the action, what we have said would dispose entered into between W. C. Welborn and of this case, but the record further shows that subsequent to the first trial of this cause the defendant secured a good title to the land conveyed him by the plaintiff by obtaining quitclaim deeds from Mrs. Wakefield and Ira C. Welborn, and after the cause was reversed by the Supreme Court the plaintiff, by leave of court, filed his amended reply to the defendant's amended answer, and pleaded that by virtue of said quitclaim deeds any defect or irregularity complained of by the defendant had been completely cured. The quitclaim deeds, which were introduced in evidence, contained the following recital: "That I (name of grantor) for and in consideration of the sum of ten ($10.00) dollars cash in hand paid by J. F. Harbour, receipt of which is hereby acknowledged, and the further consideration to perfect the title to the hereinafter described land, said defect in said title being a defective acknowledgment to a power of attorney which I made to W. C. Welborn, dated October 6, 1908, as recorded in Book 23, page 431, of the Deed Records of Reeves County, Texas, and to correct that certain deed by Ira C. Welborn by his agent and attorney in fact, W. C. Welborn, dated October 9, 1909, conveying to T. J. Herron the hereinafter described land, said deed recorded in Book 34, page 187, of the Deed Records of Reeves County, Texas, and to perfect the title to the hereinafter described land in J. F. Harbour, the grantee herein, the said T. J. Herron having heretofore, by deed dated October 28, 1910, conveyed the hereinafter described land to the said J. F. Harbour; and for the further consideration that the said J. F. Harbour, make payment of the consideration to the said T. J. Herron, as mentioned in said deed from T. J. Herron to the said J. F. Harbour as dated October 28, 1910, as aforesaid, have granted, sold, conveyed and quitclaimed and by these presents do grant, sell, and quitclaim unto the said J. F. Harbour, .of the county of Oklahoma, state of Oklahoma, all my right, title, interest, and estate in and to the following described land in Reeves county, state of Texas, to wit." Then follows the description of the land. These deeds were delivered to and filed for record by the defendant, and, according to the recitals therein, he agreed to pay the plaintiff the consideration named in the original deed from the plaintiff to him. It also appears from the record that these deeds were executed by Ira C. Welborn and Mrs. Alice Wakefield pursuant to a contract the defendent Harbour, wherein Mr. Harbour, for considerations named in the contract, was to purchase the other undivided one-half interest in said land from Mr. W. C. Welborn, together with other lands. For various reasons this contract could not be carried out promptly, and the grantors in the quitclaim deeds refused to deliver the deeds to Mr. Harbour until he conveyed them certain unincumbered lands to which he had title, and exceeding in value the sum claimed by the plaintiff to be due on the purchase price. Mr. Harbour positively testified that he was required to deed this land to Alice Wakefield and Ira C. Welborn in order to procure the correction deeds, and also to convey certain other lands to Mr. W. C. Welborn. While there is some evidence in the record to the effect that the quitclaim deeds recited the true consideration for their execution and delivery, the evidence, as a whole, amply supports Mr. Harbour's contention that he paid a new and independent consideration to the grantors in the quitclaim deeds in excess of the notes executed to Mr. Herron as a part of the purchase price for the same land. The true consideration in a deed may be shown by parol. [6] It has uniformly been held that, where a vendor sells land, the title to which is defective and the purchaser is compelled to acquire an outstanding title which inures to the benefit of the seller, said purhaser is entitled to be reimbursed for what he has reasonably expended in acquiring the outstanding adverse or superior title. also entitled to interest and expenses necHe is essarily incurred, the total amount not to exceed, however, the value of the land. Lewis v. Boskins, 27 Ark. 61; Smith v. Meek, 85 Ky. 46, 2 S. W. 650; Hardeman v. Cowan, 18 Miss. (10 Smedes & M.) 486; Kindley v. Gray, 41 N. C. 445: Stephens v. Black, 77 Pa. 138; Austin v. McKinney, 73 Tenn. (5 Lea) 488; Denson v. Love, 58 Tex. 468; Davis v. Jelks, 13 La. Ann. 432: Thredgill v. Pintard, 53 U. S. (12 How.) 24, 13 L. Ed. 877; 39 Cyc. p. 1630. ( This case has been twice tried in the district court, each trial resulting in a judgment for the defendant, and there being no reversible error called to our attention in the briefs, the judgment is affirmed. All the Justices concur. (75 Okl. 166) (182 P.) HUGHES