"It was probably with the idea of crippling this base from which her pursuers were radiating that the Emden made her raid here. Had she found it temporarily undefended she could, at one blow, seriously have embarrassed the English cruisers patrolling these waters and at the same time caused a terrific loss to English commerce by sinking the many merchantmen at anchor in the harbor. "It was early on Wednesday morning that the Emden, with a dummy fourth funnel and flying the British ensign, in some inexplicable fashion sneaked past the French torpedo boat Mosquet, which was on patrol duty outside, and entered the outer harbor of Penang. Across the channel leading to the inner harbor lay the Russian cruiser Jemtchug. Inside were the French torpedo boats Fronde and Pistolet and the torpedo boat destroyer D'Iberville. The torpedo boats lay beside the long Government wharf, while the D'Iberville rode at anchor between two tramp steamers. "At full speed the Emden steamed straight for the Jemtchug and the inner harbor. In the semi-darkness of the early morning the Russian took her for the British cruiser Yarmouth, which had been in and out two or three times during the previous week and did not even "query" her. Suddenly, when less than four hundred yards away, the Emden emptied her bow guns into the Jemtchug and came on at a terrific pace, with all the guns she could bring to bear in action. When she had come within two hundred and fifty yards she changed her course slightly, and as she passed the Jemtchug, poured two broadsides into her, as well as a torpedo, which entered the engine room, but did comparatively little damage. "The Russian cruiser was taken completely by surprise and was badly crippled before she realized what was happening. The fact that her captain was spending the night ashore, and that there was no one on board who seemed capable of acting energetically, completed the demoralization. She was defeated before the battle began. However, her men finally manned the light guns and brought them into action. "In the meantime the Emden was well inside the inner harbor and among the shipping. She saw the French torpedo boats there, and apparently realized at once that unless she could get out before they joined in the action her fate was sealed. At such close quarters (the range was never more than four hundred and fifty yards) their torpedoes would have proved deadly. Accordingly, she turned sharply and made for the Jemtchug once more. "All the time she had been in the harbor the Russian had been bombarding her with shrapnel, but owing to the notoriously bad marksmanship prevalent in the Czar's navy had succeeded for the most part only in peppering every merchant ship within range. As the Emden neared the Jemtchug again both ships were actually spitting fire. The range was practically point-blank. Less than one hundred and fifty yards away the Emden passed the Russian, and as she did so torpedoed her amidships, striking the magazine. There was a tremendous detonation, paling into insignificance by its volume all the previous din; a heavy black column of smoke arose and the Jemtchug sank in less than ten seconds, while the Emden steamed behind the point to safety. "No sooner had she done so, however, than she sighted the torpedo boat Mosquet, which had heard the firing and was coming in at top steed. The Emden immediately opened up on her, thereby causing her to turn around in an endeavor to escape. It was too late. After a running fight of twenty minutes the Mosquet seemed to be hit by three shells simultaneously and sank very rapidly. The German had got a second victim. "It was here that the chivalrous bravery of the Emden's captain, which has been many times in evidence throughout her meteoric career, was again shown. If the French boats were coming out, every moment was of priceless value to him. Nevertheless, utterly disregarding this, he stopped, lowered boats, and picked up the survivors from the Mosquet before steaming on his way. "The English here now say of him admiringly, 'He played the game.' "Meantime, boats of all descriptions had started toward the place where the Russian cruiser had last been seen. The water was covered with débris of all sorts, to which the survivors were clinging. They presented a horrible sight when they were landed on Victoria Pier, which the ambulance corps of the Sikh garrison turned into a temporary hospital. Almost all of them had wounds of one sort or another. Many were covered with them. Their blood-stained, and, for the most part, naked, bodies, were enough to send shivers through even the most cold-blooded person. It was a sight I shall not forget for many a day. Out of a crew of three hundred and thirty-four men, one hundred and fortytwo were picked up wounded. Only ninety-four were found practically untouched. Ninety-eight were "missing." It is not yet known how many of the crew of seventy-eight of the Mosquet were rescued by the Emden." "AUSTRIA TRICKED BY MONTENEGRO IN [THE following account is taken from a dispatch of Mr. Lincoln Eyre, staff correspondent of the New York World, dated February 4, 1916, from Lyons, France.] "Partly as a result of a long conversation with the Prime Minister of Montenegro, partly from other informants familiar with the matter, I have been able to get at the truth about the Montenegrin mystery. Both Entente and Teutonic censors have bottled up the facts about Montenegro's collapse, because the facts are not wholly creditable to either side. . . The