service, or the land should revert to the State The time allowed was repeatedly extended, the last extension expiring in 1818 when a fortification had been constructed it not fully completed. The fort has long since ceased to be garrisoned. In 1889 an individual citizen "entered the site as State land. Held that this act was without legal authority or effect; that the condition subsequent in the deed was one of the breach of which the grantor, the State, could alone take advantage; and that, as the State had not proceeded to reenter for such breach, the United States was not ousted and could legally continue to hold the premises. (c) (Ibid., par. 18.) The act of February 27 1877 (19 Stat. L., 242), contains a requirement that it shall be the duty of all officers of the United States having any of the title papers (of property purchased, or about to be purchased, for the erection of public buildings) in their possession, to furnish them, forthwith, to the Attorney General. No public money shall be expended until the written opinion of the Attorney-General shall be had." All papers relating to the Washington Aqueduct and public buildings and grounds in the District of Columbia will be filed in the office of the Chief of Engineers. All other deeds and papers pertaining to the title or sale of, and any lease, grant, license, or easement of, upon, or over any military reservation or other lands under the jurisdiction of the War Department will be filed in the office of the Judge AdvocateGeneral. When any such papers come into the possession of any bureau they shall within five days thereafter be transferred to the oflice of the Judge AdvocateGeneral. (Par. 704, A. R.) a See Kohl v. U. S., 1 Otto, 367. b 16 Opin. Att. Gen., 477. e See Schulenberg v. Harriman, 21 Wall., 44. United States courts. Jurisdiction to located, shall have jurisdiction of proceedings for such condemnation, and it shall be the duty of the AttorneyGeneral of the United States, upon every application of the Secretary of the Treasury, under this act, or such other officer, to cause proceedings to be commenced for condemnation, within thirty days from the receipt of the applica tion at the Department of Justice. Act of August 1, 1888 (25 Stat. L., 357). Procedure in condemnation. Sec. 2, ibid. Jurisdiction over reservations; when exclusive. Constitution. 1209. The practice, pleadings, forms and modes of proceeding in causes arising under the provisions of this act shall conform, as near as may be, to the practice, pleadings, forms and proceedings existing at the time in like causes in the courts of record of the State within which such circuit or district courts are held, any rule of the court to the contrary notwithstanding. Sec. 2, ibid. JURISDICTION OVER RESERVATIONS. 1210. The Congress shall have power: To exercise exclusive Legislation in all Cases whatsoArt. I sec. 1, ever, over such District (not exceeding ten Miles square. as may, by Cession of particular States, and the Accep tance of Congress, become the Seat of the Government of the United States, and to exercise like Authority over all Places purchased by the Consent of the Legislature of the State in which the Same shall be, for the Erection of Forts, Magazines, Arsenals, dock Yards, and other needful Build ings. Article I, section 8, Constitution of the United States. The power to take private property for public uses, generally termed the right of eminent domain, belongs to every independent government. It is an incident of sovereignty and requires no constitutional recognition The provision found in the fifth amendment to the Federal Constitution, and in the constitutions of the severa. States, for just compensation for property taken, is merely a limitation upon the use of the power. It is no part of the power itself but a condition upon which the power may be exercised. U. S. v. Jones. 109 U. S 513, 518; Boom Co. v. Patterson. 98 U S.,106, Kohl v. U. S., 91 U. S., 367; Cooley Con. Lim., 526, U. S. v. Oregon Railway and Nav Co., 16 F. R., 524. In some instances the States, by virtue of their own right of emi nent domain, have condemned lands for the use of the General Government, and sach condemnations have been sustained by their courts, without, however, denying the right of the United States to act independently of the States Kohl v. U.S.91 CS 367 373; Gilmer v. Lime Point. 18 Cal. 729, Burt & Merchants Ins Co. 106 Mass 356 U. S. v. Jones, 109 U. S,513. The estate acquired by such exercise of the right of eminent domain on the part of the United States may be a fee simple or may be the nature of an easement. 160p. Att. Gen 387. The legislature is the judge of the necessity for exercising the right in any case Cooley Const. Law, 527. 