The Revenge of the Melians: Asymmetric Threats and the Next QDRDIANE Publishing, 2001 - 104 pages |
From inside the book
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Page 12
... Tanker War The recurring themes that have been raised in this chapter can be applied to a recent example . Throughout most of the decade of the 1980s , Iran and Iraq waged a merciless war that managed to 12 THE REVENGE OF THE MELIANS.
... Tanker War The recurring themes that have been raised in this chapter can be applied to a recent example . Throughout most of the decade of the 1980s , Iran and Iraq waged a merciless war that managed to 12 THE REVENGE OF THE MELIANS.
Page 13
... Iran had some unique advantages . The Iranian Navy , while greatly weakened from the revolution of 1979 , was still the most powerful indigenous navy in the Gulf . Geography also helped . The long coastline of Iran gave ample ...
... Iran had some unique advantages . The Iranian Navy , while greatly weakened from the revolution of 1979 , was still the most powerful indigenous navy in the Gulf . Geography also helped . The long coastline of Iran gave ample ...
Page 14
... Iranian approach seemed to pay divi- dends , but in December 1986 the Kuwaitis requested information about reflagging ... Iran in raising the stakes . Mines , while slightly more difficult to trace to their sponsor , also held the danger ...
... Iranian approach seemed to pay divi- dends , but in December 1986 the Kuwaitis requested information about reflagging ... Iran in raising the stakes . Mines , while slightly more difficult to trace to their sponsor , also held the danger ...
Page 15
... Iran , with the tacit approval of the United States . Iraqi attacks on Iran - bound vessels ( and , occasion- ally , by accident on U.S. warships , namely the Stark and the Chandler ) were as frequent as Iranian attacks.40 This low ...
... Iran , with the tacit approval of the United States . Iraqi attacks on Iran - bound vessels ( and , occasion- ally , by accident on U.S. warships , namely the Stark and the Chandler ) were as frequent as Iranian attacks.40 This low ...
Page 16
... Iranian use of mines and other forms of unconven- tional naval warfare sought disproportionate effect at low risk and cost . They were able to achieve this at times , but ultimately they were unable to execute this component of their ...
... Iranian use of mines and other forms of unconven- tional naval warfare sought disproportionate effect at low risk and cost . They were able to achieve this at times , but ultimately they were unable to execute this component of their ...
Other editions - View all
The Revenge Of The Melians: Asymmetric Threats And The Next Qdr Kenneth McKenzie,Kenneth F. McKenzie, Jr. No preview available - 2005 |
Revenge of the Melians:Asymmetric Threats and the Next QDR Kenneth F. McKenzie No preview available - 2000 |
Common terms and phrases
Ability to move achieve action adversary aircraft allied forces American anthrax antiaccess asym asymmetric actor asymmetric approaches asymmetric attack asymmetric warfare Athenians attack using WMD ballistic missile battlespace biological warfare biological weapons capability chapter chemical weapons CINC coalition combat component conventional counter crisis damage dangerous Department of Defense deploy deter disproportionate effect Eastland electromagnetic pulse employed employment environment fight forces by sealift Gulf HEMP High Highest Highest High High information operations information warfare Iran Iranians Japanese Joint lethal limited major theater Measure of effectiveness Melian Dialogue Melians ment National Defense University National Guard nonstate actors Northland nuclear weapons opponent ports regional relative likelihood response satellite scenario sealift Naval freedom Southland strategic effect strategic level tactical level target tion traditional terrorist means U.S. and allied U.S. forces U.S. homeland U.S. national U.S. Navy urban vulnerable Washington weapons of mass Westland WMD or traditional
Popular passages
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