Nuclear Reactor Security Against Sabotage: Oversight Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Energy and the Environment of the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, House of Representatives, Ninety-fifth Congress, First Session ... Held in Washington, D.C., May 5, 1977, Issue 19

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Page 136 - Isolation zones shall be maintained in outdoor areas adjacent to the physical barrier at the perimeter of the protected area and shall be of sufficient size to permit observation of the activities of people on either side of that barrier in the event of its penetration. If parking facilities are provided for employees or visitors, they shall be located outside the isolation zone and exterior to the protected area barrier.
Page 2 - Tennessee, has been prepared by the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation of the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission. This supplement...
Page 222 - defense-in depth" concept of reactor plant design. 2. The massive structure of the plant, which protects critical components from external attack. 3. The safety design basis of the plant, which emphasizes system reliability, flexibility, redundancy, and protection against commonmode failures. 4. Engineered safety features, which are added to the basic system to cope with abnormal operations or accidents.
Page 192 - Intrusion alarm shall be functionally tested for operability and required performance at the beginning and end of each interval during which it is used for security, but not less frequently than once every seven (7) days. (3) Communications equipment shall be tested for operability and performance not less frequently than once at the beginning of each security personnel work shift.
Page 181 - Instruct guards or other armed response personnel to prevent or delay an act of industrial sabotage by applying a sufficient degree of force to counter that degree of force directed at them, including the use of deadly force when there is a reasonable belief it is necessary in self-defense or in the defense of others.
Page 1 - NFC has not operated decisively or effectively in the security area and, as a result, security systems at perhaps all powerplants would not be able to withstand sabotage attempts by threats that are now considered minimum by NRC.
Page 157 - ... special nuclear material and who require such access to perform their duties. Authorization for such individuals shall be provided by the issuance of specially coded numbered badges indicating vital areas and material access areas to which access is authorized. Unoccupied vital areas and material...
Page 137 - Whenever there is evidence that any key, lock, combination, or related equipment may have been compromised it shall be changed. Upon termination of employment of any employee, keys, locks, combinations, and related equipment to which that employee had access, shall be changed.
Page 181 - An acceptable safeguards contingency plan must contain (Da predetermined set of decisions and actions to satisfy stated objectives, (2) an identification of the data, criteria, procedures, and mechanisms necessary to effect efficiently the decisions and actions, and (3) a specification of the individual, group, or organizational entity responsible for each decision and action.
Page 251 - On the basis of intelligence and other relevant information available to the NRC, there are no known groups in this country having the combination of motivation, skill, and resources to attack either a fuel facility or a nuclear power reactor. In addition, studies have indicated that the generic characteristics — ie, the "defense-in-depth" concept of reactor plant design — of commercial power reactors make the releasing of radioactivity by acts of sabotage difficult.

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