2 Lands may be acquired by the United States, within the territory of a State, ID any one of three ways: (1) By purchase without the consent of the legislature of the State within which the lands are situated; (2) by purchase with such consent, (3) by an exercise of the right of eminent domain. Kohl v U. S. 91 U. S. 367. When the United States acquire lands within the limits of a State with the con sent of the legislature of the State, for the erection of forts arsenals, dockyards. and other needful buildings, the Constitution confers upon them exclusive jurisdic tion of the tract so acquired; but when they acquire such lands in any other way than by purchase with the consent of the legislature they will hold the lands sub ject to this qualification; that if upon them forts, arsenals, or other public build ings are erected for the uses of the General Government, such buildings, with their appurtenances, as instrumentalities for the execution of its powers will be free from any such interference and jurisdiction of the State as would destroy of impair their effective use for the purposes designed. Such is the law with reference to all instrumentalities created by the General Government. Their exemption from State control is essential to the independence and sovereign authority of the United States within the sphere of their delegated powers. But when not used as such over offenses ceded districts. 30. When any offense is committed in any place, jurisdiction Jurisdiction over which has been retained by the United States or ceded committed in to it by a State, or which has been purchased with the con- July 7, 1898, v sent of a State for the erection of a fort, magazine, arsenal, dockyard, or other needful building or structure, the punishment for which offense is not provided for by any law. of the United States, the person committing such offense shall, upon conviction in a circuit or district court of the United States for the district in which the offense was committed, be liable to and receive the same punishment as the laws of the State in which such place is situated now provide for the like offense when committed within the jurisdiction of such State, and the said courts are hereby vested with jurisdiction for such purpose; and no subsequent repeal of any such State law shall affect any such prosecution. Act of July 7, 1898. SALE OF ABANDONED AND USELESS MILITARY RESER VATIONS. 1211. That whenever, in the opinion of the President of the United States, the lands, or any portion of them, included within the limits of any military reservation heretofore or hereafter declared, have become or shall become useless for military purposes, he shall cause the same, or so much thereof as he may designate, to be placed under the control of the Secretary of the Interior for disposition as hereinafter provided, and shall cause to be filed with the Secretary of the Interior a notice thereof. Act of July 5, 1881 (23 Stat. L., 103). instrumentalities, the legislative power of the State will be as full and complete as The purchase of lands in a State by the General Government, with legislative A cession to the General Government, in the act giving the consent of the State to the purchase of such land, of "jurisdiction," does not confer exclusive jurisdiction, the purpose of the act not requiring it, but such jurisdiction only, concurrent with that of the State, as Congress may lind necessary for the objects of the cession. Ivid. Upon lands so ceded for the purpose of a home for disabled volunteers the crimipal laws of the United States, which apply only to places within their exclusive jurisdiction, are not operative. Ibid. A State may cede to the United States exclusive jurisdiction over a tract within its limits in a manner not provided for in the Constitution of the United States; and may prescribe conditions to the cession, if they are not inconsistent with the effective use of the property for the purpose intended. The reservation which has usually accompanied the consent of the States, that civil and criminal process of the State Sale, etc., of useless military abandoned and reservations. July 5, 1884, v. 23, p. 103-104. subdivision of lands. Sec. 2, ibid. Survey and SEC. 2. That the Secretary of the Interior may, if in his opinion the public interests so require, cause the said lands or any part thereof, in such reservations, to be regularly surveyed, or to be subdivided into tracts of less than forty acres each, and into town lots, or either, or both. He shall cause the said lands so surveyed and subdivided, and each tract thereof, to be appraised by three competent and disinterested men to be appointed by him, and who shall after having each been first duly sworn to impartially and faithfully execute the trust reposed in them, appraise the Appraised. courts may be served in the places purchased, is not considered as interfering in any respect with the supremacy of the United States over them, but is admitted to prevent them from becoming an asylum for fugitives from justice. Fort Leavenworth R. L Co. v. Lowe, 114 U. S., 525, 533. Such reservations provide only that civil and crim inal process, issued under the authority of the State, which must, of course, be for acts done and cognizable by the State, may be executed within the ceded lands. Dot. withstanding the cession." Not a word is said from which we can infer that it wa intended that the State should have a right to punish for acts done within the ceur lands. Ibid., 534; United States v. Cornell, 2 Mason, 60; Commonwealth v. Clary, s Mass., 72; Mitchell v. Tibbetts, 17 Pick., 298; People v. Godfrey, 17 Johns (N. Y Residents within such ceded districts have none of the duties and obligations and none of the rights and privileges of citizens of the States within which such lasis are situated. They are not subject to taxation; they can not exercise the right of suffrage. 