Authorization Act, Congress has called for the creation of an integrated national program for the development of threat and risk assessment methodologies, at the urging of this subcommittee, for the establishment of an independent advisory committee; for the production of regular, detailed reports; and for the certification of RAID personnel who will be trained to respond to WMD incidents. The act also authorizes the President to call up reserve forces to assist in responding to a WMD event.

Continued congressional support and leadership are essential to this process. Both the Department of Defense and the Department of Justice, as you have heard, have recently conducted forums with first responders. As Mr. Blitzer reported, without exception, the No. 1 request of first responders has been for the identification of a single Federal agency to lead the training and equipping of first responders.

Mr. Chairman, that's what we're talking about when we talk about a transfer. We're talking about a single Federal agency to deal with the issue of training and equipping first responders.

As the first responders have told all of us who have been participants in these forums, they want the ease, the convenience, and the predictability of one-stop shopping. In an effort to respond to that need, as has been reported this morning, the Department of Defense and the Department of Justice are working to propose an interagency agreement which establishes the Department of Justice as the lead Federal agency for the Federal Domestic Preparedness Program.

As I said, DOD would propose to transfer those facets of the Nunn-Lugar-Domenici legislation that deal with training and exercising first responders, and would be able to rationalize within the interagency the training and equipping programs that are now being conducted partially by DOD and partially by the Department of Justice. If this transfer of authority is accepted, the Department of Defense will support the Department of Justice both during the transition and following its completion.

We believe these actions clearly demonstrate that we are making real, tangible progress toward an enhanced homeland defense. Our goal, as we move into the 21st century, is to have in place an effective, integrated, and flexible response mechanism able to respond to a wide range of unconventional threats.

Although we may never be fully prepared to respond to all types of events in every single location in America, we have begun to lay the foundation for an integrated, across-the-board response, one that makes sense, and one that is truly responsive to the needs of the first responders. The continued partnership for WMD preparation among local, State, and Federal authorities will be essential if we are to be successful in this endeavor.

Mr. Chairman, I stand ready to respond to you for questions. [The prepared statement of Mr. Cragin and Mr. Roberts follows:]

Mr. Chairman, thank you for this opportunity to discuss the Department of Defense (DoD) role in the federal response to domestic terrorism involving weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Our comments will focus on actions taken to date by DoD to provide the domestic emergency preparedness training mandated in Public Law 104-201, better known as the Defense Against Weapons of Mass Destruction Act of 1996, or Nunn-Lugar-Domenici (NLD) Legislation. We will also discuss the integration of the National Guard and other Reserve components into our preparedness plans, our efforts to establish a single lead federal agency for domestic WMD preparedness, and our comments on two GAO draft reports.

The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict (ASD(SO/LIC)) serves as the principal staff assistant and civilian advisor to the Secretary of Defense for policy oversight related to combating terrorism. In that capacity, SO/LIC is responsible for overseeing the policy and resource aspects of DoD's activities in the Domestic Preparedness Program. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs (ASD(RA)) serves as the principal staff assistant to the Secretary of Defense on all matters involving Reserve components of the United States Armed Forces. In that capacity, RA is responsible for overall supervision of Reserve component affairs of DoD. ASD(RA), in coordination with ASD(SO/LIC), is responsible to integrate and rationalize the WMD domestic preparedness training program with the program to equip first responders with WMD-related equipment.

We have organized our remarks in the following manner: first, we will provide a short overview of DoD's combating terrorism program, describing how, in accordance with Presidential Decision Directives 39 and 62, we support the Department of Justice (DOJ) and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) in the crisis management phase of a domestic terrorist incident and how we support the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) in the consequence management phase; second, we will discuss the general DoD policy for domestic preparedness training for first responders; third, we will update efforts to improve the National Guard and other Reserve component contributions in the mission area; fourth, we will address DoD's intent to transfer the domestic preparedness program to DoJ; and finally, we will respond to the findings and recommendations of the General Accounting Office reports, "Combating Terrorism: Opportunities Exist to Gain Focus and Efficiencies in the Nunn-Lugar-Domenici Domestic Preparedness Program," (currently in draft), and “Combating Terrorism: Threat and Risk Assessments Can Help Prioritize and Target Program Investments."

Before we begin, there are three critical points to make as background for our discussion. First, DoD's combating terrorism program is part of a coordinated United States Government (USG) interagency team response. No single agency possesses the authorities, response mechanisms and capabilities to effectively deter or resolve terrorist incidents. The Department of State (DoS) is the lead agency for combating terrorism overseas. DoJ is the lead agency in the U.S., its trusts, and territories. Certainly, as a major supporting agency, DoD brings a wealth of resources to the effort, unique and highly sophisticated in many instances. In the United States we provide support to the

law enforcement authority of the DoJ and the FBI. For consequence management, there is specific technical expertise not only within DoD, but also within the Public Health Service (PHS), Department of Energy (DOE), Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), the FBI and others, all of which FEMA must bring together in a team effort to respond to a domestic WMD release. Simply put, any response to a WMD release requires an interagency team response.

Next, DoD has been looking at mitigating the effects of a WMD incident for several years, well before it became a subject of public discussion following the demise of the Soviet Union and the 1995 sarin gas attack in a Tokyo subway. Although the combating terrorism community inherited a solid foundation and a well functioning interagency process from previous administrations, our review of WMD terrorism dramatically illustrated new tactical, technical, and policy challenges posed by domestic terrorism.

