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their own behalf. The work has been expensive, and has brought down upon the brewers a great deal of political opposition and misrepresentation, but on the whole the response to the movement has been most encouraging.
Perhaps nothing could illustrate the difficulty of the problem from the brewers' standpoint more than a recent controversy with the chief of police of Cincinnati. The chief stated that he did not propose to act as the brewers' agent in assisting to convict lawbreaking dive-keepers."
RETORT OF THE BREWERS' BOARD.
Percy Andreae, of the Brewers' Board of Trade, retorted as follows:
"We have succeeded in some instances, distributed over some fifty cities and villages in the State, in driving out notorious divekeepers. But in a far greater number of instances we have failed and in every one of these latter instances the cause of our failure proved to be the same cause of which our esteemed chief of police makes so strange a boast. In other words, we succeeded wherever the police administration welcomed our efforts, and we failed wherever the police administration did not welcome our efforts, or, as Chief Millikin emphatically describes it, 'where the police proudly refused to act as the brewers' agent.'
The Texas Brewers' Association was perhaps the pioneer in the clean-up movement. An enormous amount of money was spent in securing evidence as to disorderly practices, particularly in connection with the gambling evil as associated with the saloon. The association has succeeded in breaking up gambling in the saloons and suppressing other disorderly practices.
GREATEST SUCCESS IN MILWAUKEE.
Perhaps Milwaukee represents the most successful undertaking for which the brewers are responsible in the clean-up movement. At the instance of the Milwaukee Brewers' Association the chief of police recommended to the new council license committee last May that a number of licenses be revoked. After considerable negotiations between the authorities and the brewers, in the course of which the Mayor stated that "It would be easier to refuse licenses for cause than to revoke them for cause," action was postponed until the beginning of July, when every license expired.
In the meantime a white list was prepared of the saloons that were being properly conducted, for which license renewals were recommended by the license committee and the chief of police. As a result of this action, seventy-nine saloons were closed on July 6. These places included three dozen dance halls, connected with saloons, in outlying parts of the city, and a number of so-called hotels and joints where women of questionable character resorted. About fifty saloons were also closed in the County of Milwaukee, outside of the city.
The Milwaukee incident is particularly significant because it shows what can be done by the earnest coöperation of the manufacturers, the reputable dealers and the civic authorities. In this case the mayor, the chief of police and the common council worked in complete harmony with the brewers and the Milwaukee Liquor Dealers' Protective Association. The brewers, however, are entitled to the credit for initiating the movement.
Space forbids a further recital of testimony. It has, however, been demonstrated that the brewers can accomplish a great deal where the laws are reasonably good and the authorities honestly willing to do their part. Much might be said from the standpoint of legislation, which is often very loose or thoroughly unfair; in many States both the retail and wholesale branches of the business have little or no protection under the law, as compared with other lines of trade.
DEFENSE OF LIQUOR SELLERS.
The tendency to treat the liquor business as an outlaw business which exists by sufferance only, brings about a condition of instability and uncertainty which is most demoralizing. As a class, I believe the majority of the men engaged in the traffic have the same respect for law and order as men in any other business, but they are the victims of too much legislative bungling and quackery.
The license to sell liquors is really a limited franchise and implies a contract between the city and the licensee. The city is not giving the saloon keeper a square deal if it grants a similar franchise to another man to start business next door in opposition to him. On the other hand, it is a cruel act of injustice to ruin a man who has obeyed the law, by canceling his license, without giving him any compensation.
The evidence in my possession leads me to believe that the abolition of the license system has resulted disastrously in practically every important city where it has been tried. It is equally true that the license system has been attended by grave evils in many places.
GOVERNMENT SHARES IN BLAME.
Sometimes the law or the system is at fault, but quite as often the condition simply reflects the carelessness or corruption of the local government. The recent action of the National Municipal League in considering saloon regulation as an important municipal problem is a hopeful sign of the times.
With the natural reaction from the destructive radicalism of the abolitionists, a spirit of honest inquiry has come. Public sentiment has been aroused; it is waiting now for competent direction. Trained students of social legislation and men in the front rank of civic administration should take advantage of this situation, with a view to the permanent betterment of conditions. It is time for intelligent laymen to take the lead.
THE QUESTION OF COMPENSATION.
HE Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United
liberty or property without due process of law.
This is the saving guarantee of our civilization, the corner stone of social order. To maintain this principle inviolate is the highest function of our Government, the most exalted care and responsibility of our Judiciary.
Yet, by a memorable decision rendered in the year 1887, the Supreme Court of the United States held that the brewing and distilling properties of the country, being subject to the police powers of the State, were not entitled to the guarantee afforded and covenanted in the Fourteenth Amendment. Passing upon a claim for compensation on behalf of certain brewers in Kansas, whose business had been destroyed and whose property had been rendered valueless by the Prohibition law, the Court, after postulating that "the public health, the public morals and the public safety may be endangered by the general use of intoxicating drinks,' pronounced judgment in these terms:
"A prohibition simply upon the use of property for purposes that are declared by valid legislation to be injurious to the health, morals or safety of the community cannot, in any just sense, be deemed a taking or an appropriation of property for the public benefit. The power which the States have of prohibiting such use by individuals of their property as will be prejudicial to the health, the morals or the safety of the public, is not—and, consistently with the safety and existence of organized society, cannot be-burdened with the condition that the State must compensate such individual owners for pecuniary losses they may sustain by reason of their not being permitted, by a noxious use of their property, to inflict injury upon the community."
Twenty years have passed since this celebrated decision was uttered, and it is still generally regarded as having finally settled the question of compensation for the liquor interests. Meantime the march of prohibition, with its attendant spoliation and confiscation, has continued and is now far more menacing, with greater possibilities of ruin, than when the United States Supreme Court passed upon the Kansas cases. Therefore, it may be permitted to us to take some small comfort in the reflection that even the United States Supreme Court has been known to "reverse itself," and we are further assured that before a still higher tribunal—the Court of Conscience-nothing is settled until it is settled right.
JUDGE BREWER'S STRONG DISSENT.
The decision referred to reversed a decree of Judge Brewer, then of the United States Circuit Court of Kansas, now himself a member of the United States Supreme Court. Judge Brewer had held that "the State can prohibit the defendant from brewing, but before it can do so it must pay the value of the property destroyed."
Evidently Judge Brewer, although reversed, was not convinced, for speaking before the Yale Law School a few years later (in 1891) he said: "I am here to say to you in no spirit of obnoxious or unpleasant criticism upon the decision of any tribunal or judge, that the demands of absolute and eternal justice forbid that any private property, legally acquired and legally held, should be spoliated or destroyed in the interests of public health, morals or welfare, without compensation."
Referring to the action in which he had been reversed, he made this statement, at once a plea and a justification:
"There were four or five breweries, with machinery and appliances, valuable only for use, worth a few thousand dollars, a mere bagatelle in comparison with the wealth of the State, built up under the sanction of the law, owned by citizens whose convictions were different from those of the majority, and who believed the manufacture and sale of beer to be right and wise. As good citizens, it was fitting that they should yield to the judgment of the majority. As honest men it was fitting for the majority not to destroy without compensation."
Still unpersuaded by the voice of the highest tribunal in the