been disgruntled soldiers aiming weapons at IFOR personnel and having those weapons knocked away. They haven't been fired. But these are not acts of policy. They are acts of individuals. Undisciplined local factions and individuals are the threat down there, people that are just upset with the situation and the way it is going, and having a weapon in their hand and being able to potentially use it or point it at someone. That seems to be the most prevalent recurring threat that we certainly have been seeing in the past couple of weeks. As I said, we have had the 12 landmine incidents. We, of course, continue to have worries about the foreign elements in there and the Iranian connection, potential mujaheddin terrorists. But landmines, what I want to stress here, are not the only threat that our forces face. They are one, and have to be seen in the context of threat, and in fact in many days they are not the primary threat the forces face. What I would like to conclude with, and what I hope I have given you a sense of from what I have been able to share with you today at this level, is that we believe we have reliable intelligence on the mine situation. We believe we have that from previous intelligence estimates, from having tracked the former Yugoslavia. We believe that information is being adequately and significantly supplemented by what the warring factions are providing to us in accordance with the Dayton accords. And, as I think you are going to hear and be convinced in a few moments, we have a wonderful scientific and technology data base from which to assess what these mines are, how they operate, how they should be cleared, how they should be searched for and how they can be handled in a safe way in a battlefield environment. As I said, we have the cooperation of the warring factions, and from our perspective that makes the mine threat certainly dangerous but a manageable threat to the implementation force in Bosnia, sir. Pending your questions. Mr. WELDON. Thank you, Mr. Mazzafro. We will hold the questions until we have the whole panel. With that, we will turn to Mr. Reeder, who is an intelligence analyst for the National Ground Intelligence Center. Thank you, and you may begin. STATEMENT OF THOMAS REEDER, LANDMINE WARFARE ANALYST, NATIONAL GROUND INTELLIGENCE CENTER Mr. REEDER. Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to appear today before you regarding the landmine threat in Bosnia and Herzegovina. It is a privilege for me to be able to present technical aspects of the landmine threat and perhaps to provide a perspective on these issues. I am Tom Reeder. I am from the National Ground Intelligence Center. I am a mine warfare analyst and have been studying foreign landmine use and landmine operations for the last 14 years. The landmine threat in the region of the former Republic of Yugoslavia is pervasive. For 42 years mine laying has been ongoing, encompassing every imaginable method ranging from well planned and in place, marked and monitored minefields, to simple hand-scattered antipersonnel mines. Additionally, sophisticated mine laying techniques have been developed which have enhanced obstacles while protecting the mines themselves. A serious threat from booby traps also exists. From the onset, the former Yugoslavian army was extremely well equipped with mines, fuses, special booby trap devices and explosives. The breakdown of national authority, open displays of ethnic hatred, time and these devices themselves have fostered a willingness to booby trap mines, equipment, facilities, and buildings. Quite simply, the landmine situation faced is among the worst in the world. To put it in perspective, only Afghanistan, Cambodia, and Angola clearly have a more daunting problem. Bosnia alone certainly faces at least 1.7 million mines; in the region, 5 to 7 million. As national demining centers emerge, these numbers will fluctuate, but they will not change the obvious scope of the problem. A few germane points to consider: It has been brought up by a number of parties that the former Yugoslavia was a major producer of mines and, again, the vast majority of mines that are being found were produced by the former Yugoslavia. Many of the antipersonnel and antitank mines that are being used are within the category of what we would describe as low metallic content, difficult to detect mines, and I have some examples of these that we can discuss. Perhaps more than 10,000 minefields exist within the region. But, again, most minefields are small point minefields, and they are located at what were once considered important checkpoints, strategic locations, et cetera. But you have to bear in mind the passage of time and the movement of combatants. Shoulders, bypass routes, and U.N.-approved roads, most major routes are safe but shoulders, bypass routes and unapproved roads are highly suspect. We also have to keep in mind that there are some unique regional flavors to this mine laying in Yugoslavia. For example, lessons you may have learned in one location may not directly translate to another location. It is very complex, and those mines and booby traps present a continuous problem to the civilians. The watchword in describing the mines there is that they are random and poorly marked. Again on an up-note, before I finish this train of thought, we do have to bear in mind that UNPROFOR forces were able to successfully operate in this region under these circumstances. I would like to close my prepared comments today with an observation based on participation and support provided to a number of peacekeeping operations or major deployments of the United States and allied forces over the last two decades. I am going to try to do this in a time-line manner so you can understand how this flowed. The landmine situation in Bosnia began to develop as early as mid-1991. In 1992 and 1993, studies in handbooks which quantified this threat were published by the intelligence community jointly with the United States Army Engineer School and our allies. The result is that U.S. Army and allied engineer units throughout Europe quickly and early became focused upon this threat, and they began requesting technical data from their own schools as well as the Euro-NATO Training Engineer Center in Munich. As allied engineer units participating in UNPROFOR developed exper tise in these engineer operations, their observations and lessons learned were freely shared. I feel that this early awareness by engineer commanders and engineer staff officers, in conjunction with the obvious world focus, translated to some serious planning by our military leadership. The end result of this planning and preparation is that prior to movement of a single IFÓR unit, I think the theater was firmly in control. They have established means to analyze and plot known mine locations and to ferret out additional data. This theater response and level of expertise far exceeds anything that I have ever seen, and they have my full respect and admiration. Thank you. [The prepared statement of Mr. Reeder follows:] 23 JANUARY 1996 LANDMINE THREAT IN THE FORMER REPUBLIC MR. THOMAS S. REEDER LANDMINE WARFARE ANALYST NATIONAL GROUND INTELLIGENCE Mr. Reeder is assigned as the senior landmine warfare subject-area analyst, responsible for all-source analysis and intelligence production. Mr. Reeder functions as the focal point for a complex subject area regularly representing Department of Defense and national intelligence agencies. Threat briefings and assessment products are frequently provided in support of multi-service materiel development efforts as well as international programs. Mr. Reeder and his staff have successfully accomplished landmine survey and assessments throughout the world (Afghanistan, Cambodia, El Salvador, Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kuwait, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, Nicaragua, and Somalia) in support of potential and ongoing international demining programs. As a result of Mr. Reeder's accomplishments, the National Ground Intelligence Center has been identified as the "Center of Excellence for Foreign Landmine Warfare." The special surveys and assessments ensued from taskings which supported various agencies including the United Nations (High Commissioner for Refugees), the International Commission of the Red Cross, the Department of State (Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance, Refugee Affairs, and Political Military International Security Operations), the Organization of American States, and the Department of Defense. Mr. Reeder has been a landmine warfare analyst at the National Ground Intelligence Center for the last 13 years. Prior to this period, he served 4 years in the US Army and 4 years in industry. As a Senior Senior Staff Engineer, Mr. Reeder was responsible for estimates, budget, design, contracting, scheduling, and supervision of construction efforts for all major facilities of a major oil company. As a combat engineer officer, Mr. Reeder served in the 82d Airborne Division both in the 307th Engineer Battalion (ABN) and the 618th Engineer Company (LE) (ABN). Mr. Reeder holds a Bachelor of Science in Civil Engineering from the Virginia Military Institute where he graduated with distinction. His civilian accomplishments include awards for service in Desert Shield/Storm, the Defense Intelligence Agency Director's Award for Intelligence, and the Director of Central Intelligence's National Intelligence Medal of Achievement. Key military accomplishments include Honor Graduate of the US Army Ranger School, completion of both Airborne and Jumpmaster Schools, and the award of the Master Parachutist badge. Mr. Reeder's personal interests include commercial wine grape production, horseback riding, boating (canoe and kayak), hiking, farming, and enology. |