is therefore void. Upon this proposition there can be no two opinions. The one remaining question for consideration, and the only question upon which a difference of opinion may exist, is the question as to whether or not the said act of 1870, providing, as it does, for "working a forfeiture" of the salary of a district judge for one quarter of a year for "failure or neglect" to decide a question within a given time, has the effect of "diminishing" his salary within the meaning of the constitutional inhibition.

So far as I am at present advised, this particular question has never been determined by the courts of this state, and I believe that this is the first attempt that has ever been made, in this state, to enforce the provisions of said territorial act. We are, however, not without authority in the opinions of courts of final resort in other states.

A statute of Tennessee provided that, if for any cause a judge of any court of record failed to attend, the bar should elect one of its members as a special judge, who should preside in the place of the regular judge. The act further provided that the special judge should be paid at the same rate as the regular judge for the time he served, and that the amount thus paid should be deducted from the salary of the regular judge.

The Constitution of the state of Tennessee provides that the compensation of its judges "shall not be increased or diminished during the term for which they were elected."

The above statute was held invalid by the Supreme Court.

Burch vs. Baxter, 12 Heisk. (Tenn.), 601.

Twelve years later the Supreme Court of the same state was called upon to pass upon the validity of a later statute of that state, which provided that a special judge should receive no compensation from the state unless the regular judge should expressly

authorize the same to be paid out of his own salary. In upholding this later statute, the Supreme Court took occasion to quote with approval its former decision in Burch vs. Baxter, supra, and said:

"And this act was properly held to be unconstitutional because it diminished the salary of the regular judge during his continuance in office."

The Constitution of the state of Kentucky provides that the judges of the Circuit Court shall receive a compensation "which shall not be diminished during the time for which they were elected." The Constitution of that state further provides that

"It shall be the duty of the General Assembly to regulate by law in what cases, and what deductions from the salaries of public officers, shall be made for neglect of duty in their official capacity."

A statute of that state provided that if the circuit judge be absent, or if present and "he cannot properly hold court," a judge pro tem. shall be elected by the bar, and his salary shall be deducted from the salary of the circuit judge.

The Supreme Court, in construing the above statute, held that no deduction could rightfully be made from the salary of the circuit judge, except for neglect, and that a statute authorizing a deduction for any other reason than the one specified in the Constitution is unconstitutional and void.

Auditor vs. Adams, 13 B. Mon. (Ky.), 150.

The above decision has been twice since reaffirmed by the same court.

Garrard vs. Nuttall, 2 Met. (Ky.), 106.

Auditor vs. Cochran, 9 Bush (Ky.), 7.

The Constitution of the state of Arkansas provides that the judges of the Supreme and Circuit Courts shall receive a compensation "which shall not

be diminished during the time for which they were elected."

A statute of that state provided that if any judge of the Circuit Court

"Shall fail to hold his court in any of his counties, at such time as is required by law, such judge shall forfeit and pay to the State, the sum of one hundred and fifty dollars."

The Supreme Court of that state, in construing the above statute, made use of the following language:

"All experience proves, that power over a man's subsistence amounts but too frequently to a power over his will. If the judges fail to do their duty, they are liable to removal by address or impeachment. The constitution forbids their salary being taken from them, or reduced in its amount. The Legislature can not effect, indirectly, what it is forbid to do, directly. It is certainly a clear proposition, that the Legislature can not declare that the salary of the judges, upon a failure to discharge their duties, shall be forfeited to the State. To allow them to do that, necessarily makes them the judges of what should constitute a forfeiture; and that would indirectly place in their hands the power to lessen, or entirely take away, their salary, during the term for which they are elected, which is clearly and pointedly inhibited by the constitution. The salaries of the judges of the Supreme and Circuit Courts stand upon the same ground, and the Legislature can no more touch the salary of the one than of the other. They are both fixed, so far as their diminution is concerned, by the constitution, and are inviolate, and excepted out of the powers of the Legislature. * * * We can regard this law in no other light than as an act of forfeiture in favor of the State, for the non-performance of a judicial duty, and, for that failure, it decrees a certain amount of the judge's compensation forfeited to the State.

"If this does not expressly diminish the salary of the judge, during the time he is in office, by indirect, yet effectual means, then we are sure language can not give the power. To our minds, the act is a direct and dangerous attack upon the independence of the judiciary, and upon the freedom and happiness of the people, and in contravention of their supreme will, as expressed in the constitution."

Ex Parte Tully, 4 Ark., 220, 224-225.

In my opinion, our constitutional inhibition not only applies to direct legislation, the avowed purpose and object of which is to diminish the salaries of public officers after their election or appointment, but also to any indirect legislation which has the effect of diminishing their salaries after their election or appointment, and I am further of the opinion that the constitutional restriction applies not only to legislation enacted after their election or appointment, but to legislation enacted before their election or appointment, where, by the provisions of the statute itself, it does not become operative as to a particular officer until the happening of some event, after his election or appointment, and which may or may not happen.

The Constitution of this state, at the time of its adoption, created the office of district judge and fixed the tenure thereof, but left the compensation to be regulated by statute. By the above cited amendment to the Constitution of this state, adopted in 1882, the salaries of district judges are fixed at four thousand dollars per annum. I am of the opinion that, even in the absence of a constitutional provision forbidding the diminution of the salaries of district judges after their election or appointment, it would be beyond the legislative power to in any way reduce or diminish the salaries of district judges as fixed by the Constitution, unless there existed a constitutional provision expressly authorizing such diminution.

"The authorities all recognize and establish the doctrine, that a constitutional office is beyond the reach or control of legislative authority, except in the manner and to the extent expressed in the constitution; and that where a salary or compensation is provided by the constitution, it is an incident to the very office itself, and can not be detached from it. The right to the salary follows the office, as shadow follows the substance." Blair vs. Marye, 80 Va., 485, 492.

My conclusion, therefore, is that the said territorial act of 1870 is in conflict with the Constitution of the state of Colorado, and is inoperative and void. Respectfully submitted,

Amount of deposit required by statute to be made by Foreign Insurance Companies doing business in Colorado.

What constitutes an impairment of the capital of Foreign Insurance Companies.

State of Colorado,

Attorney General's Office.

Denver, Colorado, August 9, 1900.

Sir I have the honor to submit the following reply to your official request for advice to your de partment, upon three questions, which are as follows:

"1. Under our statutes, what is the amount of the deposit which must be made with the State Treasurer of this State, or with the duly authorized officer of some other State of the United States, by foreign insurance companies doing business in this State, in exclusive trust for the benefit and security of all of the Company's policy holders and creditors, and which our statutes