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Printed for the use of the Committee on Government Reform

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpo.gov/congress/house
http://www.house.gov/reform

89-545 PDF

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

WASHINGTON: 2003

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office
Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512-1800; DC area (202) 512-1800

COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM

DAN BURTON, Indiana

TOM DAVIS, Virginia, Chairman

CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida
JOHN M. MCHUGH, New York
JOHN L. MICA, Florida
MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana
STEVEN C. LATOURETTE, Ohio
DOUG OSE, California

RON LEWIS, Kentucky

JO ANN DAVIS, Virginia

TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania
CHRIS CANNON, Utah

ADAM H. PUTNAM, Florida
EDWARD L. SCHROCK, Virginia

JOHN J. DUNCAN, JR., Tennessee
JOHN SULLIVAN, Oklahoma
NATHAN DEAL, Georgia

CANDICE S. MILLER, Michigan
TIM MURPHY, Pennsylvania
MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio
JOHN R. CARTER, Texas

WILLIAM J. JANKLOW, South Dakota
MARSHA BLACKBURN, Tennessee

HENRY A. WAXMAN, California
TOM LANTOS, California
MAJOR R. OWENS, New York
EDOLPHUS TOWNS, New York
PAUL E. KANJORSKI, Pennsylvania
CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York
ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland
DENNIS J. KUCINICH, Ohio
DANNY K. DAVIS, Illinois

JOHN F. TIERNEY, Massachusetts
WM. LACY CLAY, Missouri

DIANE E. WATSON, California

STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts

CHRIS VAN HOLLEN, Maryland

LINDA T. SANCHEZ, California

C.A. "DUTCH" RUPPERSBERGER, Maryland ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of Columbia

JIM COOPER, Tennessee

CHRIS BELL, Texas

BERNARD SANDERS, Vermont (Independent)

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KF27
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2003

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CONTENTS

Page

Hadler, James L., State epidemiologist, State of Connecticut Department
of Public Health, prepared statement of

138

Layne, R. Davis, Deputy Assistant Secretary, Occupational Safety and
Health Administration, prepared statement of

157

Rhodes, Dr. Keith, Chief Technologist, Center for Technology and Engi-
neering, Applied Research and Methods, prepared statement of
Shays, Hon. Christopher, a Representative in Congress from the State
of Connecticut, prepared statement of

16

3

STAMPING OUT ANTHRAX IN USPS FACILITIES: TECHNOLOGIES AND PROTOCOLS FOR BIOAGENT DETECTION

MONDAY, MAY 19, 2003

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY, EMERGING
THREATS AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS,

COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM,

Washington, DC. The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 1 p.m., in room 2247, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Christopher Shays (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Present: Representatives Janklow, Kucinich, Linda Sanchez of California, Ruppersberger, and DeLauro.

Staff present: Lawrence Halloran, staff director and counsel; R. Nicholas Palarino, PhD, senior policy advisor; Kristine McElroy, professional staff member; Robert A. Briggs, clerk; Joseph McGowen, detailee; David Rapallo, minority counsel; Denise Wilson, minority professional staff member; and Jean Gosa, minority assistant clerk.

Mr. SHAYS. Good afternoon. A quorum being present the Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats and International Relations hearing entitled, "Stamping Out Anthrax in Postal Facilities, the Technologies and Protocols for Bioagent Detection," is called to order.

Whether the mail-borne anthrax attacks of 2001 were of domestic or foreign origin remains a mystery. The investigation, to date, has not discovered who forever transformed once innocent letters and packages into ubiquitous vectors of disease. So the lessons learned from these tragic events remain our best defense against further attempts to contaminate the mail stream and other public spaces with deadly spores.

There was much to learn. Once it became clear the envelopes sent to Senators Leahy and Daschle had left a deadly trail of extraordinarily virulent statically volatile anthrax, established assumptions about the ancient pathogen had to be discarded. The accepted lethal dose of 8,000 to 10,000 air borne germs, derived mainly from animal data, had to be revised drastically downward. Perhaps to just a single spore. Sampling and testing protocols proved insensitive to finely engineered material easily reaerosolized.

It is those sampling and testing protocols we examine today. The search for anthrax at the Wallingford, CT, postal facility offers an instructive case study, a cautionary tale on the need to maintain

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