The USG is working hard to deter or to prevent, and should that fail, to minimize the effects of a WMD terrorist incident. Nevertheless, there are no silver bullets. We have an excellent response capability, probably the finest in the world; but we cannot say with absolute certainty that we can prevent the eventual use of a WMD device, or that our current procedures could negate the mass casualties and damage associated with such an attack.

Finally, the programs we discuss today to help solve these challenges will take time - several years at a minimum; significant resources, including adequate funding; public education; and a committed partnership by the nation's leadership at all levels – local, state and federal – to create a system in the United States in which a WMD incident can be successfully managed with a minimum loss of life and physical damage.

Within DoD, we divide our Combating Terrorism Program into three components: anti-terrorism, counter-terrorism and terrorism consequence management. Anti-terrorism involves all defensive measures employed to protect personnel and facilities against a terrorist incident. Conversely, counter-terrorism refers to offensive response measures to deter, resolve and mitigate a terrorist act. Terrorism consequence management includes a range of activities required to provide emergency assistance to alleviate damage, loss, hardship, or suffering caused by WMD terrorism attacks and to protect the public health and safety and restore essential government services.

It is DoD policy to protect its personnel, their families, facilities and equipment from terrorism. Toward that end, DoD specifically funds and executes programs for security at military installations and DoD dependent schools, for a widespread training and awareness program and for upgraded antiterrorism/force protection measures for military commands abroad and at home.

When looking at counter-terrorism efforts, DoD has a number of rapid response elements for responding to specific terrorist events including WMD incidents. We have several expert capabilities which have been well developed over a number of years, intensely exercised with our interagency partners, and used on several occasions to assist

our FBI counterparts - primarily in a technical role to date. These capabilities include a 24-hour command center watch every day of the year to respond to any terrorist incident; a number of specialized military units on alert ready to respond within a few hours; and a command and control element well versed in all terrorist scenarios. To address WMD, these forces have been augmented with integral technical expertise, and can rapidly access our national laboratory expertise to assist them in rendering safe a WMD.

For terrorism consequence management, DoD possesses a broad array of response assets in both the Active and Reserve components which can also be functionally task organized to provide support that is suitable to consequence management - for example, decontamination, medical support, mortuary affairs and transportation. DoD teams also support FEMA in consequence management through technical chemical-biological reconnaissance and assessments, and providing equipment, technical expertise, and links to other interagency organizations with identified capabilities. DoD assets can also provide depth to first responder efforts both by making additional assets available as local capabilities are exhausted and by providing other assets to secure the area, evacuate areas at risk of becoming contaminated, provide extended decontamination, medical evaluation, and address other related requirements.

National Guard and other Reserve component personnel will play a prominent role in supporting local and state governments in terrorism consequence management. At its core is the establishment of 10 Rapid Assessment and Initial Detection (RAID) teams, comprised of 22 highly skilled, full-time, and well-trained and equipped National Guard personnel. One RAID team will be stationed within each of 10 federal regions. Their purpose will be to deploy rapidly, assist local first responders in determining the precise nature of an attack, provide expert medical and technical advice, and help pave the way for the identification and arrival of follow-on state and federal military response assets.

The 10 states selected to host a RAID element are California, Colorado, Texas, Missouri, Illinois, Georgia, Pennsylvania, New York, and Massachusetts and Washington. The locations were selected based on:

⚫ demographics of the response area (cities, counties, and states);

⚫ availability of National Guard airlift for the team;

• location of other military centers of excellence;

• location of other supported federal response assets and teams;

• state support for fielding the team;

⚫ availability of interstate compacts to allow the team's use across state lines.

Beginning next month, and subject to Congressional approval and funding, each team member will undergo more than 600 hours of extensive technical training. The teams will also be equipped with state of the art detection and analysis equipment, as well

as computer models to help assess and project the affected areas for various types of attacks. When needed, these teams will be called to action by the state governor, who can deploy them to assist local agencies quickly, before a National Disaster Declaration by the President. The existence of interstate compacts allows governors in adjoining states to deploy their National Guard members to surrounding states, as needed, before a Presidential Declaration occurs. The teams are also available for use as a federal asset to respond as needed via the Federal Response Plan.

Complementing and supporting the RAID teams are 54 reconnaissance and 127 decontamination teams located within existing Reserve component force structure. They will receive additional training and equipment in FY99 and FY00 to perform these missions.

To ensure the continued integration of the Guard and Reserve into our national WMD preparedness strategy, the Reserve Component Consequence Management Program Integration Office (CoMPIO) has been established within DoD. It reports directly to the Director of Military Support and, through that general officer, to the Secretary of the Army, the DoD Executive Agent for WMD Preparedness. This office coordinates the identification, training, equipping and exercising of Reserve component WMD assets and manages their integration into national WMD response plans. In addition to structuring the training and equipping of the new Reserve component response elements, CoMPIO will:

• improve the information flow between military response elements;

· document the specific functions, positions, and procedures for each element;

· develop distance learning capabilities that will allow us to train and sustain these elements;

• refine the planning and training for subsequent elements;

· integrate these elements into exercises with defense coordinating officers, response task force commanders and their staffs, and emergency preparedness liaison officers;

• document the location and capabilities of the elements in the DoD resources database.

This plan to integrate the Reserve components into our national WMD strategy is a prudent one. By incorporating and leveraging existing forces into current WMD response planning, while creating only one new type of unit (the RAID team), this plan is highly cost effective. It will help fill the existing gaps in civilian response capabilities, especially those of local responders who need to rapidly determine the precise nature of