6 Opin. Att. Gen., 577; 10 ibid., 35; Sinks v. Reese, 19 Ohio, 306. They are not entitled to the benefit of the public schools. 1 Met. (Mass.), 580. An act of the legislature of a State ceding to the United States the jurisdiction of the State over a tract of land used as a military reservation, upon condition that suc jurisdiction shall continue only so long as the United States shall own and occupy such reservation; that the State shall have the right, within the reservation to serve civil process and to execute criminal process against persons charged with cring committed within the State, and that roads may be opened and kept in repair withi such reservation, cedes to the United States the entire political jurisdiction of tar State over the place in question, including judicial and legislative jurisdiction, exce;; as to service of process and opening roads, and the same can not be affected or further limited, without the consent of the United States, by a subsequent act of the State legislature attempting to impose additional restrictions on the jurisdiction cede. In re Ladd, 74 Fed. Rep., 31. After such cession a justice of the peace, acting under authority of the State. Jus no jurisdiction over the ceded territory in matters of alleged criminal violation (f the laws of the State committed on such territory. Ibid. It is a general rule of public law, recognized and acted upon by the United States that whenever political jurisdiction and legislative power over any territory are transferred from one nation or sovereign to another, the municipal laws of the country- that is, laws which are intended for the protection of private rights—on tinue in force until abrogated or changed by the new government or sovereign. ly the cession public property passes from one government to the other, but priva property remains as before, and with it those municipal laws which are designed to secure its peaceful use and enjoyment. As a matter of course, all laws, ordinances, and regulations in conflict with the political character, institutions, and constitution of the new government are at once displaced. But with respect to other laws affecting the possession, use, and transfer of property, and designed to secare good order and peace in the community, and promote its health and prosperity, which are of a strictly municipal character, the rule is general that a change of govern ment leaves them in force until, by direct action of the new government, they are altered or repealed. Chicago and Pacific R. R. v. McGlinn, 114 U. S., 542, 547, American Insurance Co. v. Cantor, 1 Pet., 542; Halleck Int. Law, ch. 34, sec. 14. While after such cession the municipal laws of the State governing property an property rights continue in force in the ceded territory, except so far as in confict with the laws and regulations of the United States applying thereto, the crimi laws of the State cease to be of force within the ceded territory, and laws regnlating the sale of intoxicating liquors, requiring a license therefor, and punishing unlicensed sales, cease to be operative, both as in conflict with the regulations of the United States governing military reservations, and as penal in character. Is a Ladd, 74 Fed. Rep., 31. Such cessions are necessarily temporary, to be exercised only so long as tim places continue to be used for the public purposes for which the property was a quired, or reserved from sale." When they cease to be so used the jurisdiction reverts to the State. Fort Leavenworth R. R. Co. v. Lowe, 114 U. S., 525, 542. A lease by the United States to a city for market purposes of vacant land which was a part of land ceded by the State to the United States for the purposes of a navy yard and naval hospital, with a provision that the United States may retain saca use and jurisdiction no longer than the premises are used for such purpose, operates, at least while the lease is in force, to suspend the exclusive authority and jurisdiction of the United States over the leased land, and thereby makes it subject to the jurisdiction of State courts in an action for ouster therefrom. Palmer v. Barrett, 162 U. S., 399. The character and purposes of the occupation of a reservat having been officially and legally established by that branch of the Government which has control over such matters, it is not open to the courts, on a question of said lands, subdivisions, and tracts, and each of them, and report their proceedings to the Secretary of the Interior for his action thereon. If such appraisement be disapproved, the Secretary of the Interior shall again cause the said lands to be appraised as before provided; and when the appraisement has been approved he shall cause the said lands, subdivisions, and lots to be sold at public sale, lie sale. to the highest bidder for cash, at not less than the ap- Conditions of praised value thereof, nor less than one dollar and twentyfive cents per acre, first having given not less than sixty jurisdiction, to inquire what may be the actual uses to which any portion of the reserve is temporarily put. Benson v. U. S., 146 U. S., 331. Over lands reserved for military or other governmental purposes in the Territories the jurisdiction of the United States is necessarily paramount. When a Territory is admitted as a State it is within the power of Congress to stipulate for the power of exclusive jurisdiction over such reservations, or to except them from the jurisdiction of the State. Failing to do this, however, the State can exercise such authority and jurisdiction over them as over similar property held by private individuals; and the United States can acquire ex lusive jurisdiction only when the same has been formally ceded by the legislature of the State in which the lands are situated. Fort Leavenworth R. R. Co. v. Lowe, 114 U. S., 525. Lands acquired by the United States for public uses, by purchase with the consent of the States, or by an exercise of the right of eminent domain, are not public lands, that term applying only to "such lands as are subject to sale or other disposition under general laws.' Newhall v. Singer, 92 U. S., 761. When an act admitting a State into the Union, or organizing a Territorial government, provides that the lands in possession of an Indian tribe shall not be a part of such State or Territory, the new government has no jurisdiction over them. Langford &. Monteith, 102 U. S., 145. For an example of such a reservation on the part of Congress in the admission of a State into the Union see the act of July 10, 1890 (26 Stat. L., 222), admitting the State of Wyoming. “Jurisdiction over territory in a State may be acquired by the United States, under the seventeenth clause of section 8 of Article I of the Constitution, by the purchase of such territory, with the consent of the State, for the erection of forts, magazines, arsenals, dockyards, and other needful buildings. The Constitution gives Congress the power of exercising exclusive legislation over such place, and this is held to mean exclusive jurisdiction. The State's consent to the purchase for any one of these constitutional purposes invests the United States with exclusive jurisdiction, and the State can not, even by the express language of its legislation, reserve to itself any part of this jurisdiction. (The reservation of the right of serving process for causes of action arising outside such territory is not held to be an actual reservation of a part of the exclusive jurisdiction intended to be vested in the United States.) But it would seem that this is only true when the purchase is for one of the Constitutional purposes. By correct construction, "other needful buildings" would wean buildings of the same character as those specified-buildings intended for military or defensive purposes. A more comprehensive ineauing has, indeed, been sometimes given to the expression, but no justification for such construction is found, a a In Pinckney's draft of a constitution there was this clause: To provide such dockyards and arsenals and erect such fortifications as may be necessary for the United States, and to exercise exclusive jurisdiction therein." (This draft was submitted May 29, 1787.) There was no corresponding provision in the Constitution reported by the committee of detail (August 6), but the committee of eleven, by report of September 5, recommended the adoption of the clause as it now reads, except that it did not have the words "by the consent of the legislature of the State." In the debate on the proposition Mr. Gerry contended that this power might be made use of to enslave any particular State by buying up its territory, and that the strongholds proposed would be a means of awing the State into an undue obedience to the General Gov. ernment. Mr. King thought himself the provision unnecessary, the power being already involved; but would move to insert, after the word 'purchased,' the words by the consent of the legislature of the State.' This would certainly make the power safe." (5 Elliot's Debates, 511.) And in The Federalist (No. 43) it is remarked: "Nor would it be proper for the places on which the security of the entire Union may depend to be in any degree dependent on a particular member of it." So Story says (1224): "The other part of the power, giving exclusive legislation over places ceded for the erection of forts, magazines, etc., seems still more necessary for the public convenience and safety. The public money expended on such places, and the public property deposited in them, and the nature of the military duties which may be required there, all demand that they should be exempted from State authority. In truth, it would be wholly improper that places on which the security of the entire Union may depend should be subjected to the control of any member of it. The power, indeed, is wholly unexceptionable, since it can only be exercised at the will of the State; and therefore it is placed beyond all reasonable scruple. Yet it did not Lands at pub. |