explanations about the much-discussed treaty of peace between Austria-Hungary and the Montenegrin Government, which the Prince and his companions have certainly provided, have never been printed in any German or Austrian newspaper. "Broadly, the facts about the Montenegrin mystery are as follows: The Quadruple Entente, and particularly Italy, found itself unable to do for Montenegro all that the Montenegrin Government felt it should have done. Italy decided it was wiser not to risk her warships in the Austrian submarine zone, and therefore did not send across the Adriatic the supplies of which the Montenegrins stood in dire need. "Feeling herself in an impossible position, Montenegro asked for an armistice, primarily with the object of getting her troops to a point of safety. The Austrian generals readily consented and negotiations began which the Austrians felt certain would lead to peace. They were tricked, however, to the extent that the King and most of his advisers suddenly escaped from the country, thus breaking off the negotiations. "It is not unlikely, however, that had the Austrians been ready to offer less rigorous terms Montenegro would have capitulated finally. It is this slip-up on their part-after they had announced the conclusion of a peace treaty that so irritated the Austrians and that led the Teutonic censorship to shut down on Montenegrin news. . . ." M. Miouchekovitch, Prime Minister of Montenegro, is quoted by Mr. Erye as having given the following account of the incident: "Finally the Austrians began their furious attack on Mount Lovchen. The bombardment was terrific, and Lovchen is not, as has been stated, impregnable — particularly when it is defended by men whose ammunition is running low, who are without heavy guns and who are insufficiently fed. "To gain time we began to talk of peace. The Austrians were quite ready to join in that talk, but the terms they proposed such as taking from us the hereditary arms carried by every Montenegrin peasant at all times and delivering to them the Serbian troops in our midst were quite impossible. However, we discussed an armistice and thus gained a week, for while the negotiations were in progress the Austrians' advance ceased. "Then it was decided that the royal family must leave. I started off one day with the Queen, Prince Danilo and his consort, and the princesses. The diplomatic corps left the same day and met us at St. Jean de Medua. The King, who wanted to have a final conference with his generals, followed the next day. That is all there is to the much debated separation of King Nicholas and the diplomats accredited to his court." (New York World, February 22, 1916.) (f) Spies THE CAPTURE OF MAJOR ANDRÉ (1780) SIR HENRY CLINTON, in command of the British forces at New York in September, 1780, relates: "About eighteen months before the present period (September, 1780), Mr. Arnold (a major-general in the American service) had found means to intimate to me that... he was desirous of quitting them and joining the cause of Great Britain, could he be certain of personal security and indemnification for whatever loss of property he might thereby sustain. . . . A correspondence was after this opened between us under feigned names; in the course of which he from time to time transmitted to me most material intelligence; and, with a view (as I supposed) of rendering us still more essential service, he obtained in July, 1780,1 the command of all the enemy's forts in the Highlands, then garrisoned by about 4000 men. The local importance of these posts has been already very fully described;3 1 Arnold was appointed to the command of West Point and its dependencies on August 3, 1780, but almost a month earlier he seems to have been able to predict it as probable to Clinton. (Sargent: The Life and Career of Major André [Boston, 1861], pp. 251, 258-59.) 2 Particularly West Point on the Hudson River fifty miles north of the city of New York and on the opposite bank. 3 "The reduction of West Point had long been the hope of the enemy [the British]; but to accomplish it without loss of life would indeed have been a triumph for Clinton and a most brilliant conclusion to the campaign. Mr. Sparks has clearly mapped out the advantages he must have contemplated in this contingency. In the first place, the mere acquisition of a fortress so important, with all its dependencies, garrisons, stores, magazines, vessels, etc., was an achievement of no secondary magnitude. The supplies gathered here by the Americans were very great, and once lost could not have been readily, if at all, restored. The works were esteemed our tower of salvation; an American Gibraltar, impregnable to an army 20,000 strong. Even though yet unfinished, they had cost three years' labor of the army and $3,000,000; and were thought an unfailing and secure resort in the last emergency. But the ulterior consequences of its possession were of even greater importance. It would enable Sir Henry to have checked all trade between New England and the central and southern states. It was, in Washington's eyes, the bolt that locked this communication. The eastern states, chiefly dependent for their corn-stuffs on their sisters in the union, were commercial rather than agricultural communities; and the power that at once commanded the seaboard and the Hudson might easily bring upon them all the horrors of famine. . . . But even these advantages were of less moment than those more immediate. It was shrewdly and correctly suspected |