et al. v. WATKINS et al. (No. 8988.) to make questions for the jury as to whether the holder of the junior mortgage was not put upon inquiry and would not have learned of the prior mortgagee's lien by investigation, and the trial (Supreme Court of Oklahoma. July 15, 1919.) court erred in instructing a verdict. Former opinion modified. For former opinion, see 173 Pac. 369. PER CURIAM. Shortly after the opinion in the foregoing case was handed down, an order was made withdrawing it for correction. That portion of the statement in the opinion beginning with subdivision 1, down to and inclusive of the words "enrolled as a freedman," should, in order to accurately state the facts, read as follows: "An examination of the record discloses that a number of witnesses testified that Nicey Sizemore, the deceased allottee, was a daughter of Governor Nero, a negro, and a full-blood Creek Indian woman, and that Lucy Barnett was the stepdaughter of Governor Nero and the daughter of a negro woman called Polly. The record evidence admitted and offered supports this testimony, inasmuch as the enrollment card of Nicey Sizemore, admitted, establishes the fact that she was enrolled as a full-blood Creek Indian, and the card of Lucy Barnett, offered and excluded, shows that she was enrolled as a freedman." Also, there should be stricken from the opinion the third paragraph of the syllabus and all that portion of subdivision 3 of the opinion treating of the question of the applicability of section 3 of the act of May 27, 1908 (35 Stat. at L. 313, c. 199). As corrected in this respect, the opinion is approved and adopted and ordered refiled. (72 Okl. 308) BLEVINS et al. v. W. A. GRAHAM CO. (No. 8164.) 2. CHATTEL MORTGAGES 153-MORTGAGE NOT FILED-VALIDITY AS TO SUBSEQUENT MORTGAGE-STATUTE. Comp. Laws Okl. 1909, § 4422, provided that a mortgage of personal property was void and incumbrancers in good faith for value, unas against creditors and subsequent purchasers less the original or an authenticated copy was filed as therein required. Rev. Laws Okl. 1910, § 4031, contains a similar provision, except that the words "in good faith" are omitted; but a further provision of such section, relating to mortgages on property in an unorganized county, makes such mortgages void against subsequent purchasers or incumbrancers in good faith that a chattel mortgage shall cease to be valid for value, unless filed. Section 4035 provides as against subsequent purchasers or incumbrancers in good faith after the expiration of three that the Legislature did not intend to make an years, unless a renewal certificate is filed. Held, unfiled mortgage invalid as against a purchaser for value; but, having notice of the mortgage, used the words "purchasers, and incumbrancers for value" in the first part of the section in the same sense as the words "purchasor incumbrancers * * in good faith for value" in the last part of the section. 3. STATUTES 181(2), 184, 205, 225-CONSTRUCTION OTHER STATUTES REMEDY CONSEQUENCES. * er, To ascertain the intention of the Legislature in the enactment of the statute, the court may look to each part of the statute, to other statutes upon the same or relative subjects, to the evils and mischiefs to be remedied, and to the natural or absurd consequences of any particular interpretation. Error from County Court, Mays County; H. A. Kehn, Judge. Action in conversion by George Blevins and (Supreme Court of Oklahoma. May 13, 1919.) another against the W. A. Graham Company. (Syllabus by the Court.) 1. CHATTEL MORTGAGES 157(3)-EXISTENCE OF PRIOR LIEN-QUESTION for Jury. In a suit for conversion by a mortgagee whose mortgage was prior as to date, but was not witnessed or acknowledged, but filed in the office of the county clerk, against a mortgagee who sold the property covered by the mortgages and applied the proceeds of the sale upon the debt secured by his mortgage, and where the holder of such junior mortgage saw and read the senior mortgage in the office of the county clerk, but pursued his investigations no further, but deemed said senior mortgage void for want of subscribing witnesses or proper acknowledgment before some officer authorized to take acknowledgments, and proceeded to take his mortgage and have the same properly executed and filed for record, and, when default was made by the mortgagor, sold the property and applied the proceeds as aforesaid, evidence held Judgment for defendant on a directed verdict, and plaintiffs bring error. Reversed and remanded, with directions. A. C. Brewster and Forrester Brewster, both of Pryor, for plaintiffs in error. J. H. Langley, of Pryor, for defendant in error. JOHNSON, J. This was an action in conversion brought in the county court of Mayes county, Okl., by George Blevins and E. N. Jackson, plaintiffs in error, against W. A. Graham Company, a corporation, defendant in error. Judgment was for the defendant. The trial court, after hearing the cause, directed the jury to return a verdict for the defendant. To this ruling the plaintiff duly excepted, and brings error, setting up five assignments of error, only one of which it is necessary to comment upon here, as the other For other cases see same topic and KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests and Indexes assignments of error can all be disposed of by disposing of this one. Did the court err in peremptorily instructing the jury to return a verdict in favor of the defendant? The parties practically agree upon the evidence, and the case depends upon the construction of sections 4031 and 4036, Revised Laws 1910, relating to Chattel Mortgages. The record discloses the following facts: On April 16, 1915, one Mayes Johnson executed to the plaintiffs his chattel mortgage, cov. ering a certain horse, as security therefor. The chattel mortgage was neither acknowledged by a proper officer nor subscribed by any witnesses. It was deposited with the county clerk (ex officio register of deeds) on April 21, 1915, and marked "Filed." On May 15, 1915, the same Mayes Johnson and Emma Johnson, his wife, executed to defendant their promissory note for $700, together with their chattel mortgage on personal property to secure the same, which personal property included the same horse covered by plaintiff's mortgage. The defendant's mortgage was duly acknowledged by a prop er officer and duly filed for record May 15, 1915. One C. H. Graham, secretary and treasurer of the defendant corporation, who acted as the representative of the corporation in the securing of defendant's mortgage, searched the records of the office of the county clerk, prior to the taking of defendant's mortgage, and saw the plaintiff's mortgage and read it. About June 15, 1915, the defendant took possession of the horse on account of default in the payment of its note, and sold it, applying the proceeds to the $700 note. The plaintiff brought an action for damages in conversion with the result as above stated. The claim is made on behalf of the defendant that the statutes of Oklahoma invalidate plaintiff's mortgage as to them, because neither the original mortgage nor a copy thereof authenticated by the register of deeds was filed for record. For many years the statute of Oklahoma relating to this subject read as follows: "A mortgage of personal property is void as against creditors of the mortgagor, and subsequent purchasers, and incumbrancers of the property in good faith, for value, unless the original or an authenticated copy thereof, be filed by depositing the same in the office of the register of deeds of the county where the property mortgaged, or any part thereof, is at such time situated." Section 4422, Snyder's Comp. Laws Okl. 1909. See Strahorn-Hutton-Evans Commission Co. v. Florer, 7 Okl. 499, 54 Pac. 710. In 1911 the Legislature of Oklahoma adopted the revision of the state statutes made by code commissioners known as the Revised Laws of Oklahoma, and the corresponding provision is found as a part of section 4031, but the words "in good faith" are omitted. It is contended that this change of the statute renders void the plaintiff's mortgage, because the defendants were subsequent incumbranc ers for value. The statute in question 'is a portion of a chapter relating to the execution, recording, and effect of mortgages upon real and personal property. Other sections of the chapter retain the exception of actual notice as equivalent to a sufficient notice by record. Sections 4031, 4035, Revised Laws Okl. 1910. [3] In order to ascertain the intention of the Legislature in the enactment of section 4031, the court may look to each part of the statute, to other statutes upon the same or relative subjects, to the old law upon the subject, to the evils and mischiefs to be remedied, and to the natural or absurd consequences of any particular interpretation. Lewis' Suth. Stat. Const. §§ 378, 382, 471; Endlich on Interp. of Stats. §§ 39, 295, 298; Holy Trinity Church v. United States, 143 U. S. 457, 12 Sup. Ct. 511, 36 L. Ed. 226; Knowlton v. Moore, 178 U. S. 41, 20 Sup. Ct. 747, 44 L. Ed. 969; United States v. Hogg, 112 Fed. 909, 50 C. C. A. 608; Interstate Drainage & Invest. Co. v. Board of Com'rs, 158 Fed. 270, 85 C. C. A. 532; Hemmer v. United States, 204 Fed. 898, 123 C. C. A. 194; Harper v. Victor, 212 Fed. 903, 129 C. C. A. 423. [1, 2] The remaining portion of section 4031 is as follows: "And a mortgage of personal property situ ated in portions of this state attached to an organized county thereof for judicial purposes shall be void against creditors of the mortgagor, subsequent purchasers, or incumbrancers of the property in good faith for value, unless the original or an authenticated