technical base". In other words, wanting to produce weapons is very different from being able to do so.

If it is difficult for Libya it is a more daunting challenge for terrorists left to their own devices. The case of the ill-fated Japanese terrorist group-Aum Shinryko-provides important insights that we should consider in reviewing the NLD program. Aum was determined to create such weapons, in part to confirm its founder's apocalyptic predictions. Starting in 1990 Aum invested millions of dollars, employed several Ph.D. scientists, and acquired labs specifically designed to create chemical and biological agents capable of causing mass casualties. They tried twice unsuccessfully to produce and use Botulinus Toxin A (one of the deadliest biological agents). They had a similar failure with anthrax. They successfully produced the nerve agent sarin, but it lacked the purity and effectiveness associated with military-grade weapons. Their attack on the Tokyo subway system injured five thousand people and killed 12. Despite the attack the subways were back in operation the same day.

We cannot ignore the possibility that a terrorist group will try again to produce such weapons, but we should acknowledge that producing such weapons is not easy. Unfortunately that is not the message the American people are receiving. Last November Secretary of Defense Cohen appeared at a press conference holding a bag of sugar and warning that "this amount of anthrax could wipe out Washington, DC". The Secretary of Defense also warned that, “A lone madman or nest of fanatics with a bottle of chemicals, a batch of plague-inducing bacteria, or a crude nuclear bomb can threaten or kill tens of thousands. A few months later the Wall Street Journal (Feb. 27 1998) ran an editorial that perpetuated this myth, claiming that "Chemical and biological weapons can be concocted by just about any determined terrorist in a lab coat". The truth is otherwise. Producing these types of weapons requires infrastructure and expertise more sophisticated than a lab coat and a garage.

Besides being tough to produce these weapons also are difficult to use.

At minimum people handling such substances must wear bulky protective gear or risk killing themselves. Wind, rain, and temperature also adversely affected the performance of chemical and biological weapons. Aum Shinryko, for example, tried but failed to kill three Japanese magistrates with a cloud of sarin because of a wind shift.

Saddam Hussein is one of the few leaders in the world who knows firsthand the limits of these weapons. Saddam used mustard gas, tabun, and anthrax against people—the Kurds and the Iranians to be specific. According to a publicly released CIA document on the Iran-Iraq War, Iraq used chemical weapons "under two types of circumstances: as part of a spoiling attack to repel Iranian forces... and as preparation firing in advance of an Iraqi assault. . . .By the end of the war, Iraqi forces used chemical weapons frequently." Although more than 600,000 Iranians died during the eight-year war with Iraq, only 5,000 died from the chemical weapons. Saddam, however, also discovered that such weapons were unreliable and dangerous to his own troops and people. The same CIA document reports that, "large numbers of Iraq's own troops were killed or injured during Iraqi Chemical attacks." Conventional weapons killed far more Iranians than did the "weapons of mass destruction".

NLD and Domestic Terrorism

I believe it is highly unlikely that terrorists on their own will be able to produce and use chemical and biological weapons within the next five years to cause mass casualties. Producing such weapons generally requires the infrastructure and wealth of a nation. However, as demonstrated by Aum Shinryko, it is possible that a well-financed, well organized group staffed with good scientists can produce potentially lethal chemical or biological agents even if they have not perfected reliable delivery systems to produce mass casualties. It is appropriate, therefore, that the US Government continues steps to help American communities detect and manage this threat.

I believe the Nunn-Lugar-Domenici Act of 1996 was a step in the right direction but share the concerns of the GAO that the good intentions underlying this legislation are not producing good policy results and that resources are being wasted. Specifically, I see two major, inter-related problems:

1. There is a wasteful duplication of effort;

2. No one is really in charge.

The US Government is not paying attention to lessons we have learned from coordinating and organizing resources to deal with international terrorism. International terrorist assistance starts when the US Government offers help or a foreign government request assistance. In either case, there must be the permission and cooperation of the host government. In the case of a specific terrorist incident, such as the bombings in Africa, the US Government personnel and resources dispatched to the scene operate under a clear chain of command. In all cases, there is someone in charge, usually the US Ambassador, who is the President's representative on scene. If military action is required (and the host government has approved that course of action) then there is a set procedure for passing the authority from the Ambassador to the appropriate US military commander on scene. Both the Ambassador and the military commander are acting on behalf of the President as directed by the National Command Authority. Once hostilities cease the military commander returns authority to the Ambassador. In all cases there is a clear understanding of who is in charge and who has authority to do what.

