After a careful examination of this act, I am of the opinion that the action of the insurance department, under date of March 27, 1900, advising the company, through its secretary, "that the German Fire Insurance Company of Peoria, Illinois, is no longer authorized to transact the business of insurance in this state," and must "cease the procurement of new business from and after the receipt of this letter," was justified under the law, and that said company is not entitled, under the law, to a renewal of its license to do business for a period of one year thereafter.

In conclusion, I beg to say that an early response to your request for my official advice was deferred, in order that I might avail myself of the very able briefs of counsel which were submitted by C. W. Franklin, Esq., and Benedict & Phelps, on behalf of the protestants and the German Fire Insurance Company of Peoria, Illinois, respectively.

Very respectfully,

DAVID M. CAMPBELL,

Attorney General.

By CALVIN E. REED,

Assistant.

TO HON. H. H. EDDY,

Deputy Superintendent of Insurance,

Denver, Colorado.

IN RE

DISTRICT JUDGES.

The Territorial Act, (Laws of 1870, page 66; 1 Mills' Ann. Stats., Sections 1031-1033), providing for the forfeiture by a District Judge, of one quarter's salarý for his failure to decide all questions within ninety days after the adjournment of court, is unconstitutional and void.

State of Colorado,
Attorney General's Office.

Denver, Colorado, August 7, 1900.

Sir I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your official communication of the 3d instant, transmitting a written communication recently received by you from one of the Denver daily evening newspapers, the material portion of which communication is as follows:

"You are hereby notified that the Hon. Peter L. Palmer, one of the judges of the Second Judicial District, has failed to comply with the requirements of Section 1031 Mills Statutes, in that he has not determined all matters submitted to his court within ninety days after the adjournment thereof, and that by reason of such failure, is not entitled to receive any salary for the quarter in which said failure has occurred.

"You are therefore hereby warned not to audit or allow the account of said Peter L. Palmer for the quarter commencing July 1st 1900, and that should you audit or allow said account you and your official bondsmen will be held liable for the amount so audited or allowed.

1900."

"Dated at Denver, Colorado, this twenty-eighth day of July

I note your inquiry in the following language:

"Will you kindly advise me whether or not the section quoted in said protest, to-wit, 1031, Mills' Statutes, is good and

sufficient grounds for me to withhold the issuing of said warrant?"

The question of fact as to whether or not the honorable district judge "has failed to comply with the requirements of section 1031, Mills' Statutes, in that he has not determined all matters submitted to his court within ninety days after the adjournment thereof," and has thus brought himself within the terms of said statute, if such a question may lawfully be determined by an executive officer, a matter upon which I express no opinion, is a question to be determined by the Auditor of State and not by this office. In this opinion, therefore, I shall assume that you desire my official opinion as to your duty, in the event that you shall hereafter determine the said question of fact in accordance with the statement contained in the said protest.

In the view which I take of the question submitted, it is unnecessary for me to determine the exact period of time covered by the words: "for the quarter in which such failure shall occur." It is also unnecessary for me to determine the effect of the statute in a case where the commencement of a succeeding term of court, as fixed by law, is more than ninety days from and after the date of the adjournment of the court for the last preceding term.

The section of Mills' Annotated Statutes above referred to is section 1 of an act, containing three sections, which was passed by the territorial legislature in 1870. The said act is entitled "An act relating to the judges of the Supreme Court of Colorado territory," approved February 11, 1870, and is reprinted in chapter 35 (division II, entitled "District Courts") of Mills' Annotated Statutes, as sections numbered 1031, 1032 and 1033 thereof.

While the title of the act refers to the judges of the Supreme Court, the body of the act deals with District Courts. The first section of said act provides that:

"Every motion, demurrer, issue, or other matter, arising in any cause pending, or to be tried in any district court of this territory, and which shall be submitted to any such court for judgment or decision, shall be determined within ninety days after the adjournment of court;

This section contains a proviso to the effect that the section shall not be so construed as to prohibit a decision after the expiration of the time limited, "but only as working a forfeiture as hereinafter provided."

Section 2 of said act provides that if any judge of any District Court to whom any matters shall be submitted for judgment or decision shall fail or neglect to decide or give judgment upon the same within the time limited by section 1 of this act, "he shall not receive from the territorial treasury any salary for the quarter in which such failure shall occur."

Section 3 of said act provides that the auditor of the territory, before auditing the account of any judge for salary,

"Shall require such judge to certify that all motions, demurrers, issues, and other matters arising in any cause, which have been submitted to him for judgment or decision thereon, have been determined as required in the first section of this act."

Legislation of this character is a matter entirely within the province of a territorial legislature, or of a state legislature, where no constitutional restriction exists.

Carlile vs. Henderson, 17 Colo., 532, 534.

The Constitution of this state, adopted in the year 1876, contained the following among other provisions:

"Judges of the Supreme and District Courts shall each receive such salary as may be provided by law;

Section 18, Article VI, Constitution.

"Except as otherwise provided in this Constitution, no law shall extend the term or any public officer, or increase or diminish his salary, or emoluments after his election or appointment;

Section 30, Article V, Constitution.

was

The above section of the Constitution amended in 1882 by adding thereto the following, among other provisions:

"Judges of the district courts shall each receive an annual salary of four thousand dollars."

Another provision of the Constitution provides. that certain executive officers of the state, named in the Constitution,

"Shall receive for their services a salary to be established by law, which shall not be increased or diminished during their official terms."

Section 19, Article IV, Constitution.

The Supreme Court of this state, in construing the last two above cited constitutional provisions, made use of the following language:

"Section 30 of Article V is clear, explicit and decisive. *

"By section 19 executive officers can not have their salaries increased or diminished during their official terms. By section 30 no public officer can by law have his term extended or his salary or emoluments increased or diminished after his election or appointment."

Carlile vs. Henderson, 17 Colo., 532, 535536.

The conclusion, therefore, is irresistible, that any law which operates to diminish the salary or emoluments of any public officer of this state, after his election or appointment, is in conflict with the above cited provisions of the Constitution of this state, and