copy thereof, be de-. posited and filed in the office of the register of deeds of the county to which the territory in which such property is situated is attached for judicial purposes." If a literal interpretation is placed upon this section, an unrecorded mortgage upon personal property situated in unorganized counties is void as to purchasers in good faith, but a mortgage upon property situated in organized counties is void as to purchasers in bad faith. Section 4035 provides that a chattel mortgage shall cease to be valid as against subsequent purchasers or incumbran cers in good faith after the expiration of three years from filing for record, unless a renewal certificate is filed. We cannot believe that the Legislature of Oklahoma intended to inaugurate a new policy or to declare that one who knew of an existing incumbrance might ignore it and acquire property free from any lien, if he but paid some consideration to the seller. Nor was it intended that one rule should apply in organized counties and the opposite rule in unorganized counties, nor one rule as to the real estate mortgages, and its opposite as to chattel mortgages. The purpose of the statute was to give constructive notice to those whose dealings were in good faith, and who had no actual knowledge of the facts. The words "purchasers, and incumbrancers for value" in the first portion of (182 P.) "In an action of replevin, the right of a creditor to the possession of the property in controversy, who holds a chattel mortgage on his debtor's property, good as between the parties, but void as to other creditors because not filed as required by law, but who has taken possession of the mortgaged property, after condition broken, as security for the debt, with the consent of the mortgagor, is superior, under section 3578, Wilson's Rev. & Ann. St. Okl. 1903, to that of a subsequent execution creditor who has levied upon the same. Greenville National Bank Evans-Snyder-Buel Co., 9 Okl. 353, 60 Pac. 249, is overruled." section 4031 are used in the same sense as the 908: "A chattel mortgage is valid between the parties thereto and purchasers with actual notice of its existence, although same be neither witnessed nor acknowledged." We hold that in view of the authorities supra, and the evidence, there were questions for the jury as to whether the holder of the junior mortgage was not put upon inquiry, and could not have learned of the prior mortgagee's lien by investigation, and that the trial court erred in instructing a verdict. Cause reversed and remanded, with direction that further proceedings be had not inconsistent with the views herein expressed. SHARP, RAINEY, PITCHFORD, HARAlso in the case of Dabney et al. v. Hatha- RISON, and MCNEILL, JJ., concur. way, 51 Okl. 658, 152 Pac. 77: "Under section 4031, Rev. Laws 1910, which makes a chattel mortgage void as against creditors of the mortgagor, and subsequent purchasers and incumbrancers of the property for value, unless the mortgage 'be filed by depositing the same in the office of the register of deeds of the county where the property mortgaged, or any part thereof, is at such time situated.' Held, that the mortgagee has done all the law requires of him when he has filed the mortgage by depositing it in the office of the register of deeds; and, if the instrument is not then properly recorded and indexed, it is the fault of the register of deeds, and the mortgagee will not lose his rights or be made to suffer by reason of the laches of the register of deeds." The defendant in support of his contention cites the case of Greenville National Bank v. Evans-Snyder-Buel Co., 9 Okl. 353, 60 Pac. 249: "A chattel mortgage which is not signed by two witnesses, under section 3275 of the Statutes of Oklahoma 1893, which provides that 'a mortgage of personal property must be signed by the mortgagor in the presence of two persons, who must sign the same as witnesses thereto, and no further proof or acknowledgment is required to admit it to be filed,' is not entitled to be filed in the office of the register of deeds of any county in Oklahoma, and if a register of deeds files a chattel mortgage which has not been signed by two witnesses, such filing gives the mortgagee absolutely no rights which he would not have had without such filing" -which has been expressly overruled by this court in the case of Frick Co. v. Oats et al., 20 Okl. 491, 94 Pac. 688: PER CURIAM. Plaintiff in error, Henry Andrews, was convicted in the district court of Choctaw county on a change of venue from McCurtain county of the crime of robbery. The information charges that in McCurtain county, on or about the 11th day of May, 1917, he did unlawfully and feloniously and by means of force and fear take from the possession of Louis Kirk the sum of $773.50. The jury fixed his punishment at imprisonment in the penitentiary for the term of 20 years. From the judgment rendered on the verdict on the 31st day of October, 1917, an appeal was taken by filing in this court May 1, 1918, a petition in error with case-made. Plaintiff in error has filed a motion to dismiss his appeal, signed by himself and acknowledged before J. G. Duncan, a notary, public in and for Pittsburg county, which motion is allowed, and the appeal herein is dismissed. Bridges & Vertrees, of Waurika, for plain- AMERICAN EXPRESS CO. v. BAGWELL tiff in error. (Supreme Court of Oklahoma. May 21, 1918. On Rehearing, Sept. 9, 1919.) Commissioners' Opinion, Division No. 1. Error from County Court, Bryan County; J. L. Rappolee, Judge. Action by Bagwell Bros. against the American Express Company. Judgment for plaintiffs, and defendant brings error. On rehearing, reversed and remanded for a new trial. G. F. Deck, of Durant, and Porter Newman, of Durant, for plaintiff in error. RUMMONS, C. The plaintiff in error in due time perfected its appeal from the judgment of the trial court, and in accordance with the rules of this court on July 9, 1917, duly served and filed its brief herein. The defendant in error has failed to file a brief, request an extension of time in which to file brief, or offer any excuse for failure to file brief. From an examination of the brief of plaintiff in error, the argument and authorities seem to sustain the assignments of error presented in its brief. This court not being required to search the record for reasons to affirm the judgment of the court below, under rule 7 of this court (171 Pac. x), the judgment of the trial court should be reversed, and this cause remanded for a new trial. On Rehearing. PER CURIAM. This cause was reversed on May 21, 1918, for failure of defendant in error to file brief as required by rule 7 (171 Pac. x). Rehearing was granted on showing made as to why brief had not been filed. The cause was submitted on October 9, 1918, and on November 14, 1918, an order was entered granting defendant in error thirty days additional time in which to file brief. No brief having been filed as yet and no reason given for failure to file same, the opinion filed May 21, 1918, reversing said cause is adhered to and cause reversed and remanded for new trial. PER CURIAM. Brooks Andrews was convicted in the district court of Jefferson county of a violation of the prohibitory liquor laws, second offense, and his punishment fix ed as above stated. since the 29th day of January, 1918; the This appeal has been pending in this court which time no appearance was made by any cause having been submitted June 3, 1919, åt counsel representing plaintiff in error, nor has any brief been filed in his behalf. Rule IX of this court (165 Pac. x) provides: "When no counsel appears, and no briefs are filed, the court will examine the pleadings, the instructions of the court and the exceptions taken thereto, and the judgment and sentence, and if no prejudicial error appears, will affirm the judgment." This appeal has evidently been abandoned. An examination of the pleadings, instructions, and judgment and sentence discloses no prejudicial error, and in accordance with rule IX, supra, the judgment is affirmed. BOWDRY v. STATE. (No. A-3249.) (Criminal Court of Appeals of Oklahoma. Aug. 12, 1919.) Appeal from County Court, Tulsa County; H. L. Standeven, Judge. B. W. Bowdry was convicted of the crime of unlawful possession of intoxicating liquors, and sentenced to pay a fine of $200, and to serve 90 days in the county jail, and he appeals. Appeal dismissed. O. S. Booth, of Tulsa, for plaintiff in error. PER CURIAM. This is an appeal from the county court of Tulsa county, wherein the defendant, B. W. Bowdry, was convicted of the crime of unlawful possession of intoxicating liquors in the county court of Tulsa county, and judgment rendered on the 22d day of September, 1917, adjudging that the defendant pay a fine of $200 and be sentenced to the county jail for a period of 90 days. From this judgment, an appeal was attempted to be taken to this court, but the petition in error and case-made were not filed in this court Jefferson until the 22d day of January, 1918, more than 120 days after the rendition of judgment, to ANDREWS v. STATE. (No. A-3251.) (Criminal Court of Appeals of Oklahoma. Aug. 12, 1919.) Appeal from District Court, County; Cham Jones, Judge. Brooks Andrews was convicted of a viola-wit, the 122d day. tion of the prohibitory liquor laws, second offense, and sentenced to pay a fine of $500 and to serve one year's imprisonment in the state reformatory at Granite, and appeals. Affirmed. Where the appeal in misdemeanor cases is not filed within 120 days after the rendition of the judgment, this court has no jurisdic tion to entertain the same. 7 Okl. Cr. 48, 121 Pac. 1089; Eaton v. State, |