Domestically the chain of command is murky and confused. The US Government has an impressive array of capabilities and services available to help American communities deal with all kinds of disasters, including terrorism. If it is a tornado, a flood, or a hurricane than the chains of command are clearthe Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) is in charge. FEMA has done an outstanding job in this area. However, when the issue is terrorism, the

In my experience, the US Government does a better job of helping foreign governments deal with terrorist threats than state governments because the chains of command are clearer overseas. Consider, for example, the support the United States provided in 1992 before and during the Barcelona Games. The US State Department led the effort, which included several other US departments and agencies. This process started three years before the games and included a systematic assessment of Spanish counter terrorism capabilities and needs and a follow on assessment of the US personnel and equipment that would be required to help identify and deter terrorist incidents. Working through the US Ambassador, the US Government team had one point of contact with the Government of Spain for making important decisions and resolving problems. The Government of Spain had the US team work through a designated point of contact in the Spanish Ministry of Interior.

This was not the case in 1996, when the US Government provided similar services and support to the Atlanta Olympic Committee. The coordination effort was far more cumbersome. Federal Government representatives wanted to help, but the delivery of the assistance was confused. The Federal Government found itself dealing with 22 different jurisdictions, including the City of Atlanta, Fulton County, and the State of Georgia. There was no single government entity in charge within the state. Likewise, the Federal agencies on scene had difficulty sorting out who should set priorities on the federal side because no single agency had the authority that a US Ambassador overseas enjoys.

GAO's report on the implementation of the NLD Act makes clear that this kind of well-intentioned chaos continues. I say well-intentioned because the Federal personnel and agencies involved the Department of Defense, the FBI, FEMA, HHS, as well as the US Congress—are genuinely trying to help combat the threat of chemical and biological terrorism. Unfortunately, no one is really in charge of the process.

Scarcity of resources may be a problem in some federal programs, such is not the case in the field of terrorism. There are too many resources and too many duplications of effort. Responsibility for dealing with chemical and biological "weapons of mass destruction", for example, is split among the U.S. Army Technical Escort Unit, the U.S. Army Medical Research Institute for Infectious Diseases, the Marine Corps' Chemical Biological Incident Response Force, and the Naval Medical Research Institute. In addition, the Center for Disease Control and Prevention, the National Institutes of Health, the Food and Drug Administration, and the Environmental Protection Agency all claim to have a critical role in the process. Meanwhile, the FBI has created its own hazardous materials response unit. The FBI also has proposed building its own forensic labs to handle chemical and biological agents even though facilities already exist at the Center for Disease Control, the Environmental Protection Agency, the National Institutes of Health, at Edgewood Arsenal, and U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID).

We have many lead agencies but we do not have a single leader. DOD has the lead for enhancing domestic preparedness. The FBI, by virtue of a Presidential Decision Directive, has the lead for domestic terrorism while FEMA has the lead for managing the consequence of terrorist incidents. In addition, HHS has the lead for Metropolitan Medical Strike Teams, and the National Guard now has been given the lead for creating ten regional response teams. Having lead agency authority should include the ability to coordinate budgets and programs to ensure they are used efficiently and effectively.

Although the Nunn-Lugar-Domenici Act has provided ample resources to prepare for the threat of chem-bio terrorism, it has inadvertently contributed to bureaucratic chaos and duplication. As I noted earlier the general outlines of the effort is sound-i.e., help train and equip first responders to deal with the threat. I believe three